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AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF PRIVACY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS HISTORICAL
EVOLUTION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY IN OTHER MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO
THE MODE OF CLASSIFICATION FOR INVASIONS OF PRIVACY GENERALLY ACCEPT-
ED IN THE UNITED STATES.
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"I give the fight up; let there be an end,
A privacy, an obscure nook for me.
I want to be forgotten even by God."
(Robert Browning "Paracelsus" pt v)
"Some thirty inches from my nose,
The £rontier of my Person goes,
And all the untilled air between
Is private ~us or demesne.
Stranger, unless with bedroom eyes
I beckon you to fraternize,
Beware of rudely crossing it:
I have no gun, but I can spit."
(W.H. Auden "Prologue: The Birth of Architecture")
iv
PREFACE
This work does not pretend to be perfect. I have chosen
to examine the law of privacy in South Africa against the back-
ground of other legal systems but within the flexible princi,ples of
Roman-Dutch law in the hope that the study will be of some
practical benefit to students, scholars and practitioners. I am
well aware, however, that the methodology adopted may be regarded
in some quarters as too casuistic and insufficiently theoretical,
scientific or exhaustive.
The publication of Professor J Neethlingts excellent thesis
on Die Reg op Privaatheid at a time when this work~s almost
complete gave me some cause for concern but happily we have
adopted different approaches. Our works at times overlap - for
instance my coincidental choice of the United States, England,
the Federal Republic of Germany and France was in part influenced
by the availability of literature on the subject in those countries.
My treatment of the concept in these countries, however, is
necessarily more cursory than that of Professor Neethling because
while I have also touched on the position in other legal systems
my main concern has been the evolution and development of the law
of privacy in South Africa.
I wish to express my sincere thanks to my Superviser, James
Lund, for his helpful comments and suggestions particularly
concerning the controversial question of animus injuriandi; to
Ingrid Lister-James for the many hours spent typing from a manu-
script which was often indecipherable; and to Anne Aarsen who
willingly assisted Ingrid in moments of crisis.
Finally I would like to thank Norah for her patience and
understanding during the many evenings and weekends sacrificed
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right to privacy is recognized by social scientists as
essential for the preservation of an individual's human dignity in-
cluding his physical, psychological and spiritual well-being.
Privacy, however, has been increasingly threatened by developments in
technology and the mass media which are common features of modern
. --------..,
soclety. )
-----The legal protection of privacy can be traced back to Roman
and Roman-Dutch law where the texts reflect several injuriae which
today would be regarded as invasions of privacy. The modern
concept, however, was first clearly articulated in the United States
at the turn of the twentieth century, although its seminal threads
were also present in some Civil law jurisdictions. Certain
provisions of the Civil Codes of Germany, France and a number of
other European countries have been interpreted to include an action
for invasion of privacy and in some instances privacy is also protected
in several Penal Codes. The Common law countries on .the other
hand, have had to develop an entirely new tort. In the United States
after some initial resistance the tort of privacy is probably more
developed than in any other country, whereas in England the courts
have been reluctant to recognize the wrong.
The courts in South Africa have been able to draw on the
broad principles of the developed Roman law - the a~tio injuriarum or
~
the lex Aquilia. the privacy cases so far reported in South
Africa have been brought under the actio injuriarum in terms of which
the essential elements of intention, wrongfulness and impairment of
personality must be proved~' The South African courts have not
yet defined the concept but like the social scientists have
generally regarded privacy as an aspect of dignitas in cases where a
solatium is claimed. In determining the question of wrongfulness,
however, our judges have been influenced by developments elsewhere,
particularly in the United States. Consequently it has been
argued that invasion of privacy should be viewed as a separate
independent wrong. Nonetheless the essential elements of the
proposed new wrong have not been clearly defined nor the question of
fault and its impact on freedom of speech fully considered. It
seems that in South Africa in an action for invasion of privacy
resulting in sentimental loss the plaintiff must prove animus
injuriandi, except perhaps where it is perpetrated by the press.
xxxiv
In most cases invasions of privacy take the form of intrusions
or publicity, and in the United States where the law of privacy is
probably most fully developed it is generally accepted that
invasions of privacy may be categorized into intrusions, publication
of private facts, false light cases and appropriation. These
categories provide a useful frame of reference for an analysis of
the wrong in South African law, particularly its accommodation under
~
the common law. The broad principles of the South African law of
~
delict are generally sufficiently flexible to accommodate the
American categories but as in the United States and elsewhere special
measures are necessary to protect the individual against threats to
his privacy by public and private data bank storage systems.
Furthermore South African statute law has considerably weakened
the efficacy of the common law protection of privacy by interfering
in individual private life for ideological reasons to a degree which
would not be tolerated in most Western European or North American
countries.
------Defences to an action for invasion of privacy can be divided
~
into those which negative the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct
and those which rebut fault~ Where, however, the invasion is by the
press the defences are limited to the forme!;;
The utility of the action for invasion of privacy in South
Africa has not yet been fully realized, particularly its us~fulness
as an alternative to defamation and injurious falsehood as well as
the doubtful wrong of injuria per censequentias. There is no reason
in principle why in future where an invasion of privacy arises from
negligence the plaintiff may not bring an action provided he can
prove patrimonial loss. Proof of the latter has been made easier
by the fact that patrimonial loss has been interpreted by the courts
to include damages arising from emotional shock. Legislation is
needed, however, to control the collection and dissemination of
data bank information by public and private agencies· the activities7 .
of private investigators and security guards; and the importation,
manufacture, sale or delivery of monitoring equipment.
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A. The Desire for Privacy
The desire for privacy is common to both animals and man-
kind. It has been suggested that in the animal world there
exists a "biological right of privacy,,1) which expresses itself
in a desire for "territoriality".2) Important aspects of this
"animal privacy,,3) are "personal distance", which occurs between
individual 'members of a group,4) and "social distance" which is
observed between the different groups themselves. 5) Similar
"distances" are found in human relationships,6) although they may
vary with different cultures. For instance, the recognition of
a right to privacy by individual members of a family towards each
other can be equated to "personal distance",7) while the relation-
ship of the family itself to other families in the community can
be regarded as "social distance". In some primitive societies
where there are small communities, closely-knit families, and
strict religious controls there may be little scope for privacy
as we know it. 8)
Anthropologists have shown that with the movement from
primitive to modern societies there has been an increase in the






Ardrey op cit 177.
ET Hall The Hidden Dimension (1969) l3f; cf Westin op cit 9.
Hall op cit 14; Westin op cit 9.
E Goffman Relations in Public (1972) 5lf.
"One aspect of family life that cannot be overlooked is the
need for privacy. It is necessary to have private space in
order to enjoy intimate contacts to the full. Severe over-
crowding in the home makes it difficult to develop any kind of
normal relationship except a violent one". D Morris Intimate
Behaviour (1972) 205.
8) For instance it has been said that in Samoa "there is no privacy
and no sense of shame" M Mead Coming of Age in Samoa (1965) 113;
Westin op cit 12f. Nonetheless most societies recognize some
form of "privacy" - even if not in the "Western" sense. Cf
Westin op cit l4ff. Cf P Burns "The Law and Privacy: The Canadian
Experience" (1976) 54 Canadian Bar R 1, 3. .
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opportunities for privacy, largely due to the anonymity of city
life, the development of the small nuclear family and individual
dwellings, mobility in work and residence, and the weakening of
religious authority. 1) But even modern societies have differing
concepts of privacy.2) For instance, while the Germans demand
closed office doors, fenced yards, separate rooms and strict per-
son to person distancing,3) the Americans are content with open
office doors, unfenced properties and informal rules of personal
and social distance. 4) The English on the other hand are accus-
tomed to shared offices and bedrooms, and use "reserve" rather
than doors and walls to preserve their privacy.5) The French
and the Arabs have been described as "sensually involved,,6) with
individual members of their society in a manner which would be
offensive to Germans, Englishmen and Americans. 7) It has been
suggested that because the Japanese and the Arabs enjoy crowding
together they have no word for "privacY",8) but as Hall points
out "one cannot say that the concept of privacy does not exist
only that it is very different from the Western conception".9)
Hall goes further in his theory of "proxemics,,10) to show that
Americans surround themselves with concentric "zones" of distance
HallAs do the Arabs.
"Proxemics is the term ... for the interrelated observations
and theories of man's use of space as a specialized elaboration
of culture" Hall op cit 1.
1) Westin op cit 21; E Shils "Privacy: Its Constitution and
Vicissitudes" (1966) 31 Law and Contemp Problems 289; cf H
Storey "Infringements of Privacy and its Remedies" (1977) 47
Australian LJ 498; "In a large city many people do not.even
know the names of their neighbours - the paradox of social iso-
lation of the teeming city can cause a great deal of stress and
misery for many of the human zoo inmates" D Morris The Human
Zoo (1969) 38.
2) C Fried "Privacy" (1968) 77 Yale LJ 475, 486£. Burns op cit 4.
3) Hall op cit l34ff; Westin op cit 29.
4) Hall op cit l38ff; Westin op cit 29.
5) Hall op cit l39f; Westin op cit 29.
op cit 159.
6) Hall op cit 145, 151. For instance, the intimate eye contact
used by both in conversation (Hall op cit 145, l6l) and the
Arab's delight in "breath to breath" olfactory stimulation
(Hall op cit l59f).
Hall op cit 134, 161.







in their relationship with others. 1) Intimate distance which
extends to 18 inches and embraces very close friends and re-
lations; personal distance, extending to four feet and used in
ordinary conversation; social distance, from four to 12 feet,
relating to business and social gatherings; and public distance
which extends beyond 12 feet and occurs, for instance, where a
speaker addresses a public meeting or delivers a lecture.
2
)
Goffman, on the other hand, refers to a different aspect of pri-
vacy during his discussion of the "territories of self", in which
he emphasizes the "information preserve,,:3)
"There is the content of the claimant's mind, control over
which is threatened when queries are made that he sees as
intrusive, noisy, untactful. 4) There are the contents of
pockets, purses, containers, letters and the like, which the
claimant can feel others have no right to ascertain. 5)
There are biographical facts about the individual over the
divulgence of which he expects of maintain control. 6) And,
most important ... there is what can be directly perceived
about an individual, his body's sheath7) and his current be-
haviour, the issue here being his right not to be stared at
or examined".8)
Psychologists have recognized that where an individual's "core
self" is exposed against his will, he is likely to suffer ill-
health, which may even result in suicide or a nervous breakdown. 9)
1) It could be argued that this was what the United States Supreme
Court had in mind when it referred to "zones of privacy" in
Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479, 484. Cf GL Bostwick
"A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision"
(1976) 64 Ca). LR 1447.
2) Hall op cit l16ff; cf DJ Schneider Social Psychology (1976)
105; Fast op cit 31£.
3) Goffman op cit 63. "The set of facts about himself to which
an individual expects to control access while in the presence
of others" Ibid. Cf Westin op cit 33.
4) See below 223, 228.
5) See below 200, 206.
6) See below 256.
7) That is "the skin that covers the body, and at a little remove,
the clothes that cover the skin". Goffman op cit 62.
8) See below.
9) Westin op cit 33f. Cf D Madgwick ?riv~cy under Att~ck (1968) 2.
--
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"People maintain themselves in physical health and in psy-
chological and spiritual well-being when they have a 'private
place' some locus that is inviolable by others except at the
.. t. ,,1)person's express lnvlta lon ·
Shils a sociologist, has defined privacy as a "zero-relationship"
, 2)
between two persons or two groups, or between a group and a person,
but recognizes that the mere existence of a person as a human being
necessitates being placed under scrutiny.3) In the words of
Fleming:
"The mere fact of living in the complex society of today ex-
poses everyone to annoying contacts with others, most of which
he must bear as the price of social intercourse".4)
Chambliss and Seidman have suggested that the degree of this scru-
tiny or exposure will depend upon the social status of the indivi-
dual and may have a significant effect on crime statistics. 5) The
privacy of the poorer classes is usually ignored by law enforcement
authorities,6) and in any event their lack of privacy at home may
cause them to commit offences in public. 7) Conversely the middle-
classes can commit similar crimes in the privacy of their homes,
secure in the knowledge that such privacy is generally respected
by the authorities. 8)
Philosophers make little mention of privacy but it has been
suggested that it is inherent in Locke's transcendental idea that
all man makes and becomes are part of "his own person".9)
1) SM Jourard "Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy" (1966) 31
Law and Contemp Problems 307, 310. "Psychologically then
prlvacy is a two-way street consisting not only of what we need
to exclude from or admit into our own thoughts or behaviour,
but also of what we need to communicate to, or keep from,
others". OM Ruebhausen & OG Brim "Privacy and Behavioural Re-
search" (1965) 65 Columbia LR 1184, 1189.
2) Shils op cit 281.
3) Shils op cit 286.
4) JG Fleming The Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 527; cf J Stone Social
Dimensions of Law and Justice (1966) 214; Fried op cit 486.
5) WJ Chambliss & RB Seidman Law, Order and Power (1971) 332f.
6) "LIlt is perfectly clear that police practices in the slums and
ghettos systematically ignore the right to privacy of these
people" Chambliss & Seidman op cit 334.
7) "Thus middle-class gambling is protected from police scrutiny by
the privacy of a home, whereas a lower-class gambler must expose
himself to the sanctions of the legal system by gambling in pub-
lic" Chambliss & Seidman op cit 333.
8) Chambliss & Seidman op cit 334f.
9) MR Konvitz "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude"
(19~6) 31 Law &Contemp Problems 272, 275.
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"L~7veryman has a 'property' in his own 'person'. This nobody
has any right to but himself".1) Similarly, Marcuse's conten-
tion that man "seeks a private space in which man may become and
remain 'himself''',2) has been well expressed as follows:
"A person may claim the right to be let alone when he acts
publicly as when he acts privately. Its essence is the
claim that there is a sphere of space that has not been ded-
icated to the public use or control. It is a kind of space
that a man may carry with him into his bedroom or into the
street".3)
Konvitz claims that the transcendental concept of an "inner" and
"outer" man is closer to Cooley's definition of "the right to be
let alone,,4) than Warren and Brandeis' phrase "the right to pri-
vacY",5) because the latter seems to be restricted to "what has
been withdrawn from public view".6) This may explain why the
American courts have sometimes experienced difficulty in allowing
an action for invasion of privacy where the act takes place in pub-
lic. 7) Negley has remarked that Bentham's concern about the in-
terference of the "legislator" in the realm of "private ethics,,8)
caused him to regard "the law as ail invasion of privacy which must
be justified on the ground of necessary utility".9)
1) John Locke The Second Treatise of Civil Government (Everyman ed
1924) 129; cf Konvitz op cit 275.
2) H Marcuse One Dimensional Man (1970) 20, where he refers to
"introjection" which implIes the existence of an inner dimen-
sion distinguished from, and even antogonistic to the external
exigencies - an individual consciousness and an individual un-
conscious apart from public opinion and behaviour" Ibid. Cf
Shils op cit 306, who maintains that individuality consists of
"the 'social space' around an individual, the recollection of
his past, his conversation, his body and its image Lwhich7 all
belong to him".
3) Konvitz op cit 279f. Cf Hall op cit 157: "the Arabs ...
apparently takes on rights to space as they move".
4) 51 .
TN Cooley A Treatise on the Law of Torts 2 ed (1888) 29. See below
5) SD Warren & L[I Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (lH9U) 4 Harvard LR
193. See below.
6) Konvitz op cit 279.
7) See below 55.
8) Ed JH Burns & HLA Hart, Jeremy Bentham An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1970) 290f.
9) G Negley "Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy" (1966)
31 Law & Contemp Problems 319. Cf R Pound "Interests in Person-
ality" (1915) 28 Harv LR 345: "Unhappily, in the nineteenth cen-
tury legal history was written from an individualistic stand-
P?i~t and was in~erp~eted as a development of restrictions on in-
aIv~dual aggressIon In the interests of individual freedom of
actIon". . .
6 .
Although it may be true to say that the attempts to set up
Utopian societies in the 18th and 19th centuries led to "the
elimination of privacy as a source of social conflict",1) Bent-
ham's traditional emphasis on individual liberty was continued
by John Stuart Mill who states: "Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign".2) Fried sees as the
essence of inter-personal relationships and worthwhile human exis-
tence the qualities of "respect, love, friendship and trust",
which cannot exist without privacy.3) "To make clear the nece-
ssity of privacy as a context fOT respect, love, friendship and
trust is to bring out also why a threat to privacy seems to threaten
our very integrity as a person".4) Privacy is not merely an ab-
sence of information about an individual in the minds of others,
but rather the individual's control over the information he has
about himself '. S)
During the movement towards an urban technological society the
desire for privacy was stimulated by developments in science, the
separation of the church from the state and the growth of political
democracy.6) Science has allowed dwellings and places of work to
become self-contained, while freedom of religious belief and poli-
tical expression has led to increased recognition of the worth and
dignity of the individual. 7)
1) Ne~leI of cit 323. Cf E Ryan "Privacy, Orthodoxy and Democracy"
2) 5~ ~i lSUtr!¥~~~l~n¥~fu,~L~terty, Representative Governm~nt
(everyman ed 1962) 73. Cf Mill's letter opposing the Contagious
Diseases Acts which subjected prostitutes to compulsory medical
inspections. L Blom-Cooper and G Drewry Law and Morality (1976)
l19f.
3) Fried op cit 477£. Cf P Stein & J Shand Legal Values in Western
Society (1974) 192.
4) Fried op cit 477. For "love's right to privacy" see E Cahn
The Moral Decision (1966) 88.
S) Fried op cit 483.
6) Ruebhausen & Brim op cit l18S.
7) Ibid; cf Westin op cit 33.
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"The essence of privacy is no more, and certainly no less,
than the freedom of the individual, to pick and choose for
himself the time and circumstances under which, and most
importantly, the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs,
behaviour and opinions are to be shared with or withheld
from others. The right to privacy is, therefore, a posi-
tive claim to a status of personal dignity - a claim for
freedom, if you will, but freedom of a very special kind".')
It is this freedom which is being threatened.
B. The Threat to Privacy
Despite the increasing desire for, and availability of, privacy
after the shift from primitive communities to modern cities, the
new society brought with it new threats to privacy. Shils main-
tains that the trend began at the end of the 19th century with the
introduction of a number of novel concepts. Secret police were
recruited to avert threatened political anarchy, while private in-
vestigators were used in divorce actions and to safeguard industrial
property.2) Psychological testing of intelligence and aptitude
was extended from the military to ensure the ability, honesty and
loyalty of employees, while growing literacy and curiosity concern-
ing the lives of the ruling classes led to the rise of popular jour-
nalism. 3) Subsequently criminal investigation techniques improved
with the development of telephone tapping, bugging and long dis-
tance photographs, while state departments and credit bureaux began
amassing information profiles on private individuals. 4) World War
11 gave additional impetus to these threats with the technological
"spin-offs" of the "Cold War" (viz. espionage and counter-espionage
techniques), as did the post-War period of increasing empirical
8 •
research by social scientists. 1) The American working classes
apparently accept the need for electronic surveillance by govern-
ment and industry for security reasons; believe that only wrong-
doers are scrutinized by private detectives; and enjoy the dis-
closures in the popular press and television. 2) On the other hand
they generally recognize that the people next door should not know
what goes on in one's home, and that telephone tapping and gossip-
ing are abhorrent. 3) Further threats have arisen from "the rapid
development of techniques for the collection, storage and dissem-
ination of information about the individual".4)
According to Westin the technological revolution in surveil-
lance techniques poses a threefold threat to privacy through, inter
alia: physical surveillance; psychological surveillance and data
surveillance. s)
1. Physical surveillance: Spying, prying and eavesdropping, pas-
times which go back to the Middle Ages 6) and beyond,7) have become
so sophisticated that their detection is almost impossible. People
can be located by the use of fluorescent dyes, miniature radio
transmitters and radioactive materials. 8) A person who remains
on his own property may be subjected to scrutiny by a variety of
cameras: infra-red cameras, automatic miniature cameras, special
telephoto cameras (which can take photographs from up to a kilometre
away) and cameras which take pictures in the dark - not to mention
1) Ibid. See below 9.
2) Shils op cit 30lff. Thus it has been pointed out that "privacy
is in conflict with other valued social interests, such as in-
formed and effective Government, law enforcement and free dis-
semination of the news" Ruebhausen & Brim op cit 1186. Shils'
views were expressed prior to the "Watergate Scandal" in the
United States. Cf JF Decker & J Handler "Electronic Surveillance"
3) Shils op cit 303. (1975) 12 Cal West LR 60.
4) Stein & Shand op cit 185.
5) Westin op cit 68; cf V Packard The Naked Society (1970) l7f.
6) For instance, "peeping Toms" in England could be prosecuted
under the Justices of the Peace Act of 1361. See below
7) In Jewish law it was regarded as a wrong to peer and look into
another's house. Ed H Darby Baba Batra 11, 4, The Mishnah 2 ed
(1954) 367. Cf SH Hofstadter & G Horowitz The Right to Privacy
(1964) 9. Where a neighbour builds an adjoin1ng wall: "If
higher, it must be four cubits higher, for privacy's sake"
Darby The Mishnah op cit 367 nIl.
8) Westin op cit 69f.
9 .
two-way mirrors and concealed closed circuit television.
1
) In
addition conversations can be recorded by telephone tapping,
micro-miniature radio-transmitters and a number of miniature,
d d o ° l' h 2)parabolic an lrectlona mlcrop ones.
2. Psychological surveillance: The growth of social sciences
has led the development of such psychoanalytical techniques as the
use of polygraphs (lie detectors) and personality tests. Poly-
graphs are primarily used in crime detection and can even be con-
ducted without the knowledge of the subject. 3) Personality tests
are used extensively by schools 4) and employers in the United
States 5) and elsewhere. 6) According to Westin personality tests
"measure emotions, attitudes, propensities and levels of personal
adjustment ... Land generally requir~7 the subject to reveal his
attitude towards sexual, political, religious and family matters".7)
Westin suggests that polygraph examinations and personality tests
in the United States should be outlawed by statute except in cases
of national security and employment involving special stresses. 8)
Another threat which seems to have been averted in the United
States 9) and England 10 ) is that concerning subliminal suggestion ie
"the projection of messages by light or sound so quickly and faintly
that they are received below the levels of consciousness".11) As
cf D Madgwick Privacy under Attack (1968) 37ff.
1) Westin op cit 70ff; Packard Th~ Naked Society op cit 38, 40,
74f, l44f.
2) Westin op cit 73ff; Packard The Naked Society op cit 41ff.
3) Westin op cit 133ff, 211ff.
4) Cf MA Ziskind "Protecting the Privacy of School Children and
their Families through the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act of 1974" (1975) 14 Journal of Family Law 255.
5) Westin op cit 133ff, 242ff.
6) ef D Madgwick & T Smythe The Invasion of Privacy (1974) 166f;
M Jones Privacy (1974) 41ff; EPJ Myjer "Sollicitant, Privacy en
Psycho10gische Test" (1975) 26 Ars Aequi 222.
Westin op cit 134.
Westin op cit 385;
Westin op cit 292.
International Commission of Jurists "The Legal Protection of
Privacy: A Comparative Stu~y of Ten Countries" (1972) 24 Int





11) Westin op cit 279.
10.
was mentioned above if such rechniques have the effect of pene-
trating the individual's "core self" without his consent the con-
sequences can be disastrous. 1 ) Nonetheless individuals are still
subjected to a barrage of commercial and political advertising at
the instance of "the hidden persuaders".2)
3. Data surveillance: The invention of the computer has led to a
"cybermetic revolution" in the collection and processing of data
concerning private individua1s. 3) "A match-box can contain com-
puter-recorded information which, in print, could scarcely be con-
tained in a Cathedral".4) Computers can be used to store a wealth
of private and public information about persons - much of which is
"volunteered" for the benefit of the community.S) Public authori-
ties store information concerning records of births, marriages and
deaths, medical records, records of education, military service,
passport applications, employment records, social security records,
declarations for tax returns, applications for licenses of many
kinds, motor-vehicle registrations, post-office savings-books, and
telephone accounts, as well as covert police and intelligence re-
cords. 6) In South Africa much of this information is consolidated
by the requirement that members of the community (apart from Blacks)
must acquire a "book of 1ife".7) Private agencies, on the other
1) See above 3. Thus it has been pointed out that the odd, bizarre
and obscure behaviour of schizophrenics is often an attempt to
conceal the "real self" from the outside world: "If the self is
not known it is safe". RD Laing The Divided Self (1973) 163.
2) V Packard The Hidden Persuaders (1961) 216; "The most serious
offence many of the depth manIpulators commit, it seems to me,
is that they try-to in ade the privacy of our minds. It is this
right to privacy in our minds - privacy to be either rational or
irrational - we must strive to protect".
3) AR Miller "Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge
of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society" (1968-9)
67 Mich LR 1089, 1093f.
4) International Commission of Jurists "The Legal Protection of
Privacy: A Comparative Study of Ten Countries" (1972) 24 Int
Soc Sci J 418, 427.
5) In many cases, however, the information is not freely volunteered.
For instance, prospective employees submit to personality tests,
and borrowers answer financial questionnaires because of economic
pressures, while income tax returns and census forms must be com-
pleted by law. Stein & Shand op cit 190. Furthermore it has
been pointed out that "access to governmental largesse ... has
depended increasingly upon a willingness to divulge private in-
formation" Miller op cit 1103.
6) (1972) 24 . Int Soc Sci J 428; cf Westin op ci t lS9.
7) Section 7, Population Registration Act, 30 of 1950. See below
232.
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hand, compile records of bank accounts, demands for credit facili-
ties, credit card accounts, travel records (including ticket pur-
chases and hotel bookings) hotel registrations and the credit-
worthiness of the purchasing pUblic. 1 ) It was this threat to
privacy (which resulted in people not knowing if an "information
profile" existed on them, how it was being used and whether it was
accurate) which led to the introduction in the United States of
the Privacy Act of 1974,2) and suggestions for similar legislation
in other countries. 3) It has been said that in the United States
more than 100 million people appear on data dossiers,4) while in
the United Kingdom the largest credit protection agency has over
14 million people on its files. 5) In 1976 the leading credit
bureau in South Africa had over 6 million files. 6)
In many instances the results of such surveillance may be used
to invade privacy through publicity involving publication of pri-
vate facts,7) "false light" situations,8) and the so-called "appro-
priation" cases. 9)
It is probably true to say that in South Africa many of the
more technological invasions of privacy are still in their infancy.
For instance, "lie detectors" do not appear to have been used for
See below 68.
1) (1972) 24 IntSoc Sci J 428.
2) 5 United States Code §552(d).
3) For instance, in Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 431.
4) (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 428. cf Westin l59f.
5) Cf Jones op cit l5lf. It has been suggested that by 1976 credit
bureaux in the United Kingdom would have had "prepared data on
eighty per cent of the population" Stein & Shand op cit 197.
6) (1976) 11 The Credit Manager No 9, 10. See below 286.
7) See below 247.
8) See below 290.
9) See below 300.
, 2 •
law enforcement in this country,') and although computers are
widely employed by the state and in industry, apparently only one
credit bureau is computerized. 2) Nevertheless because of the
political ideology of separate development in South Africa the
state imposes numerous restrictions on the privacy of individuals
in respect of their relationships with members of other race
groups.3)
"A person's Lracia!7 classification will have far-reaching
effects on his life: it will determine where he may own
property, where he may live, and work, whether he may parti-
cipate in collective bargaining with his employers or go on
strike, whom he may marry, and what pension and compensation
benefits he will receive. Most important of all, a person's
racial group will decide his rights as a citizen of the
state". 4)
In short the subjects' common law right to privacy in South Africa
has been considerably reduced by legislative interference. Be
that as it may there are still numerous fields where the indivi-
dual's privacy is protected by the common law. The que~!ion is
whether the common law is adequate topreven! increasing' usions
into personal privacy by the government;]l~rnalists,employeLs,
ocial scientists and twentieth century technology.S)
1) The first sophisticated "lie detector" to be introduced into
South Africa was given wide-spread publicity on SABC TV on
7th June 1977!
2) Information supplied by Mr P. Bartos, Managing Director of Dun
& Bradstreet, during telephone interview on 17th March 1977.
3) Se e be low 241, 337.
4) HR Hahlo & E Kahn South Africa: The Development of its Laws·
and Constitution (1960) 797; cf JD van der Vyver Die Beskerming
van Menseregte in Suid Afrika (1975) 84ff.
5) cf Shi1s op cit 301.
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C. Privacy and the Law
The recognition of the need for privacy by anthropologists,
sociologists, psychologists and philosophers is a comparatively
recent phenomenon. By contrast the law has responded to this
need in one form or another since antiquity. Variations of an
action for invasion of privacy are to be found in Roman law,1)
Jewish law,2) Medieval English law,3) Roman-Dutch law,4) 19th cen-
tury French law,S) 20th century American6) and German law,7) and
in a number of other jurisdictions. 8) Conversely certain legal-
ized invasions of privacy have existed throughout history, parti-
cularly in respect of census gathering of public authorities.
Examples are to be found in the Roman census,9) the Anglo-Norman
Domesday Book,10) the Nuremburg and Swiss Cantonal censuses of the
15th century,11) and the mass of information stored by 20th century
. 12) I . h M· 13)government agenc1es. n some countr1es suc as eXlco,
V 1 14) d A . 15) th . h . . ..enezue a an rgent1na e r1g t to pr1vacy 1S const1tutlon-
ally protected. Moreover it has been suggested that a constitu-
tionally recognized right of privacy also exists in the United
1) See below 32.
2) cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 9.
3) cf Justice of the Peace Act of 1361, which punished "peeping

















See below 11 0, 11 9 .
See below 38.
cf Shils op cit 298 .
Ibid.
See above 10.
Articles 14, 16 of Constitution of United States of Mexico, 5th
February 1917. Cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 432. See also
Articles 7 and 25 of the Constitution; cf (1972) 24 lnt Soc Sci
J 434.
Article 59 of the Constitution. Cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 435.
See also Article 1196 of the Civil Code.
Article 19 of 1953 Constitution of the Republic of Argentina,
and Articles 1077, 1078 of the Civil Code. ef (1972) 24 lnt Soc
Sci J 437f.
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States. 1) In other countries like South Africa,2) Ceylon3) and
Scotland4) where the common law has been derived from the Civil
Law, the courts have been able to develop general principles of
personality rights.
Where the right to privacy is threatened by the authority of
the State it can be classified as a human right,S) and as such it
has been enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 6)
and the European Convention on Human Rights. 7) The degree of in-
terference by the state, however, varies from society to society.
"In Poland, for example, the law does not interfere in the
sphere of conjugal sexual life, however perverse it may be;
while the law in parts of the United States of America for-
bids so-called unnatural sexual behaviour between husband and
wife".8)
Legal philosophers have experienced difficulty in trying to deter-
mine how far the state may interfere. It has been suggested that
Hart's basic criterion for determining tte limits of the law, viz
whether the acts are done in public or private 9) must be qualified. 10)
See below 56, 61.
See below 125.
CF Amerasinghe Aspects of the Actio Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch
Law (1966) 174ff.
4) cf DM Walker The Law of Delict in Scotland (1966) 11 708ff.
5) Cf J Neethling Die Reg of Privaatheid (1976) 21: "Dit is slegs
waar die persoonlikheidsreg teen tota1itere staatsoorheersing
en arbitrere optredes van staatsorgane beskerm word, dat dit as
'n mensereg tipeer word". For whether it can be recognized as
a "right" in England see DN MacCormick "A Note upon Privacy"
(1973) 89 LQR 23ff.
Article 12. See below 142 n 1.
Article 8. See below 108.
A Podgorecki Law and Society (1974) 251f.
HLA Hart Law, Liberty and Morality (1963) 47.
MP Golding Philosophy of Law (1975) 6lf.









"Hart cannot possibly say that private sado-masochistic acts
o b d 1 1 hObo." 1) Cbetween consentlng adults are eyon ega pro 1 ltlon . on-
servative jurists like Stephen2) and Devlin3) also recognize that
privacy should be respected. The former however regards "public
indecency as an invasion of privacY",4) while the latter contends
that the claims of privacy have to be weighed against "the public
interest in the moral order".5) In the United States it has been
said that "as against the Government, the right to be let alone LI~7
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilised men".6)
This comprehensive right also extends to social relationships
between individual members of society, and has been seen as an in-
tegral part of the concept of "justice".
"Justice requires that in every social relation there should
be presupposed as ideal basis an original 'right to solitude',
inherent in everyone of the subjects who share in it, so that
in the actual concrete structure of social life there may be
reaffirmed and developed (it may be even through apparent
denials, as moments of dialectic process) that ideal element
of autonomy which constitutes the inviolable essence of the·
person".7)
1) Golaing op cit 62.
2) JF Stephen Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1882) 160; cf Golding
op cit 63 n 22.
3) PA Devlin The Enforcement of Morals (1965) 18.
4) Stephen op cit 162.
5) Devlin op cit 18. It is interesting to note that the European
Commission on Human Rights considered that laws prohibiting
homosexual behaviour were justified under Article 8(2) of the
European Convention on Human Rights as being "for the protection
of health and morals". FG Jacobs The Euro ean Convention on
Human Rights (1975) 127. Cf Doe v Comnionwealt 's Attorney 1976) 425
US 985, where the United States-Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutional~ty of a Virginian sodomy statute providing for the
prosecu~10n of homosexual relations carried on in private between
consentlng adul t males. See TO' Neill "Doe v Commonweal th' s
Attorney: A Setback for the Right 0"£ Privacy" (1977) 65
Kentucky LJ 748. .
6)
7) Per Brandeis J (dissenting) in Olmstead v US (1928) 277 US 438, 478.
G Del Vecchio Justice (1956) 116.
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The difficulties attendant upon defining the legal limits of .such
an "ideal element of autonomy" has led some writers to suggest
that a separate right to privacy is not warranted. Kalve n com-
plains that "the tort has no legal profile",1) while Stein and
Shand maintain that "if privacy cannot be defined with any preci-
sion then it is a right that cannot and should not be upheld by
the courts".2) Such criticisms may be true of an action based on
Anglo-American Common Law, but do not necessarily apply to actions
de-rived from the Civil law. 3) 6uth Africa has a Civil law system
and most delicts are actionable under the general principles of
either the actio injuriarum, for sentimental damages, or the lex
Aquilia, for patrimonial 10ss.4) In both cases the essential ele-
ments have been clearly defined by the courts. Consequently an
invasion of privacy which falls within one or other of these actions
will assume the profile of the appropriate principle action. There-
fore, unlike Anglo-American law, an action for invasion of privacy
in South Africa may well have an identifiable profile. The ques-
tion of wrongfulness (ie. whether the courts will recognize a par-
ticular interest as worthy of legal protection)~ however, is a
matter of policy, and here the courts sometimes find it useful to
consider recent developments in otherjurisdictions. 6)
This work is primarily concerned with the developments of the
common law action for invasion of privacy in South African law. It
1) H Kalven "Privacy and Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?"
(1966) 31 Law & Contemp Problems 326, 333: "We do not know on
what basis damages are to be measured, we do not know whether
the basis of liability is limited to intentional invasions or
includes also negligent invasions and even strict liability".
2) Stein & Shand op cit 187.
3) Cf Paragraph 35 HMSO Report of the Committee on
Privacy (1972 Cmnd 5012); cf MacC-o-r-m-:-i-cT"k-o-p-c-:-i~t---:::-2-:-4-.--':""_-:"-"--=-':':'
4) RG McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) 10; NJ van der Merwe
& PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse~
2 ed (1970) 16£.
5) Cf Foulds v Smith 1950 (1) SA 1 (AD) 10 (actio injuriarum);
Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (AD) 490 (lex Aquilia). See
below 170.
6) Cf O'Keeffe v Ar us Printin Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
(C) 248 ; Rh0 d~e"'":'s"¥l-:-a-:::-n--nP:-r-rl-n"7t-rl-n~g:-"--;:::;:--r...".-.---r~.2.......~----;:L:":t":;' v Duggan 1975
(1) SA 590 (RAD) 593£.
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is intended to trace the historical roots of the action in our law,
but as the action in its modern form is largely a twentieth century
development, it is necessary to examine its growth in other modern
legal systems. Some reference, therefore, will be made to the
position in the United States, England, West Germany and France,
and incidentally, to other European jurisdictions. The ensuing
analysis of contemporary law, however, does not pretend to be com-
prehensive,1) as the work is mainly concerned with South African
developments. Where the discussion focuses on the recognition of
the right to privacy in our law, a comparison will be drawn primari-
ly with American law as the courts have made frequent reference to
it on this question. 2) Before considering the modern law, however,
it is necessary to analyse the origins of the action in Roman and
Roman-Dutch law.
1) For a detailed analysis of the position in West Germany, France
the United States and England see Neethling Privaat-
heid op cit 22, 117, 152, 241.
2) Cf OtK~effe ~ A:gus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd supra 248;




HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT ROMAN AND ROMAN-DUTCH LAW
A. ROMAN LAW
Although a right to privacy is not specifically mentioned by
Roman (or Roman-Dutch) jurists, several injuriae or affronts to
personality which are very similar to the modern right were recog-
nized. The Roman Law actio injuriarum forms the basis for the
protection of personality rights in Scotland,1) Ceylon 2) and South
Africa. 3) In order to establish whether the Romans developed a
wrong analogous to the modern action for invasion of privacy it is
necessary to trace the history of the actio injuriarum from its
beginning. It is intended to consider the different stages in
the development of the actio injuriarum from the XII Tables to the
time of Justinian with a view to illustrating how there was a
gradual movement in Roman Law from specific wrongs towards a general
. 4)actl0n.
1. The XII Tables (c. 450 B.C.)
It is generally accepted that the XII Tables primarily protected
personality rights pertaining to bodily injury.5) It is true that
most of Table VIII (relating to injuria) specifies penalties for
bodily injury but Clause 1 provided penalties
"si quis occentavisset sive carmen condidisset quod infamiam
faceret flagitiumve alteri,,6)
1) DM Walker The Law of Delict in Scotland (1966) 11 708ff.
2) CF Amerasinghe Aspects of The Actio Injuriarum in-Roman~Dutch
Law (1966) l74ff.
3) RG McKerron Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) 9; NJ van der Merwe &
PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed
(1970) 336f.
4) M de Villiers The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries (1899)
2 n 15.
5) F Schultz Classical Roman Law (1951) 593f; WW Buckland Textbook
of Roman Law 3 ed (1966) 589; JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman Law
(1976) 369.
6) IT Pritchard & D Nasmith Orto1an's History of Roman Law (1871) 114.
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which Ortolan interprets as "decreed against libellers and public
defamers".1) Goodwin 2) attempts a more literal translation:
"If anyone shall publish a libel, that is, shall write verses
imputing crime or immorality to another".3)
De Villiers states that Table VIII.l relates to "public vitupera-
tion of another and to defamatory compositions tending to bring
another into disrepute and disgrace".4)
Other writers, however, have contended that the penalties were
introduced to eliminate "sorcery" and "evil incantations" by one
person against another,S) on the basis that the wording of Table
VIII.l was originally "qui malum carmen incantassit".6) The con-
flict is attributed to Pliny and Cicero giving "different versions
and different interpretations",7) with Pliny referring to sorcery8)
and Cicero mentioning defamation. 9) Jolowicz and Nicholas suggest
Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit l7lf n 9, refer to Pliny Historia
Naturalis 24.4.18, but see below 20 n 2.
9) Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit l7lf n 9, give as authority Cicero
De Re Publica 4.12. Ortolan op cit 114 n 4, cites Cicero De Re
Publica 4.10, while De Villiers op cit 1 n 3 uses Cicero Tusculan
4.2. See also P C Pauw Persoonlikheidskrenking en Skuld ln dle
Suid-Afrikaanse Privaatreg - in Regshlstorlese en Regsvergelyk-




F Goodwin The XII Tables (1886).
Goodwin op cit 13, who gives the Latin as "si quis Qccentaverit,
sive carmen condid erit quod infamiam faciat flagitiumve alteri".
4) De Villiers op cit 1, who offers: "si ui occentassit, carmenve
condisset uod infamiam faxit fla itiumve alterl". C DH van
Zyl Ges ie enis en Beginsels van ie Romeinse Prlvaatreg (1977)
344 n 377. SP Scott The Civil Law (1973) I 70, translates the
passage as "when anyone publicly abuses another in a loud voice,
or writes a poem for the purpose of insulting him, or rendering
him infamous", but ascribes it to Table VII, LAW XIII!
5) HF Jolowicz & B Nicholas Historical Introduction to the Study of
Roman Law 3 ed (1972) 171; HJ Roby Roman Private Law (1902) 220;
cf P van Warmelo t n Inleiding tot die Studie in die Romeinse Reg
(1965) 340; W Kunkel An Introduction to Roman Legal and Consti-
tutional History 2 ed (1973) 29; P van Warmelo An Introduction
to the Principles of Roman Civil Law (1976) 220.




that Pliny gave the primitive meaning and Cicero a rationalization
thereof,l) but it seems that the learned writers have confused
Table VIII.l with Table VIII.25. According to both Ortolan
2
) and
Goodwin3) the first part of Table VIII.25 read "qui malum carmen
incantasset", although Goodwin interprets the clause as a wrong
against reputation. 4) Ortolan gives as the authority for the frag-
ment of Table VIII.25, pliny,5) but the reference differs from that
referred to by Jolowicz and Nicholas. 6) In any event there is no
good reason for supposing that Cicero's rendition of Table VIII.l
was less accurate than that of Pliny - after all Cicero's De Re
Publica was published about SI BC,7) whereas Pliny's Historia
Naturalis appeared later probably some time after 77AD. 8)
Assuming therefore that the translatioffiof Table VIII.l by
Ortolan, Goodwin and De Villiers 9) are substantially accurate, it
can be argued that public utterances of defamatory compositions con-
stituted an affront to a person's reputation and dignity. It has
been said that such acts were regarded as crimes against the state
because they were "treated as a breach of public order",10) but
another possible explanation is that the provisions of Table VIII.l
were introduced to assuage wounded feelings in order to prevent vic-
tims taking the law into their own hands and thus destroying the
fabric of the state.
1) Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit l7lf n 9.
2) Ortolan op cit 119, who translates the words as referring to a
person "who practices enchantments". Scott op cit 71, is again
out of step when he attributes the clause to Table VII, Law XIV,
although he correctly interprets it as applying to "magic incan-
tations".
3) Goodwin op cit 66.
4) Ibid. Confusion may have arisen because the word "carmen" may
be interpreted as either "a song, verse or poem" or as a
"magical incantation". CT Lewis & C Short A Latin Dictionary
(1900) 293. Similarly the word "incanto" can mean "to sing" or
"to bewitch" Lewis & Short op cit 917.
5) Pliny Historia Naturalis 28.2; cf Ortolan op .cit 119 n 3.
6) See above 19 n 8.
7) P Harvey The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature (1951)
I 135. Cicero lived from 106 to 43 BC. Harvey op cit 100.
8) Harvey op cit 334, who gives Pliny's lifetime from AD 23 or 24
to 79. But contra Pauw op cit 2 who favours Pliny's interpretation.
9) See above l8f.
10) JC Ledlie Sohm's Institutes of Roman Law 3 ed (1907) 422 n 7, who
translates "carmen famosum" as "the public singing of ribald songs".
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Clauses 2 and 3 of Table VIII dealt with "membrum rupsit"l)
and "os fraxit,,2) respectively, both of which are clearly instances
of bodily injury. The former concerned broken limbs,3) while the
latter is generally translated as meaning "broken bones",4) although
"os" literally refers to the mouth,S) and has been interpreted as
"the bone (of the mouth)".6) Table VIII.4, on the other hand
merely stated:
"si injuriarum faxit alteri, XXV peonae sunto",7)
which Ortolan renders as
"for any injury whatsoever conunitted upon another the penalty
shall be 25 asses".8)
The word "injuriarum" in this context has never been satisfactorily
translated, but the popular view is that it only referred to trivial
assaults. 9) For instance, it has been said that:
"In all probability this refers merely to blows such as do not
result in serious injury Lbecaus~7 ... it is unlikely that
fifth century Romans were very susceptible to insult".10)
1) De Villiers op cit 1; cf Goodwin op cit 13.
uses "membrum rupit".
Ortolan op cit 114,
. 10)
2) De Villiers op cit 1. Goodwin op cit 13, refers to "os fractum"
and Ortolan op cit l14f n 6 does the same in his reconstruction of
the lost fragment.
3) De Villiers op cit 2; Ortolan op cit 114; Goodwin op cit 13.
See also Scott op cit 70, who assigns it to Table VII, Law IX
and substitutes "member" for "limb". Cf Pauw op cit 2, 5.
4) Cf De Villiers op cit 2; Goodwin op cit 13. Cf Pauw op cit 3,5+
5) Lewis & Short op cit 1281, ie "os fractum" means literally "a
mouth having been broken".
6) Ortolan op cit 114. ef Scott op cit 71, where Table VII, Law X
is translated as "when anyone knocks a tooth out of the gum of
a free man".
7) De Villiers op cit 1; cf Ortolan op cit 115; Goodwin op cit 13.
8) Ortolan op cit 115. Scott op cit 70, not only attributes the
clause to Table VII, Law VII, but also reduces the punishment to
"a fine of twenty asses"!
9) De Villiers op cit 2; Soh~ op cit 422; M Bliss Belediging in die
Suid-Afrikaanse (1933) 12; WA Joubert Grondslae van die Persoon-
likheidsreg (1953) 78; F Schultz Roman Legal Science (1953) 51;
van Warmelo Inleiding op cit 340; D Pugsley The Roman Law of
Property and Obligations (1972) 102; Thomas op cit 369; Van
Warmelo Introduction op cit 220 .
Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 171; cf Schultz Classical Roman Law
op cit 594; Buckland Textbook op cit 589. See also Ed E A
Whittuck E Poste Gaius Institutes of Roman Law 4 ed (1904) 429.
ef Pauw op cit 6.
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It is submitted, however, that in the light of the discussion con-
cerning Clause 1 above 1) it can be argued that the word did include
affronts to a person's honour,2) although it is conceded that the
following translation by Goodwin is unduly free:
"If anyone wilfully violates the personal freedom, safety
b 25 .. " 3)of reputation of another let the penalty e sestertll.
If Clause 1 of Table VIII dealt with aggressions on reputation and
dignitas,4) and Clauses 2 and 3 with bodily injury, there is no
reason in principle why Clause 4, which appears to be a general
clause, should not have included both affronts to personality and
minor assaults. The word "injuria" means "injustice, wrongdoing
injury, outrage, affront ... harm, injury of any kind" 5) not phy-
. 1.· 6)Slca InJury.
It has also been suggested th2t the sum of 25 asses was too
little to warrant blanket coverage for other injuriae,7) but it is
submitted that this can be explained in two ways:
(a) The early Romans recognized affronts to reputation and dignity
but apart from those mentioned in Clause 1 above,8) regarded such
affronts as being in the same class as trivial assaults. The ancient
1) See above l8ff.
2) ef Joubert persoonlikheidsre~ op cit 81 n 13. AM Pritchard Leages'
Roman Private Law 3 ed (1961 41, states: "It followed that the
grossest insult could be atoned for by a payment of 25 asses under
the Twelve Tables". Cf D Pugsley "Book Review" (1970) 86 LQR 425,
426. Furthermore JA Crook Law and Life of Rome (1970) 83 suggests
that: "The small aristocratic society of early Rome, valuing
above all overt esteem (existimatio, dignitas), dreaded its loss
exceedingly".
3) Goodwin op cit 13.
4) See above l8ff; Cf Scott op cit 13: "Well defined ideas of the
personal responsibility incurred by the publication of slanders
and libels were entertained at the epoch of the adoption of the
Twelve Tables, and he who defamed another by attacking his repu-
tation for probity, or publicly insulted him, as well as the author
of pasquinades was scourged until he died". (My italics)
5) Lewis & Short op cit 956.
6) Cf F De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius: Part 11 (1963): "How a word
which properly meant any unlawful act had come to have the special
meaning of physical assault is a mystery".
7) Jolowicz and Nicholas op cit 171: "LIlf we imagine that injuria
can here refer to the innumerable different kinds of attack on a
man's personality which it covered in the later law, it is diffi-
cult to explain how they could all be punished by the same fine".
8) See above l8f.
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Greeks had long recognized the wrong of hybris which dealt with
insults, initially those which "incurred the wrath of heaven",1)
but later probably included "actions which did not amount to
physical assault".2) Pound points out that in early law injury
to honour was more important than injury to the body3) and that
"L!7n Greek law every infringement of the personality of
another is ... (contumelia); the injury to honour, the
insult, being the essential point, not the injury to the
body".4)
It is generally accepted that although the XII Tables were essen-
tially derived from Latin custom "there was some innovation and
apparently some incorporation of the rules of Greek law".5) This
view holds good whether "the story of a special commission being
sent to Greece is literally acceptable or not",6) as it is fairly
certain that the Roman codifiers had access to the Greek legal
codes. 7) Therefore if the fifth century Greeks recognized an
action for infringement of personality rights,8) it seems to be an
oversimplification to say that the fifth century Romans were not
very susceptible to insults. It was an injuria to slap a man's
1) JW Jones: Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks (1956) 249; "It
was only overweenIng pride or boasting, arrogating to oneself
superhuman deference, abuse of power, resort to excessive and
unreasonable measures for redressing or punishing even genuine
wrongs which received the wrath of heaven; in short hybris".
2) ARW Harrison The Law of Athens: The Family and Property' (1968)
169. Cf Bliss op cit 15 n 4 who states that it has been demon-
strated "met sekerheid dat die Injuria en Hybris dieselfde ont-
wikkeling deurgemaak het".
3) R Pound "Interests of Personality" (1915) 28 Harvard LR 343, 357;
"the beginnings of law measure composition not by the extent of
the injury to the body, but by the extent of the injury to honour
and the extent of the desire for vengeance".
4) Pound op cit 357. Cf SH Hofstadter & G Horowitz The Right of
Privacy (1964) 9.
5) Buckland Textbook op cit If; F Schultz Principles of Roman Law
(1967) 7; HS Maine Ancient Law (1906) 19 n A; Poste op cit xxi.
6) Maine op cit 19 n A; Cf Goodwin op cit 6.
7) Jones op cit 312.
8)
Cf B Perrin Plutarch's Lives: Solon (1967) XXI.l, 461: "He also
forbade speaking ill of the living in temples courts-of-law
public offices and at festivals; the transgr~ssors must pay'
three dr~chmas to th~ person injured and two more into the public
treasury. Solon lIved from c640 - c558 BC, and introduced his
laws about 594 BC. Harvey op cit 400.
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face not only because it was an attack on his physical person but
d d·' 1)also because it affecte his 19n1ty.
(b) Originally the value of 25 asses was sufficiently high to act
as a deterrent to persons who contemplated committing an injuria,
although by the second century the as had been reduced to 1/12 of
its former weight. 2) Gaius mentions that "in those days of ex-
d b d
. ,,3)
cessive poverty such sums seeme to e ~n a equate reparatlon ,
and it has been pointed out that even during the second century the
value of 25 asses was "about 1/l60th of the annual cost of living
of a free labourer".4)
In the light of the above it is submitted that Clause 4 can
be interpreted to include both affronts to reputation and dignity
as well as to the person. 5)
Whatever the position under the XII Tables by the second cen-
tury with the decline in the value of money6) and the increasing
Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 273 n 9.
Cf Pound op cit 357.
Thomas op cit 369. The example is frequently given of L Veratius
who is supposed to have indulged in the practice of walking down
the street and wantonly slapping the faces of persons whom he met,
while a slave followed behind with a tray full of (devalued) asses
from which he paid out the legal penalty of 25 asses. De Villlers
op cit 4; EE Whitfield Salkowski's Roman Private Law (1886) 673
n 1; A Watson Law Making in the Later Roman Republic (1974) 46.
This story has, however, been doubted due to the value of 25 asses
even in the second century (Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 273 n 9;
A Watson Law of Obli~tions in the Later Roman Republic (1964)
248 n 3) - but see aoove 23. Watson Law Maklng op Clt 47, submits
that "so long as each as weighed approximately 10 ounces", one
slave would not have been able to carry sufficient to give Veratius
much pleasure, and that the story would be more plausible if the
event occurred~after the halving of the weight of the as". Even
then the wretched slave would have to carry 125 ounces-of asses
for each victim!
1) De Villiers op cit 2 n 14: "The amount of the penalty shows that
injuria only referred to an assault of a minor degree of gravity;
but possibly the idea of some degree of ignominy was also involved".
Cf B Ranchod Foundations of the South African Law of Defamation
(1972) 4 n 19; but cf Poste op cit ·429: "There seems to be no
necessary connection between bodily harm and dishonour, although
both may have been denoted in Latin by the word injuria".
2) De Villiers op cit 4. Cf A Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of
Roman Law (1953) 367: "As. A Roman coin originally of one pound
of bronze ... In later tImes the as was reduced to four and then
two ounces". Sohm op cit 422 n 7-,-suggests that originally an as
was worth only about five shillings - presumably at 1902 pricesr-





appreciation of the importance of personal dignity and character
1
)
the praetor was obliged to intervene to ensure more comprehensive
of
protection for the personality rights of the victims/injuriae. It
is not clear whether under the XII Tables culpa or dolus was nece-
ssary for an action but it seems that either was sufficient.
2
) Al-
though Chapter 1 of the Lex Aquilia (287 BC) reduced the importance
of membrum ruptum and os fractum, at first in the case of slaves,3)
and then freemen,4) by providing compensation for medical expenses
and loss of income,S) any claim for sentimental loss or mental or
bodily injury had still to be brought under the XII Tables.
2. Praetorian Reforms (c. 2nd century BC to 81 BC)
The praetor introduced a number of clauses in his edict which
generally abrogated the provisions of the XII Tables. The first
of these was the edictum generale which provided a general action
of injuriae whj.ch seems to have replaced Clause 2 (membrum fractum)
Clause 3 (os fractum) and Clause 4 (injuria) of Table VIII of the
XII Tables,6) although it has been argued that it only applied to
Clause 4. 7) Under the edict the plaintiff had to specify the nature
of the injuria complained of and the amount claimed and the case
would then be tried by recuperatores (later by a judex unus)8) who
would fix an amount considered to be bonum et aequum. 9)
1) De Villiers op cit 4. Contra CF Amerasinghe Defamation and Other
Injuries (1968) 318, who suggests that the Roman Law developed
empirically rather than under some guiding philosophical concept
of law.
2) De Villiers 2 n 12; Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 78; A
Watson Roman Private Law Around 200 BC (1971) 156; Jo10wicz &
Nicholas op cit l73f; cf Ranchod op cit 6.
3) Digest 9.2.1. pr; cf De Villiers op cit 3; RW Lee Elements of
Roman Law (1956) 392.
4) Digest 9.12.13; cf De Villiers op cit 3.
5) Digest 9.2.7. FP Van den Heever Aqui1ian Damages in South African
Law (1944) 53.
6) De Villiers op cit 7; Buckland Textbook op cit 590; J010wicz &
Nicholas op cit 272; van Warmelo Introduction op cit 220.
7) Bliss op cit 14; Watson Obligations op cit 248f; Watson Law
Making op cit 48~ who states: "The edictum generale was confined
to cases of physical assault and did not in any way change the
substantive law". D Daube "Nocere and Noxa" (1939) 7 Camb LJ 23
45ff, goes further and submits that serIOUS damage was not lncluded
in the edict; but cf Watson Obligations op cit 250.
8) Bliss op cit 13; Thomas op cit 369; JL Strachan-Davidson Prob-
lems of the Roman Criminal Law (1969) I 2l8ff.
9) Buckland Textbook op cit 590' Schultz Classical Roman L594. ' aw op cit
26.
In addition the praetor introduced a number of other clauses
to replace Clause 1 of Table VIII and were apparently intended to
deal with affronts to dignity and reputation. 1) These included
inter alia the following:
Ca) Convicium - the calling together or assembling of persons
adversus bonos ~ores at somebody's house and raising an insulting
and abusive clamour. 2) This was probably introduced to prevent
verbal defamation of another3 ) but it was later regarded as an
affront to the victim's dignitas. 4) It is submitted that this ac-
tion is not unlike an early form of invasion of privacy.5)
Cb) Ademptata pudicitia - offences against the dignitas of a res-
pectable woman by kidnapping her attendant,6) or indecently accosting
her,7) or by constantly following her about. 8) Although the action
was aimed at preserving the chastity, dignity and reputation of such
women it is fairly similar to the modern action for invasion of
privacy in cases of persistent following. 9)
1) De Villiers op cit 6f; Cf Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 273. De
Villiers op cit 4f, has attempted a reconstruction of the clauses
in the praetor's edict.
2) Digest 47.10.15.2.; Cf Pauw op cit 9.
3) De Villiers op cit 7.
4) Cf Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 84; De Villiers op cit 6f
n 33.
5) Cf AH Robertson Privacy and Human Rights (1973) 97, where it is
suggested that the Scottish concept of convicium also covers in-
vasion of privacy.
6) Digest 47.10.15 15 . ; Cf Pauw op cit l~.
7) Digest 47.10.15.15, 20. ; Cf Pauw op cit 11.
8) Digest 47.10.15.19; Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg cit 84. efop
Pa.uw op cit 13.
9) Cf Epstein v Epstein 191]6 TH 87 ; ~ v Jungman 1914 TPD 8', R v
Van Meer 1923 OPD 77 . See below 224.
Digest 47.10.3.1. ef Tselentis op cit 246.
Digest 47.10.11.1. Tselentis op cit 246, criticizes Ranchod's
proposit~on (Ranchod op cit IS) that dissimulation was required
because lt was thought to be in conflict with the interests of
socie~y.tha~ a person who does not take an injuria to heart after
sustalnlng lt should at a later stage be able to change his mind
and institute an action. Tselentis maintains that the real reason
was tha~ fo: contumelia the conduct must be objectively insulting
and subJectlvely hurtful to the plaintiff's feelings. Tselentis
op cit 246. Cf J C. van der WaIt "Regspraak: Jackson v NICRO" (1977)
1 TSAR 72.
27.
(c) Infamandi - a general clause which allowed an action for any
fOTm of conduct which brought infamy upon a person, usually in res-
pect of his reputation. 1 ) Daube seems unconsciously to recognize
an element of privacy when he states that such wrongs consisted "in
coming presumptuously upon one's neighbour, in encroaching upon
h . . t h ,,2)another's personal sp ere, ln puttlng a man 0 same.
De Villiers classifies convicium and ademptata pudicitia as
injuriae ad dignitatem pertinens and infamandi as an injuria ad
infamiam pertinens. 3) It has been said that for convicium and
ademptata pudicitia intention is irrelevant provided the act is done
contra bonos mores, whereas for infamandi intention must be proved. 4)
Although this seems to emerge from the texts,S) it is difficult to
understand why a dignitary wrong should be tested objectively and a
wrong to reputation subjectively. Where reputation is at stake the
logical test would seem to be the objective one as was the case in
the common law development of libel and slander in England. 6) The
better view seems to be that in all cases although the test for the
wrongfulness of the injuria was objective, the test for fault was
subjective. 7) The Roman law defences to the actions indicate a sub-
jective test for animus not injuria (e.g. infantes or lunatics were
not liable).8) Similarly tne rule dissimulatione aboletur indicates
t ha t t 11~ t est for t L. e e f fee ton t lie :p 1a i r~ t i f f f S per sona1i t Y a1so
subjective.9)
1) Digest 47.10.15.25, 27. Cf Pauw op cit l3E.
2) Daube op cit 46; Watson Obligations op cit 250.
3) De Villiers op cit 7.
4) Ranchod op cit 8; but cf Thomas op cit 370, who contends that
intention was required in all cases.
5) Digest 47.10.15.20; 23; ef Digest 47.10.15.27, where the words
"ut alium infamet" (so that he brings another into disrepute)
and "ut puta" (which is calculated) are used.
6) In English law the emphasis is on loss of reputation whereas in
Roman law it was on "outraged feelings" thus under the former pub-
lication and not intention by the defendant was important. Cf
WW Buckland & AD McNair Roman Law and Common Law 2 ed (1952) 380.




By the end of the Republic it appears that the praetor's
edict had become unified in the actio injuriarum aestimatoria and
was available for any injuria or wanton aggression upon plaintiff's
personality rights. 1) Buckland points cut that the edictum
generale
"lent itself to juristic interpretation, so that in the law
as we know it, the wrong consisted in outrage or insult or
wanton interference with rights, any act, in short, which
showed contempt of the personality of the victim or was such
as to lower him in the estimation of others, and was so in-
tended". 2)
Contumelia in the sense of a deliberate insult to the victim's
feelings became an important element,3) and intent was the gist of
the action. 4) Despite the fact that the third and second centuries
BC have been described as "the period of greatest Greek influence
on Roman life,,5) the view that the actio injuriarum was influenced
by Greek law has been doubted. 6)
3. Lex Cornelia de Injuriis (c. 81 BC)
The praetor's development of the actio injuriarum was inter-
rupted in about 81 BC by the lex Cornelia which was introduced by
Sulla to curb the lawlessness and social upheavals which arose to-
wards the end of the Republic. 7) A number of crimes or quasi-crimes
WW Buckland Main Insti-
cf Van Warmelo Inleiding
op cit 219.
ci t 442 f; S alkowski
1) Schultz Classical Roman Law op cit 595;
tutions of Roman Private Law (1931) 337;
op cit 340; Bliss op cit 13; De Zulueta
2) Buckland Textbook op cit 590; cf Sohm op
op cit 668.
3) Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 80; van Warmelo Introduction
op cit 221; cf De Villiers op cit 9; Watson Obligations op cit
218.
cf De Villiers op cit 9.
Jones op cit 312.
cit 128; Watson Law Making
6; Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg
Textbook op cit 590 n 7;
Watson Law Making op cit 186; cf
Schultz Principles of Roman Law op
op cit 187; but cf Ranchod op cit
op cit 83.





were created and included the offences of pulsare (striking),
verberare (beating) and vi domum introire (forcibly entering
another's house).1) Such wrongs were not strictly crimes as the
actions had to be instituted by the injured person but special
criminal courts (quaestiones) were set up to try offenders. 2) It
is probable that the State did not mete out punishment except in
. 1 . 3)severe cases of treason or SOCla crlmes.
Buckland mentions that there were two views concerning the
impact of the lex Cornelia on the development of the actio injuriar-
urn: (a) that it excluded the action altogether until late in the
classical age when it was restored by a Rescript of Severus and
Caracalla; and (b) that both the actio injuriarum and the lex
Cornelia existed side by side,4) with the latter being preferred
by the praetor if
"the offence is of so grave or public a character as to make
it rather an offence against public order than an injury or
an insult to an individual".5)
It is submitted that the latter is the better view because
Gaius gives several examples of injuriae actionable under the
praetor's edict. 6) Although it is not certain when Gaius was born
or died it is known that he lived during the reigns of Antonius
1) Buckland Textbook op cit 590; Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg 80;
De Villiers op cit 8; Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 274.
2) EM Burchell & PMA Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure
(1970) I 3; JC de Wet & HL Swanepoel Strafreg 3 ed! (1975) 4.
Cf Pauw op cit 15.
3) Burchell & Hunt op cit 3. Cf Crook op cit 252: "A court de
injuriis was amongst the standing jury courts established bY
Sulla; technically it was not a criminal court". Cf Jolowicz
& Nicholas op cit 274.
4) Buckland Textbook op cit 590f.
5) Roby op cit 225; Cf Watson Obligations 254f; Salkowski op cit
675; De Villiers op cit 282 n 230; Burchell & Hunt op cit 4;
Thomas op cit 371.
6) Gaius III 220 cf Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 274, who submit
that "the statute merely provided an alternative procedure for
those cases".
30.
Pius (138-61 A.D.) and Marcus Aurelius (161-80 A.D.) and was still
alive in 178 A.D.') Septimus Serverus (193-211 A.D.) and Caraca11a
(211-217 A.D.) both reigned several years after Gaius 2) and it
therefore seems that the praetor's edict existed side by side with
the lex Corne1ia de injuriis for several years prior to their
Rescript. 3)
One of the most important innovations under the lex Corne1ia
de injuriis was the recognition of an action for the forcible enter-
ing of another's home (vi domum introire) ,4) and this is often re-
garded as the best example of the recognition of a right to privacy
by the Romans. 5) The action was not based on ownership or possession
but on occupation of the residence by the injured party. It did
not matter whether the person whose domus was interfered with wa.s in
his own home or staying as a guest in the house of another. 6) Domus
did not include lodgings and stables and this strengthens the view
that the action was aimed at preserving the privacy of the family
occupying the habitation rather than the property rights of the owner
or possessor of the buildings. 7)
"The act of intrusion was regarded not as a mere infringement
of the right of property but as a violation of the sanctity
of the private residence of the Roman citizen".8)
1) Lee Elements op cit 32.
2) Lee Elements op cit xxvi.
3) Cf Buckland Textbook op cit 591 n 2.
4) Digest 47.10.5. pr.
5) Cf Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 87; CF Arnerasinghe Actio
Injuriarum in Roman Dutch Law (1966) 177; but cf Ranchod op cit
11 who says it was also an offence against the person.
6) Digest 47.10.5.2.; CF Arnerasinghe Defamation and Other Injuries
(1968) 326; Joubert Persoon1ikheidsreg op cit 88.
7) Digest 47.10.5.5.; cf Arnerasinghe Defamation op cit 327. The
action also included persons on board ships Digest 47.10.15.7.
8) De Vi11iers op cit 259 n 38.
31 .
Joubert states that although the protection of the privacy
of the home shows that the concept of injuria had been widely ex-
tended, the wrongs of pulsare and verberare indicate that the old
concept of injuria was still maintained. 1) It can, however, be
argued that at an early stage the praetor recognized an analogous
action for forcible entry into another's house. Aulius Ofilius who
lived in the last century of the Republic and was the first commen-
tator on the praetor's Edict 2) mentions that such an action for
injuria lay even though the entry was made to summon the inhabitant
to court. 3)
It is interesting to note that the first real action in Roman
law to safeguard the privacy of the home and family life, arose from
the troubled social conditions of the last century of the Republic,4)
just as the modern concept of privacy developed from the social
pressures of the mass media and modern technology on the sanctity
of family life in the early 20th Century.s)
4. Classical Law (c. 27 B.C. - 305 A.D.)
The classical jurists applied a liberal interpretation to the
praetor's Edict in its developed form. This together with the in-
fluence of the lex Cornelia de injuriis, enabled the actio injuriarum
to be extended to include any wilful disregard for another's person-
ality rights. 6) At the same time they appear to have give~ the in-
tention to injure, animus injuriandi, full recognition as a require-
ment for injuria. 7) Despite the fact that classical injuriae are
1) Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 80.
2) Berger op cit 607.
3) Digest 47.10.23.
4) JM Kelly·Roman Litigation (1966) lsf; De Villiers op cit 8.
5) WL Prosser "Privacy" (1960) 48 Ca1 LR 383. See above 7.
6) Cf Sohm op cit 422; Sa1kowski op cit 668; Buckland Main Insti-
tutions op cit 337; Jo1owicz & Nicholas op cit 273; Schultz
Classical Roman Law op cit 595. Cf Pauw op cit 16.
7) Cf Digest 47.10.31: 'tiinjuria'exaffectu facientis consistat'"
Di~est 47 .10. 3.2: "~~ ..qu1 S;::1! se 1nJunarum facere". D1g~st
9: .41. pr •. Cf De V~11lers op CIt 9; Van Warmelo Inleiding op
Clt 341; BlISS op Clt 18; Contja R~nchod op cit 15 Cf Tselentis
op cit 246. Contra Pauw op t~t 1tf. '
32.
sometimes described as relating to corpus, dignitas or fama a
d "f 1"" ht 1)broa principle of protectl0n or persona lty rlg s emerges.
Joubert points out that only corpus and fama were clearly defined
and that dignitas was left open for development.
2
)
Therefore although only forcible entry into another's home
3
)
and the premature disclosure of the contents of another's will
(while he was still alive)4) are usually regarded as examples of
the protection of privacy in Roman 1aw5) it is submitted that
several other injuriae which were primarily affronts to dignitas but
also reflected on chastity or reputation may be included. These
are very similar to the modern concept of invasion of privacy in
the United States 6) and may be subsumed under the same heads, namely:
(a) intrusions; (b) publication of private facts; and (c) putting
a person in a false light. 7)
(a) Intrusions:
(i) Forcibly entering another's home or the house where he
. "d" 8)lS reSl lng as a guest.
(ii) Accosting a woman with immoral intentions. 9) Although
this was aimed at preserving chastity lt can be regarded as a dig-
WL Prosser Law 9f Torts 4 ed (1971) 804f American Restatement on
Torts, Second (1971) § 652A. The category of "Appropriation"
has been excluded as it appears to be more concerned with the
"right to publicity" and can be covered by the other categories.
See below 311.
8) Digest 47.10.5; cf Joubert Persoon1ikheidsreg op cit 87;
Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 177.
9) Digest 47.10.15.20.
1) Cf Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 102; Amerasinghe Defamation
op cit 322; Sa1kowski op cit 669.
2) Joubert Persoon1ikheidsreg op cit 83, 85f; cf Amerasinghe Actio
Injuriarum op cit 173f; De Wet & Swanepoel op cit 233 n 92;
Contra De Wet & Swanepoe1 op cit 232f.
3) Digest 47.10.5. pr.
4) Digest 9.2.41. pr.
5) Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 87; Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum
op cit 177.






nitary wrong 1) and is analogous to the modern action for invasion of
privacy.2) But such an act was not contra bonos mores if the woman
. t 3)was dressed as a prostltu e.
(iii) Harrassing a person by unjustifiably summoning them to
Court 4) or by persistently following them about.
5
)
(iv) Convicium - calling together a mob to shout insults outside
a person's home 6) was recognised as an affront to a person's dignitas.
7
)
This is similar to the modern action which regards the continual inter-
ruption of a person's peaceful and tranquil life as an invasion of
. 8)prlvacy.
(v) Wrongfully and intentionally subjecting one's ex-wife to
an inspectio ventris on the pretext of proving adultery.g)
(b) Publication of Private fa~ts:
(i) A depositary disclosing publicly during the lifetime of a
testator the contents of a will entrusted to him. 10 )
(ii) (Quaere) Revealing a person's poverty or humble station in
l 'f 11)1 e.
(iii) (Quaere) Divulging the contents of a private letter without
the writer's consent. 12 )
1) Cf De Villiers op cit 7.




Di~est 47.10.15.22, 23; cf C Wright Cases on the Law of Torts 3 ed
(1 63) citing Instit~tes 4.4.1. Cf Bpstein V Ep~tein 1906 TH 87.
6) Digest 47.1n.15.3 - 8.
7) Cf De Villiers op cit 7. Cf Scottish law. See above 26 n 5.
8) For instance, where a person is inundated with a barrage of
offensive letters and telephone calls as a result of an appeal by a
television announcer. Robbins v Canadian Broadcasting Corp (Que)
(1957) 12 DLR 2d 35; Wright op eft 2~f. er Salmond op cit 44 n 31.
9)
Di~est 25.4.18; cf Ranchod op cit 22; DH Van Zyl "Custodia Ventris
an . Custodia Partus" (1969) 32 THR-HR 43ff.
Digest.9.2.41 p~.; ~f ~oubert Pe~~oonlikheidsreg op cit 87;
Ameraslnghe ACtl0 InJurlarum op Clt 177.
De Villiers op cit 86, who refers to Code 9.35.2. But cf Code 10.
34.2 prelude (Scott's translation): "For what is so harsh or
inhuman as by the exhibition and display of private property to
reveal the wretchedness of poverty and expose wealth to any."
De Villiers op cit 142f. See below 248£. ef Digest 47.2.14.17
which deals with theft of a letter.
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(c) False light:
Ci) Falsely claiming or asserting a freeman to be one's
slave.')
(ii) Falsely advertising the sale of a pledge 2) where defen-
dant publishes a' notice of the sale indicating, that he has received
the pledge from the plaintiff (thus implying that the plaintiff is
indebted to him and cannot not pay his debts).
(iii) Wrongfully addressing a person who is not indebted to you
as a debtor. 3)
(iv) Requesting payment from someone's surety even though the
principal debtor is prepared to pay.4)
(v) Falsely sealing up the house of an absent debtorS) thus
implying that he is unable to pay his debts. 6)
(vi) Wearing mourning clothes in order to create the false im-
pression that you have been grievously wronged by another. 7)
It is submitted that several of the injuriae mentioned in Cc)
above also relate to reputation, but nevertheless most of them would
be recognised as invasions of privacy in modern law. 8) It would be
,)
Digest 47.10.11.9.; Digest 47.10.12.
2) Digest 47.10.15.32.
3) Digest 47.10.15.33. Cf Kelly op cit 21. See below 128£.
4) Digest 47.10.19. Cf Kelly op cit 21.
5) Digest 47.10.20.
6) Cf De Villiers op cit 279 n 209.
7) Digest 47.10.15.27. Cf Kelly op cit 21. But cf Ranchod op cit
10 n 60.
8) For the position in the United States see Hofstadter & Horowitz
op cit 167; cf American Juris2rudence, Second (1964) 62 Torts §5.
Most South African cases have been decided on the basis of defama-
tion; Pickard v SA Trade Protection Societr (1905) 22 SC 89
(false publication that a person was a debtor); cf Conror v
Bennett (1886) 4 HCG 201; Lappan v Grahamstown Town Council 1906
EDC 40. See below l28f.
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impossible to establish empirically that the Romans recognised
. . f· . bl t d 1)all or indeed many of the lnvaSlons 0 prlvacy actlona e 0 ay,
but is clear that the classical actio injuriarum was wide enough
to allow for the emergence of "a general remedy for any vexatious
violation of another person's rights".2)
The action remained penal in that it was available per conse-
quentias 3) and was not transmissible against the wrongdoers heirs. 4)
Furthermore, as it was vindictam spirans it was lost on the death of
the plaintiffS) or if he displayed indifference. 6) The action pre-
scribed within one year. 7) In order to succeed the plaintiff had
to establish that the act was done intentionally and that it was
wrongful i.e. contra bonos mores. 8) If the action was brought
vexatiously and unsuccessfully it exposed the plaintiff to infamia. 9)
1) In some instances the public's right to use the public amenities
took precedence over the individual's right to privacy (e.g. a
person may stand in front of your villa to fish in public waters).
Notwithstanding this public right "it Lbecam~7 a practice to for-
bid persons from fishing in front of one's house or of one's
portico, but for this there is no legal justification". Digest
47.10.13.7.
2) Sohrn op cit 422f; cf Buckland Main Institutions op cit 336f;
Jo1owicz & Nicholas op cit 273.
3) Digest 47.10.1.3; Schultz Classical Roman Law op cit 597; Thomas
op cit 370; Van Warmelo Introduction op cit 221.
4) Buckland Textbook op cit 591; Lee Elements op cit 390; 'Van Zyl
Geskiedenis op cit 346.
5) Gaius 4.112. Cf Thomas op cit 371; Van Warmelo Introduction op
cit 222.
6) Digest 47.10.11.1. Cf Tselentis op cit 246; Thomas op cit 371.
7) Arnerasinghe Defamation op cit 348; Lee Elements op cit 390; Van
Warmelo Introduction op cit 222.
8) Tselentis op cit 246: "/rlhe classical actio inauriarum was prob-
ably a streamlined and sophisticated action whic lay when the
three essential elements of overt conduct, subjective and object-
ive contumelia, and animus injuriandi in the sense of motive were
present". Cf Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 92ff, 96 where
he states that contume1ia was not always necessary.
9) Gaius 4.177. Cf Kelly op cit 67; Lee Elements op cit 391.
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5. Post-Classical or Vulgar Law (305 A.D. - 527 A.D.)
After Diocletian (284 - 305 A.D.) the actio injuriarum was
no longer carefully delimited and more emphasis was placed on the
criminal law. 1) It has been pointed out that this caused a loss
of the precise meaning of injuria with a resulting concentration by
scholastic theorists on animus injuriandi at the expense of the ob-
jective elements of the wrong. 2) Early attempts had been made to
codify the law in the Codex Gregorianus and Codex Hermogenianu~3)
and after the division of the Empire and the deteriorating position
in the West, Roman jurisprudence reached its lowest point with the
introduction of the Law of Citations by Theodosius 11 in 426 A.D.
whereby the opinions of certain classical jurists had to be estimated
by weight, not number. 4) The confusion in the West continued with
the introduction of Codes by the conquering Barbarian chiefs e.g.
the Lex Romanum Visigothorum (506 A.D.), Edictum Theoderici (500
A.D.) and the Lex Romanum Burgundionum (500 A.D.)5) while in the
East the Codex Theodosianus (438 A.D.) attempted to systematise the
Roman law}OT
It was left to Justinian's codifiers to rediscover the classi-
cal law.
1) Ranchod op cit 20.
2) Ranchod op cit 21, citing HF Jolowicz Digest 47.2 - De Furtis
(1940) lviii.
3) Buckland Textbook op cit 37; van Zyl Geskiedenis op cit 50f.
4) Buckland Textbook op cit 33f; van Zyl Geskiedenis op cit 42f;
Van Warmelo Introduction op cit 21; Thomas op cit 54.
5) Buckland Textbook op cit 36; Ranchod op cit 24£; van Zyl
Geskiedenls op cit 54ff.
6)
Buckland Textbook op cit 38; C Pharr The Theodosian Code (1952);
van Zyl Geskiedenis op cit 5lf.
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6. The Law of Justinian
Justinian was responsible for the revival of classical law
when he commissioned the Corpus Juris Civilis. 1) The classical
concept of injuria was accepted with little change 2) although the
examples given in the Digest are often more detailed and extensive.
Thus the injuriae mentioned in Gaius' Institutes are the same as
those appearing in Justinian's Institutes and Digest.
The Digest itself is a codification of the writings of the
classical jurists. Ulpian and Paul make up nearly half and Papinian
and Julian are widely quoted as well as about 30 other classical
jurists. 3) The Novels added nothing new to the actio injuriarum
and the action reflected in the Digest and Institutes was the clas-
sical action which
"long before the time of Justinian ... had come to be regarded
as a general remedy for any wrongful aggression upon the per-
son, dignity or reputation of another".4)
In the light of the above it is submitted that many of the
examples of injuriae given in the Digest would today be recognized
as invasion of privacy.5) Furthermore on the approach adopted by
Warren and Brandeis in their classic exposition on the emergence of
the right to privacy in Anglo-American law,6) it can be argued that
under the developed actio injuriarum Roman Law recognized a general
right to privacy.
1) See generally Buckland Textbook op cit 39f£; Jolowicz & Nicholas
op cit 479ff; Thomas op cit 56f.
2) ef Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 107.
3) Buckland Textbook op cit 41.
4) McKerron op cit 9.
5) See above 32.
6) SD Warren & LD Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv LR
193; Cf WL Prosser "Privacy" (1960) 48 Cal LR 383.
- ----
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7. Privacy and the State
Notwithstanding the recognition of a right to privacy in
Roman law the Romans themselves were subject to State-imposed,
invasions of privacy analogous to those experienced in modern soc-
ieties. For instance in 433 BC Censores were introduced, who were
responsible for making a census of all citizens by ~lassifying them
according to their wealth and rank for taxation, electoral and mili-
tary reasons. 1)
"The head of each family was obliged to make a written state-
ment, upon oath, of the number of persons composing his
family, of his property of every description, and its fair
estimated value, under penalty of confiscation of any article
omitted".2)
The ancient Romans therefore were faced with similar obligations to
those imposed on South African residents in respect of population
registration3) and income tax returns. 4) Furthermore not only
could the censores disenfranchise a person by excluding him from a
particular class,S) but like their modern counterparts 6) they con-
7) .
trolled the morality of the Roman people. The reasons for enter-
ing a "censorial mark" or nota censoria against a person's name in
the census lists were unrestricted. 8) In many instances the exer-
cise of their powers resulted in blatant invasions of privacy. Thus
1) Van Warmelo Introduction op cit 5; Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit
52; Thomas op cit 15; Van Zyl Geskiedenis op cit 18; R
Dannenbring Kaser's Roman Private Law 2 ed (1968) 257.
2) Ortolan op cit 57.
3) See below 232.
4) See below 234.
5) Ortolan op cit 151.
6) Cf Publications Act, 42 of 1974, s 9.
7) Ortolan op cit 150: "The entire moral influence that can exist
in a state was lodged in their hands. As guardians of public
and private morals, they could blast the reputation of a plebian,
a senator, a consul, and even the people. Thus they restrained
the luxury of the rich; the licence of the libertine; the ill-
faith of the truthless; the indolence of the knight of the sol-
dier, of the cultivator; and the weakness of the magistrate".
cf Kaser op cit 22; Thomas op cit 15; van Zyl Geskiedenis op
cit 18.
8) Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 52.
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a man might even be penalized for "some action in his private life,
such as luxurious living, or divorcing a wife without taking the
opinion of a family council".1) The nota therefore provided a
. . ff' b h' 2)strong extra-legal sanctlon agalnst 0 enSlve e aVlour.
Initially the censores were elected for five years but this
was later reduced to 18 months,3) and after 22 BC they were no longer
appointed. 4)
Conclusions: In the developed actio injuriarum there were three
main elements:
(a) the act had to be done intentionally (animus injuriandi) -
with the intention to injure;5)
(b) there must have been an impairment of a person's personality,
i.e. his fama, corpus or dignitas 6) - the latter being very widely
defined; 7r--
Cc) the wrong itself had to be contra bonos mores i.e. wrongful
according to the prevailing mores of society.8)
Crook op cit 83; cf Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 52f.
Ortolan op cit 149; Thomas op cit 15.
Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 53.
Digest 47.10.3.1; Digest 47.10.1; cf Buckland Textbook op cit
590 n 7; WA Joubert "Die Persoonlikheidsreg: 'n Belangwekkende
Ontwikkeling in die Jongste Regspraak in Duitsland" (1960) 23
THR-HR 23, 41; Amerasinghe Defamation op cit 321; Ranchod op
Clt 12; van Warmelo Introduction op cit 221; Contra Watson
Roman Private Law op cit 156.
6) Buckland Textbook op cit 590; Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit
83f, 85f; Amerasinghe Defamation op cit 322.
7) Joubert Persoon1ikheidsreg op cit 110; Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum
op cit 173. Joubert Persoon1ikheidsreg op cit 84, defines
"dignitas" as "daardie rustig -waardige houding wat hu11e {the
Roman~7 so belangrik beskou het". De Wet & Swanepoel op cit 233
however, interpret "dignitas" as "status" and synonymous with '
"existimatio", and argue that every "iniuria" affected "dignitas"
including those relating to "corpus" an "fama".
8) Digest 47.10.15. 2,5,6; Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 102;







The developed actio injuriarum protected a person's personality
rights, and the concept of dignitas was flexible enough to incor-
porate the right to privacy. The latter was recognized by the
Romans except in the case of such State-authorized invasions of
privacy as those conducted by the censores. 1)
The classical concept of injuria was taken over by the Roman-
Dutch law jurists when the Roman law was received into the Nether-
lands.
1) See above 38.
41.
B. ROMAN-DUTCH LAW
After the revival of Roman law in Western Europe by the
Medieval Glossators, Ultramontani and the Commentators 1) most Roman-
Dutch jurists, apart from Grotius,2) appear to have adopted the
approach of Justinian's Digest and Institutes. 3) Some attempt,
however, was made to classify injuries according to their common
constituent elements.
Grotius divides lnJuriae in the wide sense into wrongs against
the body,4) honour (hoon) ,5) and reputation (lastering),6) while in
the narrow sense he regards such injuries as "wrongs against personal
liberty".7) Van der Keesel follows Grotius and states that:
"an injuria can be committed against us whenever we are hin-
dered not according to law in the exercise of those rights
which we have to body, freedom, property, dignity and reputa-
tion".8)
Van der Linden only briefly discusses the concept,9) while
Van Leeuwen includes the wrong in "crimes against honour and reputa-
tion".10) Huber describes an injuria as "a crime deliberately
committed with the effect of bringing another into ridicule and con-
tempt"ll) and most of his examples are limited to defamation or in-
sUlt. 12 ) Matthaeus, however, adopts a more flexible and wider
JC de Wet & HL Swanepoel
De
cf De Wet & Swanepoe1 op
cf Ranchod op cit 73;
1) For the revival of Roman law see generally P. Vinogradoff Roman
Law in Medieval Europe 3 d (1961) 24ff; cf B Ranchod Foundations
of the South African Law of Defamation (1972) 26ff.
2) RW Lee An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 5 ed (1961) 329, is of
the view that Grotius was influenced by Teutonic jurists, but it
has been suggested that he relied more upon the Medieval Romanist
and Spanish Scholastic writers. Ranchod op cit 62.
3) Cf Voet 47.10; Vinnius lnst 4.4.1; Huber 6.8 cf Joubert Persoon-
likheidsreg op cit 108; Ranchod op cit 72f.
Grotius 3.34.4)
5) Grotius 3.35.
6) Grotius 3.37; cf Ranchod op cit 68;
Strafreg 3 ed (1975) 234.
7) Grotius 3.35.1.
8) Van der Keesel Praelectiones 47.10.2;
Wet & Swanepoel op cit.234.
9) Van der Linden 2.5.15, 16; 1.16.3, 4;
cit 234.
10) Van Leeuwen Roman-Dutch Law 4.37; cf Ranchod op cit 73 n 6.
11 ) Huber 6.8.2.
12) cf Huber 6.8.14, 15; 6.9.9, 10.
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definition of injuria which he described as "an insult inflicted
upon someone contra bonos mores".1) Voet on the other hand follows
Ulpian's classical definition of:
"a wrongful act committed in contempt of a free person by
which his person, dignity, or reputation is intentionally
impaired". 2)
Like the Medieval Glossators,3) most of the Roman-Dutch law
writers regarded animus injuriandi as the gist of the action. 4) The
requirement of animus is referred to by Voet,5) Matthaeus,6) Van
Leeuwen,7) Van der Linden,8) Van der Keesel,9) and Huber,10) but not
by Grotius. 11 ) The interpretation of the Roman-Dutch law concept
of animus in1uriandi has given rise to a contraversy in modern SouthAfrican law. 2)
It has been said that the Roman-Dutch law jurists had no phil-
osophical basis for their treatment of injuria and that the wrong
developed empirically.13) This was probably because in many in-
stances the jurists were more concerned with taking over the developed
For the
Huber 6.8.3.
Grotius 3.35.1. cf Ranchod op cit 69; See above 41 n 2.
See below 148f
CF Amerasinghe Aspects of the Actio Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch Law
(1~66) 17 3 . Ct p.C Pauw Persoon1ikheidskrenking en Sku1d in die
SUld-Afrlkaanse Prlvaatre Reghistorlese en Regsvergelykende
n ersoe ., ee auw op Cl t or a IScusslon 0
anlmus Injuriandi in Roman-Dutch law.
1) Mattheus De Crim 47.4.1, 1; cf Ranchod op cit 74 n 9.
advantages of such an approach see below 172.
2) Voet 47.10.1; cf De Wet & Swanepoe1 op cit 234.
3) As to which see Ranchod op cit 34f.
4) Cf Maise1 v Van Naeren 1960 (4) SA 836 (C) 840f, 847; M Bliss
Be1ediging in die Suid Afrikaanse Reg (1933) 45f; Ranchod op cit
75ff.
Voet 47.10.20.5)
6) Matthaeus De Crim 7.4.7; 47.4.1.7; cf Bliss op cit 48.
7) Van Leeuwen Censura Forensis 5.15.1 - 6. Van Leeuwen Roman-Dutch
Law 4.37.4, however omIts animus injuriandi as a requirement.
8) Van der Linden 1.16.4.






Roman law to fill the lacunae existing in their local legal systems
than in critically analyzing Roman legal principles. 1)
Injuriae are often divided into wrongs against the corpus,
dignitas or fama of another,2) but there are many instances where
the different elements overlap (eg. an assault may injure a person's
body as well as his feelings, or a defamatory statement may affect
a person's reputation as well as his dignity). It has been suggest-
ed that injuries relating to fama and corpus have developed into the
modern wrongs of defamation, malicious prosecution, assault and false
imprisonment,3) while the concept of dignitas has been left open to
accommodate any future development of the law relating to injuries. 4)
In the words of Meleus de Villiers:
"Injuries against dignity evidently comprise all those in-
juries which are not aggressions upon either the person or the
reputation; in fact, all such indignities as are violations
of the respect due to a free man as such".5)
Most actions for invasions of privacy seem to involve an impair-
ment of dignitas,6) but such invasions may also affect the injured
party's corpus (eg. where he is subjected to a blood test or medical
examination without his consent)7) or fama (eg. where he is held out
in a false light).8) ----
1) Van der Linden 1.1.4 states: "In order to answer the question
what is the law in such and such a case we must first inquire
whether any general law of the land or local ordinance (Plaat-
selike Keur) having the force of law or any well-established cus-
tom can be found affecting it. The Roman law as a model of
wisdom and equity is, in default of such a law, accepted by us
through custom in order to supply this want". Lee Introduction
op cit Sf; cf Grotius 1.2.22; Van Leeuwen Roman-Dutch Law 1.1.11.
2) Voet 47.10.7; cf Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cif 173; WA
Joubert Grondslae van die Persoonlikheldsreg (1953) 102. Contra
De Wet & Swanepoel op cit 235.
3) Arnerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 173.
4) Arnerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit l74ff; WA Joubert "Die Per-
soonlikheidsreg; 'n Belangwekkende Ontwikkeling in die Jongste
Regspraak in Duitsland" (1960) 23 THR-HR 23; DM Walker The Law of
Delict in Scotland (1966) 11 708ff.
5)
M De Villiers The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of In~uries (1899) 24
n 19. Cf De Wet & Swanepoel op cit 235, who submlt that there is
no c?nvincing ~om~n and Roman-Dutch law authority "vir die op-
vattlng dat 'dlgnltas' 'n besondere persoonlikheidsreg was".
6) See below 185.
7) See below 238.
8) See below 290.
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It is submitted that in many of the examples of injuries
given by the Roman-Dutch writers one can discover the seminal
threads of an action for invasion of privacy. As in the case of
Roman Law many such injuries may be classified into the modern
categories of Ca) intrusions, Cb) publication of private facts, and
Cc) putting a person in a false light. 1)
1. Int rus ions
Ca) Forcible entry into a person's home. 2) Protection against
such an act recognised that:
"it was the individual's right to keep free from intruders
his retreat where his life could be enjoyed in private and
away from the public gaze".3)
The gist of the action therefore was the protection of dignitary
rather than proprietary rights. 4)
Cb) Trespassing upon the property of another against the latter's
prohibition. 5) It seems, however, that in Roman law such tres-
passing was justified where the trespasser was using publi\c amenities
(eg. f~shi~g in public waters).6) Voet does not elaborate on this
type of injuria 7) but relies upon passages in the Institutes 8) and
Digest 9) which are primarily concerned with catching fish or snaring
birds on the property of another without his consent.
Voet 47.10.7.
Voet 47.10.7.
Digest 47.10.13.7. See above 35 n 1.
Voet 47.10.7.
Institutes 2.1.12.
Digest 8.3.16; 41.1.3.1; 47.10.13.7.




Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 177.
cf De Villiers op cit 81 n 35. For instance the action applied







(c) Hindering a person in the disposal or use of his own prop-
erty, or from using a right of the public, or from using a public
road, or public place, or from fishing in the sea. 1) De Villiers
suggests that:
"the indignity suffered in such cases may perhaps be regarded
as a reason for rather classing them amongst injuries ad
dignitatem pertinentes".2)
(d) Summonsing a person before a tribunal for the purpose of
harassing him. 3) It is submitted that such conduct constitutes an
invasion of privacy4) as well as an abuse of judicial proceedings. 5)
The fact that a person is compelled to leave the peace and tranquil-
ity of his home or office and is made to appear in open court seems
to be a clear invasion of privacy.
(e) An ex-husband falsely subjecting his ex-wife to undergo an
inspectio ventris after divorce to establish whether or not she was
pregnant by him. o) Such an act would constitute a flagrant in-
vasion of the woman's privacy.
(f) Dishonourably intercepting a woman with a view to unchast-
ity.7) Where such an-interception does not take place in the
presence of others it is submitted that it can be regarded as an in-
trusion into the woman's right to peace and tranquility of mind while
out walking viz. an impairment of her dignity.8)
1) Voet 47.10.7.
2) De Villiers op cit 80 n 24.
3) Voet 47.10.7.
4) See below 228 (debt collections).
5) ARB Amerasinghe "Actions for Malicious Abuse of Judicial Proceed-
ings in the Law of South Africa and Ceylon" 1965/1966 Acta
Juridica 177, 179.
6) Voet 47.10.2. Cf DH van Zyl "Custodia Ventris and Custodia
Partus" (1969) 32 THR-HR 43. See below 121.
7) Voet 47.10.7. See below 110f.
8) cf De Villiers op cit 80 n 30. But contra Amerasinghe Actio
Injuriarum op cit 178.
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(g) Persistently following a decent woman about with "lustful
intention".1) In Roman-Dutch law such conduct was probably con-
sidered to be a wrong to reputation "since such a person brings
about some loss of good name by his persistent crowding",2) but it
can be argued that in modern South African law it is primarily a
d
. . 3)19n1tary wrong.
(h) Maliciously intervening to prevent the banns of marriage
being published on Sundays or market days according to custom. 4)
It is submitted that such interference is an impairment of the dig-
nity of the prospective spouses.
2. Publication of Private Facts
(a) Boasting of carnal intercourse with a "decent woman or
girl".5)
(b) Revealing that a person suffers from poverty or a particu-
lar physical deformity or disease, for instance, taunting a person
with being "crippled, one-eyed, blind, bald, humpbacked, crooked,
twisted, flat-footed, itchy or mangy".6) The fact that such revela-
tions need contain "nothing opprobrious,,7) or "no baseness,,8) seems
to indicate that it was the plaintiff's dignity rather than his repu-
tation which was being impaired. 9)
1) Voet 47.10.7.
2) Ibid; cf the approach adopted by the Court in Epstein v Epstein
1906 TH 87, 88. See below 224f.
3) Cf R v Jungman 1914 TPD 8; R v Du Toit 1930 TPD 205. See below
111:-
4) Voet 47.10.7.
5) Voet 47.10.8; cf Huber 6.9.9, who refers to false disclosures
concerning such relationships.
6) Voet 47.10.8; Huber 6.8.8.
7) Voet 47.10.8 (De Vi1liers translation).
8) Voet 47.10.8 (Gane's translation).
9) Cf SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman 1962 (2) SA 613 (AD)
617; cf DJ McQuoid-Mason "Calling White Black" (1972) 1 NULR
no. 1, l5f. In England it has been held that it is defamatory
to publish a photograph of a woman without any teeth (Funston v
Pearson, The Times March 12, 1915; cf RFV Heuston Salmond on
Tor~s 16 ed ~1973) 35 ~ 36,.but it i~ submitted that such pUbli-
catlon constltutes an lnvaSlon of prlvacy. Cf DJ McQuoid-Mason
"Invasion of Potency?" (1973) 90 SALJ 26f.
De Villiers op cit 84.
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(c) Publicly revealing the contents of a will during the life-
time of the testator with the intention of disparaging him.
1
) But
it seems that the action only lay against the depositary and not
against a third party who made the disclosure.
2
)
In the light of the above it is submitted that the empirical
approach of the Roman-Dutch jurists clearly recognised the seminal
threads of an action for invasion of privacy. Nonetheless it is
conceded that the courts in South Africa will be influenced by deve-
lopments in other modern legal systems (particularly the United




(a) Falsely seIzIng the goods of a debtor or advertising pledges
for sale where the debtor is willing and able to pay.4) The seizure
of the debtor's goods is an invasion of his property rights, but the
public advertisement of his goods for sale is an impairment of both
his reputation and his dignity which places him in a false light in
the eyes of the public.
(b) Demanding payment from sureties even though the debtor has
the ability and willingness to pay.5) It is true that such demands
may reflect upon the reputation of the debtor but the false represen-
tation that he has been unfaithful to his sureties also affects his
dignity, particularly where such demands do not go beyond the sure-
ties themselves.
(c) Wearing mourning or dirty clothes, or letting the beard grow
long to failing to cut the hair so as to arouse ill-will against
another. 6) Such conduct implied that a person who had been charged
with crime was likely to be convicted. 7) Therefore where the plain-
tiff had never been charged with a crime or there was no likelihood
1) De Villiers op cit 83; Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 88;
Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 177.
2) Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 88.
3) Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
(C) 249; Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan 1975






of the plaintiff being convicted the defendant's behaviour would
place him in a false light.
(d) Falsely stating that one had entered into marriage with
someone l ) "with the object of defaming and bringing shame" upon
that person. 2) Such a statement seems to have been just as
punishable as boasting of some impropriety with a man or a wo-
man. 3)
(e) Falsely casting doubts on the validityof a marriage, or
the chastity of a betrothed woman, a wife or a widow. 4) Generally
a wife would not sue for insults to her husband during his life-time
or after his death unless she was directly injured by the wrong. 5)
(f) Falsely denying that a person of noble birth who is ap-
plying for high office is noble or born in wedlock. 6)
(g) Where a person's deceased parent has been falsely referred
to as a slave or a worthless person or a criminal such a person may
bring an action. 7) Such person would have an actio injuriarum per
. 8)consequentlas.
l)This compares with the position in the United States where posing
as the plaintiff's wife was held to be an invasion of privacy.
Burns v Stevens (1926) 236 Mich 443, 210 NW 482; cf Prosser Torts
op cit 80S.
2) Huber 6.9.10, who states that such action was regarded as a crime:
"Otherwise it would be unjust that a mere asseveration of marriage





7)Voet 47.10.5; cf Spendiff v East London Daily Despatch Ltd 1929
EDL 113.
8)See below 351.




Conclusion: The actio injuriarum in Roman-Dutch law was essen-
tially the same as that recognized by the Romans and likewise in-
cluded a number of injuriae analogous to the modern action for in-
vasion of privacy. Therefore in order to succeed under the Roman-
Dutch law action the plaintiff would again have to prove:
Ca) that the wrongdoer had the intention to injure viz. animus
injuriandi;1)
Cb) that there had been an impairment of the plaintiff's person,
d o ° • 2) d19n1ty or reputatlon; an
Cc) that the act itself was wrongfu1 3) or contra bonos mores.
4
)
In determining the latter the courts in South Africa have in-
dicated that they will be influenced by developments in other modern
legal systems. 5) It is therefore necessary to examine briefly how
some of these systems have attempted to solve the problem.
1) Voet 47.10.1; De Villiers op cit 27£;
1960 (4) SA 836 (C) 842; See above ~2.
2) Voet 47.10.7; De Villiers op cit 52f;
iarum op cit 173; see above 41.
3) De Villiers op cit 37f~ See below 170.
4) Voet 47.10.8; De Vil1iers op cit 22; See below 172.
5) Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd supra 249-




HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS MODERN LAW
It is trite that the South African law of delict is primarily
based on the Roman and Roman-Dutch law principles of the lex Aquilia
and actio injuriarum. 1) Furthermore any action for sentimental
damages arising from an invasion of privacy will lie under the actio
injuriarum,2) in which case the plaintiff will have to prove:
(a) that the defendant acted intentionally; (b) that the defen-
dant's act constituted an aggression on his personality rights; and
(c) that the defendant's act was wrongful. 3) The latter require-
ment of wrongfulness is essentially a question of policy which, in
cases where there is little authority in our law, often may be an-
swered by reference to developments in other legal systems. 4) As
this work is mainly concerned with South African law no detailed ana-
lysis of foreign legal systems will be attempted. 5) In any event
it seems that the overriding consideration in most jurisdictions,
from ancient Rome to the modern Western democracies, is the Court's
conception of the prevailing mores of the society concerned. 6)
It is intended to consider briefly the evolution of the right
to privacy in the United States, England, West Germany and Fr~nce -
not only because these countries possess considerable literature on
1) RG McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971)10; NJ Van der Merwe &
PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed
(1970) 186.
2) See below 125, 142.
3) Whittaker v Roos & Bateman 1912 AD 92, 130f; Bredell v Pienaar
1924 CPD 203, 210; Foulds v Smith 1950 (1) SA 1 (AD)10; O'Keeffe
v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 249.
4) O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd supra 249; Rhodesian
Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD) 593£.
5) For such an analysis see J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976)
(LL.D. Thesis) 22, 117, 152, 241.
6) See above 39, 49; cf Neeth1ing Privaatheid op cit 3l3f, 406.
See below 180.
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the subject but also because they illustrate the contrasting
approaches of Common law and Civil law systems. In Common law countries
the courts have recognised the action in the United States') but
not in England. 2) In Civil law although German academics had
argued for the recognition of a right to privacy since before the
end of the 19th century,3) formal judicial approval of the concept
was only given in the 1950's.4) Conversely in France a seminal
right to privacy was recognised by the courts in the early 1900's,S)
yet academic articulation of the right only occurred at the end of
the 1930's.6) In the past South African courts, faced with in-
vasions of privacy, have primarily referred to developments in the
United States,7) but it seems useful also to examine the position in
other jurisdictions.
B. The United States 8)
Invasion of privacy seems to have emerged as a tort in the
United States during the second half of the 19th century. The
"right to be let alone" was recognized by Judge Cooley as early as
9) .
1879. By the 1880's it seems that the problem had already been
,)
See below 51.
2) See below 72.
3) Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 24; see below 84.
4) See below 86.
5) See below 96.
6) Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 118.
7) O'Keeffe v Argus printin~ & Publishing Co Ltd supra 249- Rho-
desian Printing & Publis ing Co Ltd v Duggan supra 593£:
8) For a succinct detailed discussion see Neethling Privaatheid
op cit l52ff.
9) Cf TM Cooley A Treatise on the Law of Torts 2 ed (1888) 29- cf
AF Westin Privacy and Freedom (1967) 34-Lf.- ,
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considered by the courts, for instance, in respect of an intrusion
by the owner of a house into a guest's room for the purposes of a
sexual assault,1) and the unauthorized attendance by an unqualified
stranger at a child birth in a private house. 2)
There was, however, no clear articulation of the tort of pri-
vacy until the celebrated article by Warren and Brandeis in 1890. 3)
In their article the learned authors pointed cut how the common law
had progressed from merely protecting the individual against phy-
sical interferences with person or property, to the recognition of
the need for the protection of his spiritual feelings' and intellect. 4)
Such common law actions, however, were cloaked under the tradition-
al torts of property rights, contractual rights, defamation and
breaches of confidence, whereas in fact the courts had recognized a
right to privacy.5) For instance, the remedies allowed to authors
of literary and artistic compositions and private letters whose
works are published without consent, are not concerned with protect-
ing property rights but with the plaintiff's "inviolate personality
rights".6)
Warren and Brandeis were only concerned with publication of
private facts by the press 7) and their adoption8) of Cooley's "right
1) Newell v Whitcher (1880) 53 Vt 589, 39 Am Rep 703; cf Westin
op cit 344.
2) De May v Roberts (1881) 46 Mich 160; 9 NW 146, 41 Am Rep· 154;
cf TL Yang "Privacy: A Comparative Study of English and American
Law" (1966) 15 ICLQ 175, 180.
3) SD Warren & LD Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv LR
193. For a colourful description of why the article was written
see WL Prosser "Privacy" (1960) 48 Ca1 LR 383, 423.
4) Warren and Brandeis op cit 193f.
5) Warren and Brandeis op cit 213.
6) Warren and Brandeis op cit 205.
7) H Kalven "Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warrer: and Brandeis Wrong?"
(1966) 31 Law & Contemp Problems 326, 330.
8) Warren & Brandeis op cit 195.
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to be let alone,,1) has been criticized as "totally inadequate in
a complex society".2) Nonetheless after their article there was
a gradual acceptance of the "new" tort. It was accepted by the
lower courts in New York where a doctor's name and facsimile sig-
nature had been used without his consent to advertise a patent medi-
cine 3) and where the plaintiff's portrait had been published, despite
his protest, in connection with a popularity contest,4) but rejected
by the State court in Robertson v Rochester Folding Box Co 5) where a
photograph of an attractive young woman had been used to advertise
flour products without her consent. Notwithstanding a strong
dissenting judgment by Gray J who argued that the plaintiff had the
same property right in protecting the use of her face by defendant
for commercial gain, as she would have had had he published her lit-
erary writings,6) the majority of the court in Robertson's case
denied her an action on the grounds that: (a) there was no prece-
dent; (b) the injury was purely mental; (c) recognition would open
the floodgates of litigation; (d) it was too difficult to distin-
guish public from private figures; and (e) recognition would re-
strain the freedom of the press. 7) The decision caused a storm of
public outrage 8) with the result that a statute was passed a year
1) Cooley op cit 29.
2) P Stein & J Shand Legal Values in Western Society (1974) 189. Cf
JW Wade "Defamation and the Right of Privacy" (1962) 15 Vand LR
1093, 1124: "the principle behind the law of privacy is much
broader than the idea of privacy itself". See also GL Bostwick
"A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision"
(1976) 64 Cal LR 1447, 1450. But cf MR Konvitz "Privacy and the
Law: A Philosophical Prelude" (1966) 31 Law & Contemp Problems
272, 279; see above 5.
3) Mackenzie v Soden Mineral sarings Co (1891) 27 Abb NC 402; 18
NYS 240, 249; cf SH Hofsta ter & G Horowitz The Right of Privacy
(1964) 25.
4) Marks v Jaffa (1893) 6 Misc 290, 292; 26 NYS 908; cf Hofstadter
& Horowitz op cit 25.
5)
(1902) 171 NY 64 NE 442; cf PH Winfield "Privacy" (1931) 47 LQR
23, 35; cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 26f.
6)
Robertson v Rochester Folding Box Co supra 450; cf Yang op cit 181.
7)
cf Yang op cit 180 n 25; Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 27.
8)
~o much s~ that one ~f the majority judges defended the judgment
ln a law Journal artlc1e: O'Brien (1902) 2 Ca1 LR 437,445; cf
WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 803; Hofstadter & Horowitz
op cit 27.
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later making it a misdemeanour and a tort to use the name, portrait
or picture of any person for advertising or trade without their con-
sent. 1)
Elsewhere in the United States the right to privacy was recog-
nized as a common law tort at an early stage. In Pavesich v New
England Life Insurance Co 2) a photograph of plaintiff had been pub-
lished without his consent in an advertisement next to another photo-
graph of an "ill-dressed sickly-looking man". The plaintiff's
photograph was captioned "Do it now. The man who did". The other
photograph was headed "Do it while you can the man who didn't".3)
The court followed Gray J's dissenting judgment in Robertson v
Rochester Folding Box C0 4) and held that although there was no strict
precedent, the common law was flexible enough to recognize a right of
privacy - otherwise a person's photograph "may be reproduced and ex-
hibited anywhere [for instance, tQ7 ornament the bar of a saloon-
keeper, or decorate the walls of a brothel".5) In Foster-Milburn
Co v Chinn6) it was held that the unauthorized publication in a direc-
tory (circulation 8 million) of a picture of the plaintiff together
with a short biography and a forged recommendation by him concerning
a patent medicine, was a violation of his right to privacy.
1) NY Sess Laws 1903 Ch 132, ss 1-2; cf Prosser Torts op cit 803 n
13. The statute was subsequently consolidated as Article 5 of
the Civil Rights Law "Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 28 ..
Cf MA Franklin Injuries and Remedies: Cases and Materials on
Tort Law and Alternatives (1971) 804f.
2)
(1905) 122 Ga 190; 50 SE 68; cf L Brittan "The Right to Privacy
in England and the United States" (1963) 37 Tulane L R 233, 237.
3) Brittan op cit 237.
4)
Robertson v Rochester Folding Box Co supra 450; cf Yang op cit
181 .
5)
P~vesich v New England Life Insurance Co supra 129; Winfield op
CIt (1?31~ 47 LQR ~6; cf Peck v Tribune Co (1908) 214, US 185,
1~9, WInfIeld op CIt (1931)47 LQR 34f, decided on the basis of
lIbel.
6) (1909) 134 Ky, 424; 120 SW 364.
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Several jurisdictions, however, refused to recognize the
action,l) but by the time it was included in the first edition of
the Restatement of Torts 2) it had been accepted by eleven states.
3
)
The Restatement referred to the wrong as follows:
"A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with
another's interest in not having his affairs known to others
or is likewise exhibited to the public is liable to the
other".4)
Since its inclusion in the Restatement the action has been
widely recognized and is now accepted by most jurisdictions. 5) Some
70 years after the seminal article by Warren and Brandeis, Prosser
was able to extract from the numerous reported cases on privacy four
distinct categories of invasions: intrusions, public disclosures of
private facts, placing a person in a false light and appropriation
of another's name or likeness. 6)
1. Intrusions: The intrusion or prying into the plaintiff's seclu-
sion or solitude or his private affairs must be "offensive or objec-
tionable to a reasonable man" and must concern something which is
private. 7) Therefore it excludes inquiries into public records 8) or
1) For instance, Rhode Island, in Henry v Cherry & Webb (190~) 30
RI, 13, 73, A 97 (Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 189) and Washington,
in Hillman v Star Publishing Co (1911) 64 Wash 691, 117 Pac 594
(Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit llQf).
2) Restatement of Torts (1939), § 867.
3) The figure eleven emerges from the pre-1939 cases quoted by WL
Prosser "Privacy" (1960) 48 Cal LR 383, 386.
4) Restatement of Torts (1939), § 867. No reference is made to fault
cf Kalven op cit 333.
5) Prosser Torts op cit 804. It has been suggested that privacy is
a constitutional right and that the decisions of states denying
re~ognition of the right should be overruled. Prosser Torts op cit
816. It is submitted, however, that the constitutional right only
extends to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See below.
6) Prosser op cit (1960) 48 Cal LR 389. Prosser Torts op cit 804.
7) Prosser Torts op cit 808. See generally Franklin op cit 836f.
8) Cf Gotthelf v Hillcrest Lumber Co (1952),280 App Div 668,116 NYS
2d 873 (recording of pretrial testimony); Bowles v Misle (1946)







the following about 1) or photographing 2) of a person in a public
street. 3) An individual is constitutionally protected against in-
trusions by the Fourth and Fifth Arnendments,4) although it has been
argued that protection under the latter has been weakened. 5) Apart
from illegal searches of another's home 6) or person7) the action has
o 0 8) 1 0 OIl 9)been extended to cover wlre-tapplng, e ectronlC survel ance,
peeping toms 10 ) and persistent telephone calls. 11 ) In Dietemann v
Time Inc 12 ) it was held that the First Amendment does not allow the
press to invade privacy "during the course of newsgathering".13)
1) Cf Forster v Manchester (1963) 410 Pa 192, 189 A 2d 147, unless it
constitutes "rough shadowing" Pinkerton Nat Detective Agency v
Stevens (1963) 108 Ga App 159, 132 SE 2d 119. See below.
2) Cf Forster v Manchester supra; Gill v Hearst Publishing Co (1953)
40 Cal 2d 224, 253 P 2d 441. See-below 259.
3) Prosser Torts op cit 808. It is submitted that in our law, however,
such conduct may well give rise to an action for invasion of pri-
vacy.
4) Cf Note "Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected
Privacy under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments" (1977) 90 Harvard LR
945.
5) Note op cit (1977) 90 Harvard LR 974f.
6) Dietemann v Time Inc (1968) 284 F Supp 925 (DC Cal); cf Prosser
Torts op cit 807. See below 201.
7) Cf Sutherland v Kroger Co (1959) 144 W Va 673, 110 SE 2d 716. See
below 200.
8) Rhodes v Graham (1931) 238 Ky 225, 37 SW 2d 46. Le Crane·v Ohio
Bell Telephone Co (1961) 114 Ohio App 299, 182 NE 2d 15. Cf CS
Fishman "The Interception of Communications without a Court Order:
Title Ill, Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy" (1976) 51 St
John's LR 41. See below 210. --
9) Roac~ v Harper (1958) 143 W Va 869, 105 SE 2d 564; Elson v Bower
~7) 83 Nev 515, 436 P 2d 12; cf Prosser Torts op cit 807. Cf
JF Decker & J Handler "Electronic Surveillance: Standards, Restric-
tions and Remedies 11 (1975) 12 Cal West LR 60. See below 215.
Souder v Pendleton Detectives Inc (1956) 88 So 2d 716 (La App) ;
cf PInkerton Nat Detective Agency v Stevens supra. See below 199.
Housh v Peth (1956) 165 Ohio St 35, 133 NE 2d 340. See below 223,228
(1971) 449 F 2d 244 (9th Cir). Cf A Hill "Defamation and Privacy
under the First Amendment" (1976) 76 Columbia LR 1206, 1278.
At 249. Cf Branzburg v Hayes (1972) 408 US 665, 69lf.
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In Dietemann's case two newspaper reporters who invaded the home of
a "medical quack" and used a hidden camera and radio transmitter to
record his activities were held liable for invasion of privacy.1)
It has been pointed out, however, that newspapers should not be held
liable for the publication of matter in the public interest which has
been obtained through "tainted" methods 2) as this would have prevented




2. Public Disclosures of Private Facts: An action for invasion of
1 0)
11 )
privacy will lie where private information is given publicity "of a
highly objectionable kind" even if the information is true. 5) The
principle has been applied to publicity concerning: a reformed pros-
titute,6) the plaintiff's outstanding debts,7) a person's anatomy8)
and a woman's eccentric behaviour and masculine characteristics. 9)
Prosser submits that the publicity must not be to a single individual
or a small group unless it constitutes "a breach of contract, trust
or confidential relation which will afford an independent basis for
relief",10) but this view has been criticized for being based on "a
misreading of the cases".11) Hill goes further, however, and claims
1) Hill op cit 1278.
2) Hill op cit 1279.
3) Ibid. Cf New York Times Co v United States (1971) 403 US'7l3.
4) Hill op cit 1280.
5) Prosser Torts op cit 809.
6) Melvin v Reid (1931) 112 Col App 285, 297, P 91. See below 174.
7) Trammell v Citizen News Co (1941) 285 Ky 529, 148 SW 2d 708;
Biederman's of Springfield Inc v Wright (1959) 322 SW 2d 892 (Mo);
Tollefson v Price (1967) 247 Or 398, 430 P 2d 990. Cf Prosser
Torts op cit 809. See below 228£.
8) Feeney v Young (1920) 191 App Div 501, 181 NYS 481 (films of
caesarian operation); Banks v King Features Syndicate (1939) 30
F Sup~ 352 (SD NY) (X-rays of a woman's pelvic region); Griffin
v MedIcal ~ociety (1939) 11 NYS 2d 109 (deformed nose); cf Prosser
Torts op CIt 809. See below 258, 305.
9) Cason v Baskin (1945) 155 Fla 198, 20 So 2d 243; (1947) 159 Fla
31, 30 So 2d 635. Prosser Torts op cit 80f. 'See below 256.
Prosser Torts op cit 810.
Hill op cit 1286. It is submitted that in any event the rule does
not apply in South African law. See below 255.
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that where publication of private facts is the sole basis of the
action "the plaintiff has almost invariably lost", probably because
"newsworthiness has largely swallowed up the tort".1) In order to
safeguard the freedom of the press the courts have denied an action
bl " " d " t" f " 2)where a person has been pu IClze as: a VIC Im 0 a crIme; a
criminal;3) (erroneously) charged with a crime;4) a bystander photo-
graphed appearing to be criminally involved;5) and the relative of a
victim of a newsworthy event. 6) Where, however, the disclosures are
"shocking" or "unconscionable,,7) so as to "outrage the community's
notions of decency,,8) the publication may be actionable, although the
Supreme Court has held that such disclosures are protected if they
reflect a truthful extract from "official court records".9)
3. False light: Publicity which places a person in a false light
in the public eye will be actionable if it is "objectionable to the
1) Cf Ka1ven op cit 336, 338. Hill op cit 1255: "Yet it was pre-
cisely this aspect of the tort that was the concern of Warren and
Brandeis." Cf Franklin op cit 819f.
2) Hubbard v Journal Pub1 Co (1962) 69 NM 473, 368 Pd 147.
3) Barbieri v News-Journal Co (1963) 56 Del 67,189 A 2d 773; Leopold
v Levin (1970) 45 III 2d 434, 259 NE 2d 250.
4) Williams v KCMO Broadcasting Corp (1971) 472 SW 2d 1 (Mo CE App).
5) Jacova v Southern Radio & Television Co (1955) 83 So 2d 34' (Fla).
See generally Hill op cit 1256.
6) Smith v Doss (1948) 251 Ala 250, 37 So 2d 118; Corabi v Curtis
Publ Co lI97l) 441 Pa 432, 469, 273 A 2d 899, 918. See below 359.
7) Hill op cit 1258f, who submits that this is the basis of liability
laid down in Sidis v F-R Publishing Corp (1940) 113 F 2d 806 (2 Cir);
(1940) 311 US 711, which is consistent with the decision in Melvin
v Reid supra. See below 174.
8) Time Inc v Hill (1967) 385 US 374, 383 n 7; cf Hill op cit 1263.
ct Deaton v-neIta Democrat Publ Co (1976) 326 So 2d 471 (Miss)
(story and photographs of mentally retarded school children). Cf
Commonwealth v Wiseman (1969) 356 Mass 251, 249 NE 2d 610; (1970)
398 US 960, where the showing of the "Titicut Follies" film on
criminally insane inmates in an institution, which included scenes
of "naked patients ... desperately attempting to hide ... their
privates with their hands", was restricted to "judicially-approved
audiences". Hill op cit 1260.
9)
Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn (1975) 420 US 469, 471 n 1. Cf Hill
op cit 1264f. ----
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ordinary reasonable man,,1) and does not amount to minor inaccuracies
or misrepresentations. 2) On the other hand it has been suggested
that the constitutional privilege referred to in Time Tnc v Hil1
3
)
should be extended to cover collateral falsehoods if the main allega-
tions are true,4) but it is submitted that this depends upon the
degree of falsity. Hill favours false light cases being treated as
analogous to defamation with the same fault element,S) but without
the libel/slander dichotomy,6) and it seems that this form of invasion
of privacy is becoming blurred with defamation. 7)
4. Appropriation: The appropriation of the plaintiff's name or
likeness for the defendant's benefit or advantage is also an action-
able invasion of privacy.8) Prosser points out that there is no ex-
clusive protection of a person's name in the United States,9) but that
in privacy cases the plaintiff's name is seen as a "symbol of iden-
tity".10) The plaintiff's "personal feelings" must not be ignored
but the decisions seem "to recognize the plaintiff's name as being
analogous to a "species of trade name" and his likeness to a "kind of
trade mark".ll) This was the first form of invasion of privacy recog-
nized by the American courts 12 ) and usually takes the form of the
Prosser Torts op cit 813.
Supra.
Hill op cit 1272.
Hill op cit 1274.
Hill op cit 1275.
See below 62f.
1) Prosser Torts op cit 812. Cf Restatement of Torts, Second §6S2E
(Test Draft No 22, 1976), which states the invasion must be "highly









Prosser Torts op cit 804.
Cf France (FP Walton "The Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy"
(1931) 47 LQR 219, 223; Justice Report Privacy and the Law (1970)
21, para 92. Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 128££. See below":
10!; Fed~ral Re~ublic of Germany (Article 12 BGB; Neethling
Prlvaatheld op Clt 42f). See generally Ed AH Robertson Privacy and
Human Rights (1973) 45.
10) Prosser Torts op cit 805.
11) Prosser Torts op cit 807.





unauthorized use of another's name or likeness for advertising pur-
poses. 1) The "advantage or benefit", however, need not be pecuniary
and a plaintiff has recovered where his name has been used as a can-
didate for political office;2) to advertise for witnesses of an acci-
dent;3) to provide a father for a child on a birth certificate;4)
and to enable the defendant to pose as the plaintiff's common law
wife,5) Newspapers clearly operate for profit and in order to pre-
ven t an unconstitutional interference wi th the freedom of the pre.s s 6)
the appropriation provisions of the New York privacy statute7) have
been interpreted to exclude publication of "news, history, biography,
and other factual subjects of public interest".8) Hill argues that
the unauthorized use of another's image or likeness in a newspaper ad-
vertisement is closer to the false light situation,9) but it is sub-
mitted that in South African law the distinction is irrelevant. 10 )
Notwithstanding criticism of Prosser's classification by
Bloustein,ll) who regards invasion of privacy as a dignitary wrong,
1) Prosser Torts op cit 80S.
2) La Follette v Hinkle (1924) 131 Wash 86, 229 P 317.
3) Hamilton v Lumberman's Mut Cas Co (1955) 82 So 2d 61; 226 La 644,
76 So 2d 916.
4) Vanderbilt v Mitchell (1907) 72 NJ Eq 910, 67 A 97. See below.
5) Burns v Stevens (1926) 236 Mich 443 210 NW 482.
6) Prosser Torts op cit 806f.
7) NY Civ Rights Law §50; cf Hill op cit 1300. Cf Franklin op cit 805f.
8) Saa~n v Ju1ian Messner rne (1964) 23 App Div 2d 216, 219, 260 NYS
2 51, 453; cf Hill op cit 1300. Cf Zacchini v Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co (1976) 47 Ohio St 2d 224, 351 NE 2d 454; (1977)
97 S et 730, where a 15 second telecast of the plaintiff's entire
perf?rm<:nce as a "human cannonball" was held to be "of legitimate
publlC lnterest" and not appropriation; cf Hill op cit 1276 n 335.
Hill op cit 1277.
See below 295. In most cases of invasion of privacy the action will
be governed by the provisions of the actio injuriarum. The fact
that the plaintiff was presented in a false light may however be
an aggravating factor in the assessment of damages. See below:
EJ Bloustein "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser" (1964) 39 NYULR 962. .
61 •
on the basis that Warren and Brandeis had distinguished an invasion
of privacy - or inviolate personality - as an "act wrongful in it-
self" and that considerations of reputation or the monetary value
. 1) P ,.of a person's name or likeness were lrrelevant, rosser s Vlew
prevailed and was subsequently adopted by the Restatement of Torts
(Second).2)
It has been argued that Prosser's categories have been super-
ceded by the Supreme Courts' recognition of a constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy and that there is a need for a new "toxonomy"
of privacy.3) Such a toxonomy would take into account biological,
sociological and psychological factors,4) and includes three classes
of privacy,S) ie "the privacy of repose",6) "the privacy of sanc-
tuary",?) and "the privacy of intimate decision".8) A good illus-
tration of the Courts' apparent recognition of human behavioural
patterns is Griswold v Connecticut 9) where Douglas J referred to
"zones of privacy".10) In Griswold's case the Supreme Court declared
1) Bloustein op cit 967; cf H Gross "The Concept of Privacy" (1967)
42 NYULR 34, who suggests that there are two meanings to privacy
viz a primary meaning, dealing with intrusions and disclosures,
and a secondary meaning, dealing with mental repose and autonomy.
cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit l63f.
2) Restatement of Torts (Second) (1971), §652A. Cf EJ Juta "Some
Comments on the Privacy of Public Figures in England and the
United States" (1972) 1 NULR No 1, 21, 25.
3) Bostwick op cit 1450, who states that Prosser's analysis ndoes
not accommodate subsequent cases involving contraceptives, abor-
tion and state regulation of sexual and ingestive activities".
4) See above 2ff.
5) Bostwick op cit 1450.
6) Bostwick op cit 1451: "Repose is freedom from anything that dis-
turbs or excites ... the right to be let alone in its most classic
form". See below "Intrusions" 198.
7)
Bostwick.op cit 1~56: "Sanct':lary means prohibiting other persons
from seelng, hearlng and knowlng." See below "Publicity" 246.
8) Bostwick op cit 1466: "The zone of intimate decision is an area
within which the personal calculus used by an individual to make
fundamental decisions must be allowed to operate without the in-
jection of disruptive factors by the state".
9) (1965) 381 US 479.
10)
Griswold v Connecticut supra.484; .cf Osborn v United States (1966)
385 US 323, 352, Douglas J dlssentlng. Cf Bostwick op cit 1449.
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unconstitutional state laws which impo?cd criminal sanctions for
dissemination of birth control information and contraceptives on
. d h . h . l' 1)the basis that they vlolate t e rlg t to marlta prlvacy.
Subsequently in Roe v Wade 2) the Supreme Court held that the con-
stitutional right of privacy includes a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy by abortion up to the time when
the foetus becomes viable. 3) More recently the right to privacy
has been invoked in a wide variety of cases such as:
"Whether a city may refuse to allow political advertising
on its buses,4) whether a father has the right to order that
life support systems be disconnected from his comatose daugh-
ter,S) whether a state may prohibit sodomy between consenting
adults in private,6) whether a city can restrict the number
of unrelated individuals living in one house,7) and whether
evidence is admissible if it results from a search founded
upon a warrant granted because of the positive reaction of
marijuana-sniffing dogs to a trailer parked in a public
8)" 9)space.
Some writers have gone so far as to suggest that the tort of privacy
is becoming so wide in the United States that it not only impinges
on freedom of expression but also threatens to swallow up other
t · 10) F' h' . 1 . d f' hac lons. or lnstance, t e prlnclp e ln e amatlon cases t at
a public figure may only recover damages if he can prove that the
defendant acted wi th "actual malice"_ (ie knowledge that a state-
ment was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not) 11)
1) Westin op cit 353ff.
2) (1973) 410 US 113.
3) Cf HR Hah10 "Nasciturus in the Limelight" (1974) 91 SALJ 73, 78f;
MB Cane "Whose Right to Life? Implications of Roe v--wa<Ie" (1973)7
Family Law Quarterly 413.
4) Lehman v Shaker Heights (1974) 418 US 298.
5) In re Quin1an (1976) 355 A 2d 647. Cf In South Africa where
D?minee J van Loggernberg's request to a hospital to withdraw
llfe-support facilities for his comatose wife was acceded to with-
out obtaining a court order. Rapport June 12, 1977.
6) Doe v Commonwealth Atty (1975) 403 F Supp 1199 (ED Va).See above 15n5
7) Belle Terre v Boraas (1974) 416 US 1.
8) United States v Solis (1976) 536 F 2d 880 (9th Cir).
9) .Bostwick op cit 1447.
10) Cf Prosser Torts op cit 813ff; cf DE Brown "The Invasion of Defa-
mation by Privacy" (1971) 23 Stanford LR 547f. See below 133f.
11) New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254; cf A Hill "Defama-
tion and Privacy under the First Amendment" (1976) 76 Cal LR
1206, 1211. Cf Frank1in op cit 813f.
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was extended to false light privacy cases in Time rnc v Hil1
1
)
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure -
provided it concerned "matters of public interest".2) Conversely
the principle in Hill's caseappears to be threatened by Gertz v
Robert Welch Inc 3) which held that a public figure must prove
"actual malice" by the defendant whereas "any showing of fault
greater than strict liability" was sufficient in the case of private
individuals. 4) Confusion was further confounded in Time Inc v
Firestone 5) where a plaintiff suing for defamation was able to re-
cover for "mental injury and anguish" without alleging or proving
injury to reputation. 6) It has been submitted that in order to
prevent "media self-censorship" and to protect freedom of speech
under the First Amendment this confusion should not be allowed to
water down the "actual malice" requirement adumbrated in Hill's
case. 7) Furthermore, privacy situations constitutionally protected
by the Fourth (security against unreasonable searches and seizures)
and Fifth (prevention of self-incrimination in criminal cases) Amend-
ments 8) are generally distinguishable from those which overlap with
with the constitutionalization of defamation under the First Amend-
ment. 9)
1) (1967) 385 US 374. Cf Franklin op cit 812f.
2) Note "Defamation, Privacy and the First Amendment" 1976 Duke LJ
1016, 1017f.
3) (1974) 418 US 323 (a defamation case) .. Cf Note op cit 1976 Duke Law J 1019.
4) Note op cit 1976 Duke LJ 1018; cf Hill op cit 1212.
5) (1976) 424 US 448.
6) Note op cit 1976 Duke LJ 1017.
7) Note op cit 1976 Duke LJ 1018.
8) Cf Note "Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected
Privacy under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments" (1977) 90 Harv LR
945; MG Hill, HM Rossen & WS Sogg Smith's Review: Torts (1975)
2?6: "Alth?ugh the Constitution does not speclfical1y mention any
rl~ht of p:lvacy, th~ US Supreme Court has recognized that right
WhlCh has ltS roots ln the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments and
and ~n the penumbras of. the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment
and ln the concept of llberty guaranteed by the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
9) For instance, "Intrusions". See below 198f.
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5.Data Banks: At common law where information concerning an indivi-
dual was released to another by a data bank, the former would only
be able to recover damages if he could prove that the information
1) d f " " 2)placed him in a false light, or was use or approprlatl0n purposes,
or that an action lay for defamation or negligence. 3) A Report by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)4) recommended
that: (i) there should be no secret data bank systems; (ii) an in-
dividual ought to be able to find out what information is on record
and how it is used; (iii) an individual should be able to prevent in-
formation obtained for one purpose being used for another; (iv) an
individual must be able to correct or amend identifiable information
about himself;& (iv)any agencies creating, maintaining, using or dis-
seminating identifiable information must assume the reliability of the
data and take precautions against its misuse. S) Most of these prin-
ciples have been embodied in legislation to control the activities of
data banks in both the private and public sector.
a) Private Sector: The Fair Credit Reporting Act 6) is designed to
meet the needs of commerce "in a manner which is fair and equitable to
the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy,
and proper utilization of such information".7) The Act is, however,
concerned "primarily with the accuracy of the reporting system and
secondarily with preventing the unauthorized disclosure of consumer
information".8) The privacy aspect is further weakened by·the pro-
vision that credit reports may contain information on an individual's
1) See above 58.
2) See above 59.
3)
Cf Note "Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports" (1971) 80 Yale
LJ 1035, 1049f, 1068.
4)
US ~ept of He~lth, Education and Welfare Report of the Secretary's
Advlsor Commlttee on Automated Personal Data S stems: Records
Corn uters an the Ri hts 0 Citlzens 1973 paras 20-1 1" C
HMSO Computers: Sa eguar s or Prlvacy (1975, Cmnd 6354) 42.
5)
Computers: Safeguards for Privacy op cit 47, cf also 46.
6)
15 United States Code ~1681 (1970).
7)
Ibid; ef DP Rothschild & DW Carroll Consumer Protection: Text and
Materials (1973) 269.
8)
Note "The Fair Credl"t Reportl"ng Act" (1971) 23 U Maine LR 253,257.
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"character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode
of living".1) In addition the Act does not cover the gathering of
such information for an agency's "internal use", nor where a company
reports on its own experiences with an individual. 2) Consumer re-
ports which generally concern a person's financial standing for the
purposes of a loan, are distinguished from "investigative consumer
reports" which consist of information about a person's character,3)
and "is obtained through personal interviews with friends, neighbours
or acquaintances of the sUbject".4) If an individual is refused a
job, credit or insurance due to a report from a consumer reporting
agency, the user of the information must inform him of the adverse
report and give him the name and address of the agency.s) Where
such adverse information was not supplied in a consumer report, the
user of the information must not only advise the consumer of the ad-
verse action, but also that upon written request within 60 days of
learning of the adverse action the consumer is entitled to a disclosure
of the nature of the information. 6) If an investigative consumer re-
port is involved, within 3 days of the date that the report is re-
quested the consumer must be informed that such an investigation is
being made, and is entitled on written request, to receive "a complete
and accurate disclosure of the nature and scope of the investigatiorr~7)
A data subject also has the right, upon request and proper identifica-
tion, to be informed of the nature and substance of all information
(except medical) in the agency's file. 8) The agency is obliged to
provide trained personnel to explain the information. Disclosures
may be made in person or by telephone after a written request, and the
data subject may be accompanied in his inspection by a person of his
1) IS United States Code § 1681 d(a).
2) Rothschild & Carroll op cit 270.
3) IS United States Code § 1681 aCe). See below 122 n 6.
4) Rothschild & Carroll op cit 270.
5) 15 United States Code § 1681 a(f).
6) Ibid; cf Rothschild & Carroll op cit 270.
7) IS United States Code § 1681 d (1970); Rothschild & Carroll op cit
270f.
8) IS United States Code § 1681 g, § 1681 b (1970); Rothschild &
Carroll op cit 271.
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own choosing. 1) The data subject may dispute the accuracy of his
file and if this is not resolved, may file his own information which
the agency must send out with all future reports. If investigation
shows that the subject's version is correct, the agency must, on re-
quest by him, notify any designated person who has received a copy of
the report during the past 6 months (2 years if he is an employer).2)
Where information is gathered from public records, there is the danger
of errors (eg individuals with the same name). Therefore in the case
of reports for employers agencies are required to inform the subject
that public record information is being sent to the user (giving the
latter's name and address). Furthermore the agencies must maintain
"strict procedures designed to insure "that the public information is
complete and up to date".3) There are some limitations on the use
of information. Adverse information over 7 years old may not be re-
ported except if it involves credit transactions of over $50,000,4)
and a report not furnished in response to a court order or at the sub-
ject's consent may only be given for "a legitimate business need".5)
An adverse statement in one investigative consumer report may not be
included in a subsequent investigative report unless the information
had either been received within 3 months of the subsequent report or
has been re-verified. 6) It has been pointed out that there are 3
main defects in the Act: 7) (1) No one need inform the subject that he
has a right to be told what is in his file - the user of the report
need only disclose the name and address of the reporting agency, and
the agency need only make a disclosure concerning the report when re-





IS United States Code §168l i(d); Rothschild & Carroll op cit 272.
IS United States Code §168l k; Rothschild & Carroll op cit 272.
15 United States Code §168l c (1970); cr Rothschild & Carroll op
cit 272.
5) IS United States Code § 1681 1 (1970).
6) Ibid; cf Rothschild & Carroll op cit 273.
7) Rothschild & Carroll op cit 273.
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credit information is not disclosed to the subject until the adverse
action is taken. (3) Some credit bureaux discriminate against
married women by merging a wife's credit record with her husband's file.
d C
. . 1)
The Act can be enforced publicly by the Federal Tra e ommlSSlon,
and privately by the individual concerned. In the latter the indivi-
dual may only sue for negligent or wilful non-compliance with the Act
and recover actual damages (plus court costs and reasonable attorney's
fees) and punitive damages respectively.2) Actual damages, however,
will usually be nominal for refusal of credit, but may be substantial
for loss of employment or insurance. 3) The Act virtually excludes
actions for defamation, invasion of privacy and negligence and seems
to make the r~medies granted in it exclusive. 4)
b) Public Sector: The aftermath of the Watergate scandal saw the
introduction of legislation to not only give wider access to govern-
ment records, but also to provide some control over the collection of
private information by Federal agencies. The Crime Control Act of
1973 5) provides limited access to a person's criminal records for al-
teration, and prohibits unauthorized disclosure of personally identi-
fiable research or statistical information. Furthermore only inform-
ation relevant to law enforcement and criminal investigation may be
retained. 6) The Freedom of Information Act 7) provides that all in-
formation held by governmental agencies, subject to certain excep-
tions~)should be available to the public. g) The Act was amended in
1) 15 United States Code §168l s; cf Rothschild & Carroll op cit 273f.
2) 15 United States Code §168l n, §168l o.
3) Cf Rothschild & Carroll op cit 274.
4) 15 United States Code §168l h(e); Rothschild & Carroll op cit 275.
5) 42 United States Code §370lf (Supp IV, 1974).
6) JJ Hanus & HC Relyea "A Policy Assessment of the Privacy Act of
1974" (1976) 25 American ULR 555, 567f.
7) 5 United States Code §552 (1970; Supp IV, 1974).
8) 5 United States Code §552 (b) (Supp 1976) exempts information re-
lating to" (i) national defence and foreign policy; (ii) internal
personnel rules and practices of an agency; (iii) matters specifi-
cally excluded by statute; (iv) trade secrets, privileged or con-
~idential commercial or financial matters; (v) inter agency or
lntr~-age~cy memorandums or letters; (vi) personal privacy, where
the ~nvaslon would be clearly unwanted; (vii) investigating files
complle~ for law enforcemen~ purposes; (viii) reports of agencies
responslble for the regulatlon and supervision of Financial Insti-
tutions; and (ix) geological and geophysical data concerning oil
wells .. See generally M Gorski "Access to Information? Exemptions
from Dlsclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy
Act of 1974" (1976) 13 Willamette LJ 135.
9)
Hanus & Relyea op cit 556. Cf RJ Hausen "Freedom of Information
Act - E~emption 7(A) Rejected as Discovery Tool in NLRB Enforcement
Proceedlngs" (1977) 51 St John's LR 251.
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1974 to specify the procedures for answering requests
1
) and allow
for an in camera examination by a federal district court.
2
) Privacy
receives limited protection in the Freedom of Information Act by the
proviso that "personal and medical files and similar files the dis-
closure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy" need not be disclosed. 3) This provision has re-
ceived conflicting interpretations by the courts,4) The popular
view seems to be that the courts should balance the right of privacy
of affected individuals against the right of the public to be informed,
al though the words "clearly unwarranted" indicate that the balance should
be tilted in favour of disclosure. 5) The Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act of 1974 6) provides the parents of students (and in
some cases students themselves) access to educational records of their
children, as well as specifying procedures for challenging the sub-
stance of records and limiting the dissemination of records to third
. 7)partles.
The Privacy Act of 1974 8) "requires the federal government to
give notice of the record systems it establishes, restricts inter-
governmental transfer of personally identifiable records and ensures
a data subj ect' s access to his own record". 9) It also places certain
restrictions on parties to whom federal agencies may disseminate in-
formation and requires agencies to allow data subjects to correct
1) 5 United States Code § 552 (a)(6)(A)(i), ~ 552 (a)(6)(C); cf
Gorski op cit 137. The agency must within 10 working days, find the
record and send. it, or decide if it is exempt from disclosure and ad-
vise requester accordingly. Gorski op cit 137.
2) 5 United States Code §552 (a)(4)(B); Gorski op cit 137.
3) 5 United States Code §552 (b)(6); cf Gorski l52f.
4) Cf RabIes v Environmental Protection Agency (1973) 484 F 2d 843
(4th Cir); Gorski op cit 153.
5) Rose v Dept of the Air Force (1976) 425 US 352, 381, where the
court noted that an in camera inspection procedure accommodated
both the individual~ rights to privacy and public rights to govern-
ment information. Gorski op cit 154.
6) 20 United States Code §1232 g (Supp IV 1974).
7) Hanus & Relyea op cit 569.
8) 5 United States Code §552 a (Supp 1976).
9) Hanus & Relyea op cit 573.
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errors in the information held. 1 ) The Privacy Act protects any
personally identifiable records,2) and agencies may only retain in-
formation which is "relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose
of the agency" in terms of a statute or executive order of the Presi-
dent. 3) Data should (as far as possible) be collected directly from
the subject, if it may result in adverse determinations,4) and the
individual must be informed of the authority of the agency, whether
the response is mandatory or optional, its main purpose and use, and
the effect of not providing all or part of the information. 5) The
agencies must publish at least annually a notice in the Federal Regis-
ter setting out the existence and character of the records held by
them. 6) The Act prohibits the disclosure of any record to any per-
son or agency without the prior written consent of the individual con-
cerned,7) except for instance, where it is made to an officer of the
same agency in the course of his duties or for "routine" purposes,8)
or in terms of the Freedom of Information Act,9) or to another agency
1) Ibid.
2) 5 United States Code §552 a(a) (4) (Supp IV 1974). These include
not only notations describing education, financial transactions,
medical history, criminal records, employment history etc, but
also fingerprints, voice prints and photographs. Cf Hanus & Relyea
op cit 577.
3) 5 United States Code §552a(e)(1) (Supp IV 1974). Agencies may not
however, keep records as to how a person exercises his 1st Amend-
ment rights (5 United States Code §552a(e)(8)).
4) 5 United States Code §552 aCe) (2) (Supp IV 1974); cf Hanus &
Relyea op cit 577.
5) 5 United States Code §552 a(e)(3) (A) - (D) (Supp IV 1974). Hanus
& Relyea op cit 578.
6) 5 United States Code §552 a(e)(4) (Supp IV 1974). The notice must
specify: (i) the names and locations of the record systems; (ii)
the categories of individuals recorded; (iii) the routine uses of
the records; (iv) the agency official responsible for the records;
(v) how an individual can ascertain whether he is the subject of a
file; and (vi) how a subject can inspect and contest information
in the file. Hanus & Relyea op cit 578.
7) 5 United States Code §552 a(b) (Supp IV, 1974).
8) 5 United States Code §552 a(b)(l), §552 a(b)(3).
9) 5 United States Code §552 a(b)(2).
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legally authorized to conduct civil or criminal law enforcement
activity.1) Set procedures are specified concerning accessability
of information. On request the agency must: inform the individual
whether it holds records on him,2) permit him (accompanied by a per-
.~ . h d 3) d 11 h .son of his own chOOSIng) to reVIew any suc recor s, an a ow lm
to recover a copy thereof in a comprehensible form and at a reasonable
cost. 4) A person wishing to challenge, correct or explain any in-
formation in his record may also submit a request to the agency.5)
One provision of the Act also applies to local, state and federal
agencies and limits the use of social security numbers as universal
identifiers or indexing tools. 6) The Act imposes both civil and crim-
inal penalties for contraventions of its provisions. 7)
1) 5 United States Code §552 a(b)(7) .. Hanus & Relyea op cit 578.
No agency is exempt from giving notice of the existence and nature
of record systems, but some are exempted from the provisions regard-
ing accessibility and the right to challenge (5 United States Code
§552 a(j) - (k) (Supp IV 1974)). General exemptions are provided
for the CIA and law enforcement agencies (5 United States Code
§552 a (j) (Supp IV, 1974)) while specific exemptions apply to:(i)
classified material; (ii) investigative material compiled for law
enforcement purposes; (iii) records maintained by protective ser-
vice agencies; (iv) statistical records; (v) investigative mater-
ial regarding qualifications for federal employment; (vi) testing
or examination material; and (vii) evaluation material for pro-
motion in the armed services. (5 United States Code §552 a(k) (Supp
IV,1974); cf Gorski op cit l63ff).





5 United States Code §552 a(f)(5).
5 United States Code §552 a(d)(2) (Supp IV, 1974). The applicant
must within 10 days either be allowed to correct the record or be
informed of the refusal, together with the reasons therefor and the
procedures for review by the head of an agency, and the business
address of the official denying the request. (Ibid) A request to
the agency head to review the agency's refusal to amend must be
acted upon within 30 working days (5 United States Code §552 a(d) (3)).
If the reviewing official also declines, the individual may file
a statement ot reasons for disputing the record (Ibid) which must be
given to any person to whom his file is or had been disclosed (5
United States Code §552 a(d)(4)). In addition the unsuccessful
individual may sue in a federal district court for an order to have
his record amended (5 United States Code §552 a(g)(l) (A) - (B),
§SS2 (g)(2)(A). See generally Hanus & Relyea op cit 582f.
6)
Ha~us & Re~y~a op cit 587f. See Pub L No 93 - 579. §7 (Dec 31 1971)
Whlch.prohlblts ~ny gover~m~nt agency from denying an individual
any rIght, benefIt, or prIVIlege provided by law because of a re-
fusal to disclose his social security number unless a statute speci-
fies otherwise. '
7) 5 United States Code §552 a(g), §552 a(i) (Supp IV, 1974).
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While the Freedom of Information Act makes access to govern-
ment records available to the public at large, the Privacy Act limits
accessibility to the data subjects. 1) The Privacy Act does not pro-
tect privacy, but rather controls information held by federal (as
opposed to local, state or private agencies,2) by ensuring its accu-
racy, fairness, relevance and security.3) The Privacy Act is fur-
ther weakened by the exemption concerning information accessible
under the Freedom of Information Act. 4) The cost of obtaining in-
formation under the Privacy Act is less than under the Freedom of
Information Act,S) but information is more accessible under the
latter. 6)
Conclusion: The right to privacy in the United States appears to
have developed on a policy basis which may provide useful guidelines
for our courts when considering the question of wrongfulness - but
the American concept should not be followed blindly.7) Furthermore
there appears to be little analysis of the fault element in privacy
actions in the United States - apart from the false light cases where
the wrong is becoming confused with defamation. 8) On the other hand
the statutory controls over invasions of privacy in the United States
give a good indication of how shortcomings in the common law can be
rectified.
The different aspects of the right to privacy in the United
States will be discussed in more detail during the analysis of the
actions in South African law.
Ibid.




Hanus & Relyea op cit 589.
Cf Gorski op cit 140: "even if a record has been declared exempt
under the Privacy Act, access may still be sought under the LFree-
dom of Information Ac!:7."
5) Hanus & Relyea op cit 583f.
6) Gorski op cit 171.
7) See below 178f.




Although Warren and Brandeis had based their seminal article
in part on several English cases,2) the English courts themselves
seem reluctant to recognize a tort of privacy.3) It has been
suggested that Prince Albert v Strange 4) (which was relied upon by
Warren and Brandeis) laid the foundation for a right to privacy in
English lawS) and that it is still open to the House of Lords to
recognize the action. 6) At an early stage the concept was also
rejected by English writers,7) although subsequently it has been
referred to as an "emergent tort",8) and sometimes as a "doubtful
tort".9) An infringement of privacy in England however may be
actionable if the plaintiff can bring his complaint within one of
the existing nominate torts. 10 ) In several instances such torts
f . f· . 11)cover Prosser's our categorIes 0 InvasIons:
1) For a detailed analysis of the English law see J Neethling Die
Reg op Privaatheid (1976) 24lff.
2) SD Warren and LD Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv
LR 194, 202ff.
3) B Neill "The Protection of Privacy" (1962) 25 Modern LR 393, 394;
Justice Report Privacy and the Law (1970) 8, para 30.
4) (1849) 2 De G & Srn 652, 64 Eng Rep 293 (Ch); cf Warren and
Brandeis op cit 202. Here the Prince Consort successfully ob-
tained an injunction preventing the publication of copies' of
privately exhibited etchings of the Royal Family made by Queen
Victoria and himself.
5) During the Debate on Lord Mancroft's Right of Privacy Bill (see
below 30) Lord Denning said: "So in 1848, the courts of this
country were ready to give a remedy for the infringement of pri-
vacy" (House of Lords Debates (1961) vol 229, Col 638). Cf P
Stein & J Shand Legal Values in Western Society (1974) 187: "It
is difficult to see, in the absence of any lIkelihood that the
Prince might wish to exploit them commercially, what other right
could have been infringed by publication than his right to personal
integrity and peace of mind". But cf Neill op cit 395 n 15.
6) PH Winfield "Privacy" (1931) 47 LQR 23, 34; PH Winfield & JA
Jolowicz Winfield & Jolowicz on Torts 9 ed (1971) 501.
7) Cf TE Holland Jurisprudence 8 ed (1895) 165: "One's good name,
for instance, though invaluable, may be regarded ... as an "airy
nothing ... Still less tangible would be the 'right to privacy'
or 'right to be let alone', which, it has been suggested, ought
to be so far recognized as to shield a man from the publication,
without his consent, of his portrait, or of the details of his
private life".
8) RFV Heuston Salmond on Torts 16 ed (1973) 34.
9) Winfield & Jolowicz op cit 501
10) N~ill op ci t 394, $almond op ci t 35; TL Yang "Privacy: A Compara-
tIve Study of EnglIsh and American Law" (1966) 15 ICLQ 175; Justice
Privacy op cit 8, para 31.
111 See ahove 55: cf Salmond op cit 44f.
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These are actionable under the law relatjng to:
(a) Intrusions:
(i) Trespass: where there is some physical contact with the
plaintiff's property1) or person,2) but the action will
fail if the offence takes place from off the property (eg.
3) 0 off
a 'peeping Tom' from across the street) or t~) plalntl
does not own the property (eg. a hotel guest), or the
o ft 5)
plaintiff's property is photographed from an alrcra ·
(ii) Nuisances: where there is an unreas~na~le inte~ference 6)
with the use or enjoyment by the plalntlff of hlS property,
but the plaintiff must have a legitimate interest in such
property,7) and in any event there is nothing to prevent a
landowner fTom opening new windows which look over his
o 8)
neighbour's premlses.
Jolowicz & Winfield op cit 502.
RobertsonSalmond op cit 54;
1) Sheen v ~' Daily Telegraph June 22, 1961; cf Salmond 35 n 28
(listeninga,-evice placed above plaintiff's m3ritel bed on his
wedding night). Cf Joliffe v Wilmett & Co i197lj 1 All ER 478
(QB) 484 (private qetective).
2) Salmond 122 (eg. where the plaintiff's fingerprints are wrong~
fully taken).
3) Justice Privacy op cit 9, para 35. But ownership of property
has been extended to include the subsoil of a highway adjoining
the plaintiff's property in a "peeping Tom" case Harrison v Duke
of Rutland (1893) 1 QB 142. cf Winfield op cit (1931) 47 LQR-z5;
Justice Privacy op cit 9, para 35.) ---
4) Justice Privacy op cit 9, para 35; AH Robertson Privacy and
Human Rights (1973) 98.
5) Bernstein v Skyviews & General Ltd (1977) 127 New LJ 153, unless
perhaps the plaintiff is subjected to "the harassment of constant
surveillance of his home". But contra Salmond op cit 44, who sub-
mits that the Civil Aviation Act of 1949 "might enable dam:lges to
be recovered for such an invasion of privacy as aerial photographs
of one's house".
6) Salmond op cit 51; Winfield & Jolowicz op cit 326. For instance,
where the plaintiff is hounded by continuous telephone calls,
Justice Privacy op cit 10, para 40. Cf Robbins v Canadian Broad-
casting Corp (Que) 1957) 12 DLR 2d 35; C Wright Cases on the Law
of Torts 4 ed (1967) 29f, where a doctor was inundated with a
barrage of offensive letters and telephone calls. The same would
apply where a person is subjected to watching and besetting, Jolo-
wicz & Winfield op cit 502; cf ~yon v Wilkins (1899) 1 Ch 255. But
compare the case of the Balham entist who was unable to interdict
his neighbour from using special mirrors to watch the agonized
expressions on his patient's faces. Winfield op cit (1931) 47
LQR 27.
7) Malone v Laskey (1907) 2 KB 141;
op cit 99.
8) Tapling v Jones (1865) 11 HLC 290;
,/
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(iii) Intentional infliction of emotional distress: eg. where
the plaintiff's peace of mind was disturbed by a false
report that her husband had been badly injured in a col-
lision,1) or where the plaintiff was told by private detec-
tives that unless she procured certain letters from her
mistress they would publicly disclose that her fiancee who
had been interned during World War I was a traitor.
2
) It
has been pointed out, however, that:
"many outrageous intrusions upon a person in his private
life, home, family and correspondence which, though of-
fensive and humiliating, may not produce any physical
harm".3)
Cb) Publication of Private Facts: Here the plaintiff may be
protected by the law ~f:
(i) Defamation: where the plaintiff's reputation has been
lowered in the eyes of right-thinking members of society,4)
eg. where a newspaper article about the plaintiff's mar-
riage gave the impression that she was so lacking in "sen-
sitivity, dignity and reserve" that she was prepared to
make intimate disclosures concerning her private family
life. 5) There is no liability, however, where the state-
ment or words are not defamatory.
(ii) Copyright: where the copyright in the published item vests
in the plaintiff, eg. where a photographer sells a photo-
graph of plaintiff's wedding day (which included a picture
of his murdered father-in-law), for publication in a news-
paper report about the murder,6) or the defendant publishes
a catalogue of private etchings without the consent of the
. 7)artIsts.
1) Wilkinson v Downtown (1897) 2 QB 57.
2) Janvier v Sweeney (1919) 2 KB 316.
3) Justice Privacy op cit 13, para 53.
4) Sim v Stretch LI93§7 2 All ER 1237 (HL) 1240.
5)
~ v Daily Sketch, The Times, June 28, 1966; Justice Privacy
op cit 10, para 42. The plaintiff in~ case had also been
subjected to persistent telephone call~ banging on her front
door.
6) Wi11iams v Settle LI96Q7 2 All ER 806 (CA); cf Justice Privacy
op cit 12, para 45.
7) Prince Albert v Strange supra.
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(iii) Breach of confidence: where the defendant publishes in-
timate letters written to him after he has fallen out with
the plaintif.f, 1.) or makes intimate disclosures concerning
married life with the plaintiff,2) er where disclosures
are made concerning what has passed between a doctor and
patient,3) lawyer and client,4) or tanker and client. 5)
(c) False light: where a person is, placed in a false light he may
recover under the law relating to:
(i) Defamation: which has been extended to cover such situa-
tions as where an effigy of a person 1S unjustifiably
placed near a "Chamber of Horrors" at a waxworks exhibi-
tion;6) or a "suggestive" composite photograph of the plain-
tiff is used in an advertisement;7) or it is implied that
a well-known amateur golfer has prostituted himself by
posing for advertisements;8) or that a member of an exiled
Royal Family had been ravished by a "mad monk",9) or that
someone's wife was his mistress. 10 ) But an action has
failed where it was falsely stated that a physician had
recommended certain pills;ll) where a famous physician's
name was used to advertise pil1s;12) and where a defendant
published a series of bad postcard portraits of plaintiff
depicting imaginary incidents in her life. 13 )
1) Cf Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swan 402, 418; cf Warren & Brandeis
op cit 204 n 1.
2) Argyll v Argyll L196~7 1 All ER 611 (HL) 620, 623ff; cf DJ Mc-
Quoid-Mason "Invasion of Potency?" (1973) 90 SALJ 23, 31f. See
generally Justice Privacy op cit 14, para 56(~
3) AB v CD (1851) 14 Dun10p 177; cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 253.
4) Taylor v Blacklow (1836) 3 Scott 614; cf Neethling Privaatheid
op cit 253.
5) Tournier v National Provincial & Union Bank (1924) 1 KB 461; cf
M Jones Privacy (1974) 145£.
6) Monson v Tussaud (1894) 1 QB 671 (CA); cf L Brittan "The Right
to Privacy in England and the United States" (1963) 37 Tulane LR
233, 257f.
7) Honeysett v News Chronicle Ltd (1935) KB, The Times, May 14, 1935.
8) Tolley v JS Fry & Sons Ltd [19317 All ER Rep 131 (HL).
9) Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures (1934) 50 TLR 581 (CA); Wright op ci t 969.
10) Cassidy v Daily Mirror [19227 All ER Rep 117 (CA).
11) Dockrell v Dougall (1899) 80 LT 556; (1899) 15 TLR 333.
12) C1ark v Freeman (1848) Ch 11 Beav 112, 83 Rev Rep 127.
·13) Corel1i v Wall (1906) 22 TLR 532.
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(ii) Passing-off: This occurs where in the course of his
business a person represents his goods to be those of
another in a manner calculated to deceive members of the
public into thinking that such goods are those of that
other.') On this basis Lord Byron was able to enjoin
the publication of a book of spurious poems falsely attri-
buted to him. 2) Passing-off is limited however to persons
engaged in a field of common business activity,3) with the
result that a well-known actor could not restrain another
from imitating his voice in a television commercial. 4) An
Australian case, however, has held that such an action may
succeed where the plaintiff has a commercially saleable
. 5)reputatIon.
(d) Appropriation: Where a person's image or likeness is used he
may recover under: I
(i) Defamation: ego where an advertisement implies that an
amateur sportsman has prostituted his amateur status,6) or
that a person suffers from a physical defect 7) or is a
'foppish old gentleman,.8) Truth, however, is a defence,
and consequently a boxer was unable to interdict the show-
ing of a film of a fight which he had 10st. 9)
1) Salmond op cit 408.
2) Lord Byron v Johnston (1816) 2 Mer 29, 35 ER 851.
3) Cf Clark v Freeman supra.
4) Sim v Heinz LI95~7 1 All ER 547 (CA); but cf Performer's Protec-
tion Act, 1963.
5) Henderson v Radio Corporation Pty Ltd LI96Q7 SR (NSW) 576; cf H
Storey "Infringement of Privacy and its Remedies" (1973) 47 Aust
LJ 498, 505.
6) To11ey v JS Fry & Sons Ltd supra.
7)
P~u~b v Jeyes Sanitary Compounds Co The Times, April 15, 1937; cf
RE Megarry Miscellany - at-Law (1969) 200.
8) Dun10p Rubber Co Ltd v Dunlop (1921) 1 AC 367.
9) Palmer v National Sportin~ Club Ltd (1906) MacGillivray COPfright
Cases (1905-10) 55; cf WInfie1d op cit (1931) 47 LQR 32 n 5.
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(ii) Breach of Contract: protects the plaintiff where there
is an express or implied contract between the parties:
ego where a family portrait is used by the photographer
on a Christmas card,1) or extra copies of a portrait are
sold commercially.2) But there is no such protection
where there is no such contract ego a photographer may
sell photographs taken at a dog show if there is no restric-
tion on the taking of such photographs. 3)
(iii) Breach of (Commercial) Confidence: occurs where a person
uses another's confidential material for his own commercial
gain: ego by publishing recipes purloined from another's
recipe book,4) or using a secret medical compound,S) or pub-
lishing unpublished lecture notes belorrging to another,6)
or appropriating another's business plans. 7)
It has been pointed out, however, that generally the English courts
"have shown no inclination to take advantage of the proof of
other torts, such as trespass or assault, in order to award
parasitic damages for a co-extensive invasion of privacy".8)
1) Pollard v Photographic Co (1889) 40 Ch D 345, 353; cf Warren and
Brandeis op cit 209.
2) Tuck v Priester (1887) 19 QB 639; cf Warren & Brandeis op cit
208.
3) Sports & General Press Agency Ltd v "Our Dogs" Publishing Co
(1917) 2 KB 125 (CA); Brittan op cit 239.
4) Yovatt v Winyard (1820) 1 J & W 394; (1819-20) 21 R & R 194;
Warren & Brandels op cit 212.
5) Morison v Moat (1851) 9 Hare 241, 255; (1850-52) 89 R & R 416,
427; Warren & Brandeis op cit 212 n 2.
6) Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 3 LJ Ch 209; (1823-26) 26 R & R
237; Warren & Brandeis op cit 207f.
7) Saltrnan EnJineering Co Ltd v Carnpbell En~ineering Co 119637 3 All
ER 413 (CA 414; cf Seager v Copydex Lt Z196Z7 2 All ER-415 (CA).
8) Stein & Shand op cit 195. Cf Joliffe v Willmett & CO L197!7 1 All
ER 478 (QB) 484.
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2. Criminal Law
The common law protection against invasions of privacy afforded
by the nominate torts has been supplemented by certain statutes
which impose criminal penalties for several categories of intrusions.
"Peeping Toms", for instance, can be prosecuted under the Justices
of the Peace Act,l) while watching and besetting another's house is
also a crime. 2) Other offences include persistently ringi~g
another's telephone,3) transmitting or receiving telegraphic, tele-
phonic or postal communications,4) opening postal packets and tele-
grams,S) intercepting or disclosing contents of telegrams or tele-
phonic conversations,6) and using wireless telegraphing apparatus to
pick up messages sent over the air. 7) Furthermore certain Acts
prevent disclosures of information obtained by computer services,8)
or income tax officials,9) and prohibit the harrassment and eviction
of tenants by landlords. 10 )
3. Proposed Legislation
Notwithstanding the wide area covered by the nominate torts and
the supplementary protection afforded by legislation, the need for
a comprehensive right to privacy in England has been recognized for
many years. 11 ) Several unsuccessful attempts have been made at
1) Act of 1361. The Act could be interpreted to include telescopic
lenses and binoculars, but not electronic devices. Justice
Privacy op cit 15, para 62.
2) Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. But the Act
cannot be invoked unless the object of such watching and besetting
is to force somebody to do or abstain from doing something.
Justice Privacy op cit 15, para 63.
3) Post Office Act, 1953, s 66.
4) Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1949, s 1(1); cf M Jones Privacy (1974)
143.
5) Post Office Act, 1953, s 58(1).
6) Telegraph Act, 1868, s 20. This Act does not, however, provide
for protection against telephone tapping Justice Privacy op cit
IS, para 67.
7) Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1949, s S(b); cf Jones op cit 143.
8) Post Office (Data Processing Service) Act, 1967, s 2.
9) Income Tax Management Act, 1964. Section 4 requires officials to
sign a sworn declaration that information received will not be
disclosed, in terms of Schedule 1. But see Jones op cit l87f.
10)
Rent Act, 1965, s 30. See generally Justice Privacy op cit 15 ff.
11) ef H Montgomery Hyde Privacy and the Press (1947) 8.
Gp cit.
For the position in the United States see above 51.
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introducing a statutory tort of invasion of privacy.1)
In 1961 Lord Mancroft introduced his Right of Privacy Bill
in the House of Lords, and although it was passed by a majority
(74 to 21) on the Second Reading it was withdrawn due to pressure
from the Government. 2) Lord Mancroft's Bill defined privacy in
broad terms and was primarily concerned with intrusions through the
publication of words calculated to cause distress or embarrassment. 3)
The main opposition to the Bill was on the basis of the difficulty
in determining what is "in the public interest",4) and the fear that
the proposed tort would be "imposing a new and severe restriction on
the freedom of the Press".5)
In 1967 Mr Alexander Lyon MP was also unsuccessful in his
efforts to introduce a Bill on Privacy, but unlike Lord Mancroft he
did not attempt to create a right which covered the whole area. 6)
He proposed that any serious and unreasonable interference with "the
right of any person to preserve the seclusion of himself, his family
or his property from the public" would give rise to an action. 7)
Arising out of the Justice Report on Privacy,8) Mr Brian Walden
MP attempted to introduce a Bill which defined the right to privacy
along American lines. 9) Privacy was defined as "a right of any per-
son to be protected from intrusion upon himself, his home, his family,
1) See generally D Madgwick & T Smythe The Invasion of Privacy (1974)
11ff.
2) Neil1 op cit -393; Brittan op cit 26lf; Yang op cit 188; Justice
Privacy op cit 18, para 79.
3) Robertson op cit 105.
4) House of Lords Debates (1961) Vol 229, Col 622; cf JE Juta "Some
Comments on the Privacy of Public Figures in England and the
United -States" (1972) 1 NULR 21, 23; cf Robertson op cit 102.
5) Brittan op cit 265; cf Robertson op cit 103.
6) Robertson op cit 105f.




his relationships and communications with others, his property
and his business affairs",') and different types of intrusions
were listed. 2) Such intrusions however would only be actionable
if there was a "substantial and unreasonable" infringement of pri-
vacy.3)
Despite the above attempts the Younger Committee on Privacy
in 1972 4) decided against recommending a general right of privacy
because, inter alia:
"the courts would have difficulty, greater than in other. areas,
in balancing by reference to the 'public interest', society's
interest in the circulation of truth against the individual's
claim for privacy; the law would become uncertain until suf-
ficient precedents were established; the judicial role might
be extended too far into the determination of controversial
questions of a social and political character".5)
It has been pointed out however, that su~h arguments are exag-
gerated and that the courts have often succeeded in balancing such
competing interests and deciding on uncertain legal issues. 6) None-
theless the Younger Committee did recommend the introduction of a
criminal offence of "surreptitious surveillance by means of a tech-
nical device".?)
1) Justice Privacy op cit 61; Appendix 'J' Draft Right of Privacy
Bi11, s 9 (1) .
2) For instance: a) spying, prying, watching or besetting; b) the
unauthorized overhearing or recording of spoken words; c) the
unauthorized making of visual images; and d) the unauthorized
reading or copying of documents. Justice Privacy op cit 61;
cf Taylor op cit 303.
3) Justice Privacy op cit 35, para 138; Appendix "J" Draft Right
of Privacy Bill, s 1.
4)
HMS 0 ReEort of the Committee on Privacy (1972 Cmnd 5012).
Por a descrlptlon of the terms of reference and work done by the
Committee see Madgwick & Smythe op cit l5ff.
5) Cf G Dworkin "The Younger Committee Report on Privacy" (1973)
36 Modern LR 399, 401; cf Stein & Shand op cit 187.
6) D~orkin op cit 401; cf Knuller v Director of Public Prosecutions
L197f7 2 All_ER 898 (HL) 929£; Attorney-General v Times News-
papers Ltd L197~7 1 All ER 815 (CA) 822.
7) Jones op cit 200.
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4. Data Banks: Unlike the United States there is little English
common law protection against abuses by data collection agencies.
There is no common law control over the nature, accuracy and acces-
sibility of data bank information except where the use of such in-
formation amounts to defamation,l) or can be regarded as passing-
offv 2) The gravity of the threat by data banks has been recog-
nized,3) and a number of attempts have been made to introduce Bills
for their control,4) cut none have become law. 5) One such Bill
was the Personal Records (Computers) Bil1 6) which proposed that any
person whose personal profile had been recorded should be able to:
Ca) object against the type of information stored; Cb) apply to the
Registrar of Data Banks for the removal of such information; (c)
be informed that such a profile exists; and (d) obtain a copy of
the original profile and any subsequent amendments. 7) Recently
the Consumer Credit Act 8) has provided some protection concern-
ing data collected by credit reference agencies. The Consumer
Credit Act allows a consumer to: (a) obtain the name and address
of any credit reference agency from which the other contracting
party has applied for information about his financial standing;9)
Cb) on payment of a small fee, obtain a copy of the file relating
to him kept by such an agency;lO) (c) give notice to the agency
1) See above 74;cf London Association for Prot'ection of Trade v
Greenlands (1916) 2 AC 15, 26. .
2) See above 76 ;Henderson v Radio Co'rporation' lPty} Ltd (1960) SR
(NSW) 576; cf cL Pannam "UnauthorIzed Use of Names of Photo-
graphs in Advertisements" (1967) 40 Aus!' LJ 4, 7-£.
3) "The Government is now committed to introducing some form of
legislation on computers and privacy, even though privacy has yet
to be defined". The Financial Ti~es March 14, 1977, 9; cf HMSO
~o~puters and Privact (1975 Cmnd 6353); Gomp'ute'rs: Safeguards forPrIvacy (1975 Cmna 354). '
4) For instance, the Industrial Information Bill 1968; the Private
Investigator's Bill 1969; the Data S,urveillance Bill 1969; the
Personal Records (Computers) Bill 1969. Cf Madgwick & Smythe op
cit 12; Justice Privacy op cit 18.
5) Robertson op cit 106.
6) AR Miller The Assault on privaci(Computers, Data Banks and
Dossiers) (1971) 227; cf Neeth ingP'r'iv'a'a'theid 01' tit 267 f.
7) Ibid. Cf Justice P~ivacy op cit 55, where simil~r controls are
proposed.
8) Of 1974; cf AG Guest & MG Lloyd The C6nsu~e~ Ctedit Act 1974
(1975) 158 f . ---
9) Section 157.
10)5 . 158,ectIon •
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d o 0 f . . h· fOl 1)requIrIng it to remove or amen certaIn In ormatlon In IS I e;
in the case of a dispute apply to the Director General of Fair
Trading for a ruling on the matter. 2) But neither the Personal
Records (Computers) Bill nor the Consumer Credit Act give the sub-
ject of the data profile any control over who has access to the in-
formation about him. Such accessibility is once again governed by
the limited common law remedies. 3)
1) Section 159.
2) Section l59(s).
3) The Younger Committee on Privacy in the United Kingdom found that
both banking institutions (HMSO Re ort of the Committee on Privac
(1972 Cmnd 5012); cf M Jones PrIvacy 1974 145 an cre it
rating agencies (cf Jones op cit l50f) were giving confidential
information to interested persons with little or no control over
such disclosures. Notwithstanding the contention by the banks
that "LIlt is one of the first principles that any member of the
staff realizes, absolute secrecy of any information in that branch
bank" (cf Jones op cit 145f), the Younger Committee was given
numerous examples of when investigators and others had been able
to obtain information from a bank without the consent of the
banker's client, and without the latter even knowing about the en-
quiry (ef Jones op cit l47f). The Younger Committee investigated
the nature and extent of disclosures by credit rating agencies,
but rejected the need for a proposed Control of Information Bill
which would set up a Data Bank Tribunal. (Jones op cit l54f). It
decided that where such information was compiled from public rec-
ords (eg at the courts) it was justifiable for the credit bureaux
to record such information as part of their business information
(Jones op cit 153). The Younger Committee also heard evidence con-
cerning students and privacy. Concern was expressed about the
dangers inherent in the statistical records held by the Universi-
ties Central Council on Admissions (UCCA) which include basic bio-
graphical facts (age, sex, marital status, nationality, parents'
occupation), plus a record of academic progress up to his first em-
ployment (Jones op cit 164). The main threat however arises in
those universities which kept files on their students' extra-curri-
cular activities, including who was living with who, who was on
drugs (Jones op cit 164) and who was involved in undesirable poli-
tical activity eg organising protests and demonstrations (Jones op
cit 170; cf the American Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974, see above below). The Younger Committee recognised the
following data-protection principles: (i) information collected
for a specific purpose should not be used for another without au-
thori ty; (ii) access should be confined to authorized persons;
(iii) the amount of information collected should be the minimum
n~cessar~; (~v~ statistical information should allow for separa-
tIon of IdentItIes from the rest of the data; (v) the subject should
be told about the information concerning him; (vi) the level of
security by the user should be specified and precautions taken
against misuse; (vii) provision should be made for detecting vio-
lations of security; (viii) the period information can be stored
should be limited; (ix) steps should be taken to ensure the accu-
racy of data and provision made for correction and updating; and
(x) care must be used in coding value judgments (Report of the
Committee on Privacy op cit paras 592-599; cf Computers and Privacy
op cit, Table 1.) Concerning value judgments see EF Ryan "Privacy
Orthodoxy and Democracy" (1973) 51 Canadian Bar R _ 84, 88f.
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Conclusion: Self-imposed professional controls 1) and the nominate
torts of English law are inadequate for protecting an individual's
privacy, and unless the House of Lords is prepared to extend the
principle in Prince Albert v Strange,2) legislation is necessary.
In any event it is necessary to introduce legislation to control
effectively the activities of data bank organisations, particularly
in respect of who has access to their records.
Certain other aspects of the English legislative proposals will
be considered when discussing the developments of the right to privacy
in South African law.
1) Cf E Hall Williams "Committee on the Law of Defamation: The
P?rter.Report" (1949) 12 Modern ~R 217,218: "The real remedy
lles wlth the Press, as the Commlttees point out; for the matter
is in fact 'one of internal discipline' and 'good taste'." But
cf Stein & Shand op cit 198. In 1976 the British Press Council
issued a "Dec1aratio:r: on Privacy" presumably to discourage any
further attempts to lntroduce a statutory right of privacy.
Comment (1976) 73 Law Society's Gazette 751.
2) Supra. See above 72.
D.
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANyl)
1. Civil Law
Since the end of World War 11 many invasions of privacy recog-
nized in American law have been accommodated in Germany under the
rubric of "personality rights" (perstlnlichkeitsrechte), - a concept
. 2)
much wider than privacy alone.
Although a general "right of, personality" had been contended
for by Jhering3) and Gierke4) during the nineteenth century, German
law tended to follow the Anglo-American approach of recognizing a
number of separate torts each with its own characteristics.
5
) The
actio injuriarum6) was limited to actions for insult and subsequent-
ly to criminal cases,7) and there was no broad-based civil law
action for the protection of personality rights. When Friederich
Nietzsche's relatives sued· after his death to prevent the threatened
posthumous publication of certain of his letters the Reichsgericht
(RG) dismissed an action based on personality rights, but subse-
quently allowed the plaintiffs to succeed on the basis of breach of
copyright. 8) Kohler9) has also argued that the German Civil Code
(BGB)lO) provided for the recognition of different personality
rights in Article 826 which states that:
1) For a detailed analysis of the position in West Germany see J
Neethling Die Reg oPY~ivaath~id (1976) 22ff.
2) HD Krause "The Right to Privacy in Germany - Pointers for American
Legislation?" Duke LJ 481, 503.
3)R von. Jhering Jahrbuche~ fU~ Dogmatik 23, 155; cf HC Gutteridge
"Comparative Law of the Right to Frlvacy" (1931) 47 LQR 203, 204.
4) OF von Gierke Deusches Privatrecht (1895) 1, §203; cf WA Joubert
"Die Persoonlikheidsreg: In Belangwekkende Ontwikkeling in die
Jongste Regspraak in Duitsland" (1960) 23 THR-HR 23, 29; Krause
op cit 485.
5) Gutteridge op cit 206; Krause op cit 405f.
6) See above 39 .. Cf PC Pauw Per~~~nlikheidskrenking
Suid-Afrikaanse Privaatre ... t n Re· shls7t~o'-r"""·1~·e~s~·e""· """·e~n:""'·..,.::;-:-~~~.=:....,,.::::.::.;~:.=.;::.
On ersoe 197 93.
7) Joubert op cit (1960) 23 THR-HR 29; cf Neethling Privaatheid
op cit 25.
8) (1908) 69 RGZ 404f; cf Gut~erid~e op cit 205; Krause op cit
485f. Cf A LtJgdberg "The Rlght ln a Person's Own Likeness"
(1967) 11 Scandin~v~ah Studie~· i~ Law 213, 216 re the death-bed
photographing ot Bismarck.
9) J Kohler Personlichkeitsrecht 1, 587; Joubert op cit (1960) 23
THR-HR 30.
10)Burgerliches Gesetz Buch of 1896.
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"One who intentionally damages another in a manner violating
good morals (lute sitten) is obliged to compensate him for
such damage". )
It has been said that the Reichsgericht refused to follow
Kohler's suggestion even though Article 826 was introduced to pro-
tect those interests of personality which were not specifically
mentioned in the Code,2) but it seems that there were some indica-
tions that the Article could be construed to cover intentional in-
vasions of privacy violating "good morals".3) For instance, where
a defendant made privileged disclosures to his client concerning
the plaintiff's criminal conviction 20 years previously and such
privilege was exceeded,4) or where the defendant had maliciously
disseminated old newspaper-clippings relating to the plaintiff's
° ° 1 5)crlmlna past.
After the Reichsgericht was replaced by the Bundesgerichthof
(BGH) there was a revival of interest in the "allegemeines Person-
lichkeitsrecht" probably due to the influence of the new Federal
Constitution (Grundgesetz) of 1949:
"Article 1(1). The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority".
"Article 2(1). Everyone shall have the right to the free de-
velopment of his personality in so far as he does not infringe
the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order
or the moral code".6)
Notwithstanding the suggestion that there was a "general pragmatic
development of personality right protection on the basis of Article
826 of the Civil Code and of Articles land 2 of the Federal Consti-
t t o ,,7) ° h °u lon, lt seems t at lt was the latter rather than the former
1) Translation in Justice Report Privacy and the Law (1970) 2lf,
para 97; cf Krause op cit 518.
2)
~oubert op cit (1960) 23 THR-HR 30; Krause op cit 520.
3) Krause op cit 487.
4) (1927) 115 RGZ 416; cf Krause op cit 487f.
5) (1911) 76 RGZ 110, 112. On the facts there was no evidence of
malice and the court held that Article 826 had not been breached.
Krause op cit 487 n 27.
6) Translation in Justice Privacy op cit 21, para 95; cf Joubert
op cit (1960) 23 THR-HR 31.
7) Justice Privacy op cit 21, para 97.
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which provided the break-through in the recognition of such a
right. 1) The turning point came in 1954 in the Schacht case,2)
where an attorney had written to a newspaper on behalf of his
client (Hitler's former Economics Minister) demanding that the
paper correct certain statements made in an article about his client.
The letter however was printed in the "reader's column" as if the
attorney had written in his personal capacity. The attorney's
claim for an order compelling the paper to publish a statement that
he had not written in his personal capacity was upheld by the BGH
on the basis that a "general right of personality" could be derived
from Articles 1 and 2 of the Federal Constitution. 3) The principle
in Schacht's case was subsequently reaffirmed in Wagner's case,4)
concerning the publication of the diaries and letters of Cosima
Wagner, and the Paul Dahlke case 5) in which the photograph of a
well-known actor on a motor scooter was used in an advertisement
without his consent.
In 1957 the BGH went even further in a case involving the con-
fidentiality of medical reports, where information in such a report
had been given to a third party by an insurance company.6) The
court considered the problem in the light of Article 823(1) of the
Civil Code which states:
"One who intentionally or negligently, wrongfully injures the
life, body, health, freedom, property or any other right of
another is obligated to compensate him for damage arising
therefrom".7)
In the past it seems that the Article was strictly construed
and that the trend was against the recognition of privacy as "any
1) Cf EJ Cohn Manual of German Law 2 ed (1968): "the 'right to
privacy' is derived by a somewhat strained interpretation from
arts. 1 and 2 of the Basic Law".
2) (1954) 13 BGHZ 334; cf Joubert op cit (1960) 23 THR-HR 31;
Krause op cit 488; Cf Pauw op cit 103.
3) Krause op cit 488f.
4) (1954) 15 BGHZ 249; Krause op cit 521f.
5) (1 956 ) 20 BGHZ 34 5 ; Kr ause 0 p cit 522· P . 1046) , auw op c l.t •
(1957) 24 BGHZ 72 (Arztzeugnis)~ Krause op cit 522f.




other right" on the basis that it was excluded by the eiusdem
generis rule (ie "othe'r ,right" referred to proprietary rights). 1)
The BGH, however, held that the Article could accommodate privacy
as one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of personality,
although its scope in ~ach instance was to be limited by balancing
the values and interests involved. 2) The effect of this decision
therefore was ~o render negligent, as well as intentional, invasions
of personality rights "actionable.
The extended interpretation of Article 823(1) was subsequently
applied in a number of other cases, for instance: where a newspaper
had published a photograph, and appeared to support a developing
boycott, of a plainti~f landlady who had refused to extend the lease
of one of her tenants to allow occupation by the latter's husband
who had just been released by the Russians;3) the "Herrenreiter"
case where without his consent, the photograph of a famous horse-
rider was used to advertise a patent medicine to improve sexual
potency;~) and the unauthorised use of secret tape recordings of
private conversations. 5) In the latter case which concerned record-
ings of conversations between plaintiff and defendant about the set-
tlement of their long-standing differences the court found it un-
necessary to consider the possible application of Article 826. 6)
This broad interpretation by the BGH has been criticized on
the basis that: (a) it is illogical to include a general right of
personality in interpreting a provision which is concerned'with
specific interests in life, body, health, freedom and property;7)
1) Gutteridge op cit 206.
2) Krause op cit 522f;cf Joubert op cit (1960) 23 THR-HR 32.
3) (1957) 24 BGHZ 200. The court held that by approving the boy-
cott the newspaper had exceeded its privilege. Krause op cit 523.
4) (1958) 26 BGHZ 349; Joubert op cit (1960) 23 THR-HR 33" Krause. ,
op Clt 524. In this case the Court also relied on Articles 1 and
2 of the Federal Constitution. Joubert loc cit 34.
5) (1958) 27 BGHZ 284; cf Krause op cit 524f; Joubert op cit (1960)
23 THR-HR 35; Cohn op cit 65. Except where such recordings are
made for the detection of blackmail or the recording of factual
business messages. Justice Privacy op cit 24 para 99(b).
6) Krause op cit 525.
7) K Larenz "Das 'alle emeine Personlichkeitsrecht'
unerlaubten Han lungen" 1955) 8 NJW 521, 523 ;
505 n 96.
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and (b) such an interpretation raises the danger of a "boundless
extension" of tort law. 1) Nevertheless the development appears
to have been generally welcomed,2) and the us.e of Article 823(1)
as "the sole vehicle for protection of personality seems Lto have
gon~7 beyond the point of no return".3) The latter view is re-
inforced by the text of the proposed (1958, revised 1959) "Draft Law
for the Reform of the Protection of Personality and Honour in Pri-
vate Law" which included a new Article 823(1):
"One who intentionally or negligently wrongfully injures
another in his personalitl or who, intentionally or negligently,
wrongfully injures the property or any other right of another
is obliged to compensate him for the damage resulting there-
from".4)
The proposed Draft Bill provided for protection against a num-
ber of injuries including personality in general;5) life, body,
health and freedom of person;6) insult and defamation;7) publication
of private facts or letters not in the public interest;8) taking
another's name;9) unauthorized publication of a person's picture;10)
unauthorized recording of another's words;ll) and unauthorized use
of a listening device. 12 ) The Bill was shelved however because it
seems that the Government felt that the case law developments by
the BGH had solved most of the problems concerning the protection
of personality,13) and that the Bill posed a threat to the freedom
of the Press. 14 )
1) Krause op cit 507 n 103; cf Gutteridge op cit 217.
2) H Hubmann Das Personlichkeitsrecht 2 ed (1967); cf DT Donaldson
"Book Review" (1968) 1 Modern Law and Society 147.
3) Krause op cit 509.
4) Translation in Justice Privacy op cit 23, para 98 (my italics);






10) Article 17. Except where the subject is of secondary interest
or part of a procession or assembly, or the publication refers'
to a current event, or is in the interests of science or art.




13) Krause op cit 495.
14) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 28; cf Cohn op cit 65f.
,.--
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The "court-made" right to privacy in West Germany, supple-
mented by certain provisions of the Penal Code, has developed to
the extent that it is possible to distinguish Prosser's categories
of intrusions, publication of private facts, false light and appro-
. . 1 )prlatlon.
Ca) Intrusions: The Federal Supreme Court has ruled that the law
guarantees for everyone a personal sphere in his private life which
is indispensable for the development of his personality and includes
the inviolability of the home. 2) Therefore infringements of the
private sphere of another are actionable,3) except if necessary for
c~ime detettion, for ins-ta'nce: authorized searches,4) blood tests,S)
photographs and fingerprints~6)-physical examinations,7) mail inter-
ceptions and telephone tapping. 8) Conversely the Penal Code pro-
hibits the use of truth drugs, lie detectors and hypnosis,9) and im-
poses penal ties for the un'authorized opening of letters or other
sealed do~uments10) and the yse of listening devices to "listen to
another person's private conversation without his consent" or to
"record the private conversation of another person".11)
Cb) Publication of Private Facts: A person is entitled to pro-
hibit publication of personal 1etters12 ) or other matters relating




"Current Legal Developments" (1971) 20 ICLQ 152.
Cohn op cit 65; cf (1958) 27 BGHZ 284s. See above 74.
BGB, Art 102; cf Penal Code 81; International Commission of
Jurists "The Legal Protection of Privacy: A Comparative Study
of Ten Countries" (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 418, 465.
5) Penal Code, Art 8l(a); cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 473.
6) Penal Code, Art 8l(b); cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 473.
7) Penal Code, Art 8l(c); cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 473.
8) Emergency Laws, 1968, Art 10(2); cf (1972) 24 Int Sac Sci J 492.
An attempt to have Article 10(2) invalidated as unconstitutional
failed (1971) 20 ICLQ 366f; (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 501.




11 ) Article 298; cf B van D van Niekerk "Unplugging the Bug or the
Right to be Left Alone in Criminal Law - Some Reflection~" (1971)
88 SALJ 171, 175; Ed AH Robertson Privacy and Human Rights (1973)
56. Cf "Current Legal Developments" (1966) 15 ICLQ 581.
12) Cohn op cit 65; cf (1954) 15 BGHZ 249.
Other protection against disclosures is provided
Code, Art 412; the German Unfair Competition Act,
and the Credit Act, Art 9; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc
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to personal secrets,1) including private photographs. 2) Further-
more, in addition to the matters referred to under "intrusions"
above, the Penal Code also punishes breaches of confidence by pro-
fessional persons 3) and public servants,4) as well as the revelation
of postal secrets,S) the contents of telegrams and telephone conver-
sations by post-office workers. 6) One writer has gone further and
suggested that the penal provisions should be extended to include an
offence of "public exposure" - where a person's intimate life, par-
ticularly his sexual life, or his past lapses are made pUblic. 7)
(c) False light: Misleading press reports about personal and pro-
fessional affairs are unlawful unless the public has a justifiable
interest in their publication. 8)
(d) Appropriation: Unauthorized use of a person's name for adver-
tising or other form of trade publicity or the furtherance of econ-
omic interests is actionable. 9)
1) (1957) 24 BGHZ 72 (Spatheimkehrer). See above 86.







6) Article 355. See generally Justice Privacy op cit 24, para 102.
7) G Arzt Der Strafrechtliche Schutz der Intims hare, vom zivilrecht-
lichen Personlic eitssc utz aus betrachtet 1970· cf E Sc winge
"Book Review" (1971) 4 Modern Law and Society 131,'134.
8) Cohn op cit 65; cf (1954) 13 BGHZ 3~4. See above 86.
9) Cohn op cit 65; cf (1956) 20 BGHZ 345, see above 86; (1958) 26
BGHZ 349, see above 87; (1961) 35 BGHZ 363 CGinse·ng-~lurzel).
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2. Wrongfulness
In an attempt to systematize the German law of privacy certain
writers have adopted the "spharen" theory which at first blush seems
to coincide with the psychologists' "territories of self"l) and the
United States Supreme Court's "zones of privacy".2) On closer
examination, however, the coincidence is more apparent than real as
many of the characteristics of the different "spharen" overlap.3)
The most widely accepted "spharen" classification is that of Hubmann
who recognizes the "Individualsphare", the "Privatsphare" and the
"Geheimsphare".4)
(a) The "Individua1sphare": Each individual is distinguishable
from another by his identity which is characterized by certain
indicia, for instance, his name, likeness, voice, writing and charac-
ter. S) In public therefore he is entitled to protection against
aggressions on his personality.6) Identity is protected by the
"false light,,7) and "publication,,8) privacy cases, but it has been
suggested that the courts are moving towards recognizing identity as
a separate right. 9) It can be argued, however, that the "individual-
sphare" is also protected against "intrusions" (eg the recording of
a person's voice) 10) and "appropriations"ll) by the general action
for privacy, and that little is gained by its recognition.
Cf Neeth1ing Privaatheid op cit 45.See above 90.
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 43.
See above 89.
1) E Goffman Relations in Public (1972) 63. See above 3.
2) Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479, 484. See above 61.
3) Despite the careful distinctions drawn between the "Intimsphare",
"Vertrauenssphare", "Sozialsphare", "Offentlichkeitsphare",
"Privatsphare", "Geheimsphare" and "Individua1sphare". ef Neeth-
ling Privaatheid op cit 34 n 7.
Hubmann op cit 268f; cf Neeth1ing Privaatheid op cit 34f.
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 42.
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 35.











Cb) The "Geheimsphare": Here the individual is protected against
publicity in respect of his personal behaviour, thoughts and life-
style. He mayor may not wish to make disclosures thereof to his
immediate family or friends or even certain third parties, but such
disclosures are made in confidence. 1) Some writers regard the
"geheimsphare" as syno'nymous with the "intimsphare" which is the
most secret form of privacy - ie that aspect of human behaviour
furthest removed from the public eye. 2) The test for whether the
relationship between the parties is confidential is objective, but
whether or not the person making the disclosure wishes it to be con-
fidential is tested subjectively.3) An invasion of the "geheim-
sphare" is actionable even though the disclosure was made to a small
group of persons,4) but otherwise such invasions may also overLap
with "intrusions",S) "false light,,6) and "appropriation,,7) privacy
situations.
Cc) The "Privatsphare": This includes aspects of private behaviour
which are accessible to a determined or undetermined but limited
circle of people - but not to the public in general. 8) Even where
certain activities are carried out in public they are still protected
from dissemination by the mass-media9) - unless they become matters
of public interest. 10 ) Neethling distinguishes the "privatsphare"
1 ) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 36 , 61.
2) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 36.
3) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 6lf.
4) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 71
5) See above 89.1. Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 67.
6) See above 90.
7) See above 90 ..
8) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 37, 48.
9) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 37.
10) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 37£.
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from the "geheimsphare" on the basis that: Ca) the former is much
wider than the latter; Cb) the latter contains an element of con-
fidentiality; and Cc) the former is only invaded by publicity
whereas the latter is also infringed through intrusions. 1) No such
distinctions are made by the courts 2) and in any event it seems that
the "geheimsphare" is protected against intrusions, publications,
false light revelations and appropriation by the general action for
privacy.3) Not only do the "geheimsphare" and "privatsphare" over-
lap with each other, but they also overlap with the "individualsphare".4
In short it seems that the above academic debate may have con-
tributed little to the practical evolution of the right to privacy
in West Germany. Nonetheless the suggestion that where the dis-
closures are made to a small group of persons such conduct should
only be actionable where there is a "confidential" relationship may
be of some assistance to the courts in determining whether or not the
act is wrongful. 5)
3. Data Banks 6)
There is no common law protection against the misuse of data
bank information in Germany unless the injured party can show that
the information concerns his sex life,7) or has been unlawfully ob-
tained,8) or affects his honour or business reputation. 9) One
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 112.
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 50.
See below 282.
See generally Neethling Privaatheid
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 108.
Ibid.
1) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 38.
2) Neethling Privaatheid. op cit 39.









writer has suggested that the accessibility of data should be pro-
tected technologically (eg by the user identifying himself by voice
or fingerprint) and that data banks should be controlled by an inde-
pendent state organisation. 1) Another favours the registration of
all data banks with the requirement th~t such banks must not only
give a clear explanation of: (a) their, goals; (b) the potential
circle of users; and (c) the technical a~d organisational safe-
guards concerning accessibility; but also allow the subject of the
information profile control over its use. 2)
Limited statutory protection against invasions of privacy by
data banks has been introduced in West Germany. The Penal Code pro-
vides for the protection of privacy in automated information sys-
tems,3) while the Land' H~ssen has enacted a comprehensive Data Pro-
tection Act. 4) The latter provides for: (a) a duty of protection
of confidentiality in the operation of all data banks;5), (b) a duty
of secrecy by data bank operators with penalties for breaches thereof;6)
(c) the appointment of a Data Protection Commissioner, empowered to
enforce the Act and investigate complaints;7) and (d) enables an
aggrieved person to demand rectification of errors in the data. 8)
The Act is confined to data banks in the public sector9) and does not
compel them to notify an individual that they are in possession of his
data profile. This omission considerably weakens the effectiveness
of the Hessen legislation. 10 )
Section 4.
Section 1. (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 431.
Similar legislation exists in the Land Rhineland Palatinate and in
Lower Saxony administrative regulations have been introduc~d to
control data banks in the public sector. The Federal Government's
proposed Data Protection Bill covers both the public and the private
sector. Cf HMSO Computers: Safeguards for Privacy (1975) Cmnd
6354) 43.
1) U Seidel Datenbanken und Personlichkeitsrecht (1972) l77f; cf
Neethling Privaatheid op cit l15f. ,
2) S Simitis "Chancen und Gefahren der elekfronischen Datenverar-
beitung" (1971) 24 NJW 673, 681; cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit
116. ---.
3) Article 268; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 430.
4) Act of 7 October 1970. For English translation of full text see
(1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 580.
Sections 3 and 5.
Section 16.








Conclusion: Apart from the question of data banks, it seems that
the "court-made right to privacy" in Germany has caught up with,
if not overtaken, the development of the right in the United States. 1)
Furthermore the extended interpretati6n of Article 823(1) and the
recognition of an action for intentional and negligent invasions of
privacy2~hich allow for the recovery of both sentimental damages and
pecuniary loss has led one commentator to sound a note of warning:
"Intentional privacy invasions should be discouraged to a
far greater extent than negligent invasions, with liability
for the latter perhaps being limited to situations in which
the plaintiff can show tangible damage. 'Gross negligence'
or 'recklessness' might rank close to intent, as is the case
in other areas of the law of torts. Compensation for non-
pecuniary harm should largely be limited to intentional in-
vasions". 3 )
It is submitted that the above view accords with the present
position in South African law. An action for sentimental damages
in our law is confined to the actio injuriarum which requires in-
tention (or at least a form of dolus eventualis),4) while any action
based on negligence necessitates proof of patrimonia1 10ss.5 )
1) Krause op cit 516.
See below l65f.
Krause op cit 516.
2)
On the question of fault in German law see Pauw op
3)
4)
5) See below 362f.
cit l13f.
F H Lawson, A E Anton and L Nevi11e Brown AIDos and Wa1ton's Intro-
duction to French Law 3 ed (1967) 209.
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E. FRANCE 1)
French law like South African law2) is not restricted by the
Anglo-American (and to'a lesser extent German) concept of specific
torts or civil wrongs. 3) The French courts distinguish between
material damage ("le dommage materiel") affecting the injured party's
right to property, and moral damage ("le dommage moral") -which covers
sentimental 10ss.4) Invasions of privacy fall under the latter cate-
gory5) but it seems that initially such actions were based on an ex-
tension of property rather than personality rights.~) This probably
explains why the "droits maraux" of French copyright law is included
under the "droit de la personnalite", the law relating to personality
rights. 7)
Many of the early cases involved photographs and paintings:
for instance, the attempted publication of a photograph of the ac-
tress Rachel on her death-bed;8) the publication of photographs of
well-known persons in~an advertising album without the photographer's
consent;9) where one photographer had made copies of another photo-
grapher's work to illustrate a biography of the first photographer's
subject;10) and where a portrait of an artist's subject, whose hus-
band had paid the artist in advance, was p~blicly exhibited without
her husband's consent. 11 )
1) For a summary of the French Law see J Neethling Die Reg op Privaat-
heid (1976) l17ff.
2) See below




6) Wa1ton op cit 221. Cf G Lyon-Caen "The Right to Privacy or New
Scenes from Private Life" (1967) 14 Rev of contem¥ Law 69 70:
Ha subjective law of privacy or for the respect 0 privat~ life
has been built up along the lines of property law". Cf the '
United States, see above 52.
7) ct J~stice Report Privacy and the Law (1970) 19, para 87.
8) L!85§7 Dalloz Per 62; cf Lyon-Caen op cit 70f.
9) L!90§7 2 Dalloz Per 73; cf Walton op cit 221.
10) L190§7 2 Dalloz P~r 292; Walton op cit 221.
11) Whistler v Eden L190Q7 1 Dalloz Per 497; Walton op cit 224. The
court h~ld that a pai~ter who ref~sed to deliver a painting was
~ot_entltled to make any use of lt whatever before having changed
lt ln such a way as to make it unrecognisable". Ed A H Robertson
Privacy and Human Rights (1973) 48.
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The right to privacy in France, as in the United States and
Germany appears to have developed through the case law. The French
courts have recognized the existence of "la vie privee", the right
to a private life, which includes "le droit au respect de la vie
privee", "la defense du secret de.la vie privee,,1) ie the right to
have one's private life respected, the protection of the secrets of
one's private life. 2) It seems that the right to privacy in France
is primarily based upon the general provision of the French Civil
Code. 3)
"Article 1382. Any act by which a person causes damage to
another makes the person by whose faul~ the damage occurred
liable to make reparation for such damage".4)
Article 1382 is generally regarded as providing a claim for
damages resulting from non-pecuniary injury and tc imply a protec-
tion in the civIl law for the victim's honour. S) It has been
suggested that the right to respect for private life must be dis-
tinguished from the right to be protected against attacks on honour
and reputation. The reason given is that such attacks: (a) may
relate to public life, and (b) are generally dealt with by the crim-
inal law which requires intention to harm - a factor which in France
is not relevant to the question of privacy.6) It is submitted, how-
ever, that the above explanation is unsatisfactory for two reasons:
(a) even where the facts relate to a person's public life he may have
an action for invasion of privacy eg where he is placed in a false
light,7) or his image is appropriated for gain;8) and (b) it can be
1) Justice Report Privacy and the Law (1970) 19, para 87:





argued that the word "faute" (fault) in Article 1382 has a wider
meaning than intention to harm.
1
)
The recognition of a right to privacy can also be inferred
from Article 35 of the Press Law2) which states:
"The truth of a defamatory statement can always be proved
except:
(a) when the imputation concerns the private life of a person;
(b) when the imputation refers to facts which go back to more
than 10 years;
(c) when the imputation refers to a fact constituting a wrong
which has been pardoned or prescribed, or which has given
rise to a conviction which has been erased ('~fface') by
rehabilitation or review".3)
It seems therefore that in matters relating to privacy truth
alone is no defence.
In 1970 the Civil Code was amended by a new Article 9 which
provides for the "protection of private life,,4) and is based on
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 5) The Article
states that "everyone has the right to respect for his private life,,6)
and seems to be primarily aimed at infringements by publication. 7)
Wider protection, however, is given by the new Articles 368-372 of
the Penal Code which were also introduced in 1970. 8) These amend-
ments together with the previously existing law provide the' basis for
cf Robertson op cit 53, 58.(1971) 20 ICLQ 365f;
(1971) 20 ICLQ 365.
Ibid.
1) The French word "faute" is translated as "lack, need, want ...
fault, mistake .. " Eds RPL Ledesert & M Ledesert Harrap's New
Standard French and En 1ish Dictionar Part One (1972) F:9; simi-
lar y~ t e Eng1is wor 'au1t" means "somet lng wrongly done ...
misdeed, transgression, offence ... a slip, error, mistake .. "
Ed CT Onions The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1939) 680.
2) Law of July 19,1881 (amended May 6,1944); cf Justice Privacy
op cit 20, para 88. Lyon-Caen op cit 70, also refers to the Press
Law of July 29, 1961, Article 35; the Criminal Procedure Code
Article 11; and the Law of December 6, 1954. '
3) My translation. See above 97 n 2. For the French text see
Justice Privacy op cit 20, para 88.
4) Part 111 Law of July 17, 1970; cf "Current Legal Developments"
(1971) 20 ICLQ 365; cf Rcbertson op cit 53. Cf Pauw op cit 145f.





a well developed right to privacy. It is therefore possible in
French law to identify Prosser's traditional categories of intru-
sions, publication of private facts, false light cases and appro-
. t' 1)pr1a lons.
1. Intrusions: In Civil law these include undressing an employee
suspected of theft;2) taking a telephoto picture of an actress and
her child in their home;3) searching a woman's handbag4) or a per-
son's body;S) and subjecting a person to a medical examination. 6)
Furthermore the Penal Code provides protection against such intru-
sions as unlawfully entering another's home;7) wilful and unauthorized
photographing of a person on private property;8) listening to, re-
cording, or transmitting conversations of others without their con-
sent;9) and illegal mail interception. 10 )
2. Publication of Private Facts: Protection against disclosures
concerning a person's private life is now enshrined in the new Art-
icle 9 of the Civil Code to the extent that a court may on an ex
parte application "order such measures as seizure of offending matter
10)
1) See above SS.
2)
3)
(1904) 5 Dalloz Per 596; cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 134.
Bri~itte Bardot v Beaverbrook News a ers Ltd (1966) 2 JCP 14521;
cf Current Legal Developments" 1966 IS ICLQ 581.
4) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 133.
5) Ibid.
6) International Commission of Jurists "The Legal Protection of
Privacy : A Comparative Study of Ten Countries" (1972) 24 Int Soc
Sci J 470£.
7) Article 184; c£ (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 482£; Justice Privacy
op cit 20, para 88.
8) Article 368; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 517; Robertson op cit
53.
9)
Article 368; cf Robertson op cit 58. See also Articles 371, 372;
cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 509.
Article 187; c~ (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 489f. Interception of
correspondence 1S allowed, however, for the detection of crime.
Criminal Procedure Code, Articles 30 and 81(1)' cf (1972) 24
Int Soc Sci J 493. '
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in order to prevent a threatened invasion of privacy".1) None-
theless for many years prior to 1970 the Courts recognized that a
person has a right to prohibit any publication of his own image or
likeness,2) or the contents of his correspondence. 3) As in the
United States 4) and South Africa,S) however, it was accepted that
there is a distinction between private persons ("anonymes") and per-
sons in the public eye ("}rotoganistes de l'actualite"), and between
private and public life. 6 Actors, politicians, sportsmen and other
public figures are personnages meles a la vie publique and cannot com-
plain about the publication of their portraits, provided such pic-
tures do not disclose any feature of their private life. 7) "For
the actor, family life and privacy comes into the domain of private
life just as it does for the ordinary citizen".8) Such persons are
therefore protected against scandal or gossip concerning their love
1) (1971) 20 ICLQ 365. This appears to be a codification of what
was an increasing trend in the case law. Cf Lyon-Caen op cit 72,
who stated in 1967: "More recently the courts have tended to take
a road ... La!! preliminary seizure of texts or images. This
seizure may infringe upon the freedom of the press ... [fiu!/ is,
however, the only guarantee of true protection, since it keeps
facts of private life from the public".
2) Logdberg op cit 214. Cf Anne Philipe v Societe 'France Editions
et Publications' (1966) 2 Gaz Pal 187, Lyon-Caen op cit 84; Gall
v 'Ici Paris' (1966) 1 Gaz Pal 40, Lyon-Caen op cit 84f. Botn---
cases concerned photographs of minors and in each the court banned
the proposed publication.
3) Lyon-Caen op cit 71: "Judgments concerning the right to' one's
image are also numerous, as are those protecting the secret of
correspondence".




Justice Privacy op cit 20, para 89. Cf Brigitte Bardot v Societe
de Presse Marcel Dassault (1966)1 Gal Pal 37 which stated that a
photograph reflecting "the likeness of a public personality such
as an actress which, if taken with her knowledge and during her
professional life, does not necessitate special consent for their
r~p:oduction, for such.persons do not only accept but seek pub-
llClty" Lyon-Caen op Clt 79. --
7)
Brigitte Bardot v Societe de Presse Marcel Dassault supra: "this
prin~ip~e concerning public persons is however limited: special
p~rrnlsslon becomes once more n~cessary in relation to the publica-
tlon of a photograph representIng the public person during his
private life". Cf Walton op cit 226f.
8) Lyon-Caen op cit 81; Bernard Blier v Societe 'France Editions et
Pub1i cat ions' (196 6) 2 J CP 148 75 .
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life;1) family position;2) physical, psychological or mental con-
3) 0 1 0 0 0 0 4) 5)dition; philosoph1cal or re 1910US conv1ct10ns; career; or
leisure activities. 6) This principle has been applied even where
an actress has permitted indelicate photographs of herself to be
published in the Press,7) and where a public figure attends a public
function in his private capacity (eg a wedding)8) and forbids publi-
cation. In the latter case, however, if such a public figure does
not object to the publication he is presumed to have consented.
9
)
Similarly if a writer creates a character based on an actual identi-
fiable person he will be liable to such person;10) but an historian
may give a factual objective account 6fthe life of a contemporary
person;11) and a person may produce a to~k 'or ~ilm about the life
cf Hulton v Jones L19lQ7 All
cf Lyon-Caen op cit 73.
Cf Justice Privacy op cit 20, para 90.
Ibid; cf (1966) 15 ICLQ 581.
Justice Privacy op cit 20, para 91.
ER Rep 29 (CA) 47.
Justice Privacy op cit 20f, para 91;
1) Trintignan v Societe 'La France Continue' /19667 Dalloz'749, cf
Robertson op cit 31; Segret v Chabral (1965) 2 JCP 14482, cf
Lyon-Caen op ci t 73f;, Gall v 'Ici Paris' (1966) 1 Gaz Pal 39,
cf Lyon-Caen op cit 85f;--Sachs v 'Lui' (Jan 28-31, 1967) Gaz Pal,
4 Lyon-Caen op crt 87f.
2) Bernard Blier v Societe 'France Editions et Publications' supra:
"Whereas his private life is part of the moral patrimony of every
person and,constitutes, as his image, the prolongation' of his per-
sonality; whereas anecdotes and stories about his private life
cannot be published without the special and unquestionable author-
isation of the person concerned; whereas this is particularly so
in the case of conjugal ¥rivac* and all that is connected with
sentimental or fam1ly 11 e; t ese principles should be applied
in the same way to actors who cannot be refused the protection due
to their privacy upon the special pretext that they sought the
publicity necessary for their fame". Lyon-Caen op cit 8~.
3) Anne ,Philipe v Societe 'France Editions et Publications' (1966)
2 JCP 14222; cf (1966) 15 ICtQ 581. Lyon-Caen op cit 84, men-
tions that this was a landmar case concerning seizures: "From
now on, an interference in a erson's rivate life °ustifies the
seizure 0 t e pu l1catlon". C Art1cle 9, C1v1l 0 e.
4) Brigitte Bardot v Societe 'France Editions et Publications' (1968)
JCP No 2136; cf Robertson op cit 31.
5) Marlene Dietrich v Societe 'France Dimanche' (1955) 1 Gaz Pal 396;
cf Lyon-Caen op cit 72£.
6) Brigitte Bardot v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd supra (1966) 1~ IC~Q
581; Brigitte Bardot v Societe de Presse Marcel Dassault L196Z








of a criminal, provided the facts are true and widely known to the
pUblic. 1) It is submitted, however, that in respect of disclosures
concerning the life of a criminal such disclosures must not exceed
the limits of Article 35 of the Press Law. 2) In the case of pri-
vate individuals the courts have recognized that:
"Whereas the image of the person is for each person the ~­
longation of his personality ... it follows that every person
has the right to forbid a third person to make a photographic
representation of his image, for any exhibition or publica-
tion of this image".3)
Where, however, a photograph of a private person is taken in a public
place and published without his consent the publication will only be
actionable if the photograph has been altered in such a manner as to
place him in a false light4) or expose him to ridicule. 5) Even
those writers who maintain that an individual is protected against
being photographed or filmed in a public place without his knowledge,
suggest that there are exceptions, for instance: (a) when the like-
ness is not the intended subject of the photograph ie involuntary or
incidental; and (b) when the picture is taken by professional photo-
graphers in the hope of later selling it to the person photographed. 6)
cf Eynard v Doisneau (1966) 1 Gaz Pal 331,
Villard v Roches (1965) 2 JCP 14305: "the right to reproduce a
photograph in the Eress is admissible when it has been taken in a
public place ... L!7n the scene in question the persons did not
seek to hide themselves or were not, momentarily, as a result of
the unforeseen and unsought circumstances, in a ridiculous or dis-
agreeable situation ... Lf7he original character of the photograph
repre~enting an outside scene had not been changed by publication
... LBu!7 this right should be exercised with care arising from the
desire to do nothing which might expose one's neighbour to criti-
cism or derision, even if justified by his attitude" •. Cf Lyon-Caen
op cit 75 But cf H Patrick ~Glenn "Right to Privacy in Quebec" (1974)
52 Canadian Bar R- 297, 302 n 27; cf (1971) 4 16734. See below 332.
1) (1957) 1 JCP No 1374 para 13;
2) See above 98.
3) Lyon-Caen op cit 78;
Lyon-Caen op cit 76f.
4) See below 103.
5)
cf Robertson op cit 51.
6) Robertson op cit 54.
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In addition the Penal Code imposes penalties for wilful
publication of recordings or documents 1) and breaches of profession-
al secrecy by medical practitioners, midwives and chemists
2
) - the
latter has been extended by case law to include magistrates, legal
practitioners and ministers of religion. 3) Professional secrecy is
also imposed on postal employees by the Posts and Telecommunications
Code. 4)
3. False Light: Where a person's image or likeness is portrayed in
a manner which conveys a false or misleading impression in the eyes
of the public an action may lie for invasion of privacy.5) This
principle has been applied where disclosures concerning a well-known
actress's life were published so as to give a false impression that
she had written them herself;6) where a photograph was published
which was captioned to imply that the subject was intoxicated;7) and
where an incident in a woman barrister's life was portrayed in a film
in which "certain episodes based on authentic facts and others on the
imagination of the author followLegl one upon the other to form a
whole Lso tha!7 certain insufficiently informed spectators might not
be capable of distinguishing reality from fictiod: 8) It has been
said that it does not matter whether the disclosures made are true or
false,9) but it seems that in the case o~ photographs taken in public
1) Article 369; Robertson op cit 58 n 186; (1971) 20 ICLQ 365.
2) Article 378; (1972) 24 lnt Soc Sci J 570.
3) (1972) 24 lnt Soc Sci J 571.
4) Articles 41, 42, 177; cf (1972) lnt Soc Sci J 497.
5) See below 290.
6) Marlene Dietrich v Societe de France-Dimanche (1955) 1 Gaz Pal
396; c£ Lyon-Caen op cit 72£: "the souvenirs Lmemoirs7 were pub-
lished without the authorisation of Marlene Dietrich and nothing
but clever presentation made it seem that she had given her consent."
7)
Eynar~ v Doisneau s':lpra, cf Lyon-Caen op cit 77: "ThL~l caption
constltuted an abuslve use of the photo for it suggested that the
models were drunkards".
8) Szatan-Glaymann v Cavalier Paris Ire ch July 6, 1966, Lyon-Caen
op cit 82.
9) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 136. Cf Bernard Blier v Societe
'France Editions et Publications' supra, Lyon-Caen op cit 81:
"Thus lt was an offence to publish details, whether true or false






places with the plaintiff's consent, the latter will only succeed
if he shows that the publication placed him ill a false light. 1)
(d) Appropriation: Like in the United States,2) several of the early
French privacy cases involved appropriation for commercial gain. 3)
A person's photograph cannot be published in the press or exhibited
to the public for commercial reasons without his prior consent, for
instance in a catalogue;4) on a gramophone record cover;5) in a
fashion magazine;6) or in an advertisement. 7) Furthermore an in-
dividual's image may not be used in a film without such authority,8)
unless the events depicted are of historical interest 9) or were
"widely publicized in the press".10) The "appropriation" principle
appears to have been extended to photographs of public figures taken
in public places. 11) Since 1970 the appropriation cases would also
be covered by the new provisions of the Civil Code. 12 )
1) See above 102 .
2) See above 52f.
3) See above 96.
4) Liakoff v Societe der Magasias du Printemps (1934) 2 Gaz Pal 238;
cf Robertson op cit 48 n 154.
5) Soraya Esfandiary v Societe Arteco and Richir (1961) 1 Gaz Pal 17;
cf Robertson op cit 48£ n 154.
6) (1963) 2 Gaz Pal 53; cf Robertson op cit 48f n 154.
7) Brialy case (1966) 2 JCP 14890, Lyon-Caen op cit 79f, where the
plaintiff had agreed to be photographed, but did not consent to
his photograph being used to advertise men's clothing.
LI90~7 Dalloz Per 389, Robertson op cit 48 n 155.
Cf Segret v Chabral supra, Lyon-Caen op cit 73£.
Lyon-Caen op cit 82; cf Szatan-Glaymann v Cavalier supra.
C~ Robertson op cit 49~ n 159: "the French weekly l'Express pub-
llshed a photo of Presldent Pompidou on holiday sitting on a motor
boat.next to ~ very conspicuous 'Mercury' motor car. The photo
was ll~ustratlng a ~ercury adver~isement ... On an application by
M Pompldou, the Parls Court of Flrst Instance granted an inter-
locutary injunction forbidding l'Express to distribute the number
in question because the President's picture had been used without
his consent".
12) Article 9; cf (1971) 20 ICLQ 365.
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Despite its recent inclusion in the Civil Code,1) the right
to privacy in France has never been clearly defined by either the
courts or academics. 2) French legal writers have given a number of
different definitions. Martin defines a person's private life as:
"a person's family and personal life, his intimate, spiri-
tual life, the life he lives at home with the door shut".3)
Nerson on the other hand regards the 'right to privacy' (droit a
l'intimite) as the right to:
"a private preserve which enables an individual to make the
essence of his personality inaccessible to the public without
his consent. In this way a person can enjoy peace and remain
alone with himself. He is entitled to the right kind of cen-
tral redoubt where he can escape the grip of others".4)
Carbonnier describes it as the individual's right to:
"a private sphere of life from which he has the power to ex-
clude others .. the right to respect for the private nature
of his person .. the right to be left in peace".5)
1) Ibid.
2) Justice Privacy op cit 20, para 89; Neethling Privaatheid op cit
125. Cf Lyon-Caen op cit 71: "What are the circumstances consti-
tuting personal privacy that the individual can plead in order to
avoid being pried upon? Among them are those of family life:
birth, engagement, marriage, divorce, pregnancy, sickness, death;
and also those of a person's sentimental life, professional life,
and their counterparts, that is leisure time, holiday places,
occupations, company. We should also include the features of one's
face and behaviour in everr-dat life. Perhaps also the past and
one's dreams. More quest10na le is the inclusion under the head-
ing of privacy of the amount of a person's income, the level of
one's standing, the state of one's income tax return".
3) Martin "Le secret de la vie J(rivee" (1959) Rec tr dr civ 230;
translated by Robertson op C1t 28. Neethl1ug Pr1vaatheid op cit
127, suggests that Martin's approach has the widest support in
France.
4) R Nerson (1959) Journal des Tribunaux 713; translated by Robert-
son op cit 28. Cf E Goffman Relations in Public (1972) 63, see
above 3.
5) J Carbonnier Droit Civil (1965) I 239, translated by Robertson op
cit 28. Neethling Privaatheid op cit 125, submits that
Carbonnier's approach 1S slm11ar to the German concept of "spharen".
See above 9i.
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.It has been suggested that French academics adopt similar
-theories to their German counterparts when discussing the "vie
intime" and "vie privee" 1~) al though these concepts have not been
clearly distinguished. 2)
(a) Jhe "vie in·time": This" like the German "geheimsphare,,3) is
said to refer to a person's intimate life behind closed doors ie.
his thoughts" fe~lings, image and written or spoken words. 4) The
"vie intime" recognizes the confidentiality of disclosures made to
immediate family or friends,S) as well as professional secrets 6) and
the contents of letters. 7) It is usually infringed by "intrusions,,8)
or as "publicitY",9) but may also be violated by disclosures which
place a person in a "false light,,10) (harming his image or feelings),
or the ~'appropriation"11) of his thoughts or words for commercial gain.
(b) The "vie privee": This is difficult to define but is analogous
to the German "privatsphare,,12) and includes the right to seclusion
in one's life exploits, home, and image or likeness. 13 ) It clearly
overlaps with the "vie intime" and is also infringed by intrusions,
publication of private facts, false light disclosures and appropria-
tions. 14 ) In publication cases, however, it seems that the dis-
closure will only be actionable if it was made to the public as a
whole. 15 )
Neeth1ing Privaatheid op eit 138£; ef (1972) 24 lnt Soe Sei J
570f. See above 103.
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 140.
See above 99; cf Neeth1ing Privaatheid op ci t 141.




Neethling Privaatheid op cit l3lf.
See above 99f.
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 136, who seems to imply that unlike
in German law where an invasion of the "Geheimsphare" is actionable
~ven where the di~cl~sure.is made to a few people (see above 92 ) ,
In France the plaIntIff wIll only succeed if publication is made to
the w?rl~ at.la~ge. If this is the case there is little reason
for dIstInguIshIng the "vie intime" from the "vie privee".
1) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 126, states that the "vie intime"
coincides with the "geheimsphare", and the "vie privee" with the
"privatsphare".
2) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 127.
3) See above 91.













Conclusion: Prior to 1970 the French courts had long recognized a
general right to privacy which was "among the strongest in the
world".1) The 1970 amendment to the Civil Code 2) has further sup-
plemented the broad principles of Article 1382. 3) In some cases
the right to privacy in French law goes beyond that of other juris-
dictions, for instance where it extends after a person's death in
that consent of the family is required when using the deceased's image
and likeness;4) and where it protects a person's right to use a parti-
cular Christian or surname. 5) As in Germany,6) the French have also
introduced a number of penal provisions to protect the individual's
privacy,7) and some steps have been taken to meet the threat of com-
puterization and data banks. A Commission on Data Processing and
Freedom was appointed in 1974, and has since recommended: (i) the
creation of a new independent agency with certain powers of control
over data processing; (ii) certain constraints in the public and
private sector on the collection and storage of personal data; and
(iii) recognition of the right of individuals or associations to know
and criticize the data stored about them. 8)
1) (1971) 20 I CLQ 365.
2) Article 9. See above 98.
3) See above 97.
4) L185§7 3 Dalloz Per 62; Robertson op cit 49. Cf Pauw op cit 148.
5) Walton.op ci~ 223; .cf Jus~ice privact op cit 21, para 92. CfNeethllng Prlvaatheld op Clt l28ff, w 0 regards the 'protection
of a person's name as a separate personality right.
6) See above 89f.
7) See above 99f.
8) HMSO Computers.· S f d f p. (1975 C_ a eguar s or rlvacy , mnd 6354) 45.
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F. OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
The right to privacy has been recognized in several other
European countries. Apart from England, the Federal Republic of
Germany and France, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Sweden and Turkey are
all signaturies to the European Convention on Human Rights which
states:
"Article 8 (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his name and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".1)
The right is easily accommodated in those countries which
recognize a general 'right of personality', and even where 'person-
ality rights' are not recognized, aspects of privacy may be protected
by certain provisions of the different Civil and Criminal Codes.
Switzerland, for instance, has a general law of personality rights,2)
and not only may invasions of privacy be interdicted without proof
of fault,3) but in cases of wilful or negligent invasions the injured
party can recover pecuniary loss (Schadenersatz) as well as moral
damages (Genugfuung)in more serious cases. 4) It has been suggested
1) Ed AH Robertson Privacy and Human Rights (1973) 12 n 2, who states
that Greece is also bound by the Convention. See also FG Jacobs
The European Convention on Human Rights (1975) 126.
2) HC Gutteridge "Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy" (1931)
47 LQ) 203, 211; A Logdberg "The Right in a Person's Own Likeness"
(1967 11 Scandinavian Studies in Law 213, 2l9f.
3) Article 28, Swiss Civil Code (ZGB); cf Gutteridge op cit 212;
Logdberg op cit 2l9f; WA Joubert Grondslae van die Persoonlik-
heidsreg (1953) 39.
4) Article 49, Code of Obligations (OR); cf Gutteridge op cit 213,
Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 39. Criminal penalties are
imposed by the Federal Law for the Protection of Privacy, 20
Decembe:: 1968, c~ International Co~mission of Jurists "The Legal
Protectlon of Prlvacy: A Comparatlve Study of Ten Countries"
(1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 418, 524. Generally on the law of p _
1 . t . ht . S· 1 d ersona
1 y r~g ~ ln .wltze:: an see P C Pauw Persoonlikheidskrenkin~ep
Skuld ln dle SUld-Afrlkaanse Privaatre ~'n Re shlstorlese en ~_
vergely en e n ersoe ,. n t e ques lon 0 au
see Pauw op cit l22f.
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,that such a general personality right also exists in Liechtenstein,')
and Austria. 2) Personality rights in general are not recognised
in Sweden,3) and it is uncertain whether they exist as a broad con-
cept in Denmark4) and Norway.5) The civil law action for invasion
of privacy in the Netherlands 6) is based on the French Civil Code 7)
and has been supplemented by international, constitutional and crim-
inal law provisions .. 8) Poland 9) and the Soviet Union' 0) also pur-
port to protect the right to privacy.
In several Western European countries it is once again possible
to discern the seminal threads of Prosser's categories: intrusions,
publications of private £acts, false light cases and appropriations.'1)
')Article 39; Liechtenstein Zivilgesetzbuch; cf Gutteridge op cit
214 n 7; Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 48f.
2)Article 16, Austrian Burgerlichesgesetzbuch (ABGB); cf Joubert
Persoonlikheidsreg op Clt 35.
3)Logdberg op cit 229.
4)Logdberg op cit 225.
5)Logdberg op cit 224.
6)Article 1401, Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW); cf F De Graaf
"The Protection of Privacy in Dutch Law" (1976) 5 Human Rights
177, 178. Cf Pauw op cit l24f.
7)Article 1382, see above 97; cf De Graaf op cit 181
8)De Graaf op cit 178.
9)Polish Civil Code, Law of April 23, 1964: "Article 23. A man's
personal rights, notably his health, liberty, dignity, freedom of
conscience, family name or psuedonym, image, privacy of corres-
pondence, inviolability of home and scientific, artistic, inventive
or rationalizing achievement, shall be protected by civil law in-
dependently of the legal protection contemplated by other provi-
sions". Cf Ed D Lasok Polish Civil Law (1975) IV 6.
10)Brezhnev's New Constitution (1977).
11)See above 55.
op cit 55f.
cf Articles 135(1), (2) of the pro-
Austrian Criminal Code, Robertson
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1. Intrusions: Protection against eavesdropping, interception of
correspondence or postal communications, harassment and intrusions
in the home is given in various jurisdictions.
(a) Eavesdropping: The unauthorized recording of or eaves-
dropping on, another's private conversation is a punishable offence
under the respective Criminal Codes of a number of countries. Under
the Swiss Criminal Code, for instance, it is an offence to listen to
or record non-public conversations, or to communicate the facts or
sound of such conversations to third parties. 1) In the Netherlands
the Penal Code makes it an offence to listen to conversations by
means of technical devices,2) and a similar draft Bill has been
tabled in Belgium. 3) According to the Norwegian Criminal Code it
is a crime to eavesdrop on conversations by means of a secret listen-
ing device, which includes listening to telephone conversations, con-
versations at meetings, and the surreptitious placing of listening
devices on premises. 4) Similarly the Austrian Criminal Code has
been amended to make misuse of recording devices punishable,S) while
the Danish provision concerning the unlawful interception of mail
appears to have been extended to clandestine listening. 6) The
Swedish Protection of Personal Privacy Committee has recommended that
the unauthorized listening or recording of the private affairs of
another should be a punishable offence analogous to housebreaking and
that victims should be allowed a civil action similar to defamation. 7)
1) Articles 179 bis - quater; Robertson op cit 57. (1972) 24 Int
Soc Sci J 510, 518. In March 1969 a Bill was adopted protecting
personality rights against small listening devices to supplement
the Criminal Code, Robertson op cit 57 n 183. Cf Federal Law on
Telegraphic & Telephonic Communications, Art 42, re telephone
conversations (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 498.
2) Articles 139 (a) ff, Penal Code; Articles l25ff, Code of Criminal
Procedure; cf De Graaf op cit 187.
3) Robertson op cit 57f.
4) Article 145 (a)~ Robertson
5) Article 3l0(d), as amended;
posed 1968 Bill for the new
op cit 56 n 180.
6) Robertson op cit 57.
7) Current Legal Developments (1971) 20 ICLQ 368, 369.
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In any event it could be argued that in Sweden such activities are
actionable if they constitute an "illegal" intrusion or trespass. 1)
(b) Correspondence and Post'al Communications: In Belgium the
Draft Bill on the Protection of Private Life makes it punishable to
open closed messages or to use a technical process to obtain know-
ledge of the contents of such a message,2) and similar provisions
exist in the Austrian Draft Bill: 3) The Danish Criminal Code makes
it an offence to open closed correspondence or otherwise intercept
communications~4) and likewise the Swedish Criminal Code punishes the
unlawful interception of messages in the' form of letters,S) telegrams
or other telecommunications. 6) In Switzerland not only is it an
offence to breach the privacy of correspondence,7) or postal communi-
cations 8) but under the broad provisions of the Civil Code 9) the
plaintiff may aI-so have a civil remedy. The law relating to the
privacy of letters in the Netherlands is governed by both the, Consti-
tution10 ) and the Penal Code,11) and it is. submitted under the Civil
Code. 12)
1) Article 8; Penal Code; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 509.
2) Article 1(2); cf Robertson op cit 63 n 210.
3) Articles 133(1) ,(2); cf Robertson op cit 63 n 210.
4) Article 263(1); cf Robertson op cit 57.
5) Article 2, Penal Code; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 489.
6) Article 8, Penal Code; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 489.
7) Article 179, Penal Code; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 490. Article
36(4), Federal Constitution of 29 May 1874, states: "The inviola-
bility of the secrecy of letters and telegrams is guaranteed"· cf
(1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 490. '
8) Articles 5(a), 57, Federal Law on Postal Services, 2 October 1924·
cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 490. '
9) Article 28 ; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 490f.
10) Article 173.
11 ) Article 371; cf De Graaf op cit 183.
12) Article 1401. See above 109 .
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(c) Harassment and Intrusions in the Home: Sweden imposes crim-
"" " bl" 1)inal penalties for spylng or causlng annoyance to a person ln pu lC;
harassment by radio and television reporters;2) and invasions of the
home,3) although no civil remedy is provided for the latter. 4) In
Switzerland intrusions into the home,S) harassment and spying6) are
punishable offences, all of which are likely to be actionable under
the Civil Code,7) while Dutch penal law protects the home against in-
vasions by both the State 8) and private individuals 9) so that any
violation thereof will also give rise to a civil remedy.l0)
Most European countries, however, seem to recognize that the
police force may use listening and recording devices and intercept
mail during the detection of crime,ll) or for the security of the
State. 12 )
2. Publication of Private Facts: In Sweden, Switzerland and the
Netherlands such conduct may be actionable either under the laws
See above
1) Article 7, Penal Code; cf (1972) 24 lnt Soc Sci J 523f.
2) Law on the Responsibility of the Radio, 30 December 1966; (1972)
24 lnt Soc Sci J 524.
3) Artic~e 16, Swedish Constitution, Article 6, Penal Code; (1972)
24 lnt Soc Sci J 581, 582.
4) (1912) 24 lnt Soc Sci J 482.
5) Article 186, Penal Code.
6) Article 179(7), Penal Code; cf (1972) 24 lnt Soc Sci J 524; cf
Article 179 quat, Penal Code, which makes it an offence to "record
by means of a camera or other recording apparatus anything touching
upon the private life of that person or anything concerning that
person's private life which could not be perceived by anyone in the
ordinary way", without their consent. (1972) 24 lnt Soc Sci J 518.
7) Article 28; cf (1972) 24 lnt Soc Sci J 524.
8) Article 172, Dutch Constitution; Article 370, Penal Code; cf
De Graaf op cit 182.
Article 138, Penal Code; cf De Graaf op cit 183.
De Graaf op cit 183.
Cf Robertson op cit 75f.











relating to defamation or those protecting professional confiden-
tiality. Sweden1) like Switzerland2) imposes criminal liability
for defamatory or insulting words or acts, but a Dutch writer has
suggested that in the Netherlands defamation and privacy should be
distinguished. 3) Professional and official secrecy, however, is
respected in all three countries. In Sweden4) and Switzerland5)
confidentiality is imposed on civil servants, postal workers, doc-
tors, lawyers, bankers, accountants, clergymen, chemists, social
workers, midwives and the like, and similar provisions exist in the
Netherlands. 6) It is submitted that in Switzerland7) and the
Netherlands 8) such breaches of confidence and other disclosures con-
cerning private life may also be actionable under the Civil Code.
In Norway the Penal Code goes further and imposes criminal liability
on anyone who infringes the right of privacy by publishing facts re-
lating to another's personal or domestic sphere. 9) Furthermore a
number of countries including Sweden,10) Denmark, Norway,11) and the
Netherlands 12 ) have been considering legislation to control the
operation of data banks.
1) Articles 1, 3, Penal Code; c£ (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 543£.
2) Articles 173, 176, 177, Penal Code;' cf (1972) 24 Int Sac Sci J
548.
3) De Graa£ op cit l84f: "In the case of publicized debts, the wrong
is in the fact that someone's reputation is hurt, which places the
conduct in the category of defamation. In the case of private
letters, however, it is not reputation which is at stake. - that
mayor may not be the case, but is irrelevant - but rather the
protection of someone's personal thoughts and feelings from dis-
semination against his will". Cf Pauw op cit 125.
4) Cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 568f.
5) C£ (1972) 24 Tnt Soc Sci J 571£.
6) C£ De Graa£ op cit 189£.
7) Article 28, Civil Code.
8)
Article 1401. The Courts convicted a magazine which published a
picture of a reformed prostitute to illustrate an article on pros-
titution. (1970) NJ 180; c£ De Graaf op cit 188£. C£ Melvin v
Reid (1931) 112 Cal App 285, 297 P 91. See below 174.
Article 390; c£ Logdberg op cit 224.
(1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 447£.
(1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 431.
De Graaf op cit 191.
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3. False light: In many instances where a publication puts a
person in a false light the latter will be able to sue for defama-
tion or insult. 1) It could be argued however that some countries
seem to regard such publications as an invasion of privacy. For
instance in Belgium if a writer unjustifiably gives a fictitious
character a real name to the detriment of the true owner he is
liable in damages to the latter. 2) In the Netherlands the courts
have held illegal the unauthorised release of an imperfect recording
made by a singer four years previously,3) and have enjoined the dis-
tribution of a film depicting a romantic caricature of the real life
exploits of a member of the Dutch resistance during World War 11.4)
4. Appropriation: The appropriation of a person's image or like-
ness usually occurs where his name, photograph or portrait is used
without his consent for commercial gain. 5)
(a) Names: In Italy it is a wrong to violate a person's right
to his name, but this has been held not to apply where a film is
made about a famous person whose name is actually used. 6) Similar-
ly in Norway a representation of a murder scene in a film made a
long time after the event was held to Qe actionable. 7) The same
principles have been applied in SWitzerland,8) and in Sweden a per-
son's name may be protected under the Copyright Act. 9)
(b) Photoyraphs: In Italy the right to one's image and likeness
is protected, 0) and a person may object to a likeness, which has
Robertson op cit 46.
(1971) NJ 205; cf De Graaf op cit 189.
(1963) NJ 64; cf De Graaf op cit 64.
See below l3lf.
Caruso v Tirrenia Film (1957) 1 Giuriprudenza Italiana 1 col 366;
cf Robertson op cit 46.
Logdberg op cit 224.
Article 29, Civil Code; Gutteridge op cit 214. Cf Pauw op cit 118.
(1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 560.

















been obtained without consent, being published or otherwise made
use of or exhibited. 1) A Swiss court h~s held it to be an invasion
of a person's privacy (Geheimsphare) where a picture was taken from
a group photograph of a baptism and used to illustrate a book. 2)
According to Belgian law reproduction of a person's photograph with-
out his knowledge amounts to a kind of trespass to the person,3)
while in Norway the Copyright in Photographs Act of 1960 gives copy-
right to the person cownissioning the photograph. 4) Such photograph,
however, can only be reproduced, exhibited, or otherwise published
with the consent of the subject. 5) The Swedish Act on Copyright in
Photographs also provides that the person who orders a photograph
has copyright in it, unless otherwise agreed upon,6) but allows the
photographer the right to use such photographs to advertise his busi-
ness provided the buyer does not forbid it. 7) Provisions similar to
those in the Swedish Act have been incorporated in the Finnish Act on
Copyright in Photographs of 1960,8) and the Danish Act of 1961. 9)
In 1965 the Danish Supreme Court protected a person against the un-
authorized use of the "goodwill" value of his picture. 10) The Dutch
Penal Code provides that "the surreptitious photographing of a person
on private premises is punishable if a reasonable interest of the
'victim' is injured .. Lan~7 the possession or publication of such a
photograph is punishable. 11 )
1) Article 10, Civil Code. But it does not forbid the unauthorised
taking of a person's picture; Robertson op cit 52. Sueh repro-
duction, however, seems to be limited to protection of honour,
reputation or dignity; Logdberg op cit 219. It is submitted
that privacy could be covered by the latter. See below 185.
2) Obergericht, Zurich 1944; Logdberg op cit 220.
3) (1958) Journal des Tribunaux 44; Robertson op cit 54f.
4) Logdberg op cit 223.
5) Ibid.
6) Logdberg op cit 224.
7)
S~ction 14, Swedish Copyri¥ht in Photographs Act; cf Logdberg op
Clt 226, who observes: "Slnce the person who commissions is
usually identical with the subject or closely related to him this
rule actually works, in the majority of cases as a protecti~n for
the subject". '
Logdberg op cit 224.
Ibid.
Logdberg op cit 225.
Article l38f; cf De Graaf op cit 188.
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There are, however, a number of exceptions concerning liabi-
lity for the unauthorized publication of photographs. In Italy
photographs may be used without permission where the person concerned
holds a prominent or official position;1) or where they are used in
the law C0urts or by the police;2) or for scientific, pedagogical or
c~ltural reasons;3) or if they are in the public interest. 4) The
Swiss seem to regard persons who have a place in "contemporary his-
tory" or who take part in public events, as having forfeited their
right to privacy in their public life,5) but allow them protection
concerning their private or intimate life (Privat oder Geheimsphare).6)
Furthermore in Switzerland a person may not recover if his picture
incidentally forms part of a group photograph,7) and a similar view
is adopted in Norway.8) Generally it seems that where such photo-
graphs are taken in the interest of the nation or public safety such
invasions· will be tolerated. 9)
Cc) Portraits: The Italian courts have held that although a
painter's model impl~edly consents to the pictures in which she (or
he) appears being displayed in an exhibition or art gallery, such
consent does not extend to the picture being used to decorate a night-
club. 10 ) It has been suggested that in Switzerland an action for the
unauthorized publication of a portrait need not be based on a speci-
fic provision but would be covered by the general concept of 'Person-
lichkeitsrecht' ,11) and that the same would probably apply in
op cit 220.
op cit 219.
Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 46.
Logdberg, op cit 223.
Cf Article 15, European Convention on Human Rights; Robertson
op cit 66f. See also Article 8(2). See above 108.
Pretura, Rome 28 March 1956, 11 diritto di autore (1956) 385;
Robertson op cit 49.













Liechtenstein. 1) In any event the Swiss Copyright Act of 1922,
prohibits the selling or publication of commissioned portraits of
another without his consent - and where the subject is dead the per-
mission of the family is required. 2) The Norwegian Copyright Act
of 1961, provides that the artists' right in a portrait can only be
exercised with the permission of both the subject and the person who
commissioned the portrait. 3) In Sweden the Copyright Act of 1960,
like the Swiss Act, states that in the case of commissioned portraits
the artist may not publish such a portrait without the permission of
the person who gave the commission, or after his death, the consent
of the surviving spouse or heirs. 4) Similar provisions apply in
Finland. 5) The Dutch Copyright Act also protects a person's econ-
omic interests by prohibiting the unauthorized publication of por-
traits or photographs. 6) In Sweden the law also protects "works"
of artists and presentations of such works by recording devices or
film without the artists' consent. 7)
5. Data Banks: A number of ~ther European countries ,8) apart
from the United Kingdom,9) the Federal Republic of GermanylO)
and France,ll) have taken steps to control data banks. In Sweden data
banks in both the private and public sector are controlled by a Data
Inspection Board established under the Data Act of 1973. 12 ) The pro-
posed Data Protection Law of Austria is similar to the draft German
Bill,13) and would impose obligations on data banks in the private
HMSO Computers: Safeguards for Privacy (1975 Cmnd 6354) 44.
See above 94 n 10.
1) Cf Article 39, Liechtenstein Zivilgesetzbuch; Gutteridge op cit
214, n 47; Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 48f.
2) Article 35. Logdberg op cit 220.
3) Logdberg op cit 223f.
4) Article 27. Logdberg op cit 227.
5) Finnish Copyright Act of 1961. cf Logdberg op cit 224.
6) Article 21; cf De Graaf op cit 188.
7) Logdberg op cit 229. Such an artist retains the copyright for
25 years from the date of the recording - but is not protected if
such recording does not relate to a "work".











and public sector under the control of an independent Data Protec-
tion Commission. 1) Government committees to consider the question
of data banks have been set up in Denmark and Norway,2) and in the
Netherlands,3) while legislation is also being considered in Belgium,
Finland, Eire and Spain. 4) The matter has received attention in the
United Nations 5) and the Committee of Ministers for the Council of
Europe has adopted resolutions dealing with computers in both the
private6) and public sectors. 7) 8)
Safeguards for Privacy op cit 44.
De Graaf op cit 191.
Computers: Safeguards for Privacy op cit 45.
Robertson op cit Ill.
Resolution (73) 22, 26 September 1973, which recommended that the
information stored should be accurate, up to date, relevant, not
obtained fraudulently or unfairly, only used for the purposes for
which it was obtained, secure against misuse, only released to
valid inquirers and if statistica~ released in aggregate to make
identification impossible. Furthermore the subject of the inform-
ation should have the right to know about its purpose and use,
while operating staff should be bound by rules of professional
secrecy. Computers: Safeguards for Privacy op cit 43, 47.
7) Resolution (74) 29, 29 September 1974, which stated that the public
should be kept informed about the establishment, operation and de-
velopment of electronic data banks in the public sector. In ad-
dition information stored should be obtained by fair or ~awful
means, accurate and up to date, appropriate and relevant, used
strictly in terms of clearly defined laws or regulations, confined
to specified time limits (unless statistical, scientific or his-
torical), made known to the subject, secure from misuse, only re-
leased to persons entitled thereto, and if for statistical purposes,
individual identities should not be disclosed. Data bank opera-
tors should be bound by rules of secrecy and strict security should
be observed. Computers: Safeguards for Privacy op cit 43, 48.
8) Proposals for the control of data banks have also been made in New
Zealand (Pres~rvation o~ Privacy Bill, 19?2 (NZ), Computers: Safe-
guards for PrIvacy op Clt 44) and AustralIa (cf Queensland Invasion
of Privacy Act, 1971, J Swanton "Protection of Privacy" (1974) 48
Austr LJ 91, 101; Information Storages Bill, 1971 (Victoria),













It has been said that the protection of privacy in Canada
is as great as in the United States and more than in any other
Commonwealth or European country.1) This contention however, re-
quires qualification because although there is a Federal Protection
of Privacy Act 2) which criminalizes eavesdropping and surveillance,
only three provinces have enacted Privacy Acts. 3) For the rest
while Quebec applies a Civil law approach4) the other provinces
follow Anglo-Canadian Common law. 5) Nonetheless the combination
of statute and common law seems to embrace most of the traditional
categories of invasions.
1. Intrusions: The Federal Protection of Privacy Act amended the
Criminal Code by providing that anyone who wilfully intercepts a
private communication by electromagnetic, mechanical or other de-
vice is guilty of an offence,6) and in addition to any other sentence
may be ordered to pay the victim punitive damages. 7) Eavesdropping
and surveillance are statutory torts under the Privacy Acts of British
Columbia8) and Saskatchewan,9) while the Manitoba Act 10 ) goes further
and also includes the interception of telephone conversations. 11 )
In Quebec the right is protected under the general provisions of the
Civil Code,12) for instance a plaintiff could recover where he was
1)
P Burns "The Law and Privacy: The Canadian Experience" (1976) 54
Canadian Bar Rev 1, 89.
2)
Protection of Privacy Act, SC, 1973-74 c 50; M Manning The Pro-
tection of Privacy Act (1974)
3)
British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan; cf Burns op cit 32.
4)
H Patrick Glenn "Civil Responsibility - Right to Privacy in
Quebec - Recent Cases" (1974) 52 Canadian Bar Rev 297.
5) Burns op cit 12ff.
6)
Section 178.11, Criminal Code; cf Burns op cit SO.
7)
Section 178.21(1), Criminal Code; cf Burns op cit 58.
8)
British Columbia Privacy Act SBC 1968 c 39' Manning op cit 175.
But cf Davis v McArthur (197i) 17 DLR 3d 760, the only reported
case on the Act where the plaintiff failed to recover for a
"Bumper-Beeper" homing device attached to his car by a private
detective.
Saskatchewan Privacy Act SS 1974 c80' M· .
Manitoba Privacy Act SM'1970 74' f ann~ng op c~t 184.
Cf H S 11 ." ~,c Mannlng on clt179.
tor ey In f r 1 ngeme nt 0 f Pr 1 vacy and 1 t s l{t: lJle d~1 e s ,I ( 1973) 47
AUs~ LJ 498, 507. Manitoba Telephone Act SM 1970' Manning op cit163.
Artlcl~ 1053: "~very person capable of disc~rning' right from
wrong lS respo~s~ble for the damage by his fault of another,
whether by PO~ltlve act, impudence, neglect or want of care".
Cf Burns op Clt 38.
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inundated with a barrage of offensive telephone calls and letters
h d · . d . h h" 1)after a television announcer a lnvlte Vlewers to arass lm.
In the other provinces the plaintiff will have to rely, in civil
matters, on the Anglo-Canadian common law torts of trespass to
land,2) chattels 3) and person,4) nUisance,5) and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 6) A number of provinces do, however,
impose criminal penalties for intercepting telephone communications. 7)
2. Publication of Private Facts: This form of invasion of privacy
is covered by the general provisions of the three provincial stat-
utes 8) and the Quebec Civil Code. 9) In the other common law prov-
inces remedies may be available under such nominate torts as defama-
tion,10) copyright,11) breach of contract 12 ) and breach of confidence~3)
Furthermore legislation governing the use of personal information
stored by credit and personal data reporting agencies has been intro-




cit 23. Cf Slavutych v Baker (1975) 55 DLR 3d 224;
cit 24 n 133.
1) Robbins v Canadian Broadcasting Corp (1957) 12 DLR 2d 37; cf
Patrlck Glenn op Clt 297; Burns op cit 39.
2) Parkes v Howard Johnson Restaurants Ltd (1970) 74 WWR 255 (BCSC),
Burns op cit 15. See above 73.
3) Burns op cit 16.
4) Burns op cit 17. See above 73.
5) Ibid. Cf Poole v Ragen L195§7 OWN 77 (HC), Burns op cit l7f.
6) Burns op cit 20. See above 74.
7) Cf Nova Scotia Rural Telephone Act SNS, 1967, c 273; Quebec
Telegraph and Telephone Companies Act SQ, 1964, c 286; Alberta
Government Telephone Act SA, 1970, c 12; Ontario Telephone Act
1970, c 457. Cf Manning op cit l66ff.
8) Br~tish Columbia Privacy Act, SBC, 1968, c 39, s 2(1); Manitoba
Prlvacy Act, SM, 1970, c 74, s 2; Saskatchewan Privacy Act, SS,
1974, c 80, s 2.
Article 1053.9)
10) Burns op cit 19.
11) See above 77.
12) Burns op
13 ) Burns op
Burns op
14)
Personal Investigations Act, SM, 1971, c23; cf Burns op cit 42.
15) Personal If t' R .norma lon eportlng Act, SBC, 1973, c139; cf Burns op
cit 44.
16) Consumer Reporting Act, SO, 1973, c97;
17) Consumer Reporting A t SNS 197 .c, , 3, c4;
cf Burns op cit 44f.
cf Burns op cit 44f.
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Saskatchewan,1) and to a limited extent in Newfoundland2) and
Quebec. 3)
3. False light: Where a person is publicly placed in a false
light an action may lie under the provisions of the Privacy Acts in
British columbia,4) Manitoba5) and Saskatchewan,6) as well as the
Quebec Civil Code. 7) In the common law jurisdictions the plaintiff
will have to prove that the statement amounted to passing-off
8
) or
was defamatory9) or an injurious falsehood. 10 )
4. Appropriation: The privacy statutes in British Columbia,11)
Manitoba12 ) and Saskatchewan13 ) all specifically provide for a stat-
utory tort where a person uses the name or portrait of another for
advertising or promotional purposes without his consent. 14 ) Under
the Civil Code of Quebec the courts have enjoined the use of a photo-
graph of a well-known entertainer to advertise a motor car,15) and
awarded damages to a schoolteacher whose picture was used for indus-
trial publicity purposes;16) but have refused to enjoin the screen-

















Credit Reporting Agencies Act, SS, 1972, c23; cf Burns op cit 44f.
Collection Agencies Act, SN, 1973, c14; cf Burns op cit 46f.
Consumer Protection Act, SQ, 1971, c74; cf Burns op cit 47.
British Columbia Privacy Act, s2(1).
Manitoba Privacy Act, s2.
Saskatchewan Privacy Act, s2.
Article 1053.
Burns op cit 21. See above 76.
Burns op ci t 19. See above 76.
Burns op cit 19f.
British Columbia Privacy Act, s4(1).
Manitoba Privacy Act, s3.
Saskatchewan Privacy Act, s3.
Burns op cit 32.
Deschamps v Automobiles Renault Canada Ltee /19727 SC Mtl un-
reported; cf Patrick Glenn op cit 298. - - ,
Rebeiro v Shawinigan Chemicals (1969) Ltd L19737 SC 389; cf
PatrICK Glenn 298. -
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plaintiff and a young lady gambolled naked in the rain. 1) It seems
that in the other provinces the plaintiff will only succeed if he
can show that the appropriation amounted to defamation, 2). breach of
contract,3) breach of (commercial) confidence,4) or some similar
nominate wrong.
5. Data Banks: In Canada as a result of investigations into the activi-
ties of credit reporting 5) and investigative agencies 6) legislation
has been introduced in several provinces. 7) Manitoba does not re-
quire licensing of personal information systems 8) but attempts to
safeguard the privacy of subjects by providing that: (i) no investiga-
tion may take place without the written consent of the subject or un-
less he has been given notice in writing that a personal investiga-
tion has been conducted;9) (ii) certain information may not be re-
corded, inter alia references to race and religion, and adverse factual
or investigative information more than 7 years 01d;10) (iii) access
Ibid.
1) Field v United Amusement Corporation L197!7 SC 283; cf Patrick
Glenn op cit 297. It is submitted that this decision is correct
in view of the fact that the plaintiff's antics were conducted in
full view of the public and in any event the film was a documen-
tary account of a very newsworthy event.
2) Burns op cit 19. See above 76.
3) See above 77.
4)
5) Cf Burns op ci t 40: "This type of operation is primarily .concerned
with credit information on a continuing basis".
6) Cf Burns op cit 40: "When a request for information is received by
this form of agency, one of its employees investigates usually by
telephone or by interviewing ... The sources of information include
employers, neighbours, bankers and so on". Cf EF Ryan "Privacy,
Orthodoxy and Democracy" (1973) SI Canadian Bar R 84: "These char-
acter reports are not just a record of whether a person pays his
bills - rather, they are complete profiles on where and how he
lives, whether he is in 'a peace movement or other subversive group',
whether his neighbours think he drinks too much, whether he is men-
tally ill, his relationship with his wife and family, his drug
habits, his sexual eccentricities "
7) ef Burns op cit 42f.
8) Personal Investigations Act, SM 1971, c23; Burns op cit 43f.
9) Section 3(1), such notice must be given within 10 days of the grant-
ing or denial of the benefit. The Act exempts inter alia provincial
or municipal governments, and the police acting in their official
.capacity (s2).
10) Section 4. It also excludes records of bankruptancies more than 14
years previously, statute barred debts or writs, writs issued more
than 12 months previously where the status of the action is unknown
and information about judgments unless the name and address of the '
judgment creditor is included. Cf Burns op cit 43.
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to personal reports is limited and a subject must be advised in
writing by the user if he has been denied a benefit as a result of
such reports; 1) (iv) any person may inquire of any reporting agency
whether they hold a file on him and information contained therein
must be disclosed to him;2) (v) the subject may protest any inform-
ation in his file and procedures are set out for the verification of
the information;3) (vi) the user and reporting agency cannot agree
not to disclose the information to the subject;4) and (vii) penal-
ties are imposed on both the user and the agency for failing to com-
ply with the Act. 5) Similar legislation exists in British Columbia,6)
Ontario,7) Nova Scotia8 ) and Saskatchewan,9) although the latter is
only confined to credit reporting agencies. 10 ) All four Acts require
reporting agencies to be licensed and to adopt reasonable procedures
to ensure that records are accurate and fair and do not include cer-
tain types of information. 11 ) As in the United States 12 ) the Acts
in these provinces and Manitoba also provide for the correction of
Ibid.
Section 6.
Sections 16, 19. Cf Burns op cit 44: "but both are exempt from
civil liability unless they knew or ought to have known that any
of the information was false, misleading or negligently obtained."
Personal Information Reporting Act, SBC, 1973, c139.
Consumer Reporting Act, SO, 1973, c97.
Consumer Reporting Act, SNS, 1973, c4.
Credit Reporting Agencies Act, SS, 1972, c23.
Burns op cit 44.
Burns op cit 45.
See above 66.
1) Section 5, which provides that if a subject is denied a benefit as
a result of a.report, he may within 30 days apply to the user to
ascertain the name and address of the agency, and the user must in-
form the subject of his right to protest the information. The
agency mustsupply the subject, within 24 hours, with the source of
all information, the nature of the information and inform him of













errors 1 ) and the appointment of an official to control their admin-
istration. The Newfoundland Act 2) is mainly concerned with regu-
lating agencies rather than granting consumers rights,3) while the




For purposes of this study it was considered unnecessary to
examine the law relating to privacy in the above countries in any
depth, and it is not intended to discuss the position in any other
jurisdictions. 6) The law in Scotland has not been mentioned be-
cause there seems to be little discussion of the principles involved
and the matter has not fallen for consideration by the courts - in
1) British Columbia Personal Information Reporting Act, s 16; Ontario
Consumer Reporting Act, s 12; Nova Scotia Consumer Reporting Act,
s 13; Saskatchewan Credit Reporting Agencies Act, s 25; Manitoba
Personal Investigations Act, ss 10, 11. Cf Burns op cit 46.
2) Collection Agencies Act, SN, 1973 c14.
3) Burns op cit 46f.
4) Quebec Consumer Protection Act, SQ, 1971 c74.
5) Burns op cit 47.
6) Australia like England does not recognise a common law right to
privacy and injured parties have to frame their action within the
existing nominate torts; cf H Storey "Infringement of Privacy and
its Remedies" (1973) 47 Aust LJ 498, 503; J Swanton "Protection
of Privacy" (1974) 48 Aust LJ 91. It has been suggested that
Anglo-Australian law could provide a remedy for invasion of pri-
vacy by developing the torts of negligence and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress (G Dworkin "The Common Law Protection
of Privacy" (1967) 2 Tas L R 418, 442ff; cf Storey op cit 505),
but this view h~s been doubted; Storey op cit 505; Swanton op
cit 97. The Queensland Invasion of Privacy Act, 1971, however,
provides some control over credit bureaux; Swanton op cit 101.
A constitutional right to privacy is provided for in Mexico (Art-
icles 14 and 16, Constitution of the United States of Mexico, 5th
February 1917; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 432); Venezuela (Art-
icle 59, Constitution; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 435); and
Argentine (Article 19, 1953 Constitution of the Republic of Argen-
tina; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 437f), while limited protection
is available under the Penal Code of Brazil (Articles 150, 151, 159
and 162; cf (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 440f). In Israel it has been
held that there is no common law right of privacy (Rabinowitz v
Merlin (1957) 11 PD 1225; cf R Gavison "Should we have a General
Right to Privacy in Israel?" (1977) 12 Israel LR 155, 170) and it
seems that the proposed Protection of Privacy Law Bill contemplates
a general right of privacy (P Elman "Comment on the Kahn Committee
Report on the Protection of Privacy" (1977) 12 Israel LR 172, l74f).
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any event the action would be based on the actio injuriarum. 1)
Similarly, the Cey10nese law on privacy is governed by Roman-Dutch
law principles and the most definitive examination of the problem
in modern law relies heavily on South African cases and authorities.
2
)
I. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
It is intended to give a brief conspectus of the right to
privacy in South Africa before attempting a detailed analysis there-
of.
The modern action for invasion of privacy in South Africa was
born unheralded and without the difficulties which attended its
nativity in Anglo-American and Continental legal systems. There
was no need to discover a "new tort" or to interpret a particular
section of a Code. The recognition of the action in South Africa
is a logical development under the actio injuriarum which affords a
general remedy for wrongs to interests of personality.3) The South
African cases can also be accommodated under Prosser's four cate-
. 4)gorles.
1. Intrusions: The first oblique reference to a right of privacy
seems to occur in an early Cape case, de Fourd v Cape Town CouncilS)
where de Villiers CJ in commenting upon the condu~t of certain police-
men who had entered premises suspected of being a brothel without a
proper warrant, said:
1) See generally DM Walker The Law of Delict in Scotland (1966) 11
708ff. It has been suggested that the concept of convicium may
also cover privacy in Scotland; Ed AH Robertson Privacy and Human
Rights (1973) 97.
2) CFAmerasinghe The Actio Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch Law
(1966) 174££.
3) Cf WA Joubert "Die· Pe·rsoonlikheidsreg: 'n Belangwekkende Ont-
wikkeling in die Jongste Regspraak in Duitsland" (1960) 23 THR-HR
2~; cf Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit l74ff; Walker op
Clt 798ff.
4) WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 804.
5) (1898) 15 SC 399.
See above ss.
ef ~ v Van Meer 1923 OPD 77, 82; R v
Ferreira 1943 NPD 19, 21.
cf R v Rail 1939 SR 239; R v Woods
See below. 224f. The privacy of one~s house was obliquely referred
to in ~ v ~ 1955 (3) SA 313 (SWA) 316: "In the interest of society
young girls should be protected from being molested in the privacy
of their homes by strange men." It is submitted that the complai-
nant's age was merely an aggrevating factor and that the same prin-
ciple applies to anyone who is so molested.
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"Even these abandoned women have their rights, and without
their permission or a legal warrant no policeman is justi-
fied in interfering with their privacy" 1)
In any event South African criminal law has recognized cer-
tain forms of invasion of privacy as amounting to criminal injuriae
for many years. Thus it has been held to be an injuria to accost
and follow a woman in a street for an immoral purpose,2) to spy upon
a woman while she is undressing3) or while she is bathing;4) to
enter another's home without his consent;5) to place an electronic
listening device in a person's home without his consent. 6)
An early civil case directly concerned with privacy was
Epstein v Epstein7) where the defendant employed private detectives
to keep a watch on the plaintiff (his wife) for the purpose of ob-
taining evidence of adultery by her. Wessels J held:
"The fact of being constantly followed about and spied on is
to my mind a most vexatious nuisance and I think it would be
monstrous if there were no right of complaint".8)
It is submitted that although the learned judge referred to
"nuisance" such conduct was clearly an invasion of privacy.9)
1) At 402.
2) ~ v Jungman 1914 TPD 8, ;
Ellis 1944 SR 195; cf R v
3) ~ v Holliday 1927 CPD 395,
1940 SR 58, .
4) Cf ~ v Schoonberg 1926 OPD 247, .
5) R v Sehonken 1929 AD 36, ef S v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD) 786.
6)
~ v ~ 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) 297.




2. Publication of Private Facts: In Mhlongo v Bailey') the plain-
tiff was a retired schoolmaster who had formerly associated with a
popular African artiste before she had become a celeb~ity. The
defendant's employee had published two photographs of the plaintiff
(with full knowledge of the plaintiff's having refused to part with
them). The photographs had been used to illustrate an article in
Drum magazine entitled "Dolly and her Men". One picture had been
captioned "Allison Mhlongo in the days when he admired young Dolly
Rathebe secretly", and the other "Allison Mhlongo, now a science
master at St Peter's School, Rosettenville". As the plaintiff had
never sought publicity in the past (and indeed at the time that the
photograph had been taken Dolly had not yet attained stardom), the
court held that he had suffered an aggression upon his dignitas, and
awarded him damages for invasion of privacy.2)
Unfortunately in Mhlongo's case the court stressed the need
for "insult" if the injuria was to be actionable. Kuper J commented
as follows:
"The remedy should be given only when the words or conduct
complained of involve an element of degradation, insult or
contumelia".3)
It is submitted, however, that this restrictive interpreta-
tion is not applicable to invasions of privacy. For instance, De
Villiers mentions that:
"every man has, as a matter of natural right ... the possess-
ion of an unimpaired person, dignity and reputation".4)
Such unimpaired person or dignity is afforded protection under the
action for invasion of privacy, and our courts have recognized that
"an impairment of a person's privacy prima facie constitutes an im-
pairment of his dignitas".5) .
1) 1958 (1) SA 370 (W).
2) At 372. ef Joubert op cit (1960) 23 THR-HR 40f.
3) Ibid.
4) M de Villiers The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries (1899) 24.
5) S v A supra 297. See below 185.
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The South African courts may have been faced with another
privacy case' had the plaintiffs in Prinsloo v South African Associa-
ted Newspapers Ltd 1) (a defamation action) given notice to the defen-
dants that they intended to rely in the alternative on injuria or
invasion of privacy.2) Defendants had published a photograph and
article about a young woman student at the University of the Wit-
watersrand who was alleged to have been employed by the So~th African
Police in espionage work on the campus. The plaintiffs sought an
order preventing such publication on the grounds that it was defama-
tory. The court, however, held that to publish that someone was an
)
alleged police informer was not ~ se defamatory and refused the
application. 3) Furthermore the plaintiffs could not proceed in the
alternative for invasion of privacy as they had not given defendants
h
. . . 4)t e requlslte notlce.
A more recent civil case in Roman-Dutch law on privacy,
Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan5) also concerned pub-
lication of private facts. In this case the respondents had both
been previously married, but the custody of the minor children born
of those marriages had been awarded to their respective ex-spouses.
In 1972, three years after respondents had married each other and
contrary to the custody orders, they unlawfully abducted the minor
children and settled with them in Rhodesia. In 1976 an American
private detective succeeded in tracing the family to Rhodesia, and
when the respondents learnt that the appellants were about to publish
this fact in a local newspaper, they successfully applied for an order
restraining such publication. Beadle CJ upheld the decision of the
court "a quo 6) that although the respondents personally had forfeited




5) 1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD).
6) Mr & Mrs 'X' v Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1974 (4)
SA 508 eR) 5l3f.
Mr & Mrs 'X' v Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd supra.
1954 (3) SA 244 CC) 247, 249. See below 304.
1966 (2) SA 476 (C) 490.
1971 (2) SA 293 (T) 297.
Restatement of Torts (1939) , § 867 Comment C.
Mr & Mrs 'X' v Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd supra 5llf.
See below 185.
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their right to privacy because of their conduct, their children
were entitled to protection from publicity.1) In his judgment
Beadle CJ specifically approved 2) Davies J's application in the
court a quo,3) not only of the dicta in O'Keeffe v Argus Printing
& Publishing Co Ltd,4) Gosschalk v Rossouw5) and ~ v ~6) in holding
that the appellant's conduct would have constituted an injuria, but
also his use of the American Restatement of Torts. 7) The former
dicta had been relied upon as authority for the view that invasion
of privacy constitutes an impairment of dignitas,8) while the latter
comment was used as a guide for determining the wrongfulness aspect
of such invasions. 9)
3. False Light: In Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 10 ) the
plaintiffs were nurses, one of whom was married and two of whom were
engaged. They had consented to their photograph being taken to
illustrate a nursing journal. To their dismay they subsequently
discovered that the photograph had been captioned "Off duty : lonely
and nowhere to go", and had been used to illustrate a report in a
Sunday newspaper headed "97 Lonely Nurses Want Boyfriends". The









9) Mr & Mrs 'X' v Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd
Rhodesia~ Printing & P~blishing Co Ltd v Duggan supra
DJ MCQuold-Mason "PublIC Interest 9-.n.d- Privacy" (1975)
259f. See below 178.





article was published as part of an appeal for money to be used
in the construction of a recreation centre for nurses. Unfort-
unately the court did not squarely consider the problem of privacy
and allowed only the married plaintiff to recover on the basis of
contumelia. The other plaintiffs failed because they had omitted
to allege that they were engaged to be married at the time. 1) It
is submitted that the other two plaintiffs should also have recovered,
irrespective of whether or not they were engaged, as the case could
have been decided simply on the basis of invasion of privacy without
reference to insult of contumelia. 2) The plaintiff's private lives
had been falsely exposed to the public eye,3) and the fact that the
publication was, or was not, insulting, or made the plaintiffs feel
ashamed, was irrelevant4) - the mere infringement of the plaintiff's
privacy constituted an impairment of their dignitas. 5)
It is submitted that the two unsuccessful plaintiffs in
Kidson's case, whose alleged desires for the opposite sex were wrong-
fully published in a national Sunday newspaper, suffered no less an
aggression upon their dignitas than did the plaintiff in Mhlongo's
case. 6) It may be that in Mhlongo's case the defendants' conduct
was more reprehensible because he was motivated solely by pecuniary
gain whereas in Kidson's case the motive was partly a charitable one,
but traditionally motive has been regarded as irrelevant in our law. 7)
1 ) At 469.
2) Cf DJ McQuoid-Mason "Invasion of Potency" (1973) 90 SALJ 23, 27f.
3) See below 296.
4)
Cf Fou1ds v Smith 1950 (1) SA 1 (AD) 11; O'Keeffe v Ar~us Print-
ing & Publishing Co Ltd supra 248; S v A supra 298; c Joubert
(1960) 23 THR-HR 39.
5) Cf ~ v ~ supra 297. See below 185.
6) Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 370 (W). See above 127.
7) Cf Basner v Trigger 1946 AD 83, 95; Moaki v Reckitt & Colman
(Africa) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 98 (A) 104; Smith NO & Lardner-Burke NO
v Wonesayi 1972 (3) SA 289 (RAD) 30lff. See below l5lf.
The first case in South African law 1) which
131.
4. Appropriation:
appears to have recognized the modern concept of invasion of privacy
was one dealing with the appropriation of the plaintiff's image for
advertising purposes. In O'Keeffe v Arg~s Printing & Publishing Co
Ltd 2) the plaintiff was a well-known radio announcer employed by the
SABC who allowed herself to be photographed at a pistol range to
illustrate a news story. The photograph was subsequently published
as an advertisement for firearms without her consent - indeed the
reporter employed to write the news article knew that it was against
the policy of the SABC to allow this form of publicity concerning its
employees. The court held that the publication was an aggression
upon the plaintiff's dignitas actionable under the actio injuriarum.
Watermeyer AJ (as he then was) said:
"the case must be judged in the light of modern conditions
and thought, and the fact that the identical situation is
not covered by Roman and Roman-Dutch authority is not con-
clusive of the matter".3)
The court then discussed the position in England and the United
States and concluded that "under our law similar considerations must
apply".4) As mentioned above this approach was subsequently adopted
in Rhodesia Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan. 5)
It seems clear, therefore, that an action for sentimental
damages arising from an invasion of privacy falls squarely under the
actio injuriarum. The question of whether negligent invasions are
actionable in South Africa6) and the problems associated with data
banks 7) will be considered later. In the meantime it is necessary
to define the concept of "privacy" and to discuss its essential ele-
ments under the actio injuriarum in South African law.
1) ef RG McKerron 1954 Annual Survey 125f; RG McKerron The Law of
Delict 7 ed (1971) 54.
2) 1954 (3) SA 244 (C).
3) At 248.
4) Ibid.
5) 1975 (3) SA 590 (RAD) 593f. See above 128£.
6) See below 362£.
7) See below 283£.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DEFINITION AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
A. DEFINITION
According to the dictionary "privacy" may be defined as:
"The state or condition of being withdrawn from the society
of others or from public interest; seclusion .. Absence
or avoidance of publicity or display .. A private matter,
a secret .. private or personal matters or relations".1)
Similarly the word "privaatheid" in the Afrikaans language means:
"die toestand van privaat wees, persoonlike afgesonderd-
h "d" 2)el .
The above definitions seem to conform with the socio-psycho-
logical concepts of the "core self,,3) and "zero -relationships", 4)
as well as the philosopher's "inner" and "outer" man. S) Further-
more, it is submitted that the dictionary definition can be recon-
ciled with the legal interpretations of "privacy" which have been
used in different jurisdictions.
1. The United States. As has been previously pointed out the
Restatement defines privacy as a person's
"interest in not having his affairs known to others or his
likeness exhibited to the pUblic".6)
1) Ed CT Onions The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1933) 1586.
2) MSB Kritzinger, F.J Labuschagne & P De V Pienaar Verklarende
Afrikaanse Woordeboek (1969) 651.
3) AF Westin Privacy and Freedom (1967) 33f. See above 3.
4) E Shi 1s "Pr i vacy : Its Constitut ion and Vi c ~ s situdes" (196 6) 31
Law and Contemp Problems 281. See above 4.
5) MR Konvitz "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude" (1966)
31 Law and Contemp Problems 272, 279. See above s.
6) Restatement of Torts, First (1939) § 867. See above SS.
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1)
In Kerby v Hal Roach Studios the court referred to
"the right to live one's life in seclusion, without being
subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity .. 'the
right to be let alone''',2)
while according to the American Jurisprudence
"it is the right to be free from the unwarranted appropriation
or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's
private affairs with which the public has no legitimate con-
cern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities".3)
None of the above definitions, however, define the concept
sufficiently narrowly to enable the courts to distil its essential
elements. For instance, there is no reference to whether or not
the wrongdoer's liability is based on fault. Must he have acted
intentionally or negligently or is liability strict? The case law
is confused with the growing overlap between defamation and the false
light privacy cases. 4) Where the publication concerns "a matter of
public interest", the plaintiff in a false light privacy action as
is the case of defamation,S) must prove "actual malice" by the defen-
dant. 6) On the other hand in a defamation suit a plaintiff may
sometimes recover by merely proving negligence on the part of the
defendant. 7) It has been pointed out that this would have an un-
fortunate effect on freedom of speech if it was extended to the law
of privacy, and that it should only be applied in privacy cases
where the plaintiff can prove actual damages. 8) The question of
damages is also confused. In the past it was accepted that the doc-
trine of presumed damages applied to defamation,9) and the same
1) (1942) 53 Cal App 2d 207, 127 P 2d 577.
2) At 579. Cf TL Yarig "Privacy: A Comparative Study of English and
American Law" (1966) 15 ICLQ 175, 190f.
3) American Jurisprudence, Second (1972) v 62 677f.
4) Cf DE Brown "The Invasion of Defamation by Privacy" (1971) 23
Stanford LR 547f; A Hill "Defamation and Privacy under the First
Amendment" (1976) 76 Columbia LR 1206, 1211; Note "Defamation
Privacy and the First Amendment" 1976 Duke LJ 1016, 1017f. '
5) New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254; cf Hill op cit 1211.
6) Time Inc v Hill (1967) 385 US 374; cf Note op cit 1976 Duke LJ
1017f.
Law of Torts 4ed (1971) 771.
Note op cit 1976 Duke LJ 1046.






principle held good for the false light privacy cases.
1
) In
Gertz v Robert Welch Inc 2) the court held that all damages had to
be alleged and proved if they are to be·recovered. 3) If the prin-
ciple in Gertz's case is applied to the false light privacy cases
the plaintiff will be faced wi th the task of proving "harm to men'tal
comfort" which, it has been suggested, is more difficult to prove
than harm to reputation. 4) It is submitted that the correct inter-
pretation of Gertz's case is that the plaintiff need not prove the
"actual dollar value" of the injury,S) but merely that he has sub-
jectiv~ suffered mental harm. 6) The Restatement gives the courts
limited guidance on the question of wrongfulness by stating that an
invasion is actionable if it constitutes an "unreasonable and
serious" interference with a person's right to privacy.7) It is
therefore left to the courts to make a value judgment as to what is
"unreasonable" or "serious".8)
Prosser takes a pragmatic "functional approach" without attempt-
ing to find a comprehensive definition of the concept. 9). He main-
tains that invasion of privacy is not one tort but "four distinct
kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff".10)
1) Prosser Torts op cit 815; HD Krause "The Right to Privacy in
Germany - Pointers for American Legislation?" 1965 Duke LJ 481
515; MG Hill, HM Rossen & WS SOgg Smith's Review: Iorts' (197~)
226. Contra Note op cit 1976 Duke LJ 104T: "In privacy actions,
however, as in most other tort actions, the plaintiff has always
been required to show actual injury".
2) (1974) 418 US 323.
3) At 349f; cf Note op cit 1976 Duke LJ 1030.
4) Note op cit 1976 Duke LJ 1035 n 85: "This reputation is a con-
siderably more concrete interest than the interest in mental
comfort because it is susceptible to more objective proof and
measurement. Damage to reputation can be ascertained with far
more sophistication and accuracy than the wholly subjective in-
jury of mental suffering".
5) Cf Gertz v Robert Welch Inc supra 350; Note op cit 1976 Duke LJ
1030 n 57.
See below 189.6)
7) Restatement of Torts, First op cit. §867.
8) Se e be low 172 f .
9) P Burns "The Law and Privacy: The Canadian Experience" (1976)
54 Canadian Bar Rev 1, 10.
10) Prosser Torts op cit 804.
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Prosser's categories of intrusions, disclosures, false light and
appropriation,1) however, have been described as inadequate,
because they do not accommodate certain situations where the private
individual's life is regulated by legislation. 2) It is sub-
mitted, however, that this criticism is unfounded because the ex-
amples given, viz state laws governing contraception, abortion and
the "regulation of sexual and ingestive activities",3) could all be
regarded as intrusions. 4) A more valid criticism seems to be that
Prosser's analysis concentrates on the wrongfulness aspect in the
light of the reported cases without attempting to define clearly the
que s t ion 0 f fau1t . 5) We s tin's descript ions 0 f "f 0 ur bas i c s tat e s 0 f
individual privacy,,6) viz solitude,7) intimacy,8) anonymity9) and
reserve,10) embrace most of Prosser's categories, although he goes
further by also including psychological surveillance 11 ) and data
surveillance. 12 )
1) See above 55. See below 198ff for a discussion of these categories
in the context of South African law.
2) GL Bostwick "A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary and Intimate
Decision" (1976) 64 Cal LR ..1447, 1450. See above 61.
3) Ibid.
4) See below 198f.
5) Cf H Kalven "Privacy and Tort Law - Were Warren & Brandeis Wrong?"
(1966) 31 Law & Contemp Probl~ms 326, 333.
6) Westin op cit 31.
7) Ibid: solitude "here the individual is separated from the group
and freed from the observation of other persons ... solitude is
the most complete state of privacy that individuals can achieve".
8) Westin op ci t 31: intimacy where "the individual is acti'ng as
part of a small unit that claims and is allowed to exercise cor-
porate seclusion so that it may achieve a close, relaxed, and
frank relationship between two or more individuals".
9) Westin op cit 31: anonymity "occurs when the individual is in
public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds,
freedom from identification and surveillance".
10) Westin op cit 32: reserve "is the creation of a psychological
barrier against unwanted intrusion; this occurs when the indivi-
dual's need to limit communication about himself is protected by
the willing discretion of those surround:'ng him".
11) Westin op cit l33ff.
12) Westin op cit l58ff; cf Burns op cit 10.
136.
Prior to his detailed analysis Westin gives a sociological
definition which is very wide and of little practical value to a
court seeking to extract the elements of the action:
"Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent in-
formation about them is communicated to others".1)
Westin's definition has also been criticized for using "value-loaded"
terms like "right" or "claim",2) but it is submitted that alternative
suggestions which regard privacy as "a condition,,3) or "control over
who can sense us,,4) are just as unworkable in practice.
Bloustein attempts to define the concept more narrowly by argu-
ing that it is a dignitary tort:
"An intrusion upon our privacy threatens our liberty as in-
dividuals to do as we will, just as an assault, a battery,
or imprisonment of the person does. Just as we may regard
these latter torts as offences to our concept of individualism
and the liberty it entails, so too should we regard privacy as
a dignitary tort".5)
Bloustein, however, fails because although he appears to envisage an
action similar to the actio injuri~rum he too overlooks the fault
element. It is submitted that it is primarily the failure by the
American courts and legal writers to consider the fault element in
1) Westin op cit 7. On "institutions" see below 277f.
2) L Lusky "Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts" (1972)
72 Columbia LR 693.
3) Lusky op cit; cf Bupns op cit 7: "Privacy in his LLusky'~7 view
is not a claim, and, if it is a moral right it is too vague and,
if a legal right, of little normative value because it leaves too
many unanswered questions. Instead, privacy should be regarded
as a condition Lwhereby an individual is free from certain types
of interference by other~7."
4) R B Parker "A Definition of Privacy" (1974) 27 Rutgers LR 275, 281:
"Privacy is control over whom and by whom the varIOUS parts of us
can be sensed by others". Cf Burns op cit 8: This definition,
howe~er, is ph~sically-o:iented in ~hat it is linked to the seeing,
hea:Ing, touchIng,smellIng or tastIng of another's body, voice,
bodIly products or objects closely associated with him.
5) EJ Bloustein "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser" (1964) 39 NYULR 962, 1003.
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actions for invasion of privacy which has led to conflicting deci-
sions in the different states,') and the danger that the action will
eventually swallow up certain other torts. 2)
2. England. Although invasion of privacy has been described as
a "doubtful,,3) or "emergent,,4) tort by English jurists it has been
defined in several instances. Winfield states that the wrong con-
stitutes:
"interference with another's seclusion of himself, his family
or his property from the public ll • 5)
Fleming contends that:
"the interest involved is that of 'being left alone', to main-
tain one's intellectual and emotional personality, free from
offensive intrusion by conduct calculated to annoy and induce
emotional distress".6)
Winfield's definition is similar to those found in American
law,7) but Fleming seems to go further in that he refers to "conduct
calculated to annoy and induce em~ti~nal distress". The learned
writer does not elaborate on this aspect, but it is submitted that
such a requirement coincides with the South African element of
animus injuriandi. 8) Fleming classifies privacy as an invasion of
a person's: (a) interest in seclusion; (b) interest in name, like-
ness and life history; and, (c) interest in personal dignity and
self-respect. 9)
1) See below 174.
2) ef ProsserTorts op cit 813.
3) PH Winfield & JA Jolowicz Winfi~ld and Jolowicz on Torts 9 ed
(1971) 501.
4) RFV -Heuston Salmond on Torts 16 ed (1973) 34.
5) Winfield & Jolowicz op cit 501.
6) JG Fleming The Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 526. My italics.
7) See above 132£.
8) See below 147.
9) Flerning op cit 526ff.
l3R.
The Justice Report') on the other hand preferred not to de-
fine the concept of privacy narrowly, but to simply regard it as:
"that area of a man's life which, in any given circumstances,
a reasonable man with an understanding of the legitimate needs
of the community would think it wrong to invade".2)
Such a wide definition, however, is likely to result in diffi-
culties similar to those experienced in the United States, arlslng
from the lack of sufficient guidelines and the need to rely solely
on policy considerations. 3) Justice gave two reasons for failing
to define the concept more precisely:
(a) "The notion of privacy has a substantial emotive content in
that many of the things which we feel the need to preserve
from the curiosity of our fellows are feelings, beliefs or
matters of conduct which are themselves irrational".4)
(b) "The scope of privacy is governed to a considerable extent
by the standards, fashions and mores of the society of which
we form part, and these are subject to constant change".S)
It is submitted that both reasons are untenable: the first because
the courts are unlikely to set standards according to "irrational"
criteria;6) the second because the courts have to adjust continually
to the changing mores of society.7) In any event the Draft Right
of Privacy Bill which appears in the Report itself limits the action
to any "substantial and unreasonable infringernent,,8) of th~ right to
privacy - a clear recognition of the objective factors which in-
fluence the courts when making value judgments.
Section 1, Justice Privacy op cit Appendix "J" 59.





1) Justice Report Privacy and the Law (1970)
2) Justice Privacy op cit 5 para 19.







Attempts were made to define privacy in the proposed Right
of Privacy Bills introduced by Lord Mancroft (1961) ,1) Mr Alexander
Lyon (1967)2) and Mr Brian Walden (1971) ,3) although the Younger
Committee on Privacy (1972) decided not to recommend a general
right of privacy.4) Lord Mancroft's definition was similar to
that used by Fleming5) in that it refers to publications "calculated
to cause .. distress or embarassment".6) It is submitted that
again it can be argued that this requirement is analogous to the
concept of animus injuriandi. 7) Mr Lyon's Bill, however, referred
to any "serious and unreasonable" interference with the right to
privacy,8) while Mr Walden's was based on the Draft Bill in the Jus-
tice Report. 9) Neither of the latter Bills, however, mentioned
whether such interference had to be intentional or negligent and it
is submitted that this is a weakness in both proposals. 10 )
It has been pointed out that the Canadian statutes 11 ) make no
attempt to define privacy,12) and that the "right to be let alone"
should be regarded as a principle rather than a rUle. 13 )
Values in Western Society (1974)
"even a broad desc.ription left
in due course be reduced to a








P Burns "The Law and Privacy:
54 Canadian Bar Rev 1, 11.
Ibid. P Stein & J Shand Legal
187, point out, however, that:
as a guide to the courts would


























"The rules will be articulated by statutes, case law and
constitution, whereas the principle will be derived from
moral and psychological imperatives".l)
Such an "open-textured" legislative approach would not differ much
from the judicial development of the law of negligence.
2
) It is
submitted that this approach is similar to that adopted by civil
law jurisdictions which apply broad principles of delictual liability
rather than the common law's closed categories of nominate torts.
3. Europe. It seems that there are very few judicial pronounce-
ments on the definition of privacy in Continental systems, and that
in those jurisdictions where the concept has been recognized such
recognition is based on a broad interpretation of certain general
provisions of their respective Codes. 3) In West Germany, for in-
stance, such interpretation varied from recognition under Article
826, requiring an intentional act,4) to Articles 1 and 2 of the
Federal Constitution (Grundgesetz) which made no reference to inten-
tion,S) to Article 823(1) which refers to either intentional or negli-
gent conduct. 6) In France, on the other hand, Article 1382 of the
Code merely mentions the term "fault", which can mean either inten-
tion or negligence,7) while the new Article 369 of the Criminal Code
only refers to intentional violations of privacy.8) In addition it
seems that academic theories which seek to differentiate between the
different "spharen" in Germany,9) and the "vie intime" in France 10 )
are of limited practical assistance to the courts.
RS.
86.







2) Ibid. For a description of the development of the law of negli-
gence see MA Millner Negligence in Modern Law (1967).





8) Cf "Current Legal Developments" (1971) 20 ICLQ 365. See above 99,
103.
9) See above 9lf.
10) See above 106f.
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At the Nordic Conference on the Right to Privacy1) the col-
lective attempt by a number of countries to define the concept con-
cisely was also unsuccessful. 2) Privacy was simply defined as:
"the right to be let alone to live one's own life with the
f · f " 3)minimum degree 0 Inter erence ·
The Conference did, however, find it necessary to expand on the
meaning of the proposed definition:
"This means the right of the individual to lead his own life
protected against: (a) interference with his private, family
and home life; (b) interference with his physical or mental
integrity or his moral or intellectual freedom; (c) attacks
on his honour and reputation; (d) being placed in a false
light; (e) disclosure of irrelevant embarassing facts re-
lating to his private life; (f) the use of his name, identity
or likeness; (g) spying, prying, watching and besetting;
(h) interference with his correspondence; (i) misuse of his
private communications, written or oral; (j) disclosure of
information given or received by him in circumstances of pro-
fessional confidence".4)
Many of these wrongs can be accommodated under Prosser's categories 5)
of intrusions,6) publications of private facts,7) being placed in a
false light 8) and appropriations. 9) Furthermore most are also
covered by the broad provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
1) International Commission of Jurists Conclusions of the Nordic
Conference on the Right to Privacy (1967).
2) Cf Robertson op cit 28.
3) International Commission of Jurists Conclusions of the Nordic
Conference op cit 2f; cf International Commission of Jurists
"The Legal Protection of Privacy: A Comparative Study of Ten
Countries" (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 418, 420.
4) Ibid.
5) WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 804. See above 55.
6) See below 198f.
7) See below 247f.
8) See below 290f.
9) See below 300f.
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Rights 1) and the European Convention on Human Rights. 2) None-
theless although the right to privacy is defined in wide terms
there is no indication as to when an interference therewith will
be actionable. In short the focus of attention has been on de-
fining "the right to privacy" and not the corresponding wrong of
"invasion of privacy,,~3) Generally, however, for practical pur-
poses it is with the latter that the courts are primarily concerned.
4. South Africa. The courts in South Africa, without specifically
defining the concept, have experienced little difficulty in recog-
nizing the right to privacy as one of the rights of personality
which they are prepared to protect:
"Lflhere can be no doubt that a person's right to privacy
is one of .. 'those real rights, those rights in rem related
to personality, which every free man is entitled to enjoy".4)
They have gone further, however, and seem to regard invasion of
privacy as an aspect of impairment of dignitas under the actio in-
.. 5)Jurlarum.
Academic writers in South Africa have also defined privacy in
general terms. Joubert refers to it as:
1) Robertson op cit 14: "Article 12. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or corres-
pondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Every-
one has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks".
2) Article 8; cf Robertson op cit 13. See above 95.
3) Cf DN MacCormick "A Note upon Privacy" (1973) 89 L~R 23, 24:
"to have a right of privacy in some respect is to ave a right
against relevant intrusion, and that one has only if and to the
extent that others have a duty not to intrude in the relevant
way" .
4) ~ v ~ 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) 297.
5) Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
(C) 249; ~idson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957 (3) SA 461
(W) 467f; Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 370 (W) 373; Rhodesian
Printi.ng & Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD) 594.
See below 185
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"die krenking wat 'n persoon toegebring word deur onbevoegde
inbreukmaking op die afsondering waarop hy in sy private
o 0" 1)lewe geregtlg lS ·
He divides the wrong into three categories: (a) intrusion into a
person's private life; (b) public disclosures concerning a person's
private life; and, (c) disruption of a person's quiet or peaceful
1 0f 2)1 e.
Van der Merwe and Olivier 3) and Neethling4) appear to accept
that the action lies under the actio injuriarum but argue that it
should be recognized as a "selfstandige persoonlikheidsreg".
Neethling defines privacy as follows:
"Privaatheid is 'n individuele lewenstoestand van afsondering
van openbaarheid. Hierdie lewenstoestand omsluit al daardie
persoonlike feite wat die belanghebbende self bestem om van
kennismaking deur buitestaanders uitgesluit te wees en ten
opsigte waarvan hy 'n privaathoudingswil het".5)
The above writers, however, give no indication as to what its
limits should be, but support Joubert's view6) that privacy should
be divorced from the concept of dignitas. 7) But none of the writers
1) WA Joubert Grondslae van die Persoonlikheidsreg (1953) 136. Cf
SA Strauss, MJ Strydom & JC van der WaIt Die Suid-Afrikaanse
Persreg (1976) 289; "Elke mens het 'n reg op privaatheid. Dit
beteken dat iedereen aanspraak kan maak op 'n mate van afsondering
van die openbaarheid in sy private lewe".
2) Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 136; cf NJ van der Merwe & PJ
Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed (1970)
395.
3) Op cit 393.
4) J Neethling "Grondslag vir die Erkenning van 'n Selfstandige Per-
soonlikheidsreg op Privaatheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg" (1976)
39 THR-HR 120, 128.
5) J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976) (LL.D. Thesis) 287.
6) WA Joubert Grondslae van die Persoonlikheidsreg (1953) l40f.
7) NJ van der Merwe & PJ Olivier Die Onre mati e Daad in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed (1970) 394f; eet lng op Clt 1976 39
'l'HR-HR 128.
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have gone so far as to suggest that such a "selfstandige" action
should include invasions arising from negligence, and it is sub-
mitted that an action for negligent invasion of privacy could only
lie where the plaintiff proves patrimonial 10ss.1) Amerasinghe,
without defining the concept,2) prefers to deal with it from two
aspects: (a) the right not to be interfered with in certain basic
interests relating to the privacy of life, excluding the right to
freedom from publication; and (b) the specific right to freedom from
publication. 3) In short the right to privacy includes the right
to be free from: (a) intrusions and (b) publicity.
vi
5. Conclusion. vreedom from intrusions or publici ty implies that
the individual ha control not only over who communicates with him,
but also who has access to the flow of information about him.~In
South Africa most delicts are actionable under either the actio in-
juriarum for sentimental damages or the lex Aquilia for patrimonial
10ss.5) Therefore an invasion of privacy which falls within one
or other of these actions will have to satisfy its essential element.
In some instances the actions may overlap in which case the plaintiff
may bring a "rolled-up" action for both sentimental damages and
patrimonial 10ss.6) The reported cases on privacy in South Africa
were all decided under the actio injuriarum,7) in terms of which it
is necessary to prove intention,8) wrongfulness,9) and impairment of
1) See below, cf Gelb v Hawkins 1959 (2) PH J20(W).
2) CF Amerasinghe Aspects of the Actio Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch Law
(1966) 179f.
3) Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum ~ cit 180ff.
4) P Burns "The Law and Privacy: The Canadian Experience" (1976) 54
Canadian Bar Rev 1, 9 n 42. Cf AF Westin Privacy and Freedom (1967)
33. See also E Goffman Relations in Public (1972) 63. See above
3 n 3.
5) RG McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) 10; van der Merwe &
01ivier op cit l6f.
6) Mathews v Yaung 1922 AD 412,505. Such a "rolled-up" action has
been app1ie in cases of assault (cf Stoffberg v Elliott1923 CPD
148, 152; Prinsloo v Du Plooy 1952 (4) SA 219 (0) 221) and defa-
mation (cf Salzmann v Holmes 1914 AD 471, 480; Die Spoorbond v
SAR & H 1946 AD 999,1011).
7) See above l25ff.
8) See below 165ff.
9) See below l70ff.
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plaintiff's personality.l) In most cases the courts seemed to
regard the invasion as an impairment of dignitas,2) although it
has been argued that the concept is much wider. 3) As has been
pointed out above many of the definitions are synonymous with the
word "privacy" itself: "withdrawn",4) "seclusion",5) "being let
alone",6) "solitude, intimacy, anonymity and reserve",7) "minimum
interference with one's own life,,8) and "afsondering".9) These
definitions, however, merely seek to define the right to privacy,
they give no guidance as to the circumstances in which the courts
will consider a breach of that right as an actionable invasion of
privacy. Without the latter the wrong will lack any definite pro-
file as seems to have happened in the United States. 10 )
~[!! ,is submitted that a possible definition for invasion of
privacy under'the actio injuriarum in South African law is: any
intentional and wrongful interference with another's right to se-
clusion in his private life. 11 ) The definition includes the ele-
ments of intention and wrongfulness and attempts to give some indi-
cation of the nature of the impairment of personality which occurs
in privacy cases. The word "seclusion" has been used because it
seems to be one of the few words which expresses the essence of
privacrJ According to Webster's Dictionary "seclude" means:
Neethling op citop cit l40f;





Cf HD Kalven "Privacy and Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandcis
Wrong?" (1966) 31 Law & Contemp Problems 326, 333. See above 16.
Cf PH Winfield "Privacy" (1931) 47 LQR 23, 24; Joubert Persoon-


















or another) in order to
outside influence; to with-
To screen; to protect
To separate as or as
"To remove or separate (oneself
avoid or prevent intercourse or
draw into solitude; to isolate
by shutting off or being shut off;
by a barrier".')
The Shorter Oxford Dictionary likewise defines "seclude" as:
"To remove or guard from public view;
tunities of social intercourse ... To
external influence".2)
to withdraw from oppor-
shut off or screen from
Before discussing different aspects of the law of privacy in
South Africa it is necessary to consider briefly the essential re-
quirements of the actio injuriarum: 3) Ca) intention; Cb) wrongful-
ness; and Cc) impairment of personality.
1) Ed WA Neilson, TA Knott & PW Carhart Webster's New International
Dictionart of the English Language 2 ed (1939) 2260: "SeclUSIon... Act 0 keeping out; exclusion".
2) eT Onions The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1933) 1825:
"Seclusion ... the act of secluding; excluding".
3) For the position where the injured party wishes to sue for a
negligent invasion of privacy see below 362ff.
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B. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
As has been pointed out above, where the plaintiff sues for
sentimental damages his remedy lies under the actio injuriarum,
in which case he must prove: (i) that the act was intentional;
(ii) that it was wrongful; and (iii) that it impaired his person-
ality.1)
1. INTENTION (ANIMUS INJURIANDI)
Intention is concerned with fault and must be distin uished
from w~gful e deals with the invasion of another's ri~ht.2)
In Roman and Roma~-Dutch law animus injuriandi (intention to
f ., . 3) Th f hor lnJurla. e test or suc
intention was considered to be present:
"(a) when an act is done by a person with the definite object
of hurting another in regard to his person, dignity or repu-
tation;
"(b) when an unlawful act is done as a means of effecting
another object the consequence of which act such a person is
aware will be to hurt another in regard to his person, dignity
or reputation."S)
In short animus injuriandi in Roman and Roman-Dutch law re-
quired: (a) intention to injure; and, (b) consciousness of wrong----fulness. If either of these elements were absent the action would
----
1) See above 49.
2) Cf Wentze1 v SA Yster & Staa1bedryfsvereniging 1967 (3) SA 91 (T)
98; PQR Boberg HAnimus Injuriandi and Mistake" (1971) 88 SALJ
57, 63f.
3) See above 28, 39. Cf WA Joubert "Die Persoonlikheidsreg: 'n
Belangwerkende Ontwikkeling in die Jongste Regspraak in Duitsland"
(1960) 23 THR-HR 23, 41, who points out that contumelia meant con-
duct with the intention to injure.
4) RG McKerron The Law of Delict 7ed (1971) 56; B Ranchod Founda-
tions of the South African Law of Defamation (1972) 133.
5) M De Villiers The Roman and Roman Dutch Law of Injuries (1899) 27;
cf M Bliss Belediging in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1933) 48f.
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fail. 1) Therefore, although a defendant intended to injure the
-=--plaintiff it would be a good defence if he was not aware that his
act was wrongful. Z) The motive behind th~ defendant's act, how-
"
ever, was irreleva1lt~
"Thus to give a man a bad character which he does not deserve
in order to excite commisseration for his children in whom a
person is interesting himself by collecting money on their
behalf is directly injurious, however'praiseworthy or meri-
torious the object ultimately sought to be attained may be.,,3)
Where the plaintiff established that the defendant had committed
an injuria there was a presumption that the latter had acted wrong-
fully and with animus injuriandi. 4)
Before considering animus injuriandi in relation to privacy5)
it is intended to discuss the development of the concept in defama-
tion actions as it is in the latter where most of the controversy
has occurred. Similar principles, however, apply to other claims
d h
.... 6)un er t e actIo InJurIarum.
(a) Defamation.
In Maisel v Van Naeren 7) it was suggested that until about 1915,
the courts in South Africa generally applied the Roman-Dutch law
approach to animus injuriandi. 8) At an early stage, however, the
1) Ranchod op cit 75; cf Digest 47.10.3.2: "No-one can commit an
injury unless he is ,aware that he is doing so" (De Villiers'
translation); Voet 47.10.20: "One the side of one who could
appear to have inflicted a wrong there exists an obstacle to his
being liable in the action on wrongs if the purpose to do a wrong
is lacking" (Gane's translation).
2) Digest 47.10.3.4; De Villiers op cit 28f; McKerron Delict op cit
57.
3) De Villiers op cit 28; c£ Ranchod op cit 75; RW Parsons "The
Bases of the South African Law of Defamation" (1951) 14 THR-HR 192,
193.
4) Bliss op cit 57f; Ranchod op cit 75.
5 ') See below l65ff.
6) Cf Smith NO & Lardner-Burke NO v Wonesayi 1972 (3) SA 289 (RAD) 299.
7) 196 0 (4) SA 836 (C) .
8) At 843. Cf Mackay v Philip (1830) 1 Menzies 455, 463; Botha v
Brink (1878) 8 Buch 118,122£; Bennett v Morris (1893) 10 SC 223,
226; Taute v Odendaal (1906) 23 SC 691, 693.
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English law concept of "malice,,1) began to be used interchangeably
with animus injuriandi. 2) Simultaneously the English terms "jus-
tification",3) "privilege" and "fair comment" were used to describe
similar defences applied in South Africa which had their origins
in Roman-Dutch law. 4) In English law the defences of privilegeS)
and fair comment6) justified the defendants' conduct, but if he acted
with "malice" his otherwise lawful act became unlawful. 7) Fault
was irrelevant and the defences available to the defendant were limi-
ted to those which excluded the wrongfulness of his conduct. This
English law approach of a closed list of defences for excluding
wrongfulness was increasingly adopted by the South African courts 8)
at the expense of the defences which rebutted fault or animus in-
juriandi. Eventually it was suggested that in defamation cases
animus injuriandi had become a 'hollow fiction,.9)
1) Ed RFV Heuston Salmond on Torts 16 ed (1973) 176: "Malice means
presence of an improper motive; it does not necessarily mean
personal spite or ill-will". But cf Ed JA Jolowicz Winfield and
Jolowicz on Tort 9 ed (1971) 267, 302, who refer to "express
malice". See also Bliss op cit l66f; Ranchod op cit 134:
"Express malice means spite, ill-will or male fides and is not
the same as animus injuriandi".
2) Cf White v Pilkington (1850-52) 1 Searle 107.119; Botha v Brink
supra l23f; Dip:Qenaar v Hauman (1878) 8 Buch 135 139, 143; cf
Bliss op cit 144££. cf. SAUK v O'Malley 1977 (3) SA 394 (AD) 402.
3) In English law the defence of justification will succeed if the
statement is true.' Winfield and Jolowicz op cit 373; Salmond
op cit 159. In Roman-Dutch law truth alone is no defence and the
defendant has to go further and prove public benefit. Voet 47.
10.9; Van Leeuwen Censura Forensis 5.25.3; Huber 6.8.7; cf
Botha v Brink supra 122; Ranchod op cit 86f. The English law
approach appears to have been adopted in Mackay v Philip supra 463.
4) ef SA Strauss, MJ Strydom & JC van der WaIt Die Suid-Afrikaanse
Persreg 3ed (1976) 232ff, who give a most useful analysis of
anlmus injuriandi.
5) Winfield & Jolowicz op cit 389f; Salmond op cit l67f.
6) Winfield & Jolowicz op cit 275~ Salmond op cit l82f.
7) Winfield & Jolowicz op cit 302 (privilege), 282 (fair comment);
Salmond op cit 176 (privilege), 190 (fair comment).
8) Cf Jooste v Claassens 1916 TPD 723, 735; Laloe Janoe v Bronkhorst
1918 TPD 165; Tothil1 v Foster 1925 TPD 857; Mankowitz v Geyser
1928 OPD 138, 139£; K1einhans v Usmar 1929 AD 121, 126. The
matter was left open in Basner v Tr~ 1946 AD 83, 94f. See
generally Strauss, Strydom & Van aer-waTt op cit 236ff.
9) RG McKerron "Fact and Fiction in the "Law of Defamation" (1931) 48
SALJ 154; Contra M De Vi1liers "Animus Injuriandi: An Essential
in the Law of Defamation" (1931) 48 SALJ 308.
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The courts appeared to have lost sight of the fact that in
Roman-Dutch law animus injuriandi was the gist of the action.
1
)
If the defendant could show that he did not have the intention to
injure or that he was not conscious of the wrongfulness of his act
the presumption of animus injuriandi was rebutted. 2) Furthermore
even if he did possess animus injuriandi he would still escape lia-
bility if he could show that his act was justified by one of the
objective defences, for instance, truth and public benefit, or fair
comment. 3) The objective defences did not rebut animus injuriandi,
but excluded the wrongfulness of the defendant's act,4) and could
only defeated by the plaintiff proving that the defendant had
abused his rights by acting from improper motive or malice. 5) In
other words proof of such improper motive or malice on the part of
the defendant rebutted the lawfulness of his conduct. Therefore
once animus injuriandi was equated to malice 6) it was said that the
objective defences could be defeated by the plaintiff proving that
the defendant acted with:
"animus injuriandi, or to use the terms which Schreiner JA in
Basner v Trigger7) ... considered more apt in this connection








Cf Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 264.
Wentzel v SA Yster en Staalbedryfsvereniging 1967 (3) SA 91 (T) 98.
Cf Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 264; cf Basner v
Trigger supra 83. See below.
6) Cf Tromp v McDonald 1920 AD 1, 2; Monckten v BSA Co Ltd 1920 AD
324, 332; KIeinhans v Usmar supra 126; Gluckman v Schneider 1936
AD 151, 160£; Youn~ v Kemsler 1940 AD 258, 278. Cf Bliss op cit
l44f; TW Price "An1mus Injur1andi in Defamation" (1949) 66 SALJ
4, 7; PR MacMillan "An1mus Injuriandi and Privilege" (1975)92
SALJ l45f.
7) Supra.
8) Naude v Whittle 1958 (1) SA 594 (AD) 606.
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Thus motive which is generally only relevant to the question of
lawfulness finally became confused with animus injuriandi which is
an essential requirement for fault under the actio injuriarum.
This confusion had occurred notwithstanding attempts by the courts
to distinguish motive from intention: 1)
"Motive ... is the activating impulse preceding intention".2)
The turning point came in 1960 when in Maisel v Van Naeren3) it
was held that in defamation actions: (i) English law principles had
not replaced the Roman-Dutch law;4) (ii) animus injuriandi was an
essential element;5) (iii) animus injuriandi included intention to
injure and consciousness of wrongfulness by the wrongdoer;6) and
(iv) there was no closed list of defences. 7) Therefore as in Roman
and Roman-Dutch law,8) if the defendant was unaware of the defamatory
nature of the statement he did not intend to injure the reputation
of the plaintiff; and if the defendant genuinely believed that his
defamatory statement was made on a lawful occasion he was not con-
scious of the wrongfulness of his act. 10 ) The approach in Maise1's
case was subsequently adopted by the Appellate Division in Jordaan v
Van Bi1jon,11) Craig v Voortrekkopers Bpk 12 ) and Nydoo v Vengtas,13)
See above 147.
Cf De Vi11iers 0E cit 28: "Since the law in such a case takes in-
to account the Ldefendants~7 frame of mind and not the effects of
his action" - referring to Digest 47.2.53; 47.10.3.1; 47.10.18.14.
Maise1 v Van Naeren supra 850f.
1962 (1) SA 286 (AD) 296.
1963 (1) SA 149 (AD) l56f.
1965 (1) SA 1 (AD) 14f.
1) C£ Whittaker v Roos 1912 AD 92, 125, 131; Find1ay v Knight 1935AD
58, 69f; Basner-v-Trigger supra 93, 96; Maskowitz v Pienaar 1957
(4) SA 195 (AD) 203.
2) G1uckman v Schneider 1936 AD 151, 159. Intention on the other
hand is: "the conscious mind willing to injure". De Vil1iers op
cit 29.
3) 1960 (4) SA 836 (C). Cf Strauss, S!rydom & van der WaIt op cit
246, who state that the decision "Lka~7 nie hoog genoeg aangeprys
word nie".
4) At 850, Cf Young v Kemsley 1940 AD 258, 277f: "For the sake of
convenience of expression we make use of the terminology used in
the English decisions. But that does not mean that we do not











1 b · 1)although it has been strongly argued that such approva was 0 lter.
Apart from criticisms by Boberg,2) the return to Roman-Dutch law
d b d
· . 3)
principles seems to have been generally welcome y aca emlC wrlters







Animus injuriandi is an essential element in the wrong of
defamation. 4)
There is a presumption of animus injuriandi (ie "die oog-
merk om te krenk") where the words or conduct constitute
. . . 5)an lnJurla.
Failure to allege such animus injuriandi is fatal to the
plaintiff's claim. 6)
Animus injuriandi must be distinguished from motive or
malice. 7)
Animus injuriandi includes not only the actual intention
to injure but also consciousness of wrongfulness. 8)
There is no closed list of defences,9) but those which
negate wrongfulness should be distinguished from those
which rebut fault. 10 )
1) Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1965 (3) SA 562 (W) 57lf;
Smith NO & Lardner-Burke NO v Wonesayi 1972 (3) SA 289 (RAD) 306,
307£, 309£, 3llf. But see now SAUK v 0 'Malley 1977 (3) SA 394 (AD) 403.
2) PQR Boberg "The Mental Element in Defamation" (1961) 78 SALJ 181;
,., "Animus Injuriandi wi thout Tears" (1965) 82 SALJ 437; "AiiTiiius
InJuriandl and Mistake" (1971) 88 SALJ 57. ----
3) NJ van der Merwe and PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in. die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed (1970) 378; NJ van der Merwe "Vonnisbespreking"
(1966) 29 THR-HR 76; JD van der Vyver "Animus In~uriandi en die
Afwesigheid van Wederregtelikheidsbewussyn" (1966 29 THR~HR 336;
WA Joubert & JC van der WaIt "Vonnisbespreking" (1967) 30 THR-HR
375; cf MacMillan op cit 163.
4) Maise1 v Van Naeren supra 842; Jordaan v Van Bi1jon supra 294;
Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd supra 569; Coetzee v Nel 1972
(1) SA 353 (AD) 370.Negligence is not a ground. SAUK~O'Malley Su~ra
5) J d . . . k 407 .or aan v Van Bll]on supra 294; cral~ v Voortrek erpers Bpk supra
156£; Nydoo v Vengtas supra 13; Jac son v NICRO 1976 (3) SAl(AD)~.
6) Moaki v Reckitt & Colman (Africa) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 98 (AD) 105;
Tal~aard v S & VA Rosendor£ & Venter 1970 (4) SA 48 (0) 53;
Jac son v NICRO supra 12. Ct Coetzee v Nel 1972 (1) SA 353 (AD) 374.
7) Basner v Trigger supra 95; Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd
supra 569; .Moaki v Reckitt & Colman (Africa) Ltd supra 104.
SAUK v O'Malley Supra 405. See above 151.
8) MaISel v Van Naeren supra 840, 850f; cf Smit v Meyerton Outfitters
1971 (1) SA 137 (T) 139; Muller v SA AssOCIated Newspapers Ltd
1972 (2) SA 589 (C) 593. SAUK v O'Malley supra 403~' Van
der Merwe op cit 76; Jouoert & Van der WaIt op Clt 375.
9) Maisel v Van Naeren supra 845; Jordaan v Van Biljon supra 296;
Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd supra 569.
10) Wentzel v SA Yster en Staalbedryfsvereniging 1967 (3) SA 91 (T) 98;
Geyser v Pont 1968 (4) SA 67 (W) 72f.
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Confusion has remained, however, because despite the applica-
tion of the subjective approach to animus injuriandi, the courts
have retained the traditional terminology when considering the ob-
jective defences, ie that such defences rebut animus injuriandi.
For instance, in Jordaan v Van Biljon1) Rumpff JA said:
"As die appellant daarin slaag om Lai~.7 bevoorregte
geleentheid te bewys word die vermoede van animus injuriandi
weerle en kan die appellant alleen dan slaag indien bewys
gelewer word dat respondent inderdaad die animus injuriandi
gehad het.,,2)
Similar views were expressed by the same learned judge in Craig v
Voortrekkerpers Bpk3) , Nydoo v Vengtas 4) and Benson v Robinson & Co
(Pty) Ltd 5), by Trollip J in "Geyserv Pont 6), and Hiemstra J in
. M· 7)Warlng v erV1S .
1) 1962 (1) SA 286 (AD).
2) At 294.
3) 1963 (1) SA 149 (AD) 156£: "Indien 'n verweerder bewys dat die
gewraakte woorde gebesig is met 'n ander oogmerk as om die be-
ledigde te krenk ... en daardie oogmerk deur die reg geoorloof
word,.wo:d d~t geag.dat.die lasterlike woorde ~ie ~nimus i~~uriandi
gebeslg lS nle, en lS die vermoede wat enkel Ult dle gebrul van
lasterlike woorde ontstaan, weerle."
4) 1965 (1) SA 1 (AD) 13: "Slaag die verweerder daarin om te bewys
dat die publikasie van die laster inderdaad geskied het in
omstandighede wat regtens die publikasie veroorloof, en is daar
geen ander bewys dat die verweerder wel die doel gehad het om te
beledig nie, ontstaan daar 'n vermoede dat die verweerder nie
animo injuriandi gepubliseer het nie, en word die oorspronklike
vermoede van die oogmerk om te beledig weerle".
5) 1967 (1) SA 420 (AD) 426: "Whenever defamatory words are proved
to have been published in the discharge of duty or in the exercise
of a right ie on a so-called privileged occasion, the presumption
of animus injuriandi has been rebutted, and the plaintiff will not
succeed unless he can prove the animus injuriandi by evidence
other than the defamatory words". Holmes JA appears to have made
the same error in Benson's case at 432f: "Upon proof of a privi-
leged occasion on a balance of probabilities which is an objective
matter, the law presumes the absence of animus injuriandi".
6) Supra 74: "Nou die doel van die verweer van privilegie is om die
vermoede van animus injuriandi te weerle.
7) 1969 (4) SA 542 (W) 549: "The plea of fair comment involves an
admission of defamation, but if the defamation lies in comment
and the comment is in the circumstances fair, the presumption of
animus injuriandi is negatived".
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The above references to the objective defences excluding animus
injuriandi (rather than wrongfulness)"\eems to justify Boberg's
contention that the courts are confusing wrongfulness with fault.
2
)
Strauss, Strydom and Van der Walt 3) point out that in Benson v
Robinson & Co (Pty) Ltd4) Rumpff JA, after stating that privilege
rebuts the presumption of animus injuriandi,5) immediately went on
to imply that such privilege is concerned with the lawfulness of
the defendant's act:
"A defendant who pleads circumstances from which a duty or
a right to use defamatory words emerges, relies on the
lawfulness of his act and pleads the investitive facts".6)
The learned writers therefore conclude that despite the use of the
traditional phrase "the presumption of animus injuriandi has been
rebutted" the learned judge intended to indicate that privilege
excluded wrongfulness. 7) In SAUK v OtMalley8) Rumpff CJ clarified
the distinction between wrongfulness and fault:
"Die vermoede van onregmatigheid kan in ons reg weerle
word deur getuienis wat aantoon dat die lasterlike woorde
gebesig is in omstandighede wat onregmatigheid uitsluit
Die vermoede van opset om te belaster, wat weens die
publikasie van die lasterlike woorde ontstaan, plaas 'n
weerleggingslas op die verweerder, wat die vermoede kan
weerle deur getuienis voor te le dat hy nie so 'n opset
gehad het nie".9)
Benson v Robinson & Co (Pty) Ltd supra 426.
Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 252.
1977 (3) SA 394 (AD).
At 402f.




2) Boberg op cit








It seems that Rump££ CJ's observations in O'Malley's c~se1) were
influenced by the unequivocal dictum of Jansen J in Wentzel v
.. 2)
SA Yster and Staalbedryfsverenlglng:
"Ondanks die konvensionele en geykte benadering dat 'n
geprivilegieerde geleentheid (of feit wat op 'n geoorloofde
oogmerk dui) die vermoede van animus injuriandi weerle, skyn
daar weinig twyfel te wees dat, regswetenskaplik beskou, dit
'n regverdigingsgrond is wat die onregmatigheid uitsluit en
nie opset of animus injuriandi nie".3)
Jansen J's view was subsequently adopted by Trollip J in Geyser v
Pont,4) and Watermeyer J in Muller v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd
5
)
where the latter stated:
"From recent decisions it would appear that the Courts have
begun to recognize that jurisprudentially it is more correct
to regard a defence of qualified privilege, as also the
defences of absolute privilege, justification and fair comment,
as raising the lawfulness of the publication rather than the
absence of animus injuriandi".6)
Lawfulness refers to the recognition by the Courts that the invasion
of a particular right is justified. 7) This is a matter of policy.
Fault, on the other hand, is concerned with blameworthiness,8) which
under the actio injuriarum takes the form of animus injuriandi.
1) SAUK v O'Malley 1977 (3) SA 394 (AD) 402f.
2) 196 7 (3) SA 91 (T).
3) At 98.
4) 1968 (4) SA 67 (W) 72£. Unfortunately Trollip J then went on to
say that privilege rebutted animus injuriandi Cat 74). See above
153 n 5. C£ Strauss, Strydom and Van der WaIt op cit.
5) 1972 ( 2) SA 589 (C) .
6) At 592, referring to Wentzel's case and Geyser's case.
7) See below 170£.
8) C£ Maisel v Van Naeren 1960 (4) SA 836 CC) 846.
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The latter is a subjective concept,1) and it seems illogical to say
that a person subjectively intends to commit a wrongful act if he
is not conscious of the wrongfulness of his act. / Dolus in the
sense of animus injuriandi would seem to include dolus eventualis
i.e. where the wrongdoer appreciates the consequences of his act but
is reckless as to whether or not they occur. 2)/ But if he does not
act recklessly and he is not aware of the possibility that he might
h
.... 3)
injure another he does not possess t e necessary IntentIon to InjUre.
Thus the distinction between wrongfulness and fault can be
illustrated as follows: If the plaintiff proves that the defendant
has published a defamatory statement which impairs his reputation
there is a presumption that the latter has acted wrongfully and with
animus injuriandi (fault).4) The defendant may rebut the presump-
tion of wrongfulness by showing that his act was justified in the
eyes of the law (i.e. that his act was not wrongful), for instance,
that it was privileged. 5) But if the plaintiff can prove that the
defendant abused his rights by acting with an improper motive,6) such
conduct would be regarded as wrongful, and in the case of privilege
the defence would be lost. 7) If the defendant establishes the law-
fulness of his act. the fact that he acted with animus injuriandi does
not vitiate the defence. Thus where defamatory words are spoken wil-
fully on a privileged occasion and in the knowledge that they are de-
famatory (i.e. animus injuriandi), if the privilege holds the defen-
dant is not liable. 8) Therefore the defence of privilege rebuts the
1) Cf Maisel v Van Naeren supra 840; cf Smit v Meyerton Outfitters
1971 (1) SA 137 (T) 139.
2) Cf Wessels v Bosman 1918 TPD 431, 437; Nasionale Pers v Long
]930 AD 87, 100; van Zyl v African Theatres Ltd 1931 CPD 61, 66;
Bassen v Post News aers Pt) Ltd 1965 (3) SA 562 (W) 576; Muller
v SA Associated Newspapers Pty Ltd 1972 SA 589 CC) 594; Vorster
v Strydpers Bpk 1973 (2) SA 482 (T) 487. It has been suggested
that the criminal law concept of dolus directus, dolus indirectus
and dolus eventualis should be used for animus injuriandi. Mac-
Millan op cit l57f. Cf EM Burchell & PMA Hunt South African
Criminal Law and Procedure (1970) I 116.4 Sauk v O'Malley Supra 402.
3) Strauss, Strydom & Van der Walt op cit 238.
4) Sau~ v O'Malley Supra 402.
5) Sauk v O'Malley Supra 403. See below 323f.
6) Cf Millward v Glazer 1949 (4) SA 931 (AD) 942: "There is authority
for the proposition that where a person does something, which would
otherwise not be illegal, out of malice towards another, the other
may invoke the actio doli".
7)
See below 329f.
8) Cf Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 350.
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element of wrongfulness not animus injuriandi. Where, however, the
wrongfulness of the defendant's act has been established he may
still prove the absence of fault in the form of animus injuriandi
by showing that he was not conscious of the wrongfulness of his act.
1
)
Here the defendant rebuts the presumption of animus injuriandi.
Defamation by the Press: The liability of the Press 2) for defamation
seems to have been influenced by English law,3) 'with the emphasis on
lawfulness rather than fault. It is submitted that it is probable
that some of the controversy concerning animus injuriandi could have
been avoided if both the courts and academics had clearly disting-
uished defamation by the press from other forms of defamation. 4)
At an early stage th~ courts seemed to have ignored the fault element
on the basis that it would be too easy for newspapers proprietors to
rebut the presumption of animus injuriandi. 5)
"Die uitsondering sou wesenlik gegrond kon wees op beskerm-
ing van die gewone burger teen 'n klas van persone wat by
'n medium betrokke is, wat van so 'n aard is, dat in geval
van laster gepleeg in die medium, dit moeilik is om die
opset by 'n bepaalde persoon tuis te bring.,,6)
1) Maisel v Van Naeren 1960 (4) SA 836 (C) 850f; cf Nydoo v Vengtas
1965 (1) SA 1 (AD) 15.
2) It has been accepted that for the purposes of defamation a radio
and television corporation can be plac'ed mutatis mutandis on
the same footing as the owner or publisher of a newspaper.
SAUK_v O'Malley 1977 (3) SA 394 (AD) 403.
3) Cf SAUK v O'Malley supra 404; Strauss, Strydom & van der WaIt
op cit 257.
4) For instance, in Crjig v Voortrekkerpers BEk 1963 (1) SA 149 (AD),
where the court app led the subjective approach to animus
injuriandi, the question of the liability of the press was not
ralsed, even though the case concerned publication in a newspaper.
Cf SAUK v OMalley supra 405. Conversely while Strauss, Strydom
& Van-Qer WaIt op cit 254f criticize Colman J's analysis of
animus injur~andi.in Hassen v Po~t News~apers (Pty) Ltd supra 576,
the~ agree wlth hlS declslon as lt applles to defamatory publi-
catlons by the press (at 263). Cf SAUK v O'Malley supra 407.
Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 382, appear to overlook the
question of defamation by the press in their criticism of Hassen's
case. Cf Van der Merwe op cit (1966) 29 THR-HR 76, 78f where
the author suggests that the solution in Hassen's case would
have been to recognize an action for negligent invasion of
interests of personality. But the plaintiff would then have to
prove patrimonial loss in terms of the lex Aquilia. See below
362f.
5)
Cf Hill v Curlewis (1844) 3 Menzies 520, 523. Cf Strauss, Strydom
& Van-Qer WaIt op cit 257f.
6)
SAUK v O'Malley supra 404f; cf Wilson v Halle 1903 TH 178, 201;
cr-strauss, Strydom &,Van der WaIt op cit 258.
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It has been suggested that strict liability of the press exists
in our law,') and that it is no defence for the publisher, printer,
editor or owner of the newspaper to show that he was not aware, or
could not reasonably have known of the defamatory statements in the
publication. 2) This approach appears to have been applied consistent-
ly by the courts, 3) C!:~hough i t -~lras been que-ried whether. strict
liability should be applied to editors or printers who are mere 'cogs'
. 4'
in a wheel controlled by the owner or publIsher. J It has been
pointed out, for instance, that the courts have considered the fact
that the defendant was merely a printer to be a mitigating factor
when assessing damages. 5)
Nevertheless despite the implication in some judgments that it
is necessary to prove animus in~uriandi on the part of the editor or
publisher in defamation cases,6 it seems that the rule may be relaxed
on the basis that there is a duty on such persons to be acquainted
with the contents of their publications. 7) It could also be argued
that the liability of the persons is based on vicarious responsibili-
ty.8) In SAUK v O'Mall~9) it was suggested, but not decided, that
1) SAUK v O'Malley supra 407.
2) Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt opcit 258.
3) Cf Hart v Robinson (1897) 12 EDC 24, 28; Wilson v Halle supra
200r;-Dunning v Thomson& Co 1905 TH 313, 316; Philpott v
Whittal 1907 EDC 193, 211; Maisel v Van Naeren supra 849; Hassen'
v Post News~apers (Fty) Ltd supra 577; Potter v Badenhorst 1968
(4) SA 446 E) 449; Taljaard v Rosendorf£ & Venter 1970 (4) SA 48
(0) 52; Muller v SA Associated NewspaEers Ltd 1972 (2) SA 589 (C);
SAUK v O'Malley supra 403£. But cf Ro inson v Kingswell 1913 (AD)
~ 526.
4) Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 260; cf De Villiers AJ
in Maisel v Van Naeren supra 849: "as far as I know, it has never
been suggested that an editor~r publisher who is in fact unaware
of the defamatory character of an article, could be liable even if
there should be no animus injuriandi on the part of the author".
Cf Taljaard v Rosendorff and Venter supra 52. Contra Robinson v
Kingswell supra 526. nut see now SAUK v O'Malley supra 404.
5) Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 260; cf Dunning v~
Times Ltd 1905 TH 231, 233: "the fact that they are merely----:uie
printers may be taken into account in determining the damages".
6) Maisel v Van Naeren supra 849; cf Craig v Voortrekkerpers Bpk
supra 156£. See above n
7) Cf Dunnin, v Thorn~on & Co supra 316; Carbonel v Robinson & Co (Pty)
Ltd 19651) SA 134 (D) 151; .~assen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd
1905 (3) SA 562 (W) 576; TalJaard v Rosendorff & Venter supra 52.
8) Mai~el v Van Naeren supra 849; cf Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty)
Ltd supra 576; Boberg op cit (1961) 78 SALJ 181f.
9) ] 977 (3) SA 394 (AD).
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the liability of the press was strict:
"Dat weens die besondere posisie van die pers en die radio,
wat matige media is, 'n weerlose burger in 'n moeilike posisie
geplaas kan word, is nie te betwyfel nie, en die opvatting
dat skuldelose aanspreeklikheid van die pers in ons reg bestaan,
sou myns insiens aanvaarbaar wees."l)
In any event as Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt point out, the
production of newspapers consists of "a daily race against time,,2)
which exposes' individuals to the possibility of being defamed irre- ,
spective of any intention or negligence on the part of the publishers.
3
.
The confusion concerning the application of the subjective approach
to animus injuriandi to defamation by the press,4) has probably led
to the proposed liability for the Publication of Libel in Newspapers
Act,S) which limits the defenc$ available to the press to justifica-
tion, fair comment and privilege. 6) It is submitted, however, that
such legislation is unnecessary, and that provided the courts dis-
tinguish defrmation by the press from other forms of defamation, as
was done in SAUK v O'Malley,7) no difficulties should arise. In cases
of defamation by the press the defences are limited to those which
rebut unlawfulness, in all other cases the defendant may also use
defences rebutting animus injuriandi.
(b) Other Injuries
It is clear that as a general rule animus in~tiriandi is an
essential requirement in an action for injuria. 8 Furthermore, apart
from defamation by the press,9) it seems that the subjecti;e appro;ch
to animus injuriandi in defamation cases 10 ) will ·usually apply
1) SAUK v O'Malley supra 407.
2) Cf Rhodesian Printin and Publishin Co Ltd v Howman 1967 (4) SA
1 (R 1 : "all t e wor 0 pro uCIng a newspaper, and especially
of producing the news columns, is carried out under pressure as a
daily race against time to ensure that the latest possible news
appears where it should appear, having regard to its importance".
Cf De Villiers op cit 134.
3) Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 259.
4) See above 157 n 3.
5) South African Law Commission The Liability of the Press for the
Publication of Defamatory Matter in Newspapers (1975)
6) Section 2(2), Draft Bill.
7). 1977 (3) S~ 394 (A~) 407; .cf Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit
258 n ~3: ~n.St~dIe.van dIe r~lev~nte.regspraak laat duidelik blyk
dat anImus lnJurlandl of nalatlgheld nle aanspreeklikheidsvereistes
is nie. " But cf Robinson v Kingswell supra 526.
8) Moaki v Reckett & Colman (Africa) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 98 (AD) 103f;
cf Nakharla v.Mla 1918 T~D 56, 58 (assault); Matiwane v Cecil
Nathan, Beattle & Co 1972 (1) SA 222 (N) 228 (assault).
9) See.above 157£. 10) See above 152.
Per van Winsen J in Donono v Minister of Prisons 1973 (4) SA 259
(C) 262.
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to other injuriae. 1 ) Thus in Whittaker v Roos 2) where the plain-
tiff was a prisoner who had been subjected to unlawful punishment,
Innes JA said:
"When an unlawful aggression of this nature has been proved
the law presumes that the agressor had in view the necessary
consequences of his act; that is that he had the intention
to injure, the animus injuriandi. This does not mean that
he was actuated. by malice or ill-will, but that he had deli-
berately intended that the operation of his unlawful act
should have effect upon the plaintiff".3)
Similarly in Foulds v Smith,4) which concerned adultery, van der
Heever JA stated that the
"aantyging van 'n injurie reeds 'n bewering van animus
injuriandi inhou, 'n bewering van werklike en subjektiewe
animus injuriandi".5)
In false arrest or imprisonment cases, although it has been
suggested that "the plaintiff need not allege or prove fault, either
in the form of dolus or culpa,,6) it is clear that the action lies
under the actio injuriarum and animus injuriandi is a requirement,7)
even though it is presumed to be present in such cases. 8) Animus
injuriandi must still be alleged,9) but once the plaintiff proves the
1) But intention must be distinguished from motive. For instance,
even if the motive for an assault is laudable it does not negative
the fact that the intention to assault or the assault itself might
be wrongful. Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 (3) SA
710 (T) 722.
2) 1912 AD 92.
3) At 124; cf Solomon JA at 141.
4) 1950 (1) SAl (AD).
5) At 11.
6)
7) Cf Thompson v Minister of Police 1971 (1) SA 371 (E): "In the case
of wrongful arrest the intention may be said to be direct - dolus
directus - as it is done with the definite object of hurting the
plaintiff in his person, dignity or reputation". Contra Smit v
Meyerton Outfitters 1971 (1) SA 137 (T) 139.
8) Cf Foulds v Smith supra 11; Ingram v Minister of Justice 1962 (3)
SA 225 (W) 227; Thompson v Minister of Police supra 374; Groene-
wald v Minister van Justlsie1972 (3) SA 596 (0) 599; 1973 (2) SA
480 (0) 482f; Newman v Prinsloo 1973 (1) SA 125 (T) 127; Minister
of Prisons v Donono 1974 (1) SA 323 (C) 325.
9) Cf Moaki v Reckitt & Colman (Africa) Ltd supra 103f.
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fact of his arrest or imprisonment and that it was wrongful,') the
onus is on the defendant to justify his conduct. 2) If the defen-
dant establishes that his act was justified (i.e. that the arrest or
imprisonment was effected or procured under a valid writ or warrant,3)
or in the case of a person authorized to arrest another under the
Criminal Procedure Act,4) that he acted in good faith and on reason-
able grounds 5) the lawfulness of the defendant's conduct may be re-
butted by the plaintiff proving an improper motive on the part of
the defendant. For instance, if the object of the arrest was to
frighten or harrass the arrested person rather than to bring him be-
fore a court such an arrest is un1awfu1. 6) . It has been held that
mistake is no defence at common 1aw,7) but if bona fide may be a miti-
gating factor in the ·assessment of damages. 8) It is submitted, how-
ever, that such a mistake may be a good defence,9) unless the court
infers dolus eventual is from the defendant's conduct. 10 ) Further-
more, certain statutory protection is given to persons authorised to
.. . t f t 11)execute or assIst In executIng warran s 0 arres .
1) Cf Donono v Minister of Prisons supra 262.
2) May v Union Government 1954 (3) SA 120 (N) 128.
3) Shasko1s~ v Haupt (1906) 23 SC 230, 232; Lefdahl v Dredge 1910
CPD 452, 455; Ingram v Minister of Justice supra 226; cf May v
Union Govt supra 128; Edwards v Beneke 1970 (2) SA 437 (T) 440;
Minister van Polisie v Kraatz 1973 (3) SA 490 (AD) 511f.
4) Act 51 of 1977; C£ Act 56 of 1955.
5) Section 46, Act 51 of 1977; cf s31, Act 56 of 1955.
6) Cf Tsose v Minister of Justice 1951 (3) SA 10 (AD) 17; Minister
van Po1isie v Krantz supra 508.
7) Birch v Ring 1914 TPD 106, 109; Smit v Meyerton Outfitters 1971
(1) SA 137 (T) 140; cf Smith NO ana-Lardner-Burke NO v Wonesayi
1972 (3) SA 289 (RAD) 305. But see below 339f.
8) Cf Bhika v Minister of Justice 1965 (4) SA 399 (W) 401.
9) Cf Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 476ff~ Provided it is reasonable;
if not, the arrest will be unlawful.
10) Cf Ingram v Minister of Justice supra 229f. See above 156.
11) Peace Officers and other authorized persons are protected: (a) if
they arrest the wrong person in good faith and on reasonable grounds
th~t.such person is the person named in the warrant (s 31(1) (2)
CrImInal Procedure Act 56 of 1955, cf Ingram v Minister of Justice
supra 227, cf s46 (1)(2) Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977; cf
arrest under s 65(5), Magistrates Courts Act, 32 of 1944, Edwards
v Beneke supra 440); or (b) if they arrest a person under a de-
fective warrant or writ (s 32 of Act 56 of 1955, Act 51 of 1977 has no
such provi~ion); or (c) if the warrant has been irregularly issued
(s 31, PolIce Act, 7 of 1958). Where an arrest without warrant
is made (cf ss 22 - 27, Act 56 of 1955; ss 39 - 42, 50, Act 51 of
1977) the onus of proving the lawfulness of such arrest rests upon
the.d~fendant. Union Govt v Bolstridge 1929 AD 240, 244; Tsose
v MInIster of Justice supra 18; Brand v Minister of Justice 1959
(4) .S~ 712 (AD) 714. The Common law rights of persons falsely or
malIcIously arrested are however preserved, s 41, Act 56 of 1955-
cf s 53, Act 51 of 1977. '
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In cases of abuse of legal procedures (for instance malicious
prosecution, arrest or execution) the South African courts under the
influence of English law,1) have confused malice with animus injur-
iandi. This is illustrated by the use of "malice" in the sense of
animus injuriandi,2) and the expression "absence of reasonable and
probable cause,,3) to denote unlawfulness in malicious prosecution
cases. 4) Thus it has been held that where there is proof of reason-
able and probable cause, even though there is "malice" on the part
of the defendant, the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed in an ac-
tion for malicious prosecution. 5) However, as has been pointed out
above,6) where the defendant establishes the lawfulness of his act,
the presence of animus injuriandi does not make it unlawful. None-
theless the plaintiff may still succeed if he can show that the de-
fendant a.bused his rights,7) in that he was activated by some improper
1) Moaki v Reckitt & Colman (Africa) Ltd supra 103. Cf RW Lee
"Malicious Prosecution in the Roman-Dutch Law" (1912) 29 SALJ 22;
RG McKerron "Abuse of Legal Procedure: Animus Injuriandi In Rela-
tion Thereto and to the Wrong of Defamation" (1968) 85 SALJ 421,
424. ----
2) Hotz v Shapiro (1902) 12 CTR 988, 992; Pearse v Fleischer (1884)
4 EDC 297; Lemue v Zwartbooi (1896) 13 SC 403, 406. But cf
Collins v Minnaar;- 1931 CPD 12, 14: "Now whatever the English law
may be about malicious prosecution, we must be guided by the prin-
ciples of the Roman-Dutch law, and in Roman-Dutch law what is com-
plained of as an injury, and it seems to me that it is an injury
maliciously and without reasonable cause to give information to
the police that a crime has been committed". See also ARB
Amerasinghe "Actions for Malicious Abuse of Judicial Proceedings
in South African and Ceylon Law" 1965/1966 Acta Juridica 177, 20lff.
3) Cf McKerron op cit (1968) 85 SALJ 424.
4) Traditionally to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution
the plfiintiff has to prove: (a) that defendant set the law in
motion; Cb) that defendant acted without reasonable and probable
cause; and (c) that defendant was activated by an improper motive
(malice). Beckenstrater v Rottcher 1955 (1) SA 129 (AD) 134;
Van der Merwe v Strydom 1967 (3) SA 460 (AD) 467. But cf Lederman
v Moharal Investments (Pty) Ltd 1969 (1) SA 190(AD)196. In Burkett
v SmIth 1920 AD 106, 108 the court stated that plaintiff "could
only succeed by showing a want of real and probable cause, and the
existence of animus injuriandi". It is submitted that it should
have gone further to include also the requirement of an improper
motive.
5) Hotz v Shapiro supra 992; Pearse v Fleischer supra.
6) See above 156.
7) Cf McKerron op cit (1968) 85 SALJ 424: "the juristic basis of lia-
bility in actions of this kina-IS the abuse by the defendant of
the right which he, in common with all other persons, possessed to
set the law in motion".
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or indirect motive. 1 ) Once such a motive (e.g. malice) has been
proved, the plaintiff must succeed as there is no longer any reason-
able and probable cause for the prosecution. The lawfulness of
the defendant's conduct (i.e. that there was reasonable and probable
cause) is defeated by proof of malice on his part. 2) Therefore to
institute criminal proceedings in order to further some object
other than a conviction, for instance to further a civil remedy, is
to act from an improper motive. 3) It is clear, however, that
animus injuriandi is also a requirement,4) although it is submitted
that the reference to such animus as dolus indirectus in malicious
1) Cf AJEJ "Abuse of Legal Procedure and Malicious Prosecution"
(1969) 9 Rhod LJ 7, 8: "for abuse of legal procedure ... an im-
proper motive is a requirement for liability".
2) Conversely improper motive or malice may, but need not necessarily,
be inferred from want of reasonable and probable cause Spiegel v
Miller (1881) 1 SC 264, 273f; Van Litzenberg v Louw (1899) 16 SC
283, 286; Hart v Cohen (1899)16Se 363, 367; Maserowitz v Richmond
1905 TS 342~3; Fyne v African Realty Trust 1906 EDC 248, 257;
Banbury v Watson 1911 CPD 449, 461; Nel v Wernick 1934 SR 71, 77;
Thompson v Minister of Police 1971 (lr-5A 371 (E) 373f.
3) Cf Carne v Howe (1898) 15 se 232, 236; Waterhouse v Shields 1924
CPD 155, l6g;--May v Union Govt supra 129; Minister van Polisie
v Kraatz supra 508, cf Tsose v Minister of Justice supra 17.
4) Cf Moaki v Recki tt & Colman (Africa) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 98 _(AD) 106;
Groenewald v Minister van Justisie 1973 (2) SA 480 (0) 483;
Prinsloo v Newman 1975 (1) SA 481 (AD) 492. Cf Lederman v Moharal
Investments (Pty) Ltd supra 196: "There seems little doubt that
this is the actio injuriarum and, conceivably the need may well
arise, in appropriate circumstances, to recast the above requisites
ITa) that the respondent set the law in motion; (b) that it acted
without reasonable and probable cause; and (c) that it was acti-
vated by an indirect or improper motive) into a mould more consis-
tent with the terminology of the actio". Contra McKerron Delict
op cit 263 n 32; McKerron op cit (1968) 85 SALJ 424.
Furthermore it follows that
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. "f" 1)Frosecutlon cases lS con uSlng.
even if objectively there was no reasonable and probable cause for
the defendant's conduct, he may still escape liability by showing
that he did not have the necessary (subjective) animus injuriandi.
2
)
Similar principles apply in the case of malicious arrest or
". 3) d 1"" t" 4) I h t" t"lmprlsonment an ma lC10US execu lone n s or ln ac lons con-
cerning abuse of legal procedures there is a presumption that the
proceedings were instituted lawfully and the plaintiff will only re-
cover if rebuts its presumption by showing that the defendant acted
from an improper motive and that he had animus injuriandi. In cases
1) Thompson v Minister of Police supra 375: "In the case of malicious
arrest the intention to injure is indirect - dolus indirectus as
the action of the defendant in instigating the arrest or setting
the wheels of the criminal law in motion is done as a means of
effecting another object viz the arrest of the plaintiff, the con-
sequences of which act the defendant is aware will necessarily be
to hurt the plaintiff in regard to his person, dignity or reputa-
tion". But dolus indirectus in the criminal law occurs "where,
although not the accused's aim and object, he foresaw the unlawful
act or consequence as certain, or as 'substantially certain'."
EM Burchell & PMA Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure
(1970) I 116. Dolus di rectus, on the other hand, app lies "where
the accused's aim and object was to ,do the unlawful act or to cause
the consequence". Burchell & Hunt op ci t 116.' I t is conceded
that in actions for malicious prosecution the decision of the pro-
secutor interposes between the act of the defendant and the prose-
cution itself, but the object of the defendant is to bring about
the prosecution of the plaintiff. It is submitted that such an
object is better described as dolus directus. In any event both
forms of dolus would seem to constitute animus injuriandi. Cf
MacMillan op cit 157.
2) See above 157.
3) e£ spie~el v Miller supra 273£; Hiscock v Mullinson 1923 NPD 105,
109; T ompson v Mlnister of Police supra 374£; Prlnsloo v Newman
supra 495. In false imprisonment the imprisonment is the act of
the defendant, in malicious imprisonment a judicial act interposes
between the act of the defendant and the imprisonment. Groenewald
v Minister van Justisie 1972 (3) SA 596 (0) 603; cf Newman v
Prinsloo 1973 (1) SA 125 (W) 127.
4) Cf Hart v Cohen supra 368; Cole's Estate v Oliver 1938 CPD 464,
468;--Lee v Van Riebeeck Ladies Hairdressers Pt Ltd 1962 (4) SA
181 (Tr-I83; RL Weir & Co v De Lange 1970 4) SA 25 E) 28. Such
cases should be distinguished from actions for wrongful attachment
where it is unnecessary to allege malice or want of reasonable '
cause. Cohen Lazar & Co v Gibbs 1922 TPD 142, 144; cf Smit v
Meyerton Outfitters 1971 (1) sA 137 (T) 139f; but cf Waae-& Co v
Union ~ovt 1938 CPD 84, 86: "an action for injuria will now lie in
such Clrcumstances even where there has been no malice, dolus or
animus injuriandi in the sense in which it was understood by the
older authorities". But Wade's case relied on Whittaker v Roos
1912 AD 92, as authority, and the latter clearly recognized~
traditional approach to animus injuriandi. See above 160.
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of wrongful arrest and the like there is a presumption of unlawful-
ness and that the defendant acted with animus injuriandi and the
onus is on the defendant to show either that his conduct was legally
justified or that he did not have animus injuriandi.
1
)
(c) Invasion of Privacy
It is submitted that the above principles concerning animus
injuriandi will in general apply to invasions of privacy.2)
(i) Intrusions: In criminal matters involving intrusions the courts
seem to adopt a subjective approach to apimus injuriandi 3) which has
been extended .to include dolus eventualis. Thus in S v A4) the court
rejected the contention that the appellant's only interest was to ob-
tain evidence of infidelity for their client and that they did not
have animu5 injuriandi:
"The evidence ... set out amply justifies the inference of
dolus eventualis on the part of the appellants. They must
have foreseen the possibility that the complainant could or
would be hurt and insulted by their conduct, but they acted in
reckless disregard of his feelings".5)
In the Rhodesian case of S v 1,6) however, the court seems to favour
a more objective approach,7) ~hen it was suggested that in cases of
mistake 8) the courts should apply a rule analogous to that used for
the wrongful arrest of another in terms of a statute. 9) To escape
1) See above 161.
2) Cf J Neethling "Grondslag vir die Erkenning van 'n Selfstandige
Persoonlikheidsreg op Privaatheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg"
(1976) 39 THR-HR 120, 127; CF Amerasinghe Aspects of the Actio
Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch Law (1966) 185.





1971 (2) SA 293 (T).
At 299, my italics.
19 76 (1) SA 781 (RAD) .
Cf JM Burchell "Is the Adulterers' Home their Castle? A Case of
Criminal Injuria" (1976) 93 SALJ, 265, 270.
8) See below 339£.
9) S v I supra 789, Beadle ACJ also favoured an objective approach
tor animus injuriandi in Smith NO and Lardner-Burke NO v Wonesayi
1972 (3) SA 289 (RAD) 3l5f.
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liability for the latter the defendant has to show not only that
his belief was bona fide, but also that he had reasonable grounds
for such belief.') For instance, it may be a good defence for the
defendant to show that she bona fide believed that her husband was
in bed with his paramour, and that she had reasonable grounds for
such belief when she entered the bedroom of an innocent third party.2)
But:
"if the injured spouse knows that she already has, or that she
clearly has the means of getting, other adequate evidence of
adultery and her motive for invading the privacy of the guilty
spouse is as much to embarrass them as for the purpose of ob-
taining evidence, the invasion of privacy will not be justi-
f · d" 3)le .
It is_ submitted, however, that the intention of the defendant should
be tested subjectively,4) and that the question of the reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct concerns lawfulness which is tested ob-
~
jectively,5) but may be defeated by an improper motive on the part of
the defendant. 6) Furthermore, just as "wrongful arrest of an inno-
cent person is an injuria not widely differ6nt in character from an
invasion of his privacY",7) it is submitted that a malicious invasion
of privacy may be similar to malicious prosecution. 8) Consequently
if a person maliciously makes a false report to the police that
another possesses banned literature or drugs in his home, or is con-
ducting illegal meetings at his house, it is submitted that the in-
jured party may bring an action against the informer for malicious in-
vasion of privacy, and that the same principles will apply as for
other abuses of legal procedures.9)
Ch 31 (R);




S v I supra 789.
See above l62f.
1) Section 33(2), Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act,
cf s 32, Act 56 of 1955; s 46, Act 51 of 1977.
2) See below ~l.
3) S v I supra 787.






1958 (1) SA 370 (W).
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(ii) Publicity: It is submitted that the publicity cases should
be treated on a similar basis to defamation: Where the disclosure
does not appear in the news media the courts should apply the sub-
jective criteria for animus injuriandi. 1) Where the invasion is
by the press, however, the courts should emphasize the lawfulness
aspect rather than that relating to fault. 2) The reported civil
cases on privacy all concern the press, but none have squarely con-
sidered the basis of the liability of the press in such matters. In
O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd,3) a case involving
appropriation of the plaintiff's likeness for advertising purposes,
the court seemed to assume that animus injuriandi was a requirement,4)
although it referred to the question of insult rather than inten-
tion. 5) In Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd, 6) a false light ' ,I
case, the court recognized that animus injuriandi was a requirement
but stated that it could be inferred from the plaintiff's conduct:
"I think that it can certainly be accepted that the defendant
had no wish to harm the plaintiff, but the reference to her in
the article was intentional and in my view the existence of
animus injuriandi must be presumed, the other elements of the
injuria being proved".7)
Here the court clearly distinguished motive from intention. 8) Mhlongo
v Bailey9) concerned the unauthorized publication of a photograph and
embarrassing private facts, and the court appeared to adopt.a subjec-
tive approach to animus injuriandi by an editor:
1) See above 156.
2) See above 159.
3) 1954 (3) SA 244 (C).
4) At 247.
5) At 248; but cf Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 186; "in the
context of the defence raised, the statement must be taken to re-
fer to the animus" Watermeyer AJ in O'Keeffe's case relied on
Foulds v Smith 1950 (1) 1 (AD) 11, for the proposition that too
much emphasis has been placed on the element of insult. In Fould's
case, van der Heever JA refers to contumelia which came to mean
"a deliberate insult". See above 28.
6) 1957 (3) SA 461 (W).
7) At 468, my italics.
8) See above 152.
9)
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"Although therefore the editor ... knew the whole position
he deliberately elected to trample roughshod over the feelings
of the plaintiff and intentionally committed an act of aggres-




It could be argued, however, that Kuper J made the comments to em-
phasize the seriousness of the invasion for the purposes of assessing
damages. 2) The Rhodesian courts, however, favour an objective ap-
proach for animus injuriandi,3) and in Rhodesian Printing and Publish-
ing Co Ltd v Duggan,4) which also concerned publication of private
facts, it was not necessary for the Court to discuss animus injuriandi




A subjective approach to animus injuriandi for invasions of prI-
vacy by the press may seem desirable in order to preserve freedom of
speech,6) and it could be argued that there is some authority for
such an approach in Mhlongo v Bailey.7) On the other hand freedom
1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD).
At 592f.
1) Per Kuper J at 372, my italics.
2) Cf Kuper J at 373.
3) Smith NO and Lardner-Burke NO v Wonesayi 1972 (3) SA 289 (RAD) 3l5f.
4)
5)
6) Cf Note "Defamation, Privacy and the First Amendment" 1976 Duke LJ
1016, 1018,·where it was suggested that the 'actual malice' re-
quirement in the United States should not be watered down. See
above 63. The fear of suppressing freedom of speech was one of
the reasons for rejecting Lord Mancroft's Bill in England. L
Brittan "The Right to Privacy in England and the United States"
(1963) 37 Tulane LR 233, 265. See above79. This fear may also
have influenced the policy behind the Privacy Acts in the Canadian
provinces of British Columbia and Saskatchewan which exclude negli-
gence asa basis for liability. Cf P Burns "The Law and Privacy:-
The Canadian Exp~rience" (1976) 54 Canadian Bar Rev 1, 37. See above
l19f. It is interesting to note that the requirement of inten-
tion for actions involving sentimental damages has been advocated
by some Anglo-Arnerican writers; cf HD Krause "The Right to Privacy
in Germany - Pointers for American Legislation?" 1965 Duke LJ 481,
516. See above 95; JG Fleming The Law of Torts 4 ed TI97~526.
See above 137. As has been pointed out above several of the Con-
tinental Codes also include a fault element in actions for invasion
of privacy. Cf Federal Republic of Germany, Article 823(1) BGB,
see above 88; France Article 1382 Code Civil, see above 97. See
also the Quebec Civil Code, Article 1053. See above 119 n 12.
7) Supra.
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of~s~eech must be weighed against the right of the individual to
seclusion in his private life. 1) The role of the press as a power-
ful medium of publicity2) also cannot be ignored, and there is merit
in adopting a procedure like that for defamation by the press.
3
)
Such a practice would limit the defendant's defences to those rebut-
ting wrongfulness,4) and seems to have been used by the court in
Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan.
5
) For all other
invasions of privacy actionable under the actio injuriarum the sub-
jective approach to animus injuriandi should be used, which would
enable the defendant to lead evidence to rebut either fault or wrong-
fUlness. 6)
The weighing of the interests which must be considered by
the courts is a matter of policy and concern, the question of wrong-
fulness.
1) See below 170.
2) It was the threat posed by popular journalism and the proliferation
of 'gossip columns' in the press which led to the publication of
Warren and Brandeis' celebrated article in the United States.
SD Warren and LD Brandeis 'The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4
Harvard LR 193, 196. See above 7 n '3.
3) See above 157£. C£ J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976) 356.
"Myns insiens beh00rt die pers skuldloos aanspreeklik gehou te
word vir genoegdoening op grond van skending van die reg op
privaatheid."
4) See above 159: Cf South African Law Commission The Liability of
the Press for the Publication of Defamatory Matter'in'Newspapers
(1975), Draft Bill, s 2(2). For the defences which rebut lawful-




~ee ~bove.156f.. ~ut cf ~C Pauw Persoonlikh~idsk!enking en Skuld
In dIe SUld-Afrlkaanse Prlvaatre - 'n Re shlstorlese en Re s-
vergelt en e Onersoe ,LL t eSIS ': "DI t an al lei
tot on illikhede in geval van privaatheidskending, indien dit as
onderafdeling van eerkrenking behandel word /as7 die vereistes vir
aanspreeklikheid /sall strenger worj." Thiswould not however
be true in respect Ot invasions of privacy by the pres~. The'
question of liability for negli~ent invasions of privacy will be
dealth with later. See below 62f.
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2. WRONGFUL ACT
Generally whether or not the law will recognize a particular
act or omission as wrongful is a policy consideration. In the
words of Pound -
"Undoubtedly the progress of society and the development
of government increase the demands which individuals
may make and so increase the number and variety of these
interests. But they arise, apart from the law, through
the competition of individuals with each other, the
competition of groups or societies with e,ach other, and
the competition of individuals with such groups or
societies. The law does not create them, it only
recognizes them. Yet it does not have for its sole
function to recognize interests which arise independently~
It must determine which it will recognize. n 1)
As has been pointed out above 2) South African courts appear
to experience little difficulty in recognizing invasion of
privacy as a wrongful act under the broad principles of the
actio injuriarum. The difficulty arises, however, when the law
is required to determine which forms of invasions should be
recognized. In the case of privacy the courts must balance
e:..--- - -
·th~ rigbts of the individual to freedom from interference i~ his
rivate life, a ainst the rights of the society in which he
lives to be informed concerning the affairs of its individual
members. 3) Fleming puts the position as follows:~
"Free/ ...
1) R Pound "Interests of Personality" (1915) 28 Harvard L R
343.
2) See above 125.
3) Cf P H Winfield "Privacy" (J931) 47 LQR 23,4]; H C Gutteridge
"Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy" (193]) 47 ~ 203
217f; B Neill "The Protection of Privacy" (1962) 25
Modern L R 393, 397; T L Yang "Privacy: A Comparative Study
~ Eng~Is~ and American Law" (1966) 15 rCLQ ]75, 187j cf M A Frank-
lIn In u:Ies and Remedies : Cases and Materials on Tort Law d
AlternatIves 1971) 817 . an
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"Free speech and dissemination of news are
important competing values, and it is only when
friction becomes unreasonable and offensive by
prevailing standards of taste and propriety that
legal intervention would become warranted." 1)
In discussing the policy conditions behind the recognition of
a right to privacy our courts have been influenced by developments
in Anglo-American law, particularly the latter. 2) It is intended
to adopt a similar approach although reference will also be made
to other jurisdictions.
-
The American courts have experienced considerable
difficulty in determining where to draw the line between "the
individual's interest in privacy and the public need for freedom
of speech.,,3) Similarly in England the fear of "imposing a new
and severe restriction on the freedom of the press,,4) was
apparently one of the main reasons for the rejection of Lord
Mancroft's Bill. 5) The threat to freedom of speech in the
Federal Republic of Germany was one ef the factors which led to
the shelving of the proposed Draft Law for the Reform of the
Protection of Personality and Honour in Private Law. 6) In France
on the other hand the 1970 amendments to the Civil Code 7) and
the Penal Code 8) were introduced despite the fact that the right
to privacy was already comprehensively protected. 9) Apart from
the/ ....
1. J.G. Fleming The Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 527; Cf P Stein
and J Shand Legal Va"lues in Western Society (1974) 196;
J Stone" Soc"lal Dimensions 0"£ Law and .Tus"t"ice (1966) 214:
"Moreover, some degree of anxiety is necessarily involved in
life in society and also some degree of publicity."
2) O'Ke"effe v Argus" PriIJtlng"~nd,Publ"ishing Co". aLtd. 1954(3) SA
244 ct) 249; RhodeSIan PrIntIng and PuEll~hing Co Ltd
]975(1) SA 590 (RAD) 593f.
3) Yang op cit 187; cf Note "Defamation, Privacy and the First
Amendment" 1976 Duke L J 1016, 1018. See also Pound op cit
(1915) 18 Harva~d L R 343, 362.
4) Cf L Brittan "The Right to Privacy in England and the United
States" (1963) 27 Tulane L R 233, 265.
5) See above 79.
6) See above 88.
7) Article 9~ See above 98.
8) Articles ~68~372. See above 98.
9) Cf "Current Legal Developments" (1971) 20 ICLQ 365. See above 107.
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the problem of the "freedom of the press,,1) the question
arises as to what standard should be adopted by the courts in
determining whether or not to recognize a particular invasion
as actionable. 2) It is submitted that the concept of contra
- --
bonos mores may proyide a usefu~guideline for establishing
whether the defendant's conduct was wrongful.
The contra bonos mores approach w~s used in Roman Law
(termed adversus bonos mores) particularly in respect of
convicium3) and by the Roman-Dutch jurists. 4) The phrase has
been tran~la_ted by De Villiers to mean "offensive to good
mor~is,,5) or "o£fensive to public morality /or7 public policy
?r order",6) and it seems that this is also-i~s modern meaning. 7)
Joubert points out that the contra bonos mores concept has been
applied in certain Continental systems, for instance, in Article
826 of the German Civil Code (BGB) which refers to "gute Sitten,,8)
and Article 1401 of the Dutch Civil Code, which, as judicially
interpreted, incorporates the test of "de goede zeden".9)
r----.-...,
\ The contra bonos mores test is useful in that it allows
"---for changes in the current thinking and values of the community,
so/ ...
1) Cf E F Ryan "Privacy, Orthodoxy and Democracy" (1973) 51
Canadian B~r Rev 84,
2) ef Stein & Shand op cit 196f: "(A) survey of public attitudes
to privacy commissioned by the Younger Committee ... revealed
that although many think that privacy is in general being
eroded, most individuals feel able to take steps to protect
themselves from the general decline."
3) Digest 47.10.15.2,5,6; Cf W A Joubert Grondslae van die
Pe~soonlikheids~eg (1953) 102; B Ranchod Fourtdatiort~ of the
South Afric·anLaw of Defamation (1972) 7f.
4) Voet 47.10.8; cf M de Villier~ The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law
of Injuries (1899) 22, 85; JoubertPersoortlikheidsreg op Clt
109.
5) De Villiers op cit 22.
6) De Villiers op cit 22 n 7.
7) S v I 1976(1) SA 781 CRAD) 785; cf Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg
op cTt 109; P M A Hunt South African Criminal Law and
Procedure (1970) Ir 490.
8) Justice Report privac~ and the· Law (1970) 21f, para. 97.
See above 85. Cf Jeethling Dle Reg op P~iV~~theid (1976) 95f.
9) Cf Joubert Persoonlikheid~~eg op cit 113 n 239; F de Graaf
"The Protection of Privacy in Dutch Law" (1976) 5 Human Rights
177, 189 n 30.
In the/ •..
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so that what would be regarded as an injuria in Roman or Roman-
Dutch law may not constitute a wrong today:
"Indien ons vandag beweer dat 'n onbesproke jong dame
'n vooraanstaande toneelspeelster is, dan sal sy onge-
twyfeld gevlei wees. In die tyd van Justinius daarteen
(ondanks die herkoms van die Keiserin), of selfs tydens
die regering van Koningin Elizabeth (the First) van
Engeland sou so'n bewering 'n ernstige belediging gewees
het."l)
It is conceded that it has been doubted that "our law has reached
the stage of recognizing every duty flowing from boni mores as a
legal dutY",2) but it is submitted that, in the case of invasions
of privacy the concept allows for a flexibility which enables the
court to take into account the current values and thinking of the
community when deciding whether or not to recognize such conduct
as wrongful. 3)
"LT!? seems ... that the present case must be judged in
the light of modern conditions and thought, and the fact
that the identical situation is not covered by Roman or
Roman-Dutch law is not conclusive of the matter.,,4)
In any event, it seems that to a certain extent the courts do set
themselves up as custodes rnorum, whereby they "only give effect
to mores which they consider bo·ni",5) or as Prosser puts it,
the courts exercise "a species of censorsh.ip" when determining
which wrongs are actionable. 6)
1) Per van den Heever JA in Foulds v Smith 1950 (1) SA 1 (AD) 10.
2) Meskin v Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd 1968 (4) SA 793
(W) 807. But cf Mirtister v~nP61i~ie v Ew~ls 1975 (3) SA 590
(AD) 597; PQR Boberg "The Wrongfulness of an 0mission" (1975)
92 SALJ 361, 364; contra Amicus Curiae "The Actionable Omission -
Another View of Ewels' Case" 9JSALJ 8-5. See also JC Van der Wal t
"Vonnisse: Minister "van Polisie V"EWels" (1976) 1 TSAR 101, 103.
3) Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films 1977 (4) SA 376 (T)
387.
4) O'Keeffe v Ar us Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244.
( C) 248; J~N~e-=e~t~l-:!'l-=n-:g---o'i"ti,...lo:n:"-':;-:-~r----"~..-'Z--=-;"""":e=-l;":;'s kend ing? " (1 972)
35 THR-HR 370, 374.
5) Hunt op cit 490; cf WA Joubert "Die Persoonlikheidsreg: 'n
Belangwekkende Ontwikkeling in die Jongste Regspraak in Duitsland"
(1960) 23 THR-HR 23, 38; Yng op cit 184.
6) Prosser Torts op cit 825.
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In the United States the courts appear to test whether
an invasion is contra bonos mores objectively, using the standard
of conduct which is "offensive to persons of ordinary sensibility"
or which goes "beyond the limits of decency".1) But many of the
American cases are so conflicting that one writer has suggested
that the courts appear to indulge in "naked creative choices which
r~sult in decision-making without signposts".2) For instance,
in Melvin v Reid3) a reformed prostitute was able to recover for
disclosures concerning her previous immoral life made seven years
after her reformation, while in Sidis v F-R Publishing Corp4)
a mathematical prodigy, who had managed to live in obscurity since
his childhood for thirty years and was then exposed to a
"merciless ... dissection of intimate details of •.. /liis7 personal
life",5) was denied an action on the basis that he had o~ce been
a public figure. 6) Similarly, in Mau v Rio Grande Oil C0 7) the
victim of a bank hold~up~ who had be~n shot and wounded, was able
to recover for an unauthorized radio dramatization of the incident
which mentioned him by name and was made some eighteen months
after the event, whereas in Stryker v Repu'blic Pictutes 8) a shy,
retiring marine could not recover for the exhibition, several
years later, of a film showing actual traumatic events encountered
by him during World War 11. 9) It is submitted that it could be
argued/ •..
1) Restatement of Torts (1939) § 867~ Comment C; cf Rhodesian
Printing & Publis'hing' Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD) 593.
2) Brittan op cit 249; c£ G D S Taylor nprivacy and the Public"
(1971) 34 ModernL R 288, 289.Cf Franklin op' cit 820.
3) (1931) 112 Cal App 285, 297 Pac 91. ef Franklin op cit 809f.
4) ( 1940) 1] 3 F 2d 806 (2 Ci r) t Cf Frank1in 0 p c i t 81 7f .
5) Sidis v F-R P~blishing Corp supra 807.
6) Sidis vF~R P~blishingC6rp supra 809; ef Brittan op cit 248;
cf Stone op Clt 214 "The most confirmed recluse invites public
comment by that peculiarity." The decision in' 'Sidis' case
disturbed R Pound The Task 6£ Law (1963) 76 who bbserved:
"But it is difficult to see what the law co~ld do about it."
7) (1939) 28 F Supp. 845 (ND Cal).
8) (1951) 108 Cal App 2d 191, 238 P 2d 670,
9) Brittan op cit 249.
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argued that the disclosures concerning the plaintiff~s past
behaviour in Melvin's case were more "offensive" than those
relating to the infant prodigy in Sidis' case, although,
subjectively, the hurt suffered by the latter may have been more
traumatic. Furthermore, while in Mau's case the court may
have been influenced by the fact that the radio programme was
commercially sponsored, and in Stryker's case it felt that the
public was entitled to know about the exploits of its fighting
men,1) the effect on a plaintiff in the latter case may have
been even more devastating, particularly if such a person had
attempted to forget his unfortunate war experiences. Prosser
suggests that the conflicting decisions irt M~IVin and Sidis
demonstrate that the American courts apply a "niores" test 2)
which is explained by Yang3) as follows:~
"In applying this test the court takes into
consideration the status of the plaintiff in society,
the prevailing customs~ tastes and moral standards
of society, the public benefit to be gained by the
invasion of privacy complained of, the interest shown
by the public, the lapse of time between the incident
publicized and the publication, and the ordinary
notions of decency.,,4)
Beadle A C J in Rhodesian Printing and Publis~ing Co Ltd v
Duggan,5) a case involving the protection of the privacy of minor
children,6) suggested a useful guide to assist the courts in
determining objectively whether or not such an invasion was
contra bonos mores:
"The modes/ ...
1) Cf Brittan op cit 249.
2) Prosser Torts op cit 812.
3) Yang op cit (1966) 15 ICLQ 184.
4) Gp cit 184.
5 ) 1 97 5 ( 1) SA 590 (RAD).
6) For fue facts of the case see above 128.
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"The modes of thought in any community must, in the
long term, be influenced by that community's statute
law. The statute law of this country LRhodesi~7
is clear beyond question, that children must at all
times be protected from any publicity which might be
harmful to them."l)
In the court a quo 2) Davies J had mentioned that Rule 277
of the Rhodesian High Court Rules of Court provided for the
protection from publicity of minors in custody suits.
3
) Beadle
ACJ, however, went further 4) and mentioned Rule 266, as well as
several Rhodesian statutes: the Criminal Procedure and Evidence
ActS) concerning juvenile offenders;6) the Children's Protection
and Adoption Act 7) safeguarding minors appearing before juvenile
courts 8) and the identity of adopted children;9) and the Federal
Births and Deaths Registration Act 10 ) shielding illegitimate
children from undue publicity.11) It is interesting to note
that in England 12 ) and Canada,13) in negligence cases the courts
have found it useful to refer to statutory provisions in de-
termining, as a matter of policy, whether or not they should
recognize a common-law duty in situations analogous to those for
which a statutory duty has been imposed. 14 )
It is/ ...
1) At 595.
2) See Mr & Mrs "X" V Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Co Ltd
1974(4) SA 508 eR).
3) At 513f.
4) Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan supra 595.
5) Chap 31 (R).
6) Sections 66, 75, 232(9), 237.
7) Act 22 of 1972 (R).
8) Section 4(5).
9) Section 69.
10) Act 35 of 1962 (R).
11) Section 15.
12) Scott v Green & Sons tf969J I All ER 849 (CA) 850.
13) cf Horsley V MacLa~en (1972) 22 DLR 3d 545.
14) C R Symmons "The Duty of Care in Negligence: Recentl'y
Expressed Policy Elements - Part If" (1971) 34 Modern L R
528, 536.
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It is submitted that, on the basis of Beadle ACJ's reasoning
in Duggan's case,l) a South African court could find that in this
country there is a tendency to afford minors statutory protection
from publicity, for instance the Criminal Procedure Act 2) and the
Children's Act. 3 ) Furthermore, there are a number of other South
African statutes touching upon broader aspects of privacy,4) (the
Anatomical Donations and Post-Mortem Examinations Act,5) the Tele-
graph Messages Protection Act,6) the Prisons Act,7) the Electoral
Consolidation Act,8) the Rent Act, 9) the Medical Schemes Act,10)
and Rule 17 of the Uniform Rules of Court) which the courts might find
useful in determining the prevailing 'mores' of South African society
in this regard. 'On the other hand, there are certain statutes that
clearly allow a person's privacy to be invaded (for example the
11) d dO 1 °Internal Security Act as regar s lSC osures concernlng
"listed" or professed communists,12) and Rule 36 of the Uniform Rules
of Court, providing for compulsory medical examinations in personal
injury claims)13) but generally such statutes have built-in safeguards
against unjustified invasions (for example, the Statistics Act,14)
and the Criminal Procedure Act. 15 )
cf repealed Act 56 of 1955, 564(6).Act 51 of 1977, s 154(3);
Act 33 of 1960, s 8(2).
See below 230ff.
Act 24 of 1970, s 14.
Act 44 of 1963, s 2. (iii), (iv).
Act 8 of 1959,ss 44(e)(ii). Cf S v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1962
(3) SA 396 (T) 397. ef Police Act 7 of 1958, s 27 A.
Act 46 of 1946, s 95.
Act 80 of 1976, s 44.
Act 72 of 1967, s 39.
Act 44 of 1950, s 17 bis.

















City Council v Mondovu 1966 (2) SA 319 (D) 324; Mgudlwa v
Insurance Association Ltd 1967 (4) SA 721 (E) 723. See-below
of 1976, s 8. See below 230f. 238.
of 1977, s 37(5); cf repealed Act 56 of 1955, s 289(5).
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In addition because of the State's policy of separate development
there are several Acts which prescribe how a person may live his
private life in relation to persons of another race group.1)
But even though certain statutory provisions may assist the
courts in discovering objectively "the modes of thought of the com-
munity", the courts must go further if they are to avoid the problems
experienced by Anglo-American jurisdictions. 2) The root of the dif-
ficulties encountered by American jurists and English law-givers
seems to originate in their apparent reliance upon a purely objective
assessment of what invasions go "beyond the bounds of decency" Jf-or
instance, obj ectively it is offensive to say that a person was- once
a prostitute but not that a person was once a childhood genius),
without any examination of the effect of such an invasion on the per-
sonality of the plaintiff 3) (the hurt suffered by a hardened ex-
prostitute may be much less than that suffered by a sensitive and s\hy
genius who has lived as a recluse all his life). Therefore, although
in the past our courts have been influenced by the approach of the
American Restatement,4) it is submitted that they should not rely too
1) For instance the Liquor Act 30 of 1928, s 94 (which controls the
sale and supply of liquor to blacks); the Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act 55 of 1949, s 1 (which prohibits marriages between
whites and "non-Europeans" and even applies to South African male
citizens domiciled outside the Republic); the Population Regis-
tration Act 30 of 1950, s 5 (which provides for the classifica-
tion of persons according to their race); the Immorality Act 23
of 1957, s 16 (which prohibits sexual intercourse between whites
and persons of other coloured race groups); the Extension of Uni-
versity Education Act 45 of 1959, s 17 (which prohibits registra-
tion of white students at black universities) and s 31 (which
regulates the registration of blacks at other universities); the
Group Areas Act 36 of 1966, s 13 (which prevents "disqualified
persons" living in "controlled areas"); the Prohibition of Poli-
tical Interference Act 51 of 1968, s 2 (which prevents persons of
one race group from belonging to political parties organized by
another race group). See generally HR Hahlo and E Kahn South
Africa: The Development of Its Laws and Constitution (1960) 795ff;
cf JD van der Vyver Die Beskerming van Menseregte in Suid-Afrika
(1975) 84ff.
2) For the difficulty experienced by English legislators see above 78£.
3) See below l89f.
4) ef u'Keeffe v Arsus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
Cc) 248; Rhodeslan Printlng & Publlshlng Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1)
SA 590 (RAD) 592£.
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heavily upon the American authorities which appear to focus
o 0 f lOt 1)on wrongfulness and ignore lmpairment 0 persona 1 y.
The better approach seems to be that adopted in O'Keeffe v
Argus Printing and Publishing Cd Ltd2) where it was said that
whether a plaintiff will succeed in an action for invasion of
privacy will depend:
"upon the circumstances of each particular case, the
nature of the LInvasio~7 the personality of the
plaintiff, his station in life, his previous habits
with reference to publicity and the like".3)
These factors clearly influenced Davies J in Mr & Mrs "X"
v Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd4) when he took into
account "the d~trimental effect on the children",5) and
Beadle ACJ in Duggan's case6) who was satisfied that the
publication would have "upset the children's 'tranquility and
enjoyment of their peace of mind', more particularly in their
relationship with other children".7). Therefore once the
court is satisfied that the invasion is wrongful, it must
consider whether the plaintiff's personality has been, or is
likely to be, impaired. 8)
1) See below 189f.
2) O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd supra 249.
3) Ibid. ef S v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD) 785£; c£ G Feltoe
"Private Lives and Public Sins" (1976) 16 Rhod LJ 21, 30.
4) 1974 (4) SA 508 (R).
5) At 514.
6) Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan supra.
7) At 595.
8) See below 189f.
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CONCLUSION: It is submitted that generally the test for wrongful-
ness is objective, based on the prevailing mores of society,') and
that when determining wrongfulness the courts must have regard to
the particular circumstances of a person in the plaintiff's position,
and the nature of the invasion. 2) For instance is it reasonable
for someone to make public disclosures about the present life
of an introvert former child prodigy,3) or a shy war hero4) where
the disclosures are likely to cause hurt and embarrassment? It
is submitted that such an approach would have enabled the American
courts to find for the plaintiffs in Sidis' case and Stryker's5) case
and would eliminate the danger of our courts giving similar conflict-
ing decisions. Conversely, the activities of neighbours or acquain-
tances prying or circulating gossip are virtually impossible to pre-
vent and are usually tolerated as the price paid for living in a
1) When considering whether or not the invasion or privacy was contra
bonos mores Beadle ACJ in Duggan's case (at 785) referred to the
British Columbia Privacy Act, SBC 1968, c 39, s 2(2) of which
states: "The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is
entitled in any situation or in relation to any matter is that
which is reasonable in the circumstances, due regard being given
to the lawful Interests of others; and in determining whether
the act or conduct of a person constitutes a violation of the pri-
vacy of another, regard shall be given to the nature, incidence
and occasion of the act or conduct and to the relationship, whether
domestic or other, between the parties". Cf B Burns "The Law and
Privacy: The Canadian Experience" (1976) S4 Canadian Bar Rev 1
32 n 176. Cf Saskatthewan Privacy Act, SS 1976, c 80, 56;
Manitoba Privacy Act, S M 1970, c 74, s 4(2); Burns op cit 37.
See also Neethling Privaatheid op cit 406. Cf R v S 1955 (3) SA
313 (SWA) 316. - -
2)
It could be.ar~ued.that ~rongfulness and impairment of personality
have been dIstIngUIshed In the Federal Republic of Germany
concerning bre~ches of confidence r~leva~t to the "Geheims~hare".
Here the test tor whether the relatIonshIp of the parties IS
confi~ential is obi~ctive,.but wh~ther ?r not the person making
the dIsclosure to the confIdant wIshes It to be confidential is
subjective. Neethling Privaath~id op cit 61f. See above 92.
On confidential disclosures see below 275f, 280£.
3)
Cf Sidis v F-R Publishing C6rp (1940) 113 F 2d 806 (2 Cir).
4)
CfStryker v Republic Pictures (1951) 108 Col App 2d 191 238 P 2d
670. '
5) See above 174f.
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social community.1) Where such prying or gossip becomes offensive
to the prevailing mores and is likely to adversely affect the indi-
viduals concerned, the conduct should be regarded as an invasion of
privacy.2) To bring a successful action, however, the plaintiff
will have to show that his personality has been, or is about to be
impaired. 3) In privacy cases the impairment usually takes the form
of an interference with the plaintiff's right to seclusion in his
private life. 4)
3. IMPAIRMENT OF PERSONALITY
There is no doubt that invasion of privacy constitutes an im-
pairment of personality, but there is some controversy over whether
privacy is an independent personality right or whether it is an as-
pect of dignitas~) The South African courts, however,__s~em to
regard invasion of privacy primarily ~s an impairment of dignitas. 6 )
a) Meaning of Dignitas: Lewis and Short define dignitas as "being
worthy, worthiness, merit ... dignity,,7) whereas De Villiers des-
cribes it as:
1) Cf Stein & Shrand op cit 196: "The General Council of the Bar, in
its memorandum to the Younger Committee, said ... such activities
as neighbour's or acquaintance's prying or circulating gossip,
' ... have existed for hundreds of years, and are by any normal
test objectionable; however, people have come to live with and
accept them as part of the problems of living in a social community,
to such an extent that there is not today any great demand for the
introduction of legal sanctions against such activities'."
2) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 323, suggests that where disclosures
are made to a small group they should not be wrongful unless there
is a confidential relationship. See below 282~This approach seems
to be favoured by supporter s of the German "Geheimsphare" theory.
See above 92. In the United States gossip published in the media,
is actionable. Cf A Hill "Defamation and Privacy under the First
Amendment" (1976) 76 Columbia LR 1205, l22lf; cf Warren and
Brandeis op cit 196. See above 7 n 3. Vicious back fence gossip
"between individuals may also be actionable"; cf Hill op cit 1289:
"(t)he degree of publicity given to the private fact ought to weigh
in the determination of liability vel non, but ... the absence of
publicity should not always constitute a bar to liability."
3) See above ]47.
4) See above 145.
5) See below184. Cf S v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD) 783f.
6) See below 185.
7) CT Lewis & C Short A Latin Dictionary (1900) 577f; cf "dignatio
... a deeming worth, respect, esteem, regard".
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( "that valued and serene condition in his social or individual
\ life which is violated when a person is, either publicly or
) privately, subjected by another to offensive and degrading
I treatment, or when he is exposed to ill-will, ridicule, dis-
esteem or contempt".1)
De Villiers' definition has been accepted by the courts on sever~l
occasions,2) and seems to have al~influenced academic writers.
For instance, Bliss speaks of the "eergevoel ... die inwendige eer,
die gevoelens van die beledigde self wat gekrenk word",3) and Joubert
refers to dignitas as "die eer" and gives a philosophical definition:
"Die eer is die erkenning van die geestelike-sedelike waarde
van die mens as kroon van die skepping, as wese wat uitstyg
bo die bloot fisies-psigiese van die stoflike natuur en die
dierelewe".4)
Van der Merwe and Olivier describe dignitas as "die waardigheidsge-
voel, kuisheidsgevoel, pieteitsgevoel en selfrespek van 'n persoon",5)
while de Wet and Swanepoel have referred to it in the past as "waar-
digheid, respek en geestelike onverstoorheid".6)
It is submitted, however, that it is wrong to translate dignitas ~ 1
as "die eer", 7) or as "digni ty". 8) The concept is clearly much wider. \ r
1) M de Villiers The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries (1899) 24.
2) Cf ~ v Umfaan 1908 TS 62, 67; O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publish-
ing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 247f; Rhodesian Printing & Publish-
ing Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD) 594.
3) M Bliss Belediging in die Suid-AfrikaanseReg (1933) 61.
4) WAJoubert Gronds1ae van die persoon1ikheidsrey (1953) 131 but cfJC De Wet and HL Swanepoel Strafreg 3 ed (1975 239.
5) NJ van der Merwe and PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed (1970) 390. Cf JC van der WaIt "Regspraak:
Jackson v NICRO" (1977) 1 TSAR 72, 75E.
6) JC De Wet & HL Swanepoel Die Suid-Afrikaanse Strafreg 2 ed (1960)
284. The 3rd edition of their work contains no sucli reference.
Cf De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg op cit 236: "/Dit kanl nie beweer
word dat 'dignitas' of 'dignity' in ons praktyk 'n regsgoed geword
het met 'n duidelike inhoud, wat kan dien as basis vIr 'n misdaads-
omskrywing nie".
7) Cf J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976) 373.
8) Cf ~ v Holliday 1927 CPD 395, 400: "Now 'dignitas' it seems to me
is not fully translated by the English word 'dignity'." Cf Ed CT
Onions The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1933) 509: "Dignity
The quality of being worthy or honourable ... worth, excellence,
honour".
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According to Amerasinghe 1) while fama and corpus have been extended
to include the wrongs of defamation, malicious prosecution, assault
and false imprisonment, dignitas has remained a "vacuous concept"
which can accommodate future developments under the actio injuriarum. 2)
In the words of Neethling:
"Die dignitas is nie 'n afgebakende selfstandige persoonlik-
heidsgoed nie, maar eerder die versamelnaam vir persoonlik-
heidsgoedere wat nog nie geindentisifeer en duidelik van .mekaar
onderskei is nie".3)
Neethling goes further and states: "Een van hierdie persoonlikheids-
sond~ -t;Yfel privaatheid". 4) A similar view is taken
who after analysing the criminal law cases concludes that
is:
"a somewhat vague and elusive concept which
des~ribed positively in terms of a person's
- -
respect, mental tranquility and privacy ...
negatively in terms of his right to freedom
grading, offensive or humiliating treatment
invasions of his privacy".6)
can ... be broadly,
right to self-
It can be described
from insulting, de-
and to freedom from j
Whichever definition is used, apart from those restricting the
concept to "die eer" or "honour" it seems clear that dignitas is broad
1) CF Amerasinghe Aspects of the Actio Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch Law
(1966).
2) Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 173; cf Joubert Persoonlik-
heidsreg op cit 110. De Wet and Swanepoel Strafreg op Clt 233 n
92, state that dignitas was not an independent personality right
like corpus and fama, but concerned the 'social status' with which
a person was clothed. This meaning also appears in the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary op cit 509: "Dignity ... Honourable or
high estate, position or estimation ... An honourable office, rank
or title".
3) J Neethling "Grondslag vir die Erkenning van 'n Selfstandige
Persoonlikheidsreg op Privaa~heid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg"
(1976) 39 THR-HR 120, 126; Neethling Privaatheid op cit 373. Cf
de Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg op cit 236.
4) Ibid. Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 292, distinguish
privacy from "eerkrenking".
5) PMA Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure (1970) 11.
6) Hunt op cit 496. Cf S v Tanteli 1975 (2) SA 772 (T) 774.
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h ° h . 1) S °t henough to incorporate t e rlg t to prlvacy. ome wrl ers, ow-
ever, have suggested that privacy should be divorced from dignitas.
2
)
Privacy: Aspect o£ Dignitas Of Separate Right?Joubert suggests
that the essential questions for a claim under the actio injuriarum
are merely:
"(a) was daar 'n krenking van 'n regtens beskermde persoonlik-
heidsbelang van die eiser, d.i. van 'n persoonlikheidsreg? en
(b) het die dader opsetlik gehandel, d.w.s. met sy wil gerig
op die aantasting van die ander se persoonlikheidsreg?" 3)
This approach ignores any analysis of personality interests in terms
of corpus, dignitas and fama. 4) Joubert goes further and stat~s
that these Roman and Roman-Dutch law categories are unsuited to a
modern legal system. 5) It has been said that the learned writer
seems to see the right to privacy as a separate personality right,6)
but it could be argued that he regards it as an aspect of "die eer".7)
On the other hand Van der Merwe and Olivier8) bluntly state that in
the future "die erkenning van 'n selfstandige reg op privaatheid slegs
realisties sal wees".9) This view is echoed by Neethling:
1) For instance, reputation may also be regarded as an aspect of
dignitas, in that the lowering of a person's reputation may affect
his self-esteem and dignity. Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit
176, 190. See above 43.
2) Cf van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 394f; Neethling Privaatheid op
cit 380; Neethling op cit (1976) 39 THR-HR 128.
3) WA Joubert "Die Persoonlikheidsreg; 'n Belangwekkende Ontwikkeling
in die Jongste Regspraak in Duits1and" (1960) 23 THR-HR 23, 41.
4) See above 43.
5) Joubert op cit (1960) 23 THR-HR 42.
6) Cf De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg op cit 238: "Ook die 'reg op privaat-
heid' word deur Joubert as 'n reeds afgebakende persoonlikheidsreg
beskou".
7) ef Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op ci t 135: "Di t' is 'n ernstige
krenking van die eer van 'n mens om in sy private lewe in te dring
of om dit bloot te le vir die oe en ore van die publiek, of selfs
van enkelinge wat geen reg op kennisname het nie".
8) Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 395.
9) Ibid.
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"Die reg op privaatheid word ongetwyfeld as 'n selfstandige
persoonlikheidsreg in ons reg erken en is as sodanig reeds
uit die dignitas-begrip afgebaken".1)
h Od ° 2) d'Nonetheless, "digni tas" as~ W1 e connotat_10n a~ _1 ~ ~ee_ms
clear that our courts regard invasion of privacy as dignitary wrong:
"The unauthorized publication of a person's photograph and
name for advertising purposes is in my view capable of con-
stituting an aggression upon that person's dignitas".3)
"There was in the present case an invasion of the plaintiff's
privacy which constituted an aggression upon his digni-
t as" . 4)
"I have no doubt that the right to privacy is included in the
concept of dignitas, and that there is no dearth of authority
for this proposition".5)
"Looking through Lcomplainant~7 window was clearly an invasion
of her privacy. Put another way her dignitas was injured by
the invasion of her privacy".6)
The above dicta indicate that the South African courts regard "digni-
ta~s wide enough to include the right toJPrivacy.7) Neeth1ing-- -- - -- - --
submits that because the courts see dignitas as a collection of per-
sonality rights rather than a separate right, and since such
1) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 380; Neethling op cit (1976) 39
THR-HR 128.
2) See above 181f.
3) O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C)
249.
4) Mh1ongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 370 (W) 373.
5)
~ v A 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) 297.
6) ~ v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD) 784.
7) See also Gosschalk v Rossouw 1966 (2) SA 476 (C) 490f; cf Neethling
Privaatheid op cit 375£. Neethling op cit (1976) 39 THR-HR 127
points out that the equation of privacy and dignity flows from R v
Hol1iday 1927 CPD 395, 401. -
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personality rights incorporate the right to privacy, the latter
should be regarded as a separate right.') This contention was, how-
ever, rejected by the court in ~ v l2) on the grounds that "the de-
fences which can be raised to the charge of invasion of privacy or a
charge of injury to- dignitas ... are basically the same".3) It is
submitted that in our law, whichever approach is used, an action for
se~timental damages arising from invasion of privacy will have to
satisfy the requirements of the actio injuriarum. Therefore there
is no good reason for contending that privacy should be regarded as
a separate right unless it is contended that invasion of privacy
should develop as a sui generis action outside the confines of the
actio injuriarum or lex Aqui1ia. 4)
The approach of the South African courts is not unlike that re-
ferred to by social scientists,S) and favoured by Bloustein6) in the
United States. The latter criticizes Prosser's pragmatic classifi-
1) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 375f.
2) Supra.
3)
~ v I supra 784.
4) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 380, does not appear to have this in
mind, but it seems to be contemplated by Van der Merwe & Olivier
op cit 395: "Die persoonlikheidsgoedere van die m~ns en die
erkenning van persoonlikheidsregte is in die twintigste eeu die
voorwerp van so 'n dynamiese ontwikkeling dat dit tot verydeling
van regsontwikkeling kan lei om nuwe persoon1ikheidsregteonder 'n
uitgediende sisteem te probeer tuisbring".
5) Cf OM Ruebhausen & OG Brim "Privacy and Behavioural Research"
(1965) 65 Columbia LR 1184, 1189: "The right to privacy is there-
fore a positive claim to a status of personal dignity". E Shils
"Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes" (1956) 31 Law and
Contemp Problems 289, 306: "A great deal of the intrusion into
personal privacy is ... an immoral affront to human dignity". Cf
C Fried "Privacy", (1968) 77 Yale LJ 475, 482: "Privacy is closely
implicated in the notions of respect and self-respect, and of love,
frie~dship and trust". .But contra De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg
op Cl t 236: "Mens kan nle 'self-respect', 'peace of mind', 'mental
tranquility' of welke ander 'gevoel', aan die een kant, en 'privacy'
of liggaamlike integriteit aan die ander kant as een en dieselfde
grondslag behandel nie." It should be borne in mind, however
that "dignitas" has a wider meaning than "dignity". See abov~ 182f.
6)
EJ Bloustein "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser" (1964) 39 NYULR 962.
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cation 1) for failing to stress the uniform concept of "dignity"
which underlies each of the categories. 2) Bloustein argues that as
in the "intrusion" cases, in "publication of private facts" it is
not the victim's reputation which is being harmed but his right to a
rivate life. 3) Similarly in both the "false light" and "appropria-
tion" cases the emphasis is not on reputation or commercial exploita-
tion but the affront to the injured party's dignity through the mis-
use of his name or likeness. 4) In short the right to privacy "has
-------
nothing to do with emotional tranq~ili!y or reputatio~ or the mone-
tary value of a name or likeness; it concerns 'human dignity and in-
dividuality'."S) It should therefore be regarded as a "dignitary
tort".6)-
Neethling criticizes Bloustein for failing to give privacy a
definite profile,7) but it is submitted that an equally pertinent
criticism is that the word "dignity" is not wide enough. 8) Conversely
1) WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 804; see above 55.
2) Bloustein op cit 962; cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 161.
3) Bloustein op cit 974; cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 161.
4) Bloustein op cit 989, 99lf; cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 161.
5) EJ Juta "Some Comments on the Privacy of Public Figures in England
and the United States" (1972) 1 NULR 21, 25; Bloustein op cit 1005.
6) Bloustein op cit 1003; see above 120. Cf Neethling Privaatheid
op cit 162. There is support for Bloustein's views in SD Warren
& LD Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harvard LR 193, 205,
207, 215. "The focus {by Warren & Brandei~7 was on dignity and
the "inviolate personality". Note "Defamation, Privacy and the
First Amendment" 1976 Duke LJ 1016, 1033f. The dignity aspect has
been referred to in other jurisdictions: cf New Zealand Law Re-
vision Commission Re art of Sub~Committee on Corn uter Data Banks
and Privacy (1973) 68, w ich recognize t at privacy was necessary
"to preserve the human dignity of the individual and his effective
freedom to develop and exercise the full human personality". Cf
P Burns "The Law and Privacy: The Canadian Experience" (1976) 54
Canadian Bar R 1, 3 n 14; G Del Vecchio Justice (1956) 116, who
des<rribes the 'right to solitude' as: "that ideal element of auto-
nomy which constitutes the inviolable essence of the person". See
above 15.
7) Neethling Privaatheid op cit l62f; cf Juta op cit 24.
8) See above 182.
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the meaning of the word "dignitas" ~sed EY the South African courts 1)
seems to be sufficiently broad to accommodate most invasions of pri-
vacy, and sufficiently narrow to prevent the delict from becoming so
wide that it swallows up other actions. 2)
Assuming that privacy is regarded as an aspect of dignitas in
South African law a number of other questions arise: Should the con-
cept be tested subjectively o:_objectively by the courts? Must the
plaintiff be aware of the invasion at the time that it occurs? Does
the action require an element of degradation or insult?
c) Subjective or Objective Test? In Roman Law the dissimulatione
aboletur rule in respect of injuriae 3) seems to suggest that impair-
ment of dignitas was tested subjectively.4) The principle of dissi-
mulation was given qualified approval by Voet,5) but appears to form
no part of South African law. 6) The question of whether the test
for infringement of dignitas should be subjective or objective recently
1) See above 185.




The test for whether the conduct was injurious appears to have
been objective, but whether the plaintiff had suffered injury was a
subjective enquiry. Cf M Tselentis "Book Review" 1972 Acta
Juridica 246; Van der WaIt op cit 74: "Die siening dat <lIe
dignitas van 'n seun meer gekrenk kan wees as die van sy vader, dui
op 'n subjektiewe siening van dignitas as beskermingsobjek (Digest
47.10.31). Die feit dat die persoonlikheid van t n benadeelde 'n
ernstige krenking kan meebring ... dui weer eens op t n vereiste van
subjek!iewe krenking". Cf Digest 47.10.15.48: "If, however, {an
injury/ affects and hurts me I also have an action of injury".
Translation by De Villiers op cit 274.
5) Voet 47.10.19, who points out, however, that a person is not pre-
sumed to condone an injuria merely because he keeps quiet. Cf
Van der WaIt op cit 74.
6) De Villiers op cit l88f.
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came before the Appellate Division but was not decided. In Jackson
v NICR01) Jansen JA noted that while some of the Roman-Dutch jurists
2
)
seemed to favour an objective approach,3) the modern authorities were
conflicting. He pointed out that although Hunt,4) De Wet and Swane-
poel 5) and Bliss6) appear to adopt a subjective approach there are
paragraphs in their works which indicate that the test may also be
objective. 7) Furthermore similar conflicts existed in modern Dutch
law. 8) Unfortunately Jansen JA did not find it necessary to decide
the question:
"Although a conspectus of all the aforegoing seems to favour
the view that dignitas is an objective concept, it would be
imprudent to accept, unconditionally, the assumption made by
the court a quo in this regard LIe that the test is objectiv~7,
without fuller investigation of the authority. It may, how-
ever, be assumed (without deciding) in favour of the appellant
that the true concept of dignitas is subjective, as the appeal
may be disposed of on a different ground".9)
It is submitted, however, that even if the test for impairment of
dignitas is subjective, whether or not the courts will uphold the
plaintiff's claim will depend upon their recognizing that the defen-
dant's conduct was wrongful. 10 ) The test for such wrongfulness
Huber Praelectiones 4.4.3.For instance, Mevius Decisiones 7.112;
Jackson v NICRO supra 12.
Hun t op ci t 10.
De Wet & Swanepoel op cit 240.
Bliss op cit 61.
Jackson v NICRO supra llf.
Van Bemmelen & Van Hattun Hand-en Leerboek van Het Nederlandse
Strafrecht (1954) 11 489£; Noyon & Longemeijer Het Wetboek van
Strafrecht (1954) 11 25f; cf Jackson v NICRO supra 12.
Jackson v NICRO supra 12.
C~ Van der.Wal~ op cit 76, 78. Cf JM Burchell "Dignitas: Subjec-
tIve or ObJectIve?" (1977) 94 SALJ 5, 7, who favours an objective
test seems to overlook the distinction between the recognition of
a lawfully protected interest and the effect of a breach of this
interest on the plaintiff. Cf B v ~ 1955 (3) SA 313 (SWA) 316.











5) Hunt op cit 497;
op cit 258 n 27,
taken offence.
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is objective,') but the' effec~ of the invasion is considered subject-
ively. The position has been well summarized by Hunt as follows:
"The concepts of self-respect, mental tranquility and privacy
are judged both objectively and subjectively. Objectively
in that the law accepts that each person is entitled to them.
Subjectively in that it depends upon the particular person and
the circumstances whether it can be said that his dignitas has
in fact been impaired".2)
In short once the court is satisfied that the invasion is wrongful,
the test for whether or not the plaintiff's dignitas has in fact been
. . d· b· . 3)1mpa1re 1S su Ject1ve.
d) Awareness by Plaintiff: If the test for whether the plaintiff's
dignitas has been impaired is subjective then it would seem to follow
the plaintiff must have been aware that the indignity was being per-
petrated. This view however is not consistent with the authorities.
In Roman law it mattered not that the victims of an injuria were
young children or lunatics who were not aware that an injuria had
been perpetrated. 4) The explanation seems to be that although their
self-respect and mental tranquility has not been disturbed their
right to privacy has,S) and this appears to have been applied in South
African criminal law:
"It is true that (the complainan!7 was not conscious of the
indignity but it seems to me that knowledge was not essential
If a person were to pin an offensive placard to the back
1) See above J80.
2) Hunt op cit 496.
3) ef R Pound "Interests of Perscnality" (1915) 18 Harvard LR 343 362
who points out that "the injury is mental and subjective" b~t '
must be confined to the "legal securing of the interest to ~rdinary
sensibilities". The latter refers to the wrongfulness aspect
which is measured objectively.
cf De Wet & Swanepoel op cit 238. De Villiers
suggests that such persons were presumed to have
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of a lady's dress, I think he could be convicted of injury,
even though it was removed by someone else before she became
aware of it The gist of the present offence {peeping at
the complainant while she undresse~7 is the impairment of the
complainant's rights of personality. If persons guilty of
conduct such as that of the accused could not be punished, then
the sense of security from intrusion in the minds of women
would be disturbed. They could not feel secure that their
privacy was not being violated".1)
Although in several "peeping tom" cases the accused has been
acquitted on the grounds that the peeping was secret, silent and un-
known to the complainant at the time,2) it is submitted that the
better view is that the court may infer that the aggression took I
place at the time of the accused's act, even though the victim only
learns of such conduct afterwards. 3) Similarly the fact that a
woman who is asleep is unaware at the time that she is having inter-
course with a man other than her husband will not necessarily defeat
a charge of rape. 4) Furthermore, it has been argued that a person
who is unaware that he has been wrongfully arrested may also recover
damages in respect of the period when he was unaware that his liberty
had been restrained. 5) De Wet and Swanepoel point out, however,
that in S v A6 ) it was unnecessary for the court to refer to the com-
plainant's feelings:
"Wat die klaer se gevoelens was, skyn in ieder geval nie ter
sake te wees nie. Dit gaan nie oor gekrenkte gevoelens nie,
maar oor die inbreuk op die reg van privaatheid".7)
1) Per Gardiner J in R v Holliday 1927 CPD 395, 40lf; cf R v Daniels
1938 TPD_312, 313.-
2) Cf ~ v Nyandoro 1917 SR 1; R v Van Tonder 1932 TPD 90.
3) Hunt op cit 498. Cf ~ v Pillay 1958 (1) PH H28 (N) where the
complainant was propositioned by an Indian in a language which
she did not understand but was told its meaning afterwards. The
accused was convicted of crimen injuria.
4) Cf ~ v ~ 1952 (4) SA 117 (0) l20f.
5) RG McKerron "L~w of Del~ct" 1949 Annual Survey 130. Cf Birch v
J?hannesburg CIty CouncIl 1949 (1) SA 231 (T) 238, wheret1ie-ques-
tIon was left open.
6) 1971 (2) SA 293 (T).
7) De Wet & Swanepoe1 Strafreg op cit 238 n 126.
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Nonetheless it is clear that the court must take into account the
complainant's reaction to the accused's conduct. 1)
e) Degradation and Insult: In Walker v Van Weze1 2) it was suggested
that the scope of injuria as a cause of action for the impairment of
a plaintiff's dignitas must be restricted, and that a remedy should
be given only when the words or conduct complained of involved degra-
dation, insult or contumelia. 3) Joubert points out that the require-
ment of contumelia is obsolete in modern law, and that even in late
Roman law it simply meant an intentional wrong or dolus, "ook bekend
as animus injuriandi die opset om 'n injuria of persoonlikheidskrenk-
ing te pleeg.,,4) In Foulds v SmithS) the Court cautioned against
too much emphasis being placed on the requirement of contumelia,6)
and this view was adopted in O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing
Co Ltd?) O'Keeffe's case has been interpreted to give "contumelia"
Joubert's meaning of intention to insult. 8) Unfortunately in Kidson
v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 9) and Mtlongo v Bailey10) the Court
again emphasized the requirement of contumelia in the sense of insult.
It is submitted, however, that in both cases the court erred in apply-
ing the principle in Walker's case as the judge in the latter case was
concerned with the problem of "insult" not privacy.11) Neethling
1) Cf R v Olakawu 19S8 (2) SA 357 (C) 360: "Although the test as to
what constitutes an impairment of dignity must naturally be an ob-
jective one, regard can I think, rightly be had to the complain-
ant's reaction to the accused's conduct". Cf S v A supra 298.
1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 248.
Cf Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 186: "it is submitted that
in the context of the defence raised, the statement must be taken
to refer to the animus".
Joubert op cit (1960) 23op cit 92ff;










indicates 1) that this emphasis on "insult" was also apparent in ~
v Holliday2) and ~ v ~,3) but it is submitted that in these cases
the court was referring to dolus (ie intention to injure, animus
injuriandi) ,4) not the effect of the aggression on the victim's dig-
nitas. In privacy cases the requirement of degradation or insult
appears to be irrelevant. 5)
In short, claims for sentimental damages arising from invasions
of privacy can be accommodated within the flexible framework of the
concept of dignitas under the actio injuriarum. 6) It is not anoma-
lous to classify invasion of privacy as a dignitary wrong together
with such wrongs as assault,7) false imprisonment,8) adultery9) and
insu1t 10 ) which have the common factor of aggression on the plain-
tiff's dignity, in addition to separate characteristics of their own.
But if invasion of privacy is regarded as a dignitary wrong it
seems most unlikely that an artificial person, for instance
a corporation, could recover damages. 11 )
1) Neeth1ing op cit (1976) 39 THR-HR 127.
2) 1927 CPD 395, 400, where the court referred to an "intention to do
the insulting act". My italics.
3) 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) 299, where the court found dolus eventua1is on
the basis that: "They must have foreseen the possibility that the
complainant could or would be hurt and insulted" my italics.
4) See above 165.
5) McQuoid-Mason op cit (l973) 90 SALJ 27£.
6) See above183f.Cf Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 146: "Dit sou
a11een 'n kasuisties-gebonde regspraak wees wat die reg op privaat-
heid in sy verskillende aspekte nie sou kon baseer op die reg op
dignitas nie".
7) Cf 0'Ke11y v Jamieson 1906 TS 822, 824; Prins100 v Du Plooy 1952
(4) SA 219 (0) 221.
8) Cf Whittaker v Roos & Bateman 1912 AD 92, 118, 123, 135; Makhan~
v Minister of Justice 1965 (2) SA 488 (N) 491.
9) Cf Viviers v Kilian 1927 AD 449; Bruwer v Joubert 1966 (3) SA 334
(AD). ---
Cf Walker v Van Wezel 1940 WLD 66; Brenner v Botha 1956 (3) SA
257 (T); Matiwane v Cecil Nathan, Beattie & Co 1972 (1) SA 222
(N) .
11) See below 278.. Cf SH Hofstadter & G Horowitz The Right to Priva£l
(1964) 229.; American Jurisprudence, Second (1972) v 62 692f.
See now Unlversltelt van Pretorla v Tommle Meyer Films 1977 (4)
SA 376 (T) 385.
Epstein v Epstein .1906 TH'87, 88; Rhodesian Printing & Publish~ng
Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD) 595. An interdict was re-
fused in Prins100 v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1959 (2) SA 693
(W) 695f, because the plaintiff had failed to give the defendant
sufficient notice. Se above 128. It has been suggested that in
A~g~o-Ame:i~an l~w: "(a)ll that is left for the law ... is to pro-
hIbIt by InjUnctIon or to deter by criminal sanction~~ Stein &
Shand op cit 196. In Fr~nce ~he court.may seize offending matter
to prevent a threatened InvaSIon of prIvacy (Article 9 Civil Code.
see abov~ ~9£),.and in the Federal Republic of Germany'it seems '
that an InjUnctIon may be brought. Neethling Privaatheid op cit
353f.
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4. Damages: A plaintiff who wishes to recover sentimental damages
under the actio injuriarum must prove the elements of the action, but
need not prove special damages. 1) In addition if the plaintiff
proves that he has suffered pecuniary loss, such loss may also
be recovered. 2) When awarding damages in defamation cases the court
will take into account the contents and nature and extent of the pub-
lication, the standing of the plaintiff and the conduct of the defen-
3) b' d . . f· 4)dant. A similar approach has een applle to InvaSIons 0 prIvacy.
Thus it has been held that the fact that the defendant deliberatly
rode roughshod over the plaintiff's feelings was an aggravating fac-
5) d d .. . 6)tor, while the tendering of an apology was regar e as mItIgatIng.
A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for a negligent invasion of
1 . 1 7)privacy will have to prove actua pecunIary oss.
Apart. from, or in addi tion to, damages the court may grant an
interdict restraining the proposed or continued invasion of privacy.8)
1) RG McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) 115; Van der Merwe &
Olivier op cit 386.
2)
Cf Salzmann v Holmes 1914 AD 471, 480; Sutter v Brown 1926 AD 155,
171; McKerron Delict op cit 115; Van der Merwe ~Olivier op cit
398f.
3) Buthelezi v Poorter 1975 (4) SA 608 (W) 6l3f. Cf Fayd'herbe v
Zammit 1977 (3) SA 711 (D) 719.
4) Common law systems seem to doubt whether damages are a suitable
remedy for invasion of privacy. Cf P Stein & J Shand Legal Values
in Western Society (1974) 195: "Those victims for whom the remedy
was most designed ... are the least likely to wish to republish
their private affairs or to relive their grief, by protracted and
public litigation"; cf J Stone Social Dimensions of Law and Justice
(1966) 214. This attitude may explain why in Canada in terms of
Privacy Acts "an action for invasion of privacy must by instituted
in the Supreme Court of each province". Burns op cit 38.
5) Mhlongo v Bailey supra 372.
6)
Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd supra 468.
7) See below 362£.
8)
195.
In order to obtain an interdict the plaintiff must show that he has:
(i) a clear right,1) or a right which though prima facie established
is open to some doubt;2) (ii) suffered injury actually committed or
a well grounded apprehension of irreparable injury;3) and (iii) no
other satisfactory remedy available to him.
4
) In the granting of an




Having attempted to define invasion of privacy and its essential
requirements in respect of actions for sentimental damages it is now
necessary to consider the different ways in which a person's "right
to sec1us ion in his pri vat e 1i fe" can bedi s tu r bed. Ashas bee n
pointed out Prosser divides invasion of privacy into intrusions, pub-
lic disclosures of private facts, false light cases and appropriation.
6
)
It is submitted, however, that the last three categories can be in-
cluded under the head of "publicity", as they all concern exposure of
the injured person's private life, image or likeness to the public
eye. The same is true of Fleming's categories of interest in seclusion,
name, likeness and life history, and personal dignity and self-
respect?) Tbe former two can be respectively labelled as the right to
protection against intrusions and publicity while the latter is ana-
logous to insult under the actio injuriarum in our law. 8) South
1) Epstein v Epstein supra 88; Mr and Mrs 'X' v Rhodesian Printi~
& Publishing Co Ltd 1974 (4) SA 508 eR) 514.
2) Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221, 227. ef McKerron Delict op
cit l40f; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 387f.
3) Ibid; cf Epstein v Epstein supra 88.
4) Cf Mr and Mrs 'X' v Rhodesian Printin Co Ltd supra
514: "Petitioners (on e alf of t e c ildren ave a clear right
to the privacy they claim, and the only effective means of en-
forcing that right is by way of an interdict."
5) Setlogelo v Setlogelo supra 227; cf Van der Merwe & Olivier op
cit 227; Neethling Privaatheid op cit 380.
6) WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 804. See above 55.
7) JG Fleming The Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 526ff. See above 121.
8) Cf Walker v Van Weiel 1940 WLD 66; Brenner v Botha 1956 (3) SA 257
eT); Matiwane v Cecil Nathan, Beattie & Co 1972 (1) SA 222 (N).
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African and Ceylonese writers generally follow categories closely
related to those mentioned in Anglo-American law. Thus Joubert's
reference to intrusions, public disclosures and disruptions of a
person's peaceful existence 1) is closely followed by Strauss, Strydom
and Van der Walt 2) as well as Van der Merwe & 01ivier. 3) It seems,
however, that "disruption" (for example, where a salesman continually
calls at your home to sell you something)4) may be accommodated as an
intrusion. Amerasinghe, on the other hand, seems to recognise that
most invasions take the form of either intrusions or pub1icity.5)
More recently, under the influence of German law,6) Neethling has sug-
gested a three-fold classification: intrusion, disclosures, and fix-
ation. 7) The latter also includes disclosures 8) but is distinguish-
able in that there is a violation of privacy even if the disclosure
is made to a small group of individuals ,9) whereas a "disclosure"
will only be actionable if it is made to a large groupl0) or consti-
tutes a breach of trust. 11 ) It is submitted, however, that in our
law the degree of publici~y is usually a factor to be taken into
1) WA Joubert Grondslae van die Persoonlikheidsreg (1953) 136. See
above 143. But contra JC De Wet & HL Swanepoe1 Strafre~ 3 ed (1975)
239 n 128: "Ek kan egter nie met Joubert saamstem datit 'n skend-
ing van 'n ander se reg op privaatheid is om aan horn die aanskouing
op te dring van dinge wat op sy ongestoorde lewe inbreuk maak nie".
2) SA Strauss, MJ Strydom & JC Van der WaIt Die Suid Afrikaanse Pers-
reg (1976) 289.
3) NJ Van der Merwe' & PJJ 01ivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed (1970) 395.
4) Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 289. But contra De Wet &
Swanepoel Strafreg op cit 239 n 128.
5) CF Amerasinghe Aspects of the Actio Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch Law
(1966) 180ff.
6) Cf J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976) 52f, 67f.
i)
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 315, 318 and 324.
8) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 324.
9) Ibid.
10)
11) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 319.
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 320.
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account when assessing damages,1) and the fact that the disclosure
was made to a small group of persons or did not constitute a breach
of confidence will not in itself deprive the plaintiff of a remedy
for invasion of privacy.2) Nonetheless, the greater the publicity,
or the fact that the disclosure was a breach of confidence, the more
likely it is that such conduct will be considered wrongful.
3
) It IS
submitted that Neethling's categories can again be reduced to two:
intrusions and publicity, and that the latter is wide enough to in-
clude both disclosure and fixation.
In the light of the above it is clear that most invasions of
privacy can be broadly classified into intrusions and publicity. It
is intended to consider both of these in some detail, and to indicate
how the broad principles of the South African action may accommodate
many of the invasions experienced in modern society, other than those
by data banks. 4) Although it has been suggested that the German law
of privacy may in some respects have overtaken developments in the
United States,S) it seems fair to assume that the most comprehensive
analysis of the wrong has occurred in the United States. 6) For this
reason during the course of the analysis of the basic categories of
intrusions and publicity, considerable use will be made of American
authorities. An attempt will also be made to show how Prosser's
categories 7) would be accommodated in South African law. It must be
borne in mind, however, that in all cases involving an action for In-
vasion of privacy in our law the essential elements of either the




1) See above 194.




On the question of data banks see below 283f.
ef HD Krause "The Right to Privacy in Germany
American Legislation?" 1965 Duke L3 481, 516.
6) ef Prosser Torts op cit 804, points out that
thing over four hundred".
7) Prosser Torts op cit 804. See above 55.





This form of invasion occurs where there is an intrusion
"upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion".1) Neethling
states that in the United States there are three requirements: (i)
there must be an intrusion, (ii) the occasion must be private, and
(iii) the intrusion must be regarded as offensive by a reasonable
man. 2) The fact that the defendant intruded into the plaintiff's
"inner" rather than his "outer" life may prima facie indicate that it
is more likely that the invasion is actionable,3) but ultimately lia-
bility will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. 4)
Similarly the requirement of a "private occasion" may lead to diffi-
culties, particularly where the intrusion takes the form of persistent
following 5) or harassment. 6 ) Can it be called a private "occasion"
when a person walks in a public street? Nonetheless although the
"outer" man is visible on the street, the privacy of the "inner" man
may be violated by persistent following. The question of "offensive-
ness" concerns wrongfulness and has already been considered in the
broad sense. 7) These United States requirements will be referred to
incidentally during the ensuing discussion.
1) WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 807.
2) J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976) l79f, 3l5f.
3) Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit l68ff. ~r instance, an unjustified
intrusion into the "core-self" may have a devastating psychological
effect on the victim. AF Westin Privacy and Freedom (1967) 33f.
See above 3.
4) Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
(C) 248. See above.
5) See below 224.
6) See below 228.
7) See above 170.
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Intrusions occur in a variety of ways and it would be impossible
to consider them all. Therefore an attempt has been made to select
what the present writer sees as the more important forms of intrusion.
The selection which is obviously open to criticism and does not pre-
tend to be exhaustive includes the following: (i) peeping toms; (ii)
illegal searches; (iii) mail interception; (iv) telephone tapping;
(v) eavesdropping and surveillance; (vi) nuisance calls; (vii) persis-
tent following; (viii) harassment; (ix) statistical and revenue re-
quirements; (x) criminal investigation procedures; (xi) medical exam-
inations and treatment; (xii) miscellaneous statutory intrusions.
B. ACTIONABLE INTRUSIONS
1. Peeping Toms: In criminal law most prosecutions concerning peep-
ing toms involve an element of sexual impropriety, for instance where
a man watches a woman undressing') or bathing 2) or relieving herself. 3)
It is submitted that such cases would also be actionable delictually.4)
On the other hand where the complainant was not undressing or conduct-
ing her toilet or involved in some other intimately private activity
a criminal action will not lie,S) although the injured party may be
able to sue in delict. 6 ) In any event awareness at the time by the
victim is irrelevant. 7) Other examples would be spying on a person





H011idat 1927 CPD 395, 401£; R v Danie1s 1938 TPD 312, 313;~ 1954 2) SA 134 (N) 135.
Schoonberg 1926 OPD 247.
PMA Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure (1970) I 500f.
Cf C Fried "Privacy" (1967-8) 77 Yale LJ 475, 487: "in our culture
the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute pri-
vacy, so much so that situations in which this privacy is violated
are experienced as extremely distressing, as detracting from one's
dignity and self-esteem".
4) Cf De May v Roberts (1881) 9 NW 146, an American case where a woman
successfully sued her doctor for bringing a young man who was not a
physician into her room while she was giving birth. See above 52.
5) Cf ~ v Rail 1939 SR 239, 242; R v Woods 1940 SR 58, 59; R v Peverd
1956 (1) PH H23 (0). But cf Mtetwa v State 1966 (1) PH H25 (0).
6) Cf Hunt op cit 501.
7) See above 190f.
8) SA Strauss, MJ Strydom & JC Van der WaIt Die Suid-Afrikaanse Pers-
~ (1976) 289.
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in their house or garden. 1) It is probably becoming more difficult
to detect this form of invasion because of the increasing use of sen-
sitive electronic devices 2) and telephoto cameras. Nonetheless the
man in the street is aware that such conduct is criminally punishable
and this may act as a deterrent. 3) In some instances such peeping
may be justified, for instance, where a wife wishes to obtain evidence
of her husband'~ adultery.4)
2. Illegal Searches:
(a) Of the Person: In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act,S) a
person may be searched if he has been arrested6) or the person conduct-
ing the search has been issued with a search warrant. 7) Otherwise,
apart from certain statutory provisions,8) a search without such
authority would constitute a wrong. 9) If a person is physically
searched illegally, such a search would be an assault,10) whereas if
the injured party was asked to turn out his pockets or remove his
clothes for the purposes of the search he may have an action for in-
vasion of privacy. Thus in the United States where a prospective
1) Cf JE Scholtens "Abuse of Rights" (1958) 75 SALJ 39, 4lf, who sub-
mits that it is an abuse of rights to undert~"the erection of
a building or the insertion of new windows in a house, merely in
order to spy upon the private life of others, for instance, where
this is done in order to provide the opportunity of peeping into




Section 23, but such search "shall be conducted with strict regard
to decency and order, and a woman shall be searched by a woman
only". Cf s 42(1), Act 56 of 1955.
7) Section 21(2). Sf s 42(1), Act 56 of 1955.
8)
2) See below 216 n 7.
3) S v ~ 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) received wide coverage in the
BvD Van Niekerk "Unplugging the Bug, or the Right to be
in Criminal Law - Some Reflections" (1971) 88 SALJ 171.
4) S v 11976 (1) SA 781 (RAD). See below 21& but cf S v A- - , --
5) Act 51 of 1977.
6)
For instance, in certain circumstances search powers are given
to: (i) customs officials, under the Customs & Excise Act, 91 of
1964 (ss 4,8,10 and 11); (ii) the police, under the Abuse of
Dependance-Producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act, 41
of 1971 (s 11), and the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 (s 41).
9) Cf Act 51 of 1977, ss 29,53; Act 56 of 1955, ss 41,45. See
above 160.Butsee also Act 51 of.1977, ss 46,331; cf Act 56 of
1955, ss 31, 32.
Cf Hunt op cit 435, who states: "A mere touching may in the cir-
cumstances not be trivial, and technically the slightest contact





buyer left a self-service store without purchasing anything and was
overtaken by a manager who put his hand on her shoulder, obstructed
her path, ordered her to take off her coat, reached into her dress
pockets, inspected her handbag and replaced its contents, the manager
was held liable for inyasion of privacy.1) Technically in our law
such touching would constitute an assault,2) while in English law
"person" includes clothing and therefore in England reaching into a
woman's dress pockets would have been a trespass to the person.
3
) It
is submitted that in our law such conduct would also constitute an in-
. f' 4)vaSlon 0 prlvacy. \
(b) Of the Home: An action for injuria arlslng from an inten-
tional entry into another's home without their consent has its roots
in early Roman and Roman-Dutch law. 5) In some instances an action
will lie for trespass,6) but otherwise it seems that the plaintiff
should sue for invasion of privacy. In S v 17) although the court
held that the peeping was justified,8) th~re ~as no appeal against
the conviction for "being found by night without lawful excuse".9)
It is submitted that the accused could also have been convicted for
invasion of privacy on the second count. 10 ) When discussing the fic-
titious case of the "jealous wife" and the unfortunate "Mr and Mrs
p",11) the court considered it in terms of privacy.12) In the United
1) Bennett v Norban (1959) 396 Pa 94, 151 A 2d 476, 419; 71 ALR 2d
803; Sutherland v Kroger Co (1959) 110 SE 2d 76.
Hunt op cit 429. See above 200 n 10.











Neethling Privaatheid op cit 385.
See above 32,44. See also De Fourd v Capetown




Even though the first invasion had not exceeded the bounds of
reasonableness the second had.
11) Cf Amicus Curiae '.'Criminal Injuria and the Jealous Wife" (1971)
88 SALJ 403f.
12) ~ v I supra 786.
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States it has been held to be an invasion of privacy to enter
another's house without his consent,1) even when he is not there. 1)
It is submitted that the same would apply ~n our law 3) and
that in any event the wrongdoer may also be liable for
trespass. 4) Beadle ACJ in S v 15) also seemed to suggest that an
action will lie where the injured party is staying in a hotel,6) and
this approach has been applied in the United States. 7) It is sub-
mitted that as the action for invasion of privacy in our law is re-
garded as an aspect of impairment of dignitas it makes no difference
where the victims were staying at the time that their privacy was
disturbed provided they were in a private room secluded from the pub-
lic.
(c) By the Police: Where law enforcement officers wish to enter
a person's property for the purposes of search they are generally re-
quired to have a valid search warrant. 8)
1) Cf Welsh v Pritchard (1952) 241 P 2d 816; Thompson v City of
Jacksonvill~ (1961) 130 So 2d 105; Dieteman v Time Inc (1971)
449 F 2d 244 (9th Cir).
2) Cf Ford Motor Co v Williams (1963) 132 SE 2d 206; cf Neethling
Privaatheid op cit 169.
3) For instance where privacy rather than possession is disturbed.
4) McKerron op cit 225. Trespass is also actionable under the lex
5) Aquil~Supra.
6) At 788. In Roman law an action was also available to guests.
See above 30.
7) Cf Newcomb Hotel Co v Corbett (1921) 108 SE 309 (hotel room);
cf Byfield v Chandler (1924) 125 SE 905 (stateroom on a steamer);
cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 169.
8) Act 51 of 1977, s 21. A warrant may also be issued in terms of
s 25(1): "If it appears to a magistrate or justice (of the peace)
from information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for
believing - (a) that the internal security of the Republic or the
maintenance of law and order is likely to be endangered by or in
consequence of any meeting which is being held or is to be held in
or upon any premises within his area of jurisdiction; or (b) that
an offence has been or is being or is likely to be committed or
that preparations or arrangements for the commission of an offence
are being or are likely to be made in or upon any premises within
his area of jurisdiction, he may issue a warrant authorizing a
police official to enter the premises in question at ant reason-
able time .. "~y italics~ It is submitted that midnig t and dawn
raids by the security police could not be regarded as entry "at
any reasonable time". This question does not seem to have been
raised when interpreting s 44(1) of Act 56 of 1955. But such
entry may also be made without a search warrant if a police offi-
cial on reasonable grounds believes that a warrant in terms of s
25(1) will be issued, and delay in obtaining such a warrant would
defeat the object thereof. s 25(3). Cf Act 56 of 1955, s 44(2).
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"To enter premises, to search those premises, and to remove
goods therefrom is an important invasion of the rights of the
individual. The law empowers police officers to infringe the
rights of citizens in that way provided that they have a legal
war r an t to do so' ~. 1)
This right was protected at common law even where the occupier lived
an immoral life, ego prostitutes in a place suspected of being a
brothel. 2) But if a policeman believes on reasonable grounds that
a search warrant would be issued to him and that delay in obtaining
a warrant will defeat the object of the search, he may search a per-
son or premises without such a warrant. 3) If, however, he meets
resistance and is compelled to enter the premises by force, a police-
man must first make audible demands and state his purpose before
breaking in. 4) Furthermore a policeman, who reasonably suspects
that a person in possession of information concerning an offence or
alleged offence is on any premises, may enter such premises without
a warrant "for the purpose of interrogating such person and obtaining
a statement from him" - provided he obtains the occupier's consent. 5)
Other powers of search without a warrant have been extended to the
1) De Wet v Willers NO 1953 (4) SA 124 (T) 127; cf NUSAS v Divi-
sional Commissioner of SAP 1971 (2) SA 553 (C) 558.
2) De Fourd v Cape Town Council (1898) 15 SC 399, 402. See above125.
But see now the Immorality Act, 23 of 1957, s 20(2).
3) Act 51 of 1977, s 22; cf Act 56 of 1955, s 43, where there was no
reference to belief by the police official that a warrant would be
issued to him.
4) Act 51 of 1977, s 27; cf Act 56 of 1955, s 44(4).
5) Act 51 of 1977, s 26; cf s 44 (3) (4) of Act 56 of 1955. "Occupier
is not defined, but its ordinary meaning is "One who takes or holds
possession; a holder or occupant". Ed CT Onions Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary (1933) 1356. Cf Ed AB Harcourt.Swift's Law of
Criminal Procedure 2 ed (1969) 83 who comments on the similar pro-
vision in s 44(3) of Act 56 of 1955: "It is strongly submitted
that the section does not affect the common law relating to cautions
and the power of a person to refrain from answering incriminating
questions or making admissions, etc, since the invasion of the in-
dividual's rights and liberties in this regards is most serious".
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police 1) and public officials 2) in certain circumstances. If an
injured party can establish that such persons did not act on reason-
able grounds or under a reasonable suspicion when searching his prop-
erty without a search warrant he may have an action for invasion of
privacy. The attitude of the courts towards such violations of in-
dividual freedom was forcefully expressed in Solomon v Visser,3) a
wrongful arrest case in which Steyn J said:
"It is true that the Police have many onerous duties and that
the court must not make it difficult for them to perform their
functions. If the court were to do so the public could be
deprived of the full measure of the protection to which it is
entitled. On the other hand the Police have considerable
powers, and should they exceed or abuse those powers and they
injure the individual, the court must, in my view, not hesitate
to compensate the citizen in full measure for any humiliation,
indignity and harm which results".4)
Where, however, a valid search warrant has been issued the in-
jured party will not succeed in an action unless he can show that the
warrant was issued on the basis of false information. 5) In such
cases if the person who gave the false information is convicted of
perjury any perso~ against whom a warrant was executed and who has
suffered damage as a consequence of the unlawful entry, search or
seizure, may himself or through the prosecutor, apply to court for
1) Cf Arms and Ammunition Act, 75 of 1969, ss 11(2), 12(2), 41(1)
(any policeman "who has reason to suspect"); Diamond Cutting Act,
33 of 1955, s 43 (police "at all reasonable hours"); Bantu (Urban
Areas) Consolidation Act, 25 of 1945, S 38(1); Abuse of Dependence
Producing Substances & Rehabilitation Centres Act, 41 of 1971, s 11;
Community Development Act, 3 of 1966, s 48; Liquor Act, 30 of 1928,
s 139 (1).
2) Cf Food, Drugs & Disinfectants Act, 13 of 1929, s 22 (health in-
spectors); Wines, Spirits & Vinegar Act, 25 of 1957, s 29 (author-
ized officials); Customs & Excise Act, 91 of 1964, ss 4, 8, 10, 11
(customs officers); Diamond Cutting Act, 33 of 1955 s 13 (author-
ized inspectors); National Parks Act 42 of 1962, s 26(2) (Parks'
officials); Criminal Law Amendment Act, 8 of 1953 (post office
officials); Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 25 of 1945, s
29 (authorized officials). Private persons who occupy of control
land may also enter premises in which they reasonably suspect there
is stolen stock, or produce, or articles have been stored in contra-
~ention of laws relating to intoxicating liquor, dependence-produc-
lng drugs, arms.
3) 1972 (2) SA 327 (C).
4) At 345; cf Areff v Minister van Polisie 1977 (2) SA 900 (AD) 914.
5) Act 51 of 1977, s 28(2).
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compensation in respect of such damage. 1) There is no provision
for the preservation 'of the victims' common law right to sue for
wrongful search in the 1977 Crimjnal Procedure Act,2) but it is
su~~itted that such rights are preserved.
Difficulties arise where such searches are made in connection
with political offences as the police may argue that the warrant was
issued because there were reasonable grounds for suspicion, but that
they are not bound to disclose such grounds because it will be "pre-
judicial to the interests of the State or public security".3) It
could perhaps be argued that if the plaintiff led evidence to estab-
lish that he had an unblemished record and that his opposition to the
State had been kept within the law, the court may draw an inference
that the warrant was issued without a reasonable suspicion being
raised. Unfortunately because the Terrorism Act 4) defines "terrorism"
so widely that it includes any act which is likely "to embarass the
administration of the affairs of the State",5) the police may argue
that even lawful opposition may sometimes cause a reasonable suspicion
to arise.
During the debate on Lord Mancroft's Bill in the House of Lords 6)
the Lord Chancellor mentioned that the framers of Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,7) "were aiming mainly at phy-
sical interferences such as the activities of secret police and other
1) Ibid. In terms of s 45(1) of Act 56 of 1955, the guilty person
was liable to a fine not exceeding R50 and on application by the
injured party, compensation not exceeding R200.
2) Act 51 of 1977, s 28, makes no reference to common law rights,
unlike s 45(2) of Act 56 of 1955 which read: "Nothing in subsection
(1) contained shall be construed as depriving any aggrieved person
of the right to elect any other remedy allowed by law in lieu of
the remedy under that sub-section". The victim was put on election.
Cf Swift & Harcourt op cit 84.
3) General Law Amendment Act, 101 of 1969, s 29(1). A certificate
to that effect may be i~sued by the Prime Minister or "any person
authori~ed by him ... Lor by7 any other Minister. ef AS Mathews
Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971) 258f.
4) Act 83 of 1967.
5) Section 2(2) (1) cf Mathews op cit 170f.
6) See above 79.
7) See above l41f.
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officers of public authority".1)
the British proposal for Article
Human Rights read as follows:
It is interesting to note that
8(1) of the European Convention on
"Everyone shall have the right to freedom from governmental
interference with his privacy, family, house or correspen-
dence".2)
"Governmental interference" was replaced by "interference by
a public authority" in Article 8(2) of the Convention which was even-
tually ratified by the member countries. 3) Article 8(2) in the
ratified Convention does, however, allow such interference which is:
"necessary in a democratic society in the interests of nation-
al security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime or for the protection of health or morals".4)
'Similar principles could be applied in South Africa although it
can be questioned whether the country can be regarded as truly demo-
. 5)cratlC.
3. Interception of Correspondence:
(a) Letters. It is submitted that it is trite that to intercept
and read another's correspondence without his consent is an injuria. 6)
1) House Lords Debates (1961) Vol 229, Col 629; cf B Neill "The Pro-
tection of Privacy" (1962) 25 Modern LR 393, 401 n 48.
2) Ed AH Robertson Privacy and Human Rights (1973) 17. My italics.
3) See above 108.
4) Ibid. For instance, in South Africa health inspectors may enter
premises suspecting of creating a nuisance s 127, 146 Public
Health Act, 36 of 1919.
5)
Cf Mathews Law, Order and Liberty op cit 308f.
6) Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 386. For the publication of con-
tents of letters see below 248. Such interception is a tort in the
United States; Restatement of Torts (1939) §867 comment (b)·
AF Westin Privacy and Freedom (1967) 336ff.' ,
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That such interception is wrongful is clearly recognized by the
Legislature which found it necessary to authorize specified officials
to intercept and read the contents of correspondence in certain cir-
cumstances. 1) The Post Office Act 2) provides for the opening of
"postal articles",3) where for instance a letter in the "returned
. 4)
letter office" has no address on the envelope, or the article is
suspected of relating to lotteries, sports pools or obscene or in-
decent matter,S) or the interception is necessary "in the interests
of state security".6) Othe~wise it is an offence for anyone to open
or make public the contents of any postal article. 7)
It is in the sphere of "state security" however that the biggest
threat to the individual's right to privacy regarding his correspond-
ence is likely to occur. Prior to the Post Office Amendment Act 8)
there was no legislation in South Africa "authorising any body or or-
ganisation to listen in to telephone conversations or to open postal
articles ... for Lth~7 purposes of the investigation of matters relat-
ing to the security of the State".9) Section l18A extends the power
to intercept such correspondence to persons designated by the Minister
of Posts and Telegraphs or a Minister who is a member of the State
Security Council,10) who must follow certain prescribed procedures: 11 )
to theinto Matters Relatin
§ 208.
1) Using the approach of Beadle ACJ in Rhodesian Printing & Publishing
Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD) 595, it could be argued that
postal legislation in South Africa indicates that private corres-
pondence should be protected from publicity, and that the prevailing
modes of the community is that such publicity is actionable. See
above 177.
2) Act 44 of 1958; cf English Post Office Act of 1953, s 58(1);
Justice Report Privacy and the Law (1970) 15, para 66.
3), "Postal article" means any letter, post-card, reply post-card,
letter-card ... when in course of transmission by post, and includes
a telegram when conveyed by post." s 1.
4) Section 28.
5) Section 35.'
6) Section l18A. Cf Defence Act 44 of 1957, s 101 (1).
7) Section 96. Offenders are liable to imprisonment not exceeding
7 years.
8) Act 101 of 1972, s 1.
9) Re ort of the Commission
Security of the State RP
10) Section l18A (2) (a).
11) Section l18A (2)(b). The Commission of Inquiry had recommended that
it w~uld.be "d~s~rable that interception could take place on an
a~pllcatlon, g~vIng good grounds, from the Head of the Bureau Ifor
S at~ ~ecurIty/, t~e Hea~ of the.Se~urity Police or the Director
~f M~lltary IntellIgence. CommIssIon of Inquiry op cit §2l2. My
ItalIcs. But such "2:ood grounds" wprp nnt- CTlAr;+;e-.;'l
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"Such a person shall make the request only if he believes that
the interception in question is necessary for the maintenance
of the security of the Republic, and such request shall state -
(i) the grounds upon which such a person believes that such
interception is necessary for the maintenance of the security
of the Republic;
(ii) where applicable, the period in respect of which such in-
terception is required; and
(iii) sufficient particulars to identify any postal article,
telegram or communication involved, including particulars re-
lating to the name and, where known, the address of the person,
body or organisation concerned, and any number allocated by the
department in respect of any telephone sercice involved".
The danger is that the grounds referred to in Section l18A 2(b)(i)
may be withheld on the basis that the official concerned is not bound
to disclose them as it would be prejudicial to the security of the
State. 1)
It seems that in the United States mail interception is regard-
ed as an invasion of proprietary interests 2) whereas in our law it
would seem to be an infringement of personality rights under the
actio injuriarum. 3) A practical difficulty for the potential liti-
gant is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to prove that one's
co~respondence has in fact been intercepted. As Westin points out:
"If private parties manage to get access to letters (before,
during, or after they are in the hands of the Post Office), such
mail can be opened secretly by steaming the adhesive seam open,
reading the contents, and re-sealing the envelope. Modern
technology has added to these existing situations the possibili-
ty of passing visible light or reflected infra-red energy through
an envelope and taking pictures of the contents. These pic-
tures can then be read - or, more properly, deciphered- by per-
sons skilled in reading handwriting or typing while lines are
1 ) See above 205. cf Defence Act, 44 of 1957, s 101.
2) ef 62 American Jurisprudence 2d (1972) Privacy §7, 685f.
3) See above 206. See below 252. The only South African common law
reference to ~ail interception is to be found in relation to the
question of theft. Digest 47.2.14.17.
4) Westin op cit 79.
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inverted and superimposed. There is also available today a
needle-thin 'flashlight' that can be inserted in a sealed
envelope to 'light it up' for quick reading by a trained in-
vestigator".l)
On the other hand it is easier to establish that such inter-
ception has taken place where the contents of the correspondence have
been made pUblic. 2) Furthermore if a person uses a telegram or post-
card when corresponding he must expect that his privacy may be in-
vaded by postal authorities,3) but it is submitted that he is still
protected vis-a-vis third parties. 4)
(b) Telegrams. It is submi tted that al though the contents of
telegrams may be known to those who transmit them, once the telegram
has been sealed and ready for despatch anybody who opens it will be
liable for invasion of privacy. It is clear that such an act is
wrongful as the Post Office ActS) makes it a punishable offence for
anyone other than a postal official to wilfully open a telegram addres-
sed to another. 6 ) Once again, however, such telegram may be inter-
cepted in the interests of State security.7)
It has been suggested that in the United States the disclosure
of the contents of a telegram to others does not constitute an in-
vasion of privacy.8) In Western Union reI Co v McLaurin,9) the
plaintiff failed in an action for privacy, where the defendants had
disclosed and caused to be made public certain telegrams sent to the
'n poskaart of 'n telegram
Niehaus 1960 (3) SA 109
1 .
The Department of the Interior uses clumsier
methods, see The Daily News, 7 October 1977.
1) Westin op cit 79.
2) See below 248.
3)
Section 98; cf Telegraph Messages Protection Act, 44 of 1963, s 2.
Cf English law, Wireless Telegraph Act of 1868, s 20. Justice
Privacy op cit 15, para 67.
7) Act 44 of 1958, s 118 A. Cf Defence Act, 44 of 1957, s 101 (1).
8) 62 American Jurisprudence op cit §7, 686 nIl.
9) 108 Miss 273, 66 So 739.
"Dit moet verwag word dat die inhoud van
deur andere gelees kan word" Pretorius v
(0) 112; cf Sadgrove v Hole Z190!! 2 KB
4) See below 248.
5) Act 44 of 1958.
6)
187.
Hunt op cit 496.
293 (T ) 29 8 ; c f Van Ni eker k 0 p c i t 174 .
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plaintiff by a prostitute. Plaintiff failed because he could not
make out a case without showing that he had been guilty of unlawful
and immoral conduct, and his humiliation and shame sprang from his
illicit relationships with the woman. It could be argued that such
disclosures would constitute an impairment of dignitas in our law,
as truth alone is not ~ defence.') But if such revelations were
made to expose criminal action by the plaintiff then they would be
in the public interest. 2) It should be noted that Graham v Ker
3
)
is distinguishable in that the illicit conduct of the soldier was in
the public interest because he was being paid by the public purse.
On the other hand if the plaintiff himself lives a depraved life he
may have very little dignity, in which case the damages awarded may
be greatly reduced. 4)
It is submitted that in our law to open and read the contents
of a letter or a telegram addressed to another is prima facie an in-
vasion of that person's privacy.
4. Telephone Tapping:
(a) By Private Individuals. It seems clecr that the tapping of
another's telephone is an invasion of privacy in our law. 5) Tele-
phone tapping is merely an extended form of eavesdropping. 6) This
is the view taken in the United States. In Rhodes v Graham7) damages
were awarded against a defendant who had tapped the plaintiff's pri-
vate telephone and listened-in on conversations by the plaintiff, his
family and friends. Similarly in La Crane v Ohio Bell Telephone Co,8)
1 ) Cf Voet 47.10.9; Patterson v Engelenburg 1917 TPD 350, 356;
Sutter v Brown 1926 AD 155, 172.
2) It seems that in our law it is not a criminal offence to have
intercourse with a prostitute. JRL Milton & NM Fuller South
African Criminal Law and Procedure (1971) III 343.
3) (1892) 9 SC 185,
4) Cf Voet 47.10.13;
5) Cf ~ v ~ 1971 (2)
6) SH Hofstadter & G Horowitz The Right of Privacy (1964) 105.
7) (1931) 238 Ky 225, 37 SW 2d 46; cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 107.
8) (1961) 114 Ohio App 299, 19 Ohio Ops 2d 236, 182 NE 2d 15.
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where the defendants had tapped the plaintiff subscriber's telephone
and intercepted her private conversations without notice or authority
it was held that such wire-tapping prima facie constituted an in-
vasion of privacy. The court recognized that such tapping could
cause embarassment and humiliation,1) and that it was an invasion,
regardless of whether the information was published or not. On the
other hand where such tapping is done in defence of the interests of a
telephone company, (eg to check whether the plaintiff was using her
private line to make business calls), and the taps merely established
which type of call was made, and did not listen to the whole conver-
sation, such tapping was held not to be an invasion. 2) No disclos-
ures or publications were made other than to the plaintiff to confront
her with the breach of her contract. 3) It is submitted that a simi-
lar approach would be adopted by our courts which would regard the
occasion as privileged. 4)
It has been suggested that there is no remedy available in
Scotland because tapping "requires the co-operation of Post Office
engineers",5) and that even though "the Crown has no power conferred
by law to tap telephones ... the citizen has no means of redress if
the Crown does authorize tapping of his calls.,,6) This view seems
to overlook two factors: Firstly, it is possible to tap telephones
without such co-operation simply by placing an induction coil,7) a
few feet from the telephone or its connecting wire before it JOlns
the other lines. 8) Secondly, as wiretapping is an extended form of
1) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 109.
2) Schmuckler v Ohio-Bell Tel Co (1955) 116 NE 2d 819 (Ohio CP);
cr People v Appelbaum (1950) 301 NY 738, 739; cf Hofstadter &
Horowitz op cit 110; Prosser Torts op cit 818.
3) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 109.
4) See below 324.
5) DM Walker The Law of Delict in Scotland (1966) 11 710.
6) Ibid. Cf H Street Freedom: The Individual and the Law (1963) 37.
7) Induction coils have been used in the United States since before
1941. Westin op cit 78.
8)
"No '~utting or bre~king ~nto. the telephone wires or equipment is
regulre~. The COlI, belng ln the magnetic field carrying the
VOlce slgnal, draws off a very small amount of that signal and
carries.it to a receiver that permits listening or recording of
the entlre conversation". Westin op cit 78.
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·eavesdropping,l) and as eavesdropping is a common law crime in
Scotland and England,2) it is submitted that the courts in the
United Kingdom should adopt the flexible approach used in the United
States. 3)
(b) By the State: Prior to the 1972 Post Office Amendment Act,4)
there was no authority for any person including the State to listen-
in to telephone conversations. Such listening-in by the State is
now permitted and despite the procedures provided5) there is again
the danger that the State may refuse to disclose the grounds on which
an application is made because it would prejudice the safety of the
State. 6) In any event the decision to authorize the tap is left to
a State employee delegated by the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs,
or a Minister who is a member of the State Security Council. 7) There
is therefore no judicial control over wire tapping procedures in South
Africa.
In the United States, on the other hand, 15 states have intro-
duced legislation to regulate use by the State of electronic eaves-
dropping devices and the interception of private communications during
criminal investigation. 8) Furthermore the Federal government enacted
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 9)
to protect the privacy of oral and wire communications in the course
of the fight against crime: 10)
to eavesdropping which is an indictable
Rhodes v Graham supra; Hofstadter &
1) ef "Wire-tapping is akin
offence at common law".
Horowitz op cit 107.
2) W Blackstone Commentaries
168.
on the Law of England IV 16 ed (1825)
3) But see Justice Privacy op cit 15f, para 67.
4) Act 101 of 1971, s 1. See above 207.
5) Act 44 of 1958, s 118A (2) (b). See above 207£.
6) See above 208.
7) Act 44 of 1958, s l18A (1) (a).
8) P Burns "The Law and Privacy: The Canadian Experience" (1976)
54 Canadian Bar Rev 1, 61, n 305.
9) 1~ United States Code §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp V 1975); cf CS
Flshman "The Interception of Communications without a Court Order:
Title Ill, Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy" (1976) 51
St John's LR 41.
10) Ibid.
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"Title III describes in detail who may apply to which courts
for authorization to intercept oral or wire communications,
what the application and order must contain, what crimes must
be investigated by.means of court authorised eavesdropping, the
circumstances under which evidence obtained through eavesdrop-
ping may be utilized, and the manner in which taps used to
record intercepted conversations are to be sealed and pre-
served".l)
Prior to Title III the Supreme Court in Berger v New York
2
) had laid
down "certain procedural and substantive safeguards which were con-
stitutional prerequisites to the assurance of an electronic survel-
lance warrant,,3) where there was no express or implied consent by the
party concerned. 4) Title III provides that it is not unlawful to
intercept a wire or oral communication where there is prior consent
by the person intercepting or one of the parties to the communica-
tion,S) but some states still require judicial authorixation for such
"consensual" interceptions. 6) The court in Berger's case 7) listed
the following requirement for the issuance of a surveillance warrant
for a nonconsensual interception:
"(1) There must be probable cause to believe that a particular
offence has been or is being committed; (2) the conversations
to be intercepted must be particularly described; (3) the
eavesdrop must be for a specific and limited period of time to
minimize the intrusion; (4) present probable cause must be
shown for the continuance or removal of the eavesdrop; (5) the
eavesdropping must terminate once the evidence sought has been
cit 42.
US 41; cf Katz v United States (1967) 384 US 347;
cit 42.
cit 42 n 4.
18 United States Code § 2511 (2)(c)(1970).
Cf Fishman op cit 90ff, who mentions Illinois, Maryland, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.








See above 202f. "A search warrant is confined to a definite place and
to specific items or at least to items of a stated class or descrip-
tion". Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 106; cf NUSAS v Divisional
Commissioner of SAP 1971 (2) SA 553 (C) 558.
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seized; (6) there must be notice unless a showing of exigency
based on the existence of special facts is made; and (7) there
must be a return on the warrant so the Court may supervise and
restrict the use of the seized conversations".1)
Title III was enacted ~o satisfy these requirements,2) and in addition
to protecting the privacy of oral and wire communications against in-
trusions by private citizens,3) also provides a civil remedy for any
person "whose wire and oral communication is intercepted, disclosed
or used".4)
Legislation in South Africa provides certain safeguards for the
search of a person's premises 5) and it has been said in the United
States that "a telephone interception is far more devastating than
any search warrant".6)
"Those in possession of the searched premises know the search
is going on and, when the officer has completed his search,
whether successfully or not, he departs. Not so, in the case
of a telephone interception. The interception order is ob-
tained ex parte and the person whose line is to be tapped is,
of course, in ignorance of the fact. The tap is monitored con-
tinuously day and night. Everything said over the line is
1) Cf Fishman op cit 42 n 4. Westin op cit 39lf, had previously
recommended that wire-tapping should be limited to the Secret Ser-
vice and certain other law enforcement agencies in respect of
crimes involving kidnapping and national security. Urgentappli-
cation could be made to a judge in chambers who could grant an
order for 20 c.ays, and a further 20 days "on a showing of continued
need". In emergency cases the Attorney-General could grant pro-
visional authority subject to confirmation by a judge within 24
hours. In South Africa sl18A(1)(a), Act 44 of 1958, provides
no time limits and authority may be given "for such period as the
functionary concerned may specify".
2) Fishman op cit 4lf.
3) Fishman op cit 66.
4) 18 United States Code §2520 (1970).
5)
6) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 106.
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heard, however foreign to the stated objective of the law en-
forcement officers".1)
It seems most undesirable that in South Africa the authority which
determines whether or ~ot to allow the tap is a representative of
the very body which seeks to enforce it. Telephone tapping is a
fundamental breach of a person's right to privacy,2) and it seems
right that the authority for such a breach should only be given on
good cause shown to a judge of the Supreme Court. 3)
5. Eavesdropping and Electronic Surveillance: This form of intrusion
overlaps with telephone tapping and may be covered by similar legis-
lation in the United States4) and Canada,5) and the Penal Codes of
1) Ibid.
2) Cf "The government's activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth". Katz v
United States supra 353; Cf Fishman op cit 45.
3) This approach has been adopted in Canada where in terms of the
Protection of Privacy Act of 1973 an ex parte application signed
by the provincial Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General, or
their agent may be made to a judge. (s178.l2 of the Criminal Code,
RSC 1970 c 34). Cf Burns op cit 51: "The application must be
accompanied by an affidavit which may be sworn on the information
of a peace officer, disposing to (a) the facts relied upon to jus-
tify the belief that an authorization should be given together
with particulars of the offence, (b) the type of private communica-
tion proposed to be intercepted, (c) the names and addresses, if
known, of persons whose communications, if intercepted, would assist
the investigation of the offence, (d) the period for which the
authorization is required, and (e) whether or not other investiga-
tive procedures have been tried and failed and so on". The Cana-
dian Privacy Act outlaws the wilful interception of private com-
munications by "electromagnetic, mechanical or other devices"
(s 178.11 of the Criminal Code, R SC 1970 c 34), unless the origi-
nator or receiver expressly or impliedly consents (s 178.11 (2)(a))
or the person intercepting is authorized by law (s 178.11 (2) (b)).
Burns op cit 50f.
4) See above 56.Cf JF Decker & J Handler "Electronic Surveillance:
Standards, Restrictions and Remedies" (1975) 12 Cal West LR 60.
5) See above 119.
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most European countries. 1) Electronic surveillance is merely a more
.sophisticated method of eavesdropping and it is clear that South
Afri~an courts regard both as an invasion of privacy.2) In S v A
3
)
the accused, both private detectives, were convicted on a charge of
crimen injuria for installing a "transmitter wireless microphone"
under the dressing table of the complainant, during an investigation
into the latter's private life at the request of the estranged spouse.
The court experienced no difficulty in holding that their act amounted
to an invasion of priVacy.4) In South Africa evidence obtained on a
tape recorder is admissable (provided the tape has not been tampered
with,S) and the voices are identified by corroborating eVidence),6)
but notwithstanding the increasing availability of electronic
surveillance devices,7) the use of electronically recorded evidence
in the courts seems to be limited.
In the United States, surveillance and counter-surveillance
devices have been readily available to the public,8) and it seems that
the same is true of South Africa. 9) Rhodesia has introduced the
Private Investigators and Security Guards (Control) Act
10
) which makes
it an offence, inter alia, for any private investigator
11
) or security
guard 12 ) to:
a) possess or use any device or instrument for the tapping of
telephones; or
1) See above 110f. 2) S v A 1971 (2) SA3) 293 (T) 297.
Supra. 4) -S -_ v ~ supra 297.
5) ~ v Reake 1962 (3) SA 288 (C); Cf LH Hoffman South African Law of
Evidence 2 ed (1970) 288.
6)
~ v Behrman 1957 (1) SA 433 (T); Hoffman op cit 288.
7) David Barrit "Big Brother's Alive Well and Watching .. " S d
8) Tribune, Insight, 19 August, 1973: 1. un ar
ef Westin op cit 81f.
9) ef The Da~ly News, 30 November 1977, 7: "Mr. Bill Barnfather whose
~outh Afr1~an company ~lso makes and distributes 'sweeping' devices
or detect1ng bugs (sa1d) .. 'America will tell you that as far as
they a~e concerned South.Af~ica is one of the most inundated
cou~tr1es ~s far as sOph1st1cated bugging and electronic intell"
equ1pment 1S concerned' ". 1gence
1 0)
Ac~ 23 o~ 1977~ The Act provides for the licensing and control of
pr1vate 1nvest1gators and security guards.
11 )A" "pr1vate"lnvesti~ator is a person who carries on business whereb
he seek~ 1nformat1on, for reward, not contained in public record y
~?nCer~1ng an?t~erls "per~onal actions, behaviour or character .~
b
1nanc1al pos1t1on .. bus1ness or occupation ident1"tyor h
a outs" (s 3(1) ). .. were-
12)A· "secur1ty guard 1S a person who carries on business whereb f
reward he guar~s mova~le or immovable property of another ~r or
enters another s premlses to advise on the guarding of sU~h
property, or guards any person as a client (s 4(1) ).
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b) use any camera, cinematograph camera, long-range listening
device, microphone, television camera or video-tape camera for
the surreptitious surveillance of persons. 1)
Unfortunately paragraph b) "shall (not) be construed as preventing the
use of surveillance systems in or on any premises with the consent of
the occupier or owner thereof,,2). Therefore although it may be a civil
wrong it seems that the. Act does not outlaw the use of such systems to
intrude on the privacy of a tenant or hotel guest if permission for
their use is granted by a landlord or hotel-keeper.
It is submitted that in South Africa legislation should be intro-
duced not only to control the activities of private investigators and
security guards but also to outlaw "the unauthorised importation,
manufacture, sale, delivery and .. use of monitoring devices".3)
Surveillance and Private Detectives:
4
) In S v AS) it was held that
a private detective was liable for invading the privacy of another
at the request of the latter's estranged (but not legally separated
or divorced) spouse. It seems trite that because of the intimate
nature of tne marriage relationship itself the parties inter se may
be regarded as having waived their respective rights to privacy.6)
Therefore until such time as the marriage has been terminated or sus-
pended7) by the court or by a private separation8) the marital
1) Section 24 (1)(e),(f).
2) Section 24(1)(f), proviso., Cf A Enker "Controls on Electronic
Eavesdropping - A Basic Distinction" (1967) 2 Israel LR 461, who
distinguishes "internal eavesdropping" where one of the parties co-
ope-rates with the eavesdropper from "external eavesdropping" where
neither of the parties are aware that their conversation is being
monitored.
3) Van Niekerk op cit 174f. On the need for such legislation, see
above 216 n 9.
4) There are approximately 2,000 private investigators in South Africa,
whose operations primarily include the detection of industrial
piracy and the leaking of inside information; the tracing of miss-
ing persons; and the surveillance of unfaithful spouses. Cf
"Revealed - the Secrets of the private eye" Sundar Times Magazine,
25 September 1977. For a definition of "private lnvestigator", see
above 216 n 11. \
5) Supra.
6) Marriage creates a "consortium omnis vitae" HR Hahlo The South
African Law of Husband and Wife 4 ed (1975) 109f. ef "A Medical
practltloner who treats one of the spouses does not necessarily
create a breach of confidence by disclosing the nature of the
disease from which he or she is suffering to the other spouse"
Hahlo op cit 110f. It is submitted that in such a case the dis-
closure is privileged. See below 324.
7) For instance by judicial separation. See Hahlo op cit 329ff.
8) It seems that provided it is accompanied by justa causa an "agree-
ment to. live apart" may in certain circumstances be recognized as
suspendlng some of the consequences of the marriage. Hahlo op
cit 353, 357.
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privileges (including the forfeiture of the right to privacy vis-
a-vis the other spouse) would appear to continue. The decision in
S v A does not distinguish between the situation where the spying is
done by an estranged spouse and where a detective is employed for
that purpose. 1) Thus ,i t seems to follow that if in ~ v A the sur-
veillance device had been installed by the complainant's spouse the
latter may also have been held liable criminally for invasion of pri-
vacy. In a delictual action, however, the complainant in ~ v ~
would only have been able to sue his wife if the spouses were married
out of community of property.2) Christie submits that in cases where
the invading spouse is seeking evidence of adultery by a guilty spouse
the former should be allowed the defence of qualified privilege 3)
which in certain circumstances should also apply to private investi-
gators. 4)
In S v IS) the Rhodesian Courts were faced with the situation
where the appellants, a wife and a private detective employed by her,
had invaded the privacy of her guilty husband and his paramour in
order to obtain evidence of their adultery. The court seemed to
accept that the defences open to an intruding spouse would also be
available "to any agent lawfully engaged by Liierl",6) and decided the
case on the basis of wrongfulness ie. whether or not the accused's
1) Cf RH Christie "Invasion of Privacy" (1971) 11 Rhod LJ 15, 16.
2) Cf Tomlin v London & Lancashire Ins Co Ltd 1962 (2) SA 30 (D); RG
McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) 84£; Hahlo op cit 210. Cf
Rohloff v Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation 1960 (2) SA 291
(AD).
3) Christie op cit (1971) 11 Rhod LJ l6f. This view was rejected in
~ v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD) 788f, although the Court~ formulation
of the degree of justification was very similar to that proposed
by Christie. See below.
4) Christie op cit Rhod LJ 17.
5) Supra.
6) S v I supra 787. It is submitted however, that this statement
should be qualified. For instance it may not be actionable for
an estranged husband to observe his wife walking about naked
in order to determine whether or not she is pregnant, but it is
submitted that such conduct by a private detective employed by the
husband may constitute an actionable invasion of privacy. The
husband's ~rivilege would flow from the marriage relationship.
See above Z17.
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conduct was justified. The Court adopted a combined subjective -
objective approach and required the invading spouse to prove (i) that
the invasion was done "solely with the bona fide motive of obtaining
evidence of the adultery", (ii) that he or she had reasonable grounds
for'~elieving that they were not invading the privacy of innocent
persons",and(ili) that it was "no more than reasonably necessary for
the purpose of obtaining that eVidence".1) Therefore provided the
invading spouse (or her lawful agent) acts with a bona fide motive
and that the intrusion is reasonably necessary for the lawful ends to
be achieved such conduct will be justified. The decision has been
criticized for objectifying the mens rea requirement in criminal law
which is traditionally tested subjectively,2) and for allowing "a
good motive and the moral reprehensibility of the act of adultery ...
alone LtQ7 sway the balance against the protection of the adulterer's
privacy".3) It is submitted however, that the court could have de-
cided the case simply by referring to the question of wrongfulness,4)
and that if the appellant's conduct was not wrongfu1 5) the question of
mens rea was irrelevant. 6) But if it could be shown that notwith-
standing the prima facie lawfulness of the appellant's conduct they
had been actuated by an improper motive (eg. not to obtain evidence of
the adultery, but to satisfy their prurient tastes), they would have
abused their rights and the objectively lawful act would become unlaw-




"Private Lives and Public Sins" (1976) 16 Rhod LJ 21, 28.
JM Burchell "Is the Adulterers' Home their Castle? A Case of
Criminal Injuria" (1976) 93 SALJ 265, 268.
4)
See above 170. ~ut cf B~rchell op cit (1976) ~3 SALJ 26R who doubts
whether the bonl mores lS "a relevant factor ln aeLermining whether
a serious invasion of privacy is justified." Cf Hunt op cit 487f.
It is submitted however that in delictual actions boni mores is a
useful criterion for determining wrongfulness. See above.
5) See above l56.Butif the accused's act is wrongful it is still nece-
ssary to prove that he has mens rea in respect of each element of
the crime. Hunt op cit 493.
6)
On the question of animus injuriandi see above l47ff.
7) See above 156.
220
the invading spouse intrudes on the privacy of the other spouse
with the motive of effecting a reconciliation. Furthermore although
the courts are reluctant to preserve an irretrievably broken marriage,1)
it seems that they will be even more reluctant to inhibit a spouse's
attempt to reconcile h~mself or herself with the other spouse. 2) In
terms of Beadle ACJ's test in ~ v l such attempts must be bona fide
and reasonable: there is a world of difference between contacting a
person during reasonable hours and interrupting him continuously
throughout the night. In any event persistent telephone calls and
unwelcome midnight visits could hardly be conducive to reconciliation.
It is for this reason that ~ v ~3) can be distinguished from ~ v l.4)
In ~ v ~ the accused had indulged in continuous surveillance of the
complainant, whereas in ~ v l the intrusion was made on a single
occasion when the appellants reasonably suspected that they would be
able to obtain evidence of adultery by the guilty spouse. 5) It is
submitted that apart from the question of fault the manner and duration
of the intrusion are important factors to be taken into account when
determining the reasonableness of the intrusion. 6) Thus whether or
not the invaders conduct was reasonable will depend upon the particular
circumstances. 7) For instance, it may not be necessary to intrude
physically into the other spouse's premises where mere peeping will
1) Cf Wassenaar v Jameson 1969 (2) SA 349 (W) 353; cf Hahlo op cit
362. .
2) For instance, one of the purposes of judicial separation is to en-
courage the spouses to beco~e reconciled. Cf Hahlo op cit 335.
3) 1971 (2) SA 293 (T).
4) 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD).
5) ~ v I supra 790. But cf Burchell op cit (1976) 93 SALJ 290.
6) Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
(C) 249. Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 335£. See above.
7) In Canada the British Columbia Privacy Act SBC 1968 c 39 the words
"reasonable in the circumstances" (s 2(s)) have been int~rpreted to
mean th~t. (i) t~e private d~~ect~ve was the wife's agent acting in
h~r legltl~ate l~~~res~s, (11) hl~ observation did not attract pub-
llC a~tent~on, (111) ~lS observatlon was not offensively executed,
and (lV) hlS observatlon was not unduly close or continuous.
Davis v McArt~ur (1971) ~7 DLR 3d 76~ (CA) 763; cf Burns op cit
36. In Davls case a prlvate detectlve had connected an electronic





suffice.') Similarly in cases where adultery can be established
hy circumstantial evidence, such as where a detective observes the
guilty spouse entering a brothe1 2) or a bedroom in suspicious cir-
cumstances with a person of the opposite sex,3) it is submitted that
an intrusion into the r~om concerned may be regarded as unreasonable -
al though it should be borne in mind that lfmere opportuni ty for mi s-
conduct" may not be sufficient evidence of adultery by the guilty
spouse. 4)
The courts have on occasion allowed a successful party in a
divorce case to recover the reasonable qualifying fee of a private
investigator who has given essential evidence of the guilty spouse's
adultery.5) It has been held, however, that such fees should only
be allowed where the detective has used special skills - eg training
in the analysis of finger prints or books of account - otherwise his
evidence should be treated like that of any other witness. 6)
1) Cf ~ v l supra 789f.
2) McDougall v McDougall 1908 EDC 455, 457; but contra Epstein v
Epstein (1901) 11 CTR 650, where it was held that the fact that
a detective saw the guilty spouse leaving a brothel was not ~
~ evidence of adultery.
3) Hemens v Hemens (1910) 20 CTR 137, where the couple occupied a
bedroom for some time behind a locked door.
Cf Truter v Truter 1938 NPD 250, 254f.
Cloete v 'Cloete 1961 (2) SA ~07 (W) 608; Humphreys v Humphreys
1965 (3) SA 793 (SR) 794: "Lbu!7 the fee allowed is not necessarily
related to the zeal displayed by the private detective ... and this
order must not be understood as condoning the degree to which the
defendants' and the co-respondents' rights to privacy were invaded".
6) Barratt v Barratt 1966 (3) SA 364 (D) 365: "Such investigations
would not include unprofitable periods spent in observation of per-
sons suspected of adultery." Champion v Morkel 1971 (2) SA 121 (R)
128: "Its value remains no more than that which would attach to
any ordinary observer of the events atte5ted to". Christie op cit
(1971) 11 Rhod LJ 17, submits that qualifying fees should be allowed
for a "paid investigator operating according to strict professional
standards". Generally on the activities of private detectives in
England see D Madgwick & T Smythe The Invasion of Privacy (1974)
l10f; M Jones Privacy (1974) l34f. Cf Jolliffe v Wilmett & CO
L197!7 1 All ER 478 (QB) 484, decided on the basis of trespass:
"when the parties are separated and living at arm's length, the
wife has no right whatsoever to introduce an enquiry agent into the
husband's home, whatever the purport may be, and certainly not in
order to garner evidence of the husband's adultery". Cf the Federal
Republic of Germany: "The court has now decided that a man who lets
his wife be watched in her home by a stranger, so that he can ob-
tain evidence for divorce proceedings of her matrimonial breaches
of duty, cannot use the evidence so obtained". "Current Legal
Developments "(1971) 20 ICLQ 152.
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The courts therefore appear to accept that both the guilty
spouse and the paramour are entitled to a measure of privacy - even
though they may be wrongdoers vis-a-vis the innocent spouse. Thus
they will refuse to grant an interdict (except under exceptional
circumstances) to an innocent spouse restraining a third party from
committing adultery with the guilty spouse, on the basis that the
latter has a right to dispose of his or her body as they choose.
1
)
Furthermore'the adulterous paramour is entitled to protection against
unreasonable intrusions into his private life. This is well
illustrated by an Australian case:
2
)
"/Tlhe defendant's conduct was outrageous, high-handed and
contumelious .. He broke into a private dwelling in the
small hours of the morning .. He .. stripped the bed clothes
from the unwilling plaintiff .. inflicting in consequence
definite, though minor, injuries, and caught her by the hair
"His desire to assist his daughter's divorce suit .. was such
that he was prepared to resort .. to grossly extravagant
means ID obtain evidence of adultery by {liis son-in-Ia~7 with
the plaintiff. In this pursuit he had no consideration
for her feelings or her rights. He knew the risk he was
taking and he was prepared to take it. Now he must pay
the forfeit.. The adulterous have as much right as the
chaste to the protection of their castles against invasion
and their person against force".3)
It is submitted that similar considerations would apply in
our law to both estranged spouses and investigators employed by them,
and that the victim of the intrusion in such cjrcumstances could sue
for invasion of privacy and assault. 4)
1) Wassenaar v Jameson supra 353; cf Amra v Amra 1971 (4) SA 409 (D)
410.
2) Johnstone v Stewart 1968 SASR 142; cf "The Adulterer's Castle"
(1-70) 87 SALJ 409.
3) Per Bray CJ at 145.
4) In the United States the general rule that a master or principal
is liable for the wrongs of his servant or agent committed within
the scope of the latter's authority has been applied to invasions
of privacy committed by a private investigator during the course of
his investigation. Annotation "Liability of One Hiring Private
Investigator or Detective for Tortious Acts Committed in Course of
Investigation" (1976) 73 ALR 3d 1175. Cf Souder v Pendleton
Detectiveslnc (1956) 88 So 2d 716 (La App); Pinkerton Nat Detective
~ency Inc v Stevens (1963) 108 Ga App 159, 132 SE 2d 119; Tucker v
erlcan Employers Ins Co (1969) 218 So 2d 221 (Fla App); Nader v
General Motors Corp (1970) 25 NY 2d 560 307 NYS 2d 647 225 NE 2d
765iEllenberg v Pinkerton's Inc (1972) 125 Ga App 648 188 SE 2d 911-130 Ga App 2 4, 202 SE 2d 701. "
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6. "Nuisance" Calls: Where a person's peace and tranquility in
his home is disturbed by another continuously telephoning him,1) or
persistently calling to sell him something,2) an action for invasion
of privacy may lie. A classic example of such conduct is the Cana-
dian case of Robbins v'Canadian Broadcasting Corporation~) The
plaintiff, a doctor, had written a letter of criticism to the pro-
ducer of a particular television programme. Several weeks later
during a further edition of the programme, plaintiff's name, address
and telephone number were displayed on the screen, and viewers were
invited to write or telephone him in order to "cheer him up". Plain-
tiff was subsequently inundated with a barrage of offensive letters
and telephone calls obliging him to disconnect his telephone and
causing him serious inconvenience. Plaintiff sued the television
company and recovered damages for invasion of privacy. In the
United States the principle has been applied where a creditor has
persistently and unwarrantedly telephoned a debtor,4) and it has been
suggested that an action will also lie where a person's mental repose
has been disturbed by a flood of advertisements in the mail or by
telephone. 5) It seems, however, that according to the decision in
Nader v General Motors Corp6) such intrusions will only be regarded
as invasions of privacy where they are made with a view to obtaining
private or confidential information. 7) Therefore in the United States
on the principle in Nader's case the plaintiff in Robbin's case may
1) RFV Heuston Salmond on Torts 16 ed (1973) 35.
2) NJ Van der Merwe & PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Re~ 2 ed (1970) 395; WA Jo~bert Die Grondslae van die
Persoonlikhei sreg (1953) 136; Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt
op cit 289,
3) (1957) 12 DLR 2d 37; cf Burns op cit 39.
4) Housh v Peth (1956) 133 NE 2d 340; cf Prosser Torts op cit 808.
5) R Kamlah Right of Privacy (1969) 102f; cf Neethling Privaatheid
op cit 174.
6) (1970) 255 NE 2d 765; cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 174.
7)
Nader v General Motors Corp supra 770. See generally M A Franklin
Injuries and Remedies : Cases and Materials on Tort Law and
Alternatlves (1971) 829.
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not have succeeded on the grounds of invasion of privacy although
presumably he would have had an action for nuisance.
It is submitted that our courts would not draw such a fine
distinction, as according to the old authorities it was an injuria
to violate a person's domestic peace. 1) If however the requirements
for an invasion of privacy are not met it may be possible for the
plaintiff to fall back on nuisance as a remedy. Privacy is an as-
pect of impairment of a person's dignitas,2) while nuisance relates
to interference with a person's property rights. 3) Thus if a person
persistently telephoned another but put down the receiver without
speaking each time the latter answered, it might be argued that it
is the plaintiff's peaceful occupation of his property which is being
disturbed rather than his dignitas. But it is submitted that if the
element "of animus injuriandi 4) is present such conduct could be re-
garded as an invasion of privacy. Similarly where a salesman delib-
erately and defiantly persists in coming onto a person's property al-
though technically he is trespassing, an action for invasion of pri-
vacy may lie under the actio injuriarum. 5) It is submitted that the
dividing line between an invasion of a person's property rights and
an invasion of privacy is the manner in which the intrusion is carried
out.
7. Persistent Following: The continuous shadowing of a person even
in a public place has been held to be an injuria in our law,6) and in
Epstein v Epstein7) the court interdicted a husband from employing
1) Digest 47.10.5; see above 30; Voet 47.10.7. see above 44.
2) See above 185.
3) Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (AD) 109;
cf McKerron Delict op cit 227; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 447.
4) See above 147. ef P Stein & J Shand Legal Values in Western Society
(1974) 1?5: "If a defective chimney falls on one's home, that is
an invasion of privacy" - it is submitted that this can only be
regarded as. such if the chimney was intentionally made to fall in
a manner WhICh caused an impairment of the plaintiff's dignitas.
5) ef TW Price "Patrimonial Loss and Aquilian Liability" (1950) 13
THR-HR 87, 101f.
6)
~ v Jungman 1914 TPD 8; R v Van Meer 1923 OPD 77, 82; R v Ferreira
1943 NPD 19, 21; Hunt op-cit 504.
7) 1906 TH 87.
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'private detectives to shadow his wife. In Epstein's case the de-
tectives had followed the plaintiff in public, knocked on her door
every evening for a week and had once tried the handle of the door.
Furthermore an employee of the plaintiff's landlord had observed the
detectives and thought that she was being watched to see if she was
using the premises for 'immoral purposes. 1) The court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to an interdict and pointed out that in Roman
law it was an injuria "if a person is shadowed in such a way as to
draw public attention to the fact".2) It is submitted, however, that
whether or not the plaintiff is shadowed in a manner "which draws pub-
lic attention to the fact" is merely a factor relating to overall un-
reasonableness and wrongfulness,3) and should not per se determine
the liability of the shadower. 4) Privacy concerns an aspect
of the dignitas of the victim,~) and the fact that he or she was
openly shadowed may affect the assessment of damages. The deciding
issue should be whether or not such shadowing was reasonable in the
circumstances.
Prosser suggests that in the United States a person generally
cannot recover if the surveillance of shadowing is done in a public
place or street,6) but it is submitted that the better view is that
expressed by the American Jurisprudence in relation to personal injury
investigations by private detectives:
1) At 87.
2) At 88. For the Ame r i can conceptof "r0 ugh shadowi ng" . See below 226 .
3) See above 170
4) The fact that a private detective's observations "did not attract
public attention" was one of four factors taken into account by a
Canadian court when determining the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's conduct in attaching a "bumper beeper" to the plaintiff's
motor car. Davis v McArthur (1971) 17 DLR 3d 760 (CA) 763. Cf
Burns op cit 36.
5) See above 185,
6) Prosser Torts op cit 834; Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 181.
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"where the surveillance, shadowing and trailing is conducted
in a reasonable manner, it has been held that owing to the
social utility of exposing fraudulent claims and because of
the fact that some sort of investigation is necessary to un-
cover fictitious injuries, an unobtrusive investigation, even
though inadvertently made apparent to the person being inves-
tigated, does not constitute an actionable invasion of his
privacy".1)
On the other hand it has been held that "overzealous,,2) or "rough
shadowing",3) where there has been an open, public and persistent
following of the plaintiff without any attempt at secrecy and in such
a manner as to make obvious to the public that the plaintiff was being
followed and watched (as in Epstein's case) is actionable. It seems
that the references to "reasonable manner" and "social utility" in
the American Jurisprudence are similar to the boni mores approach by
our courts. 4) In our law such "overzealousness" or "rough shadowing"
may be important factors in deciding whether the shadowing was unlawful
but would not be essentials for liability. For instance in R v
Jungman 5) an accused was convicted for continually and intentionally
following a woman for about ten minutes and then going up to her and
staring into her face without any legitimate reason. Similarly, in
~ v Van Meer 6) the accused was found guilty of injuria for following
a young woman from place to place in a public library, staring at her
face while moving close to her, following her out of the library to
her motor car and temporarily obstructing her from driving off.
In any event such shadowing may sometimes be justified as is
the case where the public interest is at stake. Therefore law en-
forcement officers should be able to follow individuals suspected on
1) American Jurisprudence, Second op cit §4l, 741, my italics; cf
Tucker v American Employer's Ins Co (1965) 171 So 2d 437,13 ALR 3d
1020 (Fla App); cf Forster v Manchester (1965) 410 Pa 192 189 A
2d 147. '
2) Page Keeton & Robert E Keeton Cases and Materials on the Law of
Torts (1971) 1102; cf Nader v General Motors Corp supra 771.
3) Schultz v Frankfort M Acci & PG Ins Co (1913) 151 Wis 537, 139 NW
386; cf Souder v Pendleton Detectives Inc (1956) 88 So 2d 716,
13 ALR 3d 1025, 1026. Cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 98.
4) See above l72f.
5) 1914 TPD 8, 10, 11.
6) 1923 OPD 77,82.
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reasonable grounds of committing criminal acts in the performance of
their duties to prevent crime.') In the United States this view
appears to have been extended to private investigators in personal
injury insurance claim cases. Thus in Forster v Manchester
2
) the
court held that the investigation of the validity of a personal in-
jury claim was socially desirable, and that under such circumstances
the following, photographing,and recording of the plaintiff's move-
ments did not give rise to an action for invasion of privacy. There
seems to be no good reason, however, why private investigators con-
cerned with personal injury claims should be in a better position
than investigators dealing with matrimonial matters. Surely it is
also "socially desirable" that an innocent spouse should be entitled
to obtain evidence of adultery by a guilty spouse where such evidence
is essential to enable her to institute divorce proceedings? It is
submitted that the solution lies in the requirement of reasonableness
and lack of male fides on the part of the innocent spouse or her
agent. 3)
A practical problem which arises in connection with privacy
actions based on persistent following is the difficulty of detecting
the wrongdoer's conduct due to the increasing availability of sophis-
ticated electronic "tagging" devices. Westin mentions that such de-
vices vary from fluorescent powders or dyes which can be applied
secretly to a person's body, clothing or toiletries, with the result
that he is illuminated for the investigator by an ultraviolet light
1) CF Amerasinghe Aspects of the Actio Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch Law
(1966) 183.
2) Supra.
3) See above 219. ef ~ v .!. surra 787 ~ For instance, in Van der Vyver
v Netherlands Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1968 (1) SA 412 (AD) where
a private detective and his assistant crept up on a couple in a
motor car parked at a dam, and attempted to photograph them by
opening the door, it seems that the insured could have claimed for
invasion of privacy. Unfortunately privacy was not raised as the
case.was solely concerned with a personal injury claim by the de-
tectlve who had leapt on the bonnet to prevent the car being driven
away and had been subjected to a hair-raising high speed journey
before he fell off!
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source carried by him;l) to miniature radio signal transmitters
secreted in clothing, motor cars, hearing aids, eye-glasses or wrist-
watches; and even a "radio pill" which can be introduced into a per-
son's medicine bottle so that "a tag can be lodged in the stomach of
the subject himself".2).
"In addition tiny quantities of gamma-ray-emitting substances,
put into a person's food, drink, a medication, are enough to
'tag' a person by indications on radiation detectors".3)
It is submitted that notwithstanding an action for invasion of privacy
the introduction of a "radio pill" or "gamma rays" into a person's
stomach may also constitute an assault. 4) Whether or not the victim
was aware that such technological tags had been introduced into his
person or property, such action per se will constitute an impairment
of his right to privacy.5)
8. Harassment: Harassment cases often overlap with "nuisance calls",6)
and in the United States most cases are concerned with the activities
of persons seeking to recover debts. In Housh v Peth7) where a col-
lection agency harassed the plaintiff debtor by telephoning him six
to eight times every day both at his home and place of employment over
a period of 3 weeks (sometimes as late as 11.45 p.m.) and on one occa-
sion called at the plaintiff's office three times in 15 minutes so
that his employer threatened to discharge him, the plaintiff was award-
ed substantial damages. 8) The plaintiff also recovered in Biederman's
1 ) Westin op cit 69.
2) Westin op cit 70; cf V Packard The Naked Society (1970) l2lff.
3) Westin op cit 70.
4) fC Hunt op cit 437, wh.o gives as an example of assau1 t "the adminis-
tration of poison, drugs and excessive alcohol."
5) Cf S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) 297
6) See above 223.
7) (1956) 133 NE 2d 340.
8) Hofstadter &Horowitz op cit 167.
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'of Springfield Inc v Wright,l) in which the defendant'~ agent appear-
ed in a cafe where the plaintiff worked as a waitress and followed
her around the restaurant shouting in a loud voice that plaintiff
and her husband had refused to pay their bill, were "dead beats" who
did not intend to pay, ,and that he would get both of them fired.
Damages were similarly awarded in Norris v _Maskin Stores 2) where an
agent attempted to collect a debt due from the plaintiff by a series
of telephone calls. A female voice had telephoned members of the
plaintiff's family on several occasions stating that she was "in
trouble" and that it was necessary for her to contact the plaintiff. 3)
An extreme example of harassment by a creditor occurred in Santieste-
ban v Goodyear Tire & Rubber C0 4) where the plaintiff had purchased
automobile tyres and tubes from the defendants on credit and was up
to date in his payments. Nevertheless the defendant removed all the
tyres and tubes from the plaintiff's car while it was parked outside
his place of work. The court awarded the latter damages for invasion
of privacy.5) It is submitted that although the wrongful act was
perpetrated on the plaintiff's property, the fact that it was done in
a high-handed manner likely to embarass him would ground a similar
action in our law under the actio injuriarum. 6) Furthermore it is
submitted that where a creditor unreasonably intrudes into the private
life of a debtor in an attempt to recover outstanding debts, an action
for invasion of privacy will lie in our law. Similar principles
would apply where such harassment is carried out by any other person,
for instance, public officials or the police where they act 'unjusti-
fiably.7)
1) (1959) Mo 322 SW 2d 892.
2) (1961) 272 Ala 174, 132 S 2d 320. It seems that such conduct would
also be actionable as defamation. See below 252f.
3) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 169.
4) (196 2) CCA 5 F1a 300 F 2d 9.
5) ef Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 169.
6) ef Price op cit (1950) 13 THR-HR 104f; Digest 9.2.27.28.
7) See above 205. ft is conceded that difficulties will arise when con-
sidering whether or not such officials had acted bona fide on a
"reasonable suspicion".
230
In the United States such harassments have sometimes been
equated to the tort of "intentional infliction of emotional distress"
(eg causing mental pain, anguish and humiliation) ,1) which in our law
would be regarded as an injuria under the actio injuriarum. Thus in
Barnett v Collection Service Company2) a widow owed $28.75 for coal
and was harassed by a collection agency sending her a series of dun-
ning letters. Defendant knew that plaintiff was exempt because of
her low wages, but continued to forward numerous threatening letters
of demand couched in offensive language (eg defendant would bother
plaintiff's employer "until he is so disgusted that he will throw you
out the back door"), as well as suggestions that plaintiff was be-
having like a criminal. 3) As plaintiff suffered nervous anxiety and
was compelled to take to her bed (even then the letters continued),
she was awarded damages for wilful and intentional infliction of men-
tal pain and anguish. 4) It is submitted that in our law even if the
plaintiff had not been harassed by the defendant she would have been
able to recover for insult. 5)
9. Statistical and Revenue Requirements: Part of the price of
living in a sophisticated technological society is the continual quest
by the State for information concerning its individual members. There-
fore in South Africa, as in other developed countries,6) a number of
statutes have been introduced to compel such members to submit certain
personal information about themselves to the State. In most cases,
however, the State has taken steps to prevent the uncontrolled dis-
semination of such information. 7)
(1932) 214 la 1303.
Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 170.
Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 171.
Cf Matiwane v Cecil Nathan, Beattie & Co 1972 (1) SA 222 eN) 227.
Cf ~tein & Shand op cit 198: "Where, ~owever, the good of society
lS lnvolved, the law may not only permlt but require the invasion
of privacy. Thus a citizen is obliged to make a return of his
income to the Inland Revenue, to fill in his census form and to
notify the authorities of certain dangerous and infectiou~ diseases."
7) But there is no guarantee that these safeguards will always work.
Cf Stein & Shand op cit 192;. cf the English Report on the Security
o~ the Census of the Populatlon (1973 Cmnd 5365), Stein & Shand op
Clt 204 n 35.







(a) Statistics Act: 1) This Act consolidates the 1957 Statistics 2)
and Census 3) Acts and provides for the collection of statistics "re-
lating to any aspect of any matter",4) and the taking of a census. 5)
For the purposes of carrying out his duties under the Act, the Secre-
tary for Statistics may enter any land, premises, building or struc-
ture "at any reasonable time after reasonable notice" to the owner or
person in control. 6) Questions asked in terms of the Act must be
answered by everyone "to the best of his knowledge or belief".7)
Failure to answer such questions constitutes an offence 8} except in
respect of questions "relating to his religious belief or denomina-
tion or political convictions".9) It is also an offence to knowingly
give false information~O) to refuse authorized persons entry for the
purpose of inspecting premises,11) and to forge ~ny form, questionnaire,
return or notice. 12) Privacy is afforded some protection in the Act
1) Act 66 of 1976.
2) Act 73 of 1957.
3) Act 76 of 1957.
4) Act 66 of 1976, s 5(1)(a). Cf Act 73 of 1957, s2, which provided
for the gathering of a variety of statistics concerning inter alia
population, housing, migration, primary and secondary industrial
production, trade services, prices, savings and investments, owner-
ship, labour relations, employment, unemployment, conditions of
service, injuries, accidents, social matters and family and house-
hold surveys. Presumably Act 66 of 1976 will be used to gather
similar statistics.
5) Act 66 of 1976, s 5(1)(b), which provides that a census is to be
taken in 1980 and thereafter every 10 years unless the Minister of
Statistics determines otherwise.
6) Act 66 of 1976, s 5(1).
7) Section 5 (2) •
8) Section l3(a).
9) Section 14.
10) Section 13 Cb) .
11 ) Section l3(c).
12) Section l3(d).
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by the secrecy provisions 1) and the fact that it is an offence for
an officer to put "an improper or offensive question" to anyone. 2)
It is submitted that a breach of either of these two provisions may
constitute an invasion of privacy.
(b) Population Registration Act: 3) The Act requires certain dis-
closures of a person's private lifestyle to be made should he wish to
be classified as a member of a particular race group. For instance:
"in deciding whether any person is in appearance obviously a
white person or not a white person .. his habits, education
and speech and deportment and demeanour shall be taken into
account".4)
In addition such person shall not be deemed to be generally accepted
as a white person unless he is so accepted in the area in which he is
ordinarily resident, employed or carries on business, or mixes socially,
or takes part in other activities with other members of the public,
and in his association with the members of his family and any other
members with whom he lives. 5) Such inquiries clearly constitute a
flagrant invasion of a person's right to privacy.6) Furthermore a
1970 Amendment to the Act,7) now requires all residents of South Africa
other than "Bantu" to obtain a "book of life", which contains a long
list of personal information eg a person's identity number; date and
place of birth; sex and race classification; ordinary place of resi-
dence and postal address; electoral division and polling dlstrict in
which he lives; (in the case of aliens, date of arrival in the Repub-
lic and country of origin); particulars as to his marriage contained
1) Section 8.
2) Section l2(a).
3) Act 30 of 1950.
4) Section 1 (2) (a) .
5) Section 1(2)(c).
6) In order to establish that he is accepted as white, a person would
have to make numerous disclosures concerning his private life-style,
which may require others to give evidence on his behalf which in
itself could be embarassing to all concerned.
7) Act 29 of 1970, s 5.
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in the marriage register; a recent photograph; particulars of com-
pulsory immunization against certain diseases; particulars concern-
ing passports and permits to leave the Republic, particulars concern-
ing driver's licences; particulars concerning firearms licences;
educational qualificat~ons and occupation; and home language. 1)
There are, however, only limited safeguards to the use of such in-
formation in that it shall not be published to anyone other than for
the purposes of the Act or any criminal proceedings, and any person
receiving such information in contravention of the Act shall not pub-
lish or communicate it to any other person. 2) In addition the Sec-
retary for the Interior may furnish such information to any department
of State, local authority or statutory body, for any of their purposes,
and to any other person who makes a written application and pays the
prescribed fee, provided the Secretary is satisfied it is in the in-
terest of the person so registered to furnish such particulars. 3) No
reference is made to consent by the person concerned, nor is provision
made for him to be advised as to who has received such information. 4)
The fact that such information can be used by the State for its own
purposes exposes members of the public to invasions of privacy which
may result in their being prosecuted under the Immorality ActS) or
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act,6) both of which are in themselves
interferences with a person's right to privacy.7) The "interest of
the person so registered" seems to refer to requests by State depart-
ments, local authorities, statutory bodies and any other persons, but
not to requests concerned with "any criminal proceedings" ie. by the
Police.
1) Section 7; cf Identity Documents in South West Africa Act, 37
of 1970; s 2(2).
2) Section 17(1); cf Act 37 of 1970, s 9.
3) Section 17(2).
4) See below 285.
5) Act 23 of 1957.
6) Act 55 of 1949.
7) See below 241.
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(c) Income Tax Act: 1) In order to assess the taxable income of in-
dividual members of society the Department of Inland Revenue requires
certain highly confidential information concerning a person's finan-
cial position, family, property holdings, liabilities and the like.
To safeguard the privacy of taxpayers and others obliged to submit
such returns, employees of the Department are required to take an
oath of secrecy.2) An income tax official:
"shall preserve and aid in preserving secrecy with regard to
all matters that may come to his knowledge in the performance
of his duties ... and shall not communicate any such matter to
any person whatsoever, other than the taxpayer concerned or
his lawful representative, nor suffer or permit any such person
to have access to any records in the possession or custody of
the Secretary except in the performance of his duties under
- - 3)
Lth~/ Act or by order of a competent court".
In any event where such a breach occurs it is submitted that
the victim can sue at common law for invasion of privacy.
Apart from statutory intrusions into the individual's personal
sphere his privacy is also invaded by credit bureaux and other non-
governmental information-gathering agencies. 4) In addition an in-
vasion of privacy which has not yet come before the courts in South
Africa but which it is submitted will be actionable in this· country
is prying into a person's private bank account. S)
1) Act 58 of 1962; cf Bantu Taxation Act, 92 of 1967, s 3.
2) Section 4(2).
3) Section 4(1).
4) See below 286f.
5) Cf Prosser Torts 808; Brex v Smith (1929) 104 NJ Eq 386 146
A 34; Zimmermann v Wilson-(1936) 81 F 2d 847 (3 Circ); 'cf
D.J. McQuoid-Mason "Invasion of Potency?" (1973) 90 SALJ 28, 29.
See below 282.
235
10. Criminal Investigation Procedures: The Criminal Procedure
Act 1) provides that a police officia~2) may take, (or cause to be
taken), the finger-prints, palm-prints or foot-prints of any person
. . 3) A I"arrested on a criminal charge, or convlcted of a crlme. po lce
official may in addition subject an arrested person to an identity
paraue,4) and take steps to ascertain whether the body of an arrested
person has any mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature or
shows any condition or appearance. 5) Similar steps may be taken by
a medical practitioner or district surgeon at the request of a police
official. 6) Furthermore a court before which criminal proceedings
are pending 7) or the accused has been convicted8) may order the re-
cording of prints or bodily characteristics. Where, however, such
a person is acquitted, or his sentence set aside, or should the State
decline to prosecute, then the record of finger-prints, palm-prints
or foot-prints must be destroyed. 9)
1) Act 51 of 1977, which repealed Act 56 of 1955.
2) Section 37(1). A police official means a member of the South
African Police, or Railway Police s l(l)(xxvi). Cf Act 56 of 1955,
s 289(1), where this power was given to "peace officers", s 1.
3) Section 37 (1) (a) ; cf Act 56 of 1955, s 289.
4) Section 37 (1) (b) ; cf Act 56 of 1955, s 289(1). For identity
parades see Swift & Harcourt op cit 871.
5) Section 37(1)(c); cf Act 56 of 1955, s 289(1). Special provision
is made for the examination of females, s 37(1)(c), proviso. In
the United States the courts have distinguished between the mere
taking of finger-prints and photographs, and the publication there-
of. Cf Reed v Harris (1941) 348 MO 426, 153 SW 2d 834; McGovern
v Van Ri~(1947) 140 NJ Eq 341, 54 A 2d 467; Mavity v T!ndal
(1946) 2 4 Ind, 364, 66 NE 2d 755; (1947) 333 US 834. Ho stadter
& Horowitz op cit l86f.
6) Section 37(2).
7) Section 37(3), where a police official is not empowered to order
the taking of such records.
8) Section 37(4). Cf Act 56 of 1955, s 289 (3).
9) Section 37(5). Cf Act 56 of 1955, s 289 (5). In the United States
it has been held that in certain cases the police are justified in
retaining fingerprints, photographs and measurements if an arrested
person has been acquitted or the charge withdrawn because "an accu-
rate idenitification system ..• may be an assistance not only for
finding the guilty ... but in clearing an innocent suspect".
Voelker v Tyndal (1947) 226 Ind 43, 75 NE 2d 548; cf Barletta v
McFeeley (1930) 107 NJ Equity 141, affirmed (1931) 109 NJ Equity
241, 156 A 658; Fernicola v Keennan (1944) 136 NJ Equity 9. Hof-
stadter & Horowitz op cit 187. In McGovern v Van Riper (1947) 140
NJ Equity 341, 54 A 2d 467, it was pointed out that: "the state
b~reau kept such material under lock ~nd key; inspection was per-
mltte~ un~er careful safeguards; coples were given to other police
organlsatlons only upon request and for good specific reasons"
Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 189. '
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If the person is convicted it seems that the State may retain
the identity records,l) and the same view has been adopted in the
United States on the basis that:
"the relation to the public of one who has been convicted of
a crime is such as to forfeit whatever right of privacy he may
be said to have ever possessed".2)
It is submitted, however, that such forfeiture of privacy only applies
to keeping of criminal records, it does not entitle others to "rake
up the ashes of the past" by making such disclosures several years
after the criminal has paid his penalty.3) With respect to the tak-
ing of such prints or bodily characteristics it has been held that
an accused may refuse to the taking of his fingerprints in public or
in open court. 4) It seems that the purpose of 5537(1),(2),(3) is to
enable the State to produce evidence which may be used in the case,
and not for the purposes of the records of the Criminal Bureau,S) al-
though s 37(4) may be used for the latter, as it refers to convicted
criminals. Where such prints or records of bodily marks are taken
against the will of the accused, the evidence of such palm print is
not inadmissible, as neither the maxim nemo tenetur se ipsum nor the
confession rule apply to such eVidence. 6)
It is submitted that where a person's prints are intentionally
wrongfully taken by the police, or the latter refuse to expunge their
records after such person has been acquitted, or his sentence set
aside, or he has had the charge against him withdrawn, he may bring
an action for invasion of privacy.
1) Cf 5 37(4) ,refers to "any court which has convicted any person
of any offence ... " cf Act 56 of 1955, s 289(4).
2) Hodtman v 01sen (1915) 81 Wash 615, 150 P 2d 1222, 1226; ef Hof-
sta ter & Horowitz op cit 189.
3) See below 268f.
4) S v Mkize 1962 (2) SA 457 (N) 460.
5) R v Daniels 1956 (2) SA 126 (N) 127.
6) Ex parte Minister of Justice: in re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75, 82f;
cf Swift & Harcourt op cit 534£.
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Section 37 also empowers the police to subject an accused to
blood tests') (eg. in the case of motorists suspected of driving, or
a person suspected of murder). In the United States it has been
held that where a person has been forced to undergo a blood test,2)
or where a test has be~n carried out without the person's knowledge
or consent,3) such conduct constitutes an invasion of privacy. In
our law such conduct, if illegal, also be regarded as an
assault. 4)
It has been suggested that in our law the investigating author-
ities should not make use of injections of sodium-amytal, the so-
called truth drug, in the course of investigations 5) and in the Uni-
ted States evidence obtained from polygraphs,6) truth drugs 7) and
hypnosis 8) have been excluded on the grounds of scientific unrelia-
b "l"t 9)1 1 y.
') Sect ions 37 (1) (c), ( 2), (3); c f RW Dar roll "Webe 0 f 0 ne B100 cl -
Ye and I" (1965) 82 SALJ 317, 320. Provisions concerning blood
tests also exist in France, Sweden,. the Federal Republic of Germany
and the United Kingdom. Cf Internation Commission of Jurists
"The Legal Protection of Privacy: A Comparative Study of Ten Coun-
tries" (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 418, 472f, 476. The same applies
in the Netherlands re drunken driving offences. Cf F De Graaf
"The Protection of Privacy in Dutch Law" (1976) 5 Human Rights
177, 186.
2) Bednarik v Bednarik (1940) 16 A 2d 80; Prosser Torts op cit 808.
3) People v Tucker (1948) 198 P 2d 941; cf Breithaupt v Abram (1957)
352 US 432; cf Westin op cit 35lf.
4) The insertion of a needle would constitute "application of force".
Cf Hunt op cit 437.
5) R v Lincoln 1950 (1) PH H 68 (AD). "Truth drugs" are authorised
In West Germany. Article 136(a), Penal Code; (1972) 24 Int Soc
Sci J 473.
6) S v Mattron (1962) 184 A 2d 225; In re Mayer (1966) 421 P 2d 781;
ef Neethling Privaatheid op cit 177. Polygraphs may not be used
for criminal investigation in West Germany undey Article 136(a)
Penal Code; (1972) 24 Int Sac Sci J 473.
7) Cf LM Despress "Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements" (1947)
14 U of Chicago LR 601.
8)
People v Ebanks (1897) 49 P 1049; ~ v Push (1951) 46 NW 2d 508.
9)
Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit l77f. Westin op cit 2l4f.
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In America the stomach pumping of a person suspected of taking
narcotics was held to be an invasion of his right to privacy.l)
11. Medical Examinations, Tests and Treatment: In Roman
2
) and
Roman-Dutch law,3) the 'wrongful subjection of a woman to an inspectio
ventris constituted an injuria, and it could be argued that such an
inspection was analogous to a medical examination. An unauthorized
medical examination may in any event constitute an assault,4) and, it
is submitted, could also be regarded as an invasion of privacy.5) In
some instances the law compels a person to undergo a medical examina-
tion. 6) Therefore in South Africa compulsory medical examinations
may be required where a person is suspected of being mentally ill,7)
or suffering from an infectious 8) or venereal disease. 9) Furthermore,
persons wishing to recover damages for personal injuries arising from
a motor vehicle collision may be subjected to a compulsory medical
examination. 10) The latter is a legally recognised invasion of privacy
cf De Graaf op cit 186, on1) Rochin v California (1951) 342 US 165;
the position in the Netherlands.
2) See above 33.




Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit.
See generally (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 469, some protection is given
constitutionally in Article 19 of the Argentina Constitution, Art-
icle 76 of the Venuzuela Constitution and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
7) Cf Mental Disorders Act, 38 of 1916, s 27(2); Mental Health Act,
18 of 1973, ss 9,12(5),18(1),(2),30(3); Criminal Procedure Act,
51 of 1977, s 79, cf Act 56 of 1955, s 290. Similar provisions
exist in West Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (1972)
24 Int Soc Sci J 473, 474, 476.
8) Public Health Act, 36 of 1919, s 23.
9) Act 36 of 1919, s 61. There is a duty on a person suffering from
venereal disease to be treated (s 54). Medical practitioners are
obliged to warn an infected person against contracting a marriage
until the disease has been cured or neutralized (s 55(1)). It is
an offence to communicate the disease to others (s 59). In Mexico. ,
Argent1na, Brazil and France future spouses are compelled to under-
go a medical examination before marriage (1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J
470. Such spouses in Mexico and Argentina may not marry 1£ they
suffer from certain specified diseases. Ibid.
10) Rule 36, Uniform Rules of Court, promulgated in terms of s 43(2)(a)
Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959; cf s 66 Railways & Harbours Act
70 of 1959. Previously at common law the courts had refused to'
make such an order. Eynon v Du Toit 1927 TPD 76, 80.
Difficulties arise, how-
in civil cases and the
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aimed at preventing fraudulent claims. 1)
ever, concerning the taking of blood tests
rendering of involuntary medical treatment.
It is submitted t~at in our law to compel a person to undergo
a blood test in a civil matter (eg to determine whether he has been
drinking or to prove paternity) may be actionable. 2) In the United
States where such tests are in the interests of minor children, the
courts appear to recognize that they do not constitute an invasion
of privacy.3) There seems to be no reason why such a principle
should not be applied in our law, although our courts have not yet
decided whether the court can order a minor child to be blood-
grouped. 4) In E v E5) the court refused to order a blood test of
a wife and child in order to establish their blood-group identity
in an action for anulment of a marriage on the grounds of stuprum. 6)
It could perhaps be argued that in the past such tests were only
used to exclude paternity, whereas recently in Van der Harst v
Viljoen7) it was shown that in rare cases paternity can be affirma-
tively corroborated,8) and that therefore the rule should be relaxed.
It is submitted, however, that the courts are unlikely to interfere
with the bodily integrity of an individual unless specifically au-
thorized to do so by Parliament.
1) Cf Durban CC v Mndovu 1966 (2) SA 319 (D) 324; Mgudlwa v AA
Mutual Insurance Assoc Ltd 1967 (4) SA 721 (E) 723.
2) Cf Darroll op cit 320f.
3) Cortese v Cortese (1950) 76 A 2d 717,719. Provision is made for
the courts to order compulsory blood tests in paternity cases in
Sweden, Switzerland ((1972) 24 Int Soc Sci J 472f, 474), Denmark
(K Henningsen "Some Aspects of Blood Grouping in Cases of Disputed
Paternity in Denmark" in F Lundquist Methods of Forensic Science
(1963) v 11 209, 220) and West Germany CAR Brownlie "Blood and the
Blood Groups: A Developing Field for Expert Evidence" (1965) 5
J of Forensic Sci Soc 124, 163).
4) Ranjith v Sheela 1965 (3) SA 103 (D); cf Darroll op cit 320f.
5) 1940 TPD 333.
6) At 335.
7) 197 7 (1 ) SA 79 5 (C) .
8) At 796.
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In the United States it seems that it is an invasion of pri-
vacy to compel a person to undergo a blood transfusion (for instance,
where it is refused on religious grounds).l) It is submitted that
in our law such conduct may also be actionable as an assault - although
a medical practitioner ·may have the defence of necessity available to
him. 2) Furthermore in South Africa the Children's Act 3) empowers the
Minister on the report of certain medical officers to consent to an
operation despite a refusal by the child's parents or guardian, if
satisfied after due enquiry that the operation or treatment is nece-
ssary.4) The words !toperation or treatment" seem wide enough to in-
clude a blood transfusion. 5)
Other intrusions occur where a person is compelled to be vacci-
nated in the interests of public health,6) and where certain employees
are subjected to medical examinations 7) or psychological testing. 8)
1) Cf In re Estate Brooks (1965) 32 III 2d 361.
2) Cf Stoffberg v Elliott 1923 CPD 148, 150.
3) Act 33 of 1960.
4) Section 20(6).
5) "Operation .. An act or series of acts performed upon an organic
body with the hand alone or by means of an instrument, to remedy
deformi ty or 'injury, cure or prevent disease or -relieve pain".
Ed CT Onions The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1933) 137.
"Treatment ... management in the application of remedies; medical
or surgical application or service" Shorter Oxford Dictionary op
cit 2238.
6) Public Health Act, 36 of 1919, ss 92, 96, 100. See also ss 102,
104. .Simil~r provisions exist in Argentina, West Germany, Sweden,
the Unlted Klngdom (1972) 24 lnt Soc Sci J 472£, 476) and the
Netherlands (De Graaff op cit 186).
7) Cf Factories, Machinery and Building Works Act, 22 of 1941, ss 39
A (3), (5). Cf the position in France and Mexico (1972) 24 Int
Soc Sci J 470, 471.
8) Cf EPJ Myjer "Sollicitant, privacy en psychologische test" (1975)
26 Ars Aequi 222. See above 9.
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12. Miscellaneous Statutory Intrusions: There are several other
South African Acts which impinge on a person's right to privacy,
for instance: the Immorality Act 1) makes it a crime for a white per-
son to have sexual intercourse with a person of another non-white
race group;2) the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 3) prevents a
white person from marrying a non-white person;4) the Publications
Act 5) limits a person's right as to the publications and other objects
he may keep in his, home;6) and the many other statutes which impinge
on a person's freedom of movement and privacy because of his race. 7)
Detention without Trial: Furthermore where a person has been detain-
ed by the police under security legislation8) he may be subjected to
interrogation against his will. 9) Such a detainee's right to pri-
vacy is qualified10) in that the court must balance the interests of
the State against those of the individual. 11 )
"Obviously (the polic~7 are not entitled, in order to induce
a detainee to speak, to subject him to any form of assault or
to cause his health or resistance to be impaired by inadequate
food, lack of sleep, living conditions or the like. Nor may
they resort to methods of interrogation commonly referred to as
the 'third degree,.,,12)
Section 1.
Gosschalk v Rossouw supra 490.
Gosschalk v Rossouw supra 492.
Per Corbett J in Gosschalk v Rossouw supra at 492.
Act 42 of 1974.
Section 8(1)(d); cf the American case of Stanley v Georgia (1969)
394 US 557, 565, where the court held that similar but less far
reaching legislation was contrary to the First Amendment.
7) See generally JD Van der Vyver Die Beskerming van Menseregte in
Suid-Afrika (1975) 95ff.
8)
For instance, s 185 Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977; cf s 215
bis, Criminal Procedure Act, 56 of 1955; s 6, Terrorism Act, 83
~1967. See generally Mathews op cit 133££.
Gosschalk v Rossouw 1966 (2) SA 476 (C) 493.
1) Act 23, of 1957.
2) Section 16. Cf E Cahn The Moral Decision (1966) 88.









In practice, however, it is difficult for the courts to ensure that
such procedures are not being used as access to detainees is restrict-
ed to State officials 1) except with special permission of the Attor-
ney-General or a person delegated by him,2) or the Minister of Jus-
tice. 3) Thus in Coop~r v Minister of Justice4) the court refused to
grant an order interdicting the police from assaulting, or subjecting
certain detainees to undue or unlawful pressure or duress on the
basis that insufficient evidence had been given to establish a prima
facie case. S) Furthermore,
"even if the court had the power to request a magistrate to
take statements from the detainees on affidavit or on commission
or by interrogations the magistrate would by virtue of the pro-
visions of sec 6(6), not be entitled to disclose information
so obtained to this court or to the applicants Lrelatives of the
detained person~7".6)
In Nxasana v Minister of Justice,7) on the' other hand, Didcott J found
himself "in firm disagreement" with the court in Cooper's c,ase,8) and
held that in principle such evidence could be so obtained and dis-
closed to court, but that on the facts there was nothing to show that
the detainee could verify the alleged ill-treatment by his evidence.
g
)
The court observed that the Terrorism Act was:
Per Trengrove J at 212.
1976 (3) SA 745 (D). The case was, however, decided after Cooper's
case·.
Section 6(6), Act 83 of 1967.
1977 (2) SA 209 (T).
At 210.
1) Section 185(5), Act 51 of 1977;







cf Section 215 bis (4), Act 56 of
8) Nxasana v Minister of Justice supra 755.
9) At 761. The applicant had submitted an affidavit on information
gathered by hearsay, as against affidavits by several police offi-
cers denying that the detainee (applicant's husband) had been ill-
treated, and by 4 magistrates and the Chief District Surgeon of
Durban, who had all visited him in private and had heard no allega-
tions of ill-treatment. It is difficult to comprehend why the
detainee should not have been given an opportunity to verify or
deny the alleged ill-treatment, as it is not beyond the bounds of
possibility that other threats or pressures could be brought to
bear on him to prevent him complaining to the visiting magistrates
or district surgeon. See also below 243 n 8.
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"draconian in its general effect ... Lby7 providing for the
detention for indefinite periods of those who have not been con-
victed of crimes, for their isolation from legal advice and
from their families, and for their interrogation at the risk of
self-incrimination". 1)
The Act did not, however, sanction ill-treatment or the use of third
degree methods to interrogate detainees and therefore did not limit
the court's power to protect the individual against ma1treatment.
2
)
Even though the court could not order a person detained under s 6 to
be brought before it to give evidence ora11y,3) in terms of the Uni-
form Rules of the Supreme Court,4) it could order evidence to be
taken on comrnission. 5) Didcott J was of the view that details about
terrorist activities attributed to a detainee, or to his knowledge,
and disclosures made by him during interrogation could be regarded as
"official information", but doubted whether this applied to·informa-
tion obtained from the detainee about his health, even though it was
conveyed to court by a magistrate who had visited him Hin the per-
formance of his official duties".6) The decision in Nxasana's case
has been welcomed as a "noteworthy decision" which is "a fine example
of a judge giving expression to the principle of acting in favorem
1ibertatis",7) but it is submitted that Didcott J could have gone
further and granted the order. The shroud of secrecy which surrounds
detention without trial makes it virtually impossible for an applicant
to obtain eVidence,S) other than hearsay, concerning the treatment or
At 755.
Nxasana v Minister of Justice supra 751f.
Cf H Rudolph "~£ficial Information' and the Detainee - A Note-
worthy Decision" (1977) 94 SALJ 147.
S) For instance during the inquest into the death of Mr Steve Biko
who died in detention on 12th September 1977, the only evidence con-
cerning his physical condition while in detention was given by the
security police and medical practitioners consulted by them. The
evidence indicated that Mr Biko had died of brain injuries inflict-
ed ~n "a scuffl~" with t~e police; had been kept naked in his cell;
chaIned to a grIlle at nIght; left lying in a urine-stained blan-
ket? whil~ ill taken naked on a l200km journey in the back of a
polIce vehIcle; and. left dying ~n h~s cell with an empty drip
bottle attac~ed to hIS arm. "EdItorIal" Sunday Times 4 December
1977. The Inquest lasted 15 days after which the presiding magis-
trate gave a 3 minute verdict that nobody was to blame f B·k'
death. Sunday Times 4 December 1977. or 1 0 S
1) At 747.
2) At 74S. Cf Schermbrucker v K1indt NO 1965 (4) SA 606 (AD) 612.
3) Cf Schermbrucker v K1indt NO supra 619, 625£.





'physical well-being of a detainee, and it seems that the authorities
would have nothing to lose by allowing evidence as to his well-being
or good-health to be made public. Such disclosures can have little
effect on a lawfully conducted investigation into a detained person's
activities, and could well obviate a repetition of the unhappy Biko
affair, 1) and alleviate growing public concern about the number of
deaths of persons held in detention. 2) It seems, however, that even
if assaults or "third degree" interrogation methods are not used, the
same ends can be achieved by subjecting a person to long periods of
solitary confinement. 3)
Conclusion: In the United States the introduction of the Freedom of
Information Act 4) allows for the disclosure of information compiled
by government agencies to be released under certain conditions to
private individuals, but prohibits the disclosure of information which
could constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy".5) The
Privacy Act of 1974 6) also controls invasions of privacy by state
agencies,7) although records maintained by the CIA and law enforcement
1) The death of Mr Steve Biko in detention (see above 243 n 8); the
comments thereon by the Minister of Justice (Daily News~ 14
September 1977; Natal Mercury 17 September 1977; -Sunday Express,
25 September 1977); and the result of the inquest (see above 243 n
8) led to world-wide condemnation of South Africa (Daily News, 5
December 1977).
2) The Sunday Times, 4 December 1977, reported that as at that date
45 people were known to have died in detention.
3) Cf AS Mathews & RC Albino "The Permanence of the Tempor~ry' - an
Examination of the 90- and l80-Day Detention Laws" (1966) 83 SALJ
16, 30ff. Cf TB Benjamin & K Lux "Solitary Confinement as Ps~
cho1ogica1 Punishment" (1977) 13 Cal WLR 265, 268: "The evidence
appears overwhelming that solitary confinement alone, even in the
absence of physical brutality or unhygienic conditions, can produre
emotional damage, declines in mental functioning and even the most
extreme forms of psychopathology, such as depersonalization,
hallucination and delusions".
4) 5 United States Code §552; cf Westin op cit 386ff.
5) 5 United States Code §552(b) (Supp III 1965-7). Cf Neethling
Privaatheid op cit 277f.
6) 5 United States Code §552(a). Cf JJ Hanus & HC Relyea "A Policy
Assessment of the Privacy Act of 1974" (1976) 25 American ULR 555;
JM Gorski "Access to Information? Exemptions from Disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974" (1976)
13 Willamette LJ 135.
7) See above 68f.
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agencies are generally exempt. 1) As yet there is no such legisla-
tion in South Africa and on the contrary there is a trend towards
secrecy, not only in law enforcement, but also in the collection of
government statistics concerning private individuals. 2) Furthermore
such private informatiqn may sometimes be disclosed to other State
departments. 3)
As has been,mentioned, 4) for an intrusion to be actionable it
must be unreasonable and offensive to the prevailing values of the
community. Thus it should not be an invasion of privacy merely be-
cause a landlord collects his rent on a public holiday,S) nor because
a passerby calls in to ask directions to a home in the neighbourhood. 6)
In the words of Fleming:
"Clearly no liability is warranted unless the interference is
substantial and of a kind that a reasonable man of normal sen-
sitivity would regard as offensive and intolerable. Merely
knocking at another's door or telephoning him on one or two
occasions is not actionable, even when designed to cause annoy-
ance; but if the calls are repeated with persistence, and in
the midst of the night, so as to interfeTe unreasonably with
the plaintiff's comfort or sleep, liability will ensue.,,7)
It is submitted that the same principles apply in our law.
1) 5 United States Code §552(a)(i) (Supp IV, 1974); cf Hanus & Relyea
op cit 585. See above.
2) ef AS Mathews "Disclose and be Damned - The Law Relating to Official
Secrets" (1975) 38 THR-HR 348, 360.
3) See above 233.
4) See above 172f.
5) Prosser Torts op cit 808; cf Horstman v Newman (1956) 291 SW 2d
567 (Ky).
6) But cf Watson v Absche 1931 TPD 499 at SOS, where it was held that
a person who asks directions at night has no legal right to be on
another's premises and is a trespasser. ef Veiera v Van Rensburg
1953 (3) SA 647 (T) 651. The approach of McKerron Delict op cit
?54 and Salmond Torts 359 seems to be prefereble viz: "no person
1S to be accounted a trespasser who enters Lpremisesl in order to
hold. communication with the occupier or any other person on the
prem1ses, unless he knows or ought to know that his entry is pro-
hibited". It is submitted that a similar principle should be
applied to invasions of privacy.





Apart from intrusions into a person's private life, his pri-
vacy may also be invaded by disclosures concerning his personal
life, publicity misrepresenting himself or his lifestyle, and un-
authorized use of his image and likeness. 1) Prosser describes the
common elements of intrusions, disclosures, false light situations,
and appropriations 2) as follows:
"the first and second require the invasion of something
secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff;
the third and fourth do not. The second and third depend
upon publicity, while the first does not, nor does the
fourth, although it usually involves it. The third requires
falsity or fiction: the other three do not. The fourth in-
volves a use for the defendant's advantage, which is not
true of the rest".3) .
Notwithstanding Prosser's contention that the above forms of
invasion of privacy are distinct and based on different elements,4)
there is much to be said for Bloustein's view,5) and the attitude
. of our courts~6) that invasion of privacy is a dignitary wrong
which is designed to protect the plaintiff's "inborn right to the
tranquil enjoyment of his peace of mind".7) This is the approach
adopted by the courts in the intrusion cases,8) and it is submitted
is the one which has been applied to the other three categories in
1) For a theoretical analysis of the disclosure cases see J Neethling
Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976) 389.




Prosser Torts op cit 814.
Ibid.
EJ Bloustein "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser" (1964) 39 New York ULR 962, 1003. See above 60f.
6) ef O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
(C) 249; Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 370 (W) 373; S v A 1971 (2)
SA 293 (T) 297; ~ v .!. 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD) 784. See below .185.
7) M De Villiers Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries (1899) 24; cf
Rhodesian Print1ng &pub11sh1ng Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590
(RAD) 594.
8) See above 199f.
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our law. It is intended to consider how the courts in South Africa
have handled cases concerning publication of private facts, false
light and appropriation. The problem of data banks will be con-
sidered under the section on publication of private facts 1) which is
primarily concerned wi~h disclosures.
B. PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE FACTS
In their article on privacy Warren and Brandeis mentioned,
inter alia, that:
"The common law secures to each individual the right of deter-
mining ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments and
emotions shall be communicated to others".2)
Any interference with this right therefore would seem to be an impair-
ment of aspects of a person's dignity. The interest primarily pro-
tected is dignit~snotreputation,3) although impairment of the latter
may be an aggravating factor in the assessment of damages, ·and would
usually ground an action for defamation. In privacy cases the plain-
tiff is being compensated for the hurt and humiliation suffered by
him as a result of having his private life made public. It is sub-
mitted that Neethling's contention that generally in the "disclosure"
cases, the disclosure must be made to a large group of people4) is
not part of our law, in that the degree of publication is one of sev-
eral factors to be taken into account by the courts when deciding if
the act was wrongful. 5)
The ability of South African law to accommodate Prosser's cate-
gory of invasions arising from publication of private facts can be
illustrated by reference to disclosures concerning (i) the contents
1) See below 283f.
2) SD Warren & LD Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv LR
193, 196. See above 52.
3) Bloustein op cit 974.
4) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 311.
5) See above 196f.
Horowitz op cit l55f.
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of private correspondence; (ii) debts; (iii) physical deformities
and health; (iv) life style; (v) childhood background; (vi) family
life; (vii) past activities; (viii) embarassing facts; (ix) confi-
dential information; and (x) information stored in data banks.
1. Contents of Private Correspondence: Not only was it an injuria
in Roman Law to disclose the contents of a will prior to the testator's
death,') but Cicero himself castigated Mark Antony for lacking a
sense of decency when he read Caesar's letter in the Senate. 2) Simi-
larly early English3) and American cases4) held that to publish the
contents of a private letter was a civil wrong,S) although it seems
that the writer not the receiver could restrain such publication. 6)
De Villiers has stated that
"Some writers have supposed that it must also be an injury to
the writer of private correspondence when his letters are pub-
lished to the world, and possibly where the effect of such pub-
lication will be to hurt another by bringing him into disrepute,
dislike or contempt, this view is a correct one".7)
It is submitted that the learned writer has stated the requirement too
strongly as in privacy cases it is not necessary to show "disrepute,
dislike or contempt".8) The only case in our law which seems to deal
indirectly with the problem of privacy and private correspondence
appears to follow De Villiers' view. In Nelson & Meurant v Quin &
C0 9) the plaintiffs applied for an interdict restraining the publica-
tion of certain private letters which had been produced at a judicial
1) Digest 9.2.41. pr. See above 33.
2) Cicero Second Philli ic AOainst Mark Anton IV; cf SH Hofstadter
& G Horowitz The Right 0: Privacy 1964) 155. See below 249.
3) Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swan 402.
4) Dennis v Leclerc (1811) 1 Mart (OS) 297 (La).
5) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit l56f.
6) Pope v Curl (1741) 3 Atk 342; cf Hofstadter &
7) De Villiers op cit 142.
8) See above 192f.
9) (1874) 4 SC 46.
Contra Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit l58f: "Italy, heir to
Rome, adheres still to Cicero's principle that to publish
letters without consent of the writer is a moral and legal
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inquiry. The court held that as there was no allegation that the
publication would entail irreparable damage the application should
be refused. 1) De Villiers CJ conceded that an action might lie if
the letters contained defamatory matter or "would cause any loss,
damage, injury, trouble or even inconvenience" to the plaintiff, or
. 2)
constituted a breach of contract. He was not however prepared to
grant an interdict in cases where there were no "special grounds, in-
dependently of the mere privacy of the communication".3) There was
no civil law authority for the plaintiff's application but such dis-
closures were apparently frowned on by the Romans:
"Cicero, in one of his speeches (Gratio Phil!£. 2, Chap 4)
speaks of the practice of publishing private letters as a
breach of good manners and an offence against common decency,
and as calculated to put an end to all familiar correspondence
between friends; but he does not condemn the practice as il-
legal, on the contrary, he rather seems to assume that it is
not illegal".4)
In any event it is submitted that the learned Chief Justice's cri-
teria of "trouble" and "inconvenience" in themselves are wide enough
to embrace invasions of privacy. The court did not refer to the
question of privacy. Not only was the action grounded on proprietary
rights and a common law form of copyright, but the court relied on
the English authorities which are in any event reluctant to recognize
an action for invasion of privacy.5) The matter was considered on
the basis of copyright and the court accepted the English rUle 6) that








5) See above 72. Nelson's case was decided 25 years after Prince
Albert v Strange (1849) De G & Son 652, which had hinted that
there might be a right of privacy in English law.
6) Nelson & Meurant v Quin & Co supra 53.
7) Jeffreys v Boosey (1854) HL, 4 HLC 815; 94 RR 389.
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case of literary works. 1) It seems, however, that the court com-
pletely overlooked the concept of privilege although it came to the
right conclusion for the wrong reasons when it stated:
"If once the principle be established that a person may obtain
an injunction to restrain the publication of his letters on
the mere ground of his right of property therein, where are we
to stop? If the absolute right contended for exists, it would
equally apply to letters and all other documents produced and
read in open court; and however necessary they may be for the
proper apprehension or elucidation of the case, it would be
competent to the author or writer to apply to the court to re-
strain the publishers of newspapers and even of law reports
from publishing such letters or documents". 2)
It is submitted that the above passage is open to criticism, in that
outside of Parliamentary privilege,3) there can be no question of an
"absolute right" in cases where the disclosure is subject to a privi-
lege. 4) On the other hand the semble that where the writer of a
letter allows it to pass out of his possession without restriction as
to its circulation he has no right on which to found an application
for an interdict to restrain the publication cf such a letter,S) is
untenable. Why should the onus be on the writer to state each time
he writes a letter that its contents are not to be published to theworld
at large? It may be that it was doubtful whether there was an English
common law right of copyright,6) and that no such right exists in our
law7) but copyright refers to proprietary rights. In matters of pri-
vacy we are dealing with impairments to the plaintiff's dignitary not
Nelson &Meurant v Quin & Co supra 47.
Nelson & Meurant v Quin & Co supra s2ff. See now English Copyright
Act, 1956, s 46(s); cf Ed EP Skone-James Copinger and Skone-James
on Copyright 11 ed (1971) 5.
7) Cf AJC Copeling Copyright Law in South Africa (1969) 1.
1) pfiPe v Curl supra, where the poet obtained an injunction against
t e defendants who wished to publish a book entitled "Letters from
Swift, Pope and Others".
2) Nelson & Meurant v Quin & Co supra 55.
3) See below 323.




'property rights. 1) It could be argued that Nelson & Meurant's case
was decided before Warren and Brandeis' historic article 2) and that
it was for this reason that the matter was only considered in the
light of copyright. This approach was, however, adverted to by
Centlivres J in Goodman v Van Moltke~) The earlier Anglo-American
cases regarded the right to privacy in correspondence as a "property
right".4) It is submitted, however, that the better view is that
publication of private letters is an interference with the writer's
personality rights as such documents often contain his thoughts and
feelings. s)
In the United States the courts recognized that although owner-
ship of the letter passes to the receiver, who has its use and enjoy-
ment, such a letter cannot be published without the writer's consent
except for his own defence or vindication. 6) On the other hand in
the United States the courts have extended the "property" concept by
allowing the executors of a deceased writer's estate to restrain pub-
lication of the deceased's private letters,7) and it has been suggest-
ed that this right should also be given to a surviving spouse on the
basis that:
1) See above 185.
2) See above 247 n 2.
3) 1938 CPD 153,155: "It is quite clear in our law ... that the
author of a letter has a copyright in that letter and can prevent
the letter being published by anyone without his authority".
4) Cf Woolsey v Judd (1855) 4 Duer (NY) 379, 404; Hofstadter &
Horowitz op cit 157; "The ground on which equity will enjoin the
publication of private letters is generally said to be the prop-
erty rights of the writer" American Jurisprudence, Second (1972)
v 62 Privacy §7.
5) Cf F De Graaf "The Protection of Privacy in Dutch Law" (1976) 5
Human Rights 177, 185: "In the case of private letters however
i~ is not reputation which is at stake ... but rather the prote~­
t10n of someone's personal thoughts and feelings from dissemination
against his will".
6) Cf Grigsby v Breckenridge (1867) 65 Ky 480; cf Hofstadter &
Horowitz op cit 157.
7) Baker v Libbie (1912) 210 Mass 599, 97 NE 109, 112; Hofstadter
v Horowitz op cit 157.
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"When a husband and wife are living together, an act of this
nature necessarily injures the other spouse. The result of
invasion, the mental distress, embarrassment and humiliation
clearly indicate that the damage is not visited upon only
one".l)
It is submitted that the reference to "mental distress, embarrassment
and humiliation" by the court is a realistic recognition that such
publications cause sentimental hurt, rather than infringement of
property rights. Similarly it can be argued that in English law the
publication of the contents of a private letter without the author's
consent amounts to a "breach of confidence",2) which is usually con-
concerned with hurt feelings.
In our law the person wishing to interdict the publication of
private correspondence, or recover damages for such publication
would have to show that he or she would personally suffer injury as
a result of the contents being publicized. 3)
2. Debts: In the United States it is an invasion of privacy to
publicize that a person has not paid his debts. 4) The action is pro-
bably used because although truth alone' is a defence to an action for
defamation it does not apply to invaslons of privacy.5) In our law,
however, truth alone is no defence to defamation and for the defence
of justification public interest is also required. 6) Consequently
in South Africa cases concerning publication of the fact that a per-
son owes another money have proceeded on the basis of defamation.
This is probably because generally it is not in the public interest to
Prosser Torts op cit 810.
Prosser Torts op cit 798; cf 62 American Juris2rudence, Second
(1972) v 62 Privacy § 7. Cf Hofstadter & Horowltz op cit 167.
6) Cf Sutter v Brown 1926 AD 155, 172; RG McKerron The Law of Delict
7 ed (1971) 186£; NJ Van der Merwe & PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige
Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed (1970) 369f.
1) Clayman v Bernstein (1940) 38 Pa D & C 543 (CP No 5 Phila Co); cf
Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 158.
2) Cf Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swan 402, 418; See above 75.
3) See below35~But cf Goodman v Van Moltke 1938 CPD 153, 155. See, how-
ever, Dun & Bradstreet (Ptt) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined CreditBureau (Cape) Pty Ltd 1968 1) SA 209 (C) 215, where the court was
not referred to to Goodman's case and assumed that there was no
common law right of copyrlght. Cf Copeling op cit 175f. It is




Thus in Piering v Bridger1)






know that one person owes another money.
respondent:
"had in conformity with his usual custom posted upon a bl.ack-
board in the bar of his hotel headed 'Bodger's ledger' the
name of the appellant with the sum of £2.18.9 against it, this
being the amount actually owing by the Lappellan!7 for liquors
consumed at the bar and unpaid for after demand".2)
It was held that appellant could not recover as there was no proof of
animus injuriandi on the part of the respondent. The same principle
would have applied had the appellant sued for invasion of privacy.3)
In Conroy v Bennett 4) a journalist recovered damages for defamation
in an action against a hotel keeper who had published an advertise-
ment in a newspaper which read:
"Notice, will Mr PE Bennet, sub-reporter of the Independent,
please call and pay his board, lodging, washing and liquor
accounts at the Masonic Hotel, and redeem his box of valuable
papers". 5)
As the defendant had admitted that the aim of the publication was to
make the plaintiff feel ashamed of himself, it was held that he had
animus injuriandi and was ~iable. It is difficult to conceive of
situations where publication of the fact that a debtor owes money to
a creditor would not amount to defamation and would only be an in-
vasion of privacy. Furthermore if the plaintiff was a habitual
debtor, it may be in the public interest for this to be known, and
such interest would ground a defence to an action for either defama-
. 6) . . f' 7)' htlon or lnvaSlon 0 privacy. A case t at causes some difficulty
is Coomer v Moorosi 8) where the defendant said of the plaintiff "You
don't pay your debts" in the presence of
1) ( 18 84) 1 Cape LJ 289 .
2) Piering v Bridger supra 289.







'other customers in defendant's shop. The court held that although
the defendant's words were prima facie defamatory, in the circum-
stances:
"he was not making a general allegation to the effect that
the plaintiff was not in the habit of paying all his debts
to other persons ... In other words the defendant informed
the plaintiff that he was not prepared to give him further
credit and he must leave his shop because he had not paid his
account".1)
The basis for the rejection of the plaintiff's action is not clear.
Even though the statement was not a "general allegation", it should
make no difference to the question of liability, but may affect the
quantum of damages. Whether a person is accused of not paying his
debts to one person, (as in Piering's case 2) or Conroy's case3)), or
to many persons, would seem to be in both cases defamatory. Perhaps
ex facie the facts the court intended to apply the de minimus non
curat lex principle, in which case an action for invasion of privacy
would also have failed. It is submitted however that on the facts
the plaintiff should have recovered. 4)
The courts in the United States have on occasion recognized
that a communication addressed to a debtor's employer, advising that
the debtor owes money, and seeking the latter's aid in recovering
such money does not amount to an invasion of privacy.5) Such com-
munications, however, must not amount to harassment: 6)
"A single telephone tall to an employer, advising him that a
certain employee owed a bill and was refusing to pay same and
that the creditor or his assignee intended to start proceedings,
and garnishee the employee's wages would not constitute either
'undue' or 'oppressive' publicity and would not be an action-
able violation of such ·employee' s right of privacy". 7)







For false publications that debts are owing see below 293.
Voneye v Turner (1951) Ky 240 SW 2d 588; Hawle~ v Professional
Credit Bureau Inc (1956) 345 Mich 500, 176 NW 2 835· Gouldman
-Taber Pontiac Inc v Zerbst (1957) 213 Ga 682, 101 SE 2d 881·
cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit l73f. '
6) See above 228 .
7) Lewis v Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau (1947) 27 Wash 2d 267,
177; P 2d 896, 899; cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 174f.
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It is submitted that our courts would not take such a lenient
view,') unless the defendant can show that the occasion was prlvl-
2) . h d .. . C ' 3)leged. Furthermore desplte t e eC1Sl0n ln oomer s case,
there is no reason in principle why our courts should follow the
American approach that it is not an invasion of privacy:
"to communicate the fact Lof the indebtednes~7 to the plain-
tiff's employer, or to any other individual, or even to a
small group, unless there is some breach of contract, trust
or confidential relation which will afford an independent
basis for relief".4)
In the case of defamation publication need only be made to a single
person other than the plaintiff for it to be actionable,S) and there
seems to be no reason why the same should not apply to invasions of
privacy.6) Hofstadter and Horowitz also suggest that:
"to communicate with the debtor himself by a writing that may
be read by others as by telegram or postcard is no breach of
the right of privacy though it may be libelous if defamatory".7)
This view, however, is untenable in view of the fact that where such
methods are used for correspondence there is a presumption that the
communications will be read by others ,8) and it is submitted that in
our law such conduct by the defendant would amount to an invasion of
privacy. It is possible that in some situations where the publica-
tion is to a "small group" the court will apply the de minimus prin-
ciple.
1) Cf Dauberman v Blumenfel 1934 NPD 314 (letter to plaintiff's
superior that plaintiff's debts not paid). It seems that gene-
rally in the United States publication to the debtor's employer
is regarded as privileged. A Hill "Defamation and Privacy under
the First Amendment (1976) 76 Columbia LR 120S, 1287.
2) See below 324.
3) Supra.
4) Prosser Torts op cit 810; Cf Neeth1ing Privaatheid op cit 3l9f,
311. But contra Hill op cit 1287: "Prosser's view that disclosure
of a private fact is not actionable unless made in a public manner
was based on authorities involving the use or abuse of a privilege,
and not pertinent at all to the proposition for which he cited them".
5) Whittington v Bowles 1934 EDL 142, l4S; McKerron Delict op cit 183"
Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 337. '
6) For instance, in intrusion cases no publication is needed at all.
See above 198.
7) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 176.
8) See above 209. Cf Western Union Tel Co v McLaul'in 108 Miss 273,
66 So 739.
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3. Physical Deformities and Health: In Roman-Dutch law it was an
injuria to reveal that a person suffered from some physical defect
(eg that he was a cripple, squint-eyed, blind, hunch-backed, flat-
footed or deformed) 1) or that he suffered frum a disease (eg the
itch or scurvy).2) In certain instances where there is an innuendo
of moral turpitude by the sufferer such disclosures may be defamatory,3)
but it seems that it is no longer defamatory per se to say that a per-
son suffers from an infectious disease which causes others to shun
and avoid him. Thus in SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman,4)
Steyn CJ said:
"Ek kan my nie voorstel dat dit lasterlik is om van t n buurman
se kinders te se dat hul masels of waterpokkies het nie".5)
It is conceded that in such instances the de minimus rule might also
apply to an action for invasion of privacy. If, however, the dis-
closures concerned certain physical deformities suffered by the child-
ren which were not usually visible to third parties, it is submitted
that despite the fact that an action for defamation would fail, an
action for invasion of privacy at the suit of such children would suc-
ceed. 6) In the United States, for instance, a woman was able to re-
cover for embarassing disclosures concerning certain masculine charac-
teristics which she possessed,7) while in England the courts have held
that it is defamatory to publish a photograph of a young woman without
any teeth. 8) In Barber v Time Incorp9) plaintiff suffered from a
TPD 857, where an envelope had "Foster has
outside. Cf Conroy v Westwood 1936 NPD




Cf Tothi11 v Foster 1925
syphilus" written on the
245.
4) 1962 (2) SA 613 (AD).
5) At 617.
6) ef French law where a photograph was taken in hospital of a child
of a famous French actor. Anne Philipe v Societe 'France Editions
et Publications' (1966) 2 JCP 14222; cf G Lyon-Caen "The Right to
Prlvacy" (1967) 14 Rev of Contemp Law 69, 84: "since the photo-
graph was reproduceo and reports given on the state of health of a
minor and on the nursing given him for purely commercial reasons lIt!
constitutes intolerable interference in the private life of the --
Philipe family".
7) Cason v Baskin (1945) 155 Fla 198, 20 So 2d 243, (1947) 159 F1a
31, 30 So 2d 635; Prosser Torts op cit 809f.
8) Funston v Pearson The Times March 12, 1915; cited in RFV Heuston
Salmond on Torts 16 ed (1973) 35 n 36. This case was decided on the
basis of defamation because no action for invasion lies in English
1aw. Se~ above 72. Jt is submi t ted, however , that thi s was in
fact an lnvaS10n of prlvacy.
9) (1942) 348 Mo 1199, 159 SW 2d 291; cf L Brittan "The Right to Pri-
vacy in England and the United St~~p~" (10~7' ~ 1
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disease which gave her a voracious appetite. Without her consent
a picture of her in hospital duly captioned with her name and address
was printed in defendant's magazine along with an article about the
disease. The court held that there was an invasion of privacy, as
one of the rights protected was the right to obtain medical treat-
ment for a non-contagious disease without personal publicity - if the
article had been for the benefit of the medical profession there was
no need to publish the plaintiff's name and address. Similar prin-
ciples have been applied to the unauthorized publication of X-ray
pictures of a person's pelvic region;1) coloured photographs of an
injury suffered by a workman;2) a person's deformed nose;3) and the
public ex~ibition of films of a caesarian operation undergone by the
plaintiff. 4) Society's aversion to unauthorized disclosures concern-
ing a person's bodily privacy is closely linked with its attitude to-
wards unpublicized intrusions into such privacy:
"(~7mong the rights of personality to which under our civiliza-
tion a woman is entitled, is the right of privacy in regard to-
her body".5)
It is submitted that the same principles apply to intrusions on the
bodily privacy of a man. In some cases, however, certain disclosures
concerning physical defects or disease are permitted in the interests
of societys for instance in crime control (where bodily abnormalities
may be recorded on arrest or after conviction, but not otherwise) ,6)
and for public health purposes (eg the reporting of "notifiable",7)
1) Banks v King Features Syndicate (1939) 30 F Supp 352; cf Prosser
Torts op cit 809 n 78.
2) Lambert v Dow Chemical Co (1968) 215 So 2d 673 (La App).
3) Griffin v Medical Society (1939) 11 NYS 2d 109 (Sup Ct), cf Prosser
Torts op cit 809 n 78.
4) Feeney v Young (1920) 191 App Div 501, 181 NYJ 481; cf Prosser
Torts op cit 809 n 78.
5) B v Ho11iday 1927 cpn 395, 401; See above 199.
6) Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, s 37; cf Act 56 of 1955, s 289
See above 235.
7) Public Health Act, 36 of 1919, s 19 (by a head of family, nearest
relative, person in attendance, or occupier of premises); s20 (by
a medical practitioner). Section 18 defines a "notifiable disease"
as including, inter alia, small-pox, scarlet fever, diptheria,
cholera, typhOld.
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"formidable epidemic",1) or venerea1 2) diseases, or that a person
is mentally il13)). The question of breach of confidence by a med-
ical practitioner will be discussed later. 4)
It is submitted, however, that in all cases where the plaintiff
sues for invasion of privacy, apart from the fact that the disclosure
must be offensive to the prevailing boni mores of society,S) the
plaintiff himself, or the fact that it is part of his anatomy, must
be identifiable. 6) For instance, merely to publish a photograph of
a person's wound, or pelvic region, or nose, or operation will not be
actionable if it is published in such a manner that the person in the
picture cannot be identified. 7)
4. Life Style: Where a' person is not a public figure,8) it seems
that there is no good reason for disclosures to be made concerning
his private mode of life, standard of living, place of dwelling and
the like. 9) Prosser mentions that in the United States it is accept-
ed that:
1) Public Health Act, 36 of 1919, s 38.
2) Pu'blic Heal th Act, 36 of 1919, s SS (2); "Every medical practi-
tioner who knows or has reason to believe that any person is suf-
fering from a venereal disease in a communicable form and is not
under treatment by a medical practitioner, or is not attending
regularly for such treatment, shall report the matter in writing
to the medical officer of health of the local authority"~ See
also s 58(1), and the limited protection afforded in s 64.
3) Mental Health Act, 18 of 1973, s 13.
4) See below 280f.
5) See above l72f.
6) Cf Brewer v Hearst Pub Co (1950) 185 F 2d 846; cf Prosser Torts
op cit 806.
7) Cf Prosser Torts op cit 80§: "Lflhere is no liability for the pub-
lication of a picture of La plaintiff'~7 hand, leg or foot, or of
his house, his automobile, or his dog, with nothing to indicate
whose they are".
8) See below 315.
9) For the position in France, see above 100f. Cf the German "Geheims-
pgare'" see above 92; the Norwegian Penal Code, Article 390, see




"anything visible in a public place can be recorded and given
circulation by means of a photograph, to the same extent as by
written description, since this amounts to nothing more than
giving publicity to what is already public and what anyone
present would be ·free to see". 1)
But he is presumably referring to photographs or descriptive articles
about the exterior of houses or gardens which are visible to the pub-
lic and would not"be actionable, unless perhaps they were used for
commercial purposes. 2) If, however, the photographer or writer went
further and intruded behind the scenes into the more intimate spheres
of domestic life then such disclosures would be actionable. 3)
In our law most cases involving publication of a person's life-
style have been decided on the basis of defamation. For instance
defendant was held liable where it was said of a plaintiff "you live
like a kaffir",4) and where a plaintiff was described as "a queer
combination of garrulousness and courtesy, squalor and dignity".5)
In the latter case the court accepted that "squalor" ordinarily meant
"a person living under conditions and amid surroundings characterized
by personal filth or dirt".6) The most dramatic example, however,
is to be found in Masters v CNA7) in which an article appeared in a
newspaper, distributed by defendants, attacking George Bernard Shaw's
suggestion that miscegnation was the solution to South Africa's race
problem. The article highlighted the dismal plight of young White
girls who married Blacks, and particularly a young Scots girl who
married an Indian from South Africa:
1) Prosser Torts op cit 811. Cf French law: see above 102.
2) See below 300. It has been held that a couple who embrace in public
may have forfeited their right to privacy. Gill v Hearst Pub Co
(1953) P 2d 441. Cf Neethling Privaatheid op-cIt 187. It is
submitted that a photograph of such conduct in our law would
amount to an invasion of privacy. But see above 102.
3) It is submitted that had the plaintiff in Sidis v FR Publishing
~orp (1940) 2 Cir l13F 2d 806 not been a "public figure" he would
ave been able to recover. See above 174.
4) De Villiers v Vels 1921 OPD 55.







"It took a year to disillusion the young wife. A year of




"After describing the half-castes as being despised by the
Whi tes and herding .themselves in slums where they live under
disreputable and degrading conditions, the article cites the
plaintiff's marriage with an Edinburgh girl and holds it up
as an example illustrating the suffering endured by White
women as a result of their marriage with .Black men ... Lthe
innuendQ7 is clear that after the marriage of the plaintiff he
went to live with his wife under disreputable and degrading con-
ditions".2)
Counsel for the defendant argued that it was not defamatory es-
pecially of a doctor to say that he lived in the slums - but the court
found that in view of the innuendo contained in the whole article it
was defamatory.3) It is submitted that invasion of privacy could
have been pleaded in the alternative.
In France revelations concerning a person's leisure activities
have been held to be actionable,4) and it is submitted that the same
should apply in our law. On the other hand it is a question of what
is offensive to the prevailing mores of society5) as Prosser says:
"Anyone who is not a hermit must expect the more or less
casual observation of his neighbour and the passing public as
to what he is and does, and some reporting of his daily acti-
vities. The ordinary reasonable man does not take offence at·
mention in a newspaper of the fact that he has returned home
from a visit or gone camping in the woods, or given a party at




4) Brigitte Bardot v Societe de Presse Marcel Dassault LI967_7 Dalloz
450. See above 101.
5) See above l72f.
6) Prosser Torts op cit at 811. Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 319
who suggests that the same principle applies to idle gossip betwee~
neighbours.
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5. Childhood background: Unless a person is a public figure or
such disclosures are in the public interest,1) it seems that they
will give rise to an action for invasion of privacy. Our courts
have only considered the matter in an action for defamation. In
Jonker v Davis 2) the defendant (a retired blacksmith) said to the
plaintiff (an assistant municipal health officer) in the presence of
others:
"Jy moet onthou dat ek die seun van 'n ryk man is en dat ek
we1 opgevoed is. Ek du1d nie dat 'n seun soos jy wat in 'n
krot groot geword het, en 'n bietjie ge1eerdheid van jou pa
ontvang het, vir my so 'n be1edigende brief stuur nie".3)
Bres1er AJ found that the word "krot" was an Afrikaans word with a
number of meanings:
"'oud, verva1len huis, e11endige woning' ... 'armoedige hut' ..
'krothuis' is 'a bawdy house' ... 'krot' .. 'cot, hovel, hole,
wretched lodging ... mawdy-house' Lsi£7 ... 'den, hovel,
shanty, kennel, dog-hole' ... and Ll~7 the plural 'krotte'
Liiiean~7 ... 'slum'''. 4)
The judge then turned his mind to the problem of what right-thinking
members of society would have thought, and concluded:
"Having regard to the present standard of public opInIon what
would the presumed reasonable man think of statements that a
person had not the opportunities of wealth and upbringing (or
education) of which another is so vocal? What would he say
about the fact that the person attacked obtained such education
as he had only from his father and that he finally came from
the humblest of homes? ... There is not in the present case an
imputation of personal squalor ... The right-thinking man may
just as well feel more sympathy for a man so criticized. Early
disadvantages, especially those which were beyond the control
1) Cf Sidis v FR Publishing Corp supra.
2) 1953 (2) SA 726 (W).
3) At 727.
4) At 731.
See above l74.~ See below 319.
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of the person attacked would not, I feel, today inspire a
feeling of contempt or ridicule or hatred, nor would those
disadvantages cause the target of such a boastful attack to
-- 1)be sLh/unned".
It is difficult to understand the learned judge's comments con-
cerning "sympathy" and the fact that the plaintiff would not be
"shunned". In defamation cases the fact that the listeners or read-
ers felt sympathy for the plaintiff is irrelevant,2) and although
shunning may be evidence of defamation it does not per se indicate
that the plaintiff has been defamed. 3) Nevertheless even if the
statement was not defamatory it is submitted that it was a clear in-
vasion of the plaintiff's privacy, and that had the plaintiff pro-
ceeded on the latter basis he would have succeeded.
6. Family life: Such disclosures concerning a person's family (eg
his wife or children) would seem prima facie to constitute an inva-
sion of the privacy of members of the family directly concerned. 4)
The courts in the United States sometimes allow an action to other mem-
bers of the family who do not form the subject of disclosures, but
are identified as relatives of the subject. In Bazemore v Savannah
HospitalS) defendants published, without plaintiff's consent, a photo-
graph taken in the hospital of the nude body of their dead child which
had been born with its heart on the outside of its body. The court
found that such conduct amounted to a "violation of the confidence and
trust reposed in the hospital", and held the hos~ital, the photograph-
er and the newspaper liable to the parents for invasion of their pri-
vacy.6) Similarly in Douglas v Stokes7) the parents of a freak child 8)
who died shortly after birth had engaged the defendant photographer to
1) At 731. The report uses the word "stunned" but this is obviously
a misprint for "shunned".
2) Cf De Villiers op cit 28.
3) SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman 1962 (2) SA 613 (AD) 617.
4) Cf French law: Bernard Blier v Societe 'France Editions et Publi-
cations' (1966) 2 JCP . 14875 ; Lyon-Caen op ci t 81. See above 101.
5) (1930) 171 Ga 257,155 SE 194; cf L Brittan "The Right to Privacy
in England and the United States" (1963) 37 Tu1ane LR 236, 247.
6) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 122.
7) (1912) 149 Ky 506, 149 SW 849. Cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 121.
8) Siamese "twins" but joined from the shoulder down. See below 358.
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take photographs of the child's nude body - twelve pictures and no
more. The photographer made additional copies without their con-
sent, one of which he copyrighted. The plaintiff's recovered for
invasion of privacy.1) Such disclosures, however, will not be ac-
tionable if they are i~ the public interest,2) and can be considered
as being a valid "news" item. Thus in Bremmer v Journal Tribune Pub-
lishing Co 3) the court held that the publication of a photograph of
plaintiff's son's mutilated and decomposed corpse, illustrating a
news article on his disappearance was not an invasion as it was "news".
There are no examples of such invasions in our law, but most
similar claims have been argued on the basis of defamation and have
concerned the mores of the plaintiff himself rather than his family.
In Viviers v Linde 4) defendant had said to a third party:
"Ik wil Viviers niet langer op mijn plaats heben als zijn
tijd om is, want die meisje Lplaintiff's daughterlby te veel
rond met die Engelsman; morgen en overmorgen kan daar slechte
dingen van kom en dan. beschuldig zy eenig een daarmee en die
rnoet daarvoor loop".5)
Plaintiff sued for defamation of his minor daughter in that the above
implied that she had had a carnal connection with the Englishman and
would in the case of his absconding, and of her confinement, accuse
another of being the father of her child. The court found that the
words were not defamatory and granted absolution. It is submitted,
however, that an action for invasion of privacy may have succeeded if
it could be shown that there was no good reason for the third party
to know what plaintiff's daughter was doing with her private life.
In Naidu v Naidu6 ) defendant had said of plaintiff "After all, Raja
Naidu got a Woda's daughter in marriage to his son" - where "Woda"
meant a person of low caste several degrees lower than that of a
"Naidu". The court held that the statement was defamatory on the
basis that:
1) It has, however, been suggested that this decision was in fact
based on breach of contract; Kelley v_Post Publishing Co (1951)
327 Mass 275, 91 NE 2d 286; cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 121.
2) See below 319.
3) (1956) 76 NW 2d 762; cf TL Yang "Privacy: A Comparative Study of
English and American Law" (1966) 15 ICLQ 175, 177.
4) (1897) 14 Cape LJ 298.
5) Ibid.
6) (1915) 36 NLR 43.
At 302.
At 305.
Mejane v Cossie supra 305.
264
"the dignity and reputation of a 'Naidu' would be impaired
if he were termed a member of the 'Woda' caste".l)
It is submitted that here the court appears to have applied a section-
al test similar to that found in the United States,2) rather than the
usual test of "right-thinking members of society generally".3) It
could be argued that the majority of the population in South Africa
would not have regarded the statement as defamatory, but it is clear
that in fact our courts have on occasion recognized a more sectional
test. 4) In any event to pry into the background of someone's family
would give rise to an action for invasion of privacy at the suit of
the person ·affected. This principle could have been applied in
Mejane v Cossie5) if the occasion had not been privileged. Here the
plaintiff, a Xhosa married to another Xhosa, was accused of passing-
off a child of another race. Members of the congregation of his
church had threatened not to take the sacrament if his light coloured
child'was baptized there. The local official of the congregation
called a closed meeting and said that the congregation "do not under-
stand the colour and hair of the child ... LI!7 is neither a Xosa
LsiflEuropean or Hottentot".6) There was a simple explanation for
the phenomenon as the child's great-grandmother was Cape Coloured. 7)
The court found that the words were per se defamatory LIe because
they implied that the child was illegitimat~7,8) 'but held that the
" ""1 d 9)occaSlon was prlvl ege .
1) At 44.
2) "The American courts have taken a more realistic view, recognizing
that the plaintiff may suffer real damage if he is lowered in the
esteem of any substantial and respectable group, even though it may
be quite a small minority". Prosser Torts op cit 743.
3) Cf Conroy v Stewart Printing Co Ltd 1946 AD 1015, 1018; Prinsloo
v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1959 (2) SA 693 (W) 695; chester-
ton v Gill 1970 (2) SA 242 (T) 247.
4) Cf Brill v Madley 1937 TPD 106, 110; Omarjee v Post Newspapers (Pty)
Ltd 1967 (2) PH J 33 (D). See also PQR Boberg 1967 Annual Survef
TI4; DJ McQuoid-Mason "Calling White Black" (1972) 1 NuLR 14, 16.






It is clear, however, that there must be some identification
of the plaintiff in the disclosure. In Spruyt v Dagbreek Pers Bpk1)
defendants had published a photograph of the plaintiff's father to
illustrate an article decrying the practice of ungrateful children
who place their aged p~rents in old age homes. A heavy black cross
was superimposed over the top part of the old man's face but certain
friends of the plaintiff gave evidence that they recognized him.
Under the photograph was a caption "Step-child". Plaintiff sued
for defamation but the court found that apart from very special cir-
cumstances a statement that children placed their parents in a home
for the aged was not defamatory.2) In any event on the facts the
court found that the average reader would not have recognized the
person in the photograph. The writer would agree that it may not be
defamatory to say that children had placed their elderly parents in
an old age home, but it is submitted that to make such a disclosure
would constitute an invasion of privacy. However, in order to suc-
ceed under the latter the plaintiff would have to show that his re-
lationship with the subject of the photograph could be identified.
Furthermore had the parent been identifiable, because privacy is con-
cerned with a person's dignitas,3) it would not have mattered whether
the "average reader" could have identified him, as identification by
his friends would have been sufficient. The fact that the "average
reader" could have identified him would have been an aggravating fac-
tor influencing the quantum of damages. 4) On the facts in Spruyt's
case, however, it seems that only the father could have successfully
brought an action for invasion of privacy.
In Botha v Shaw5) the defendant was a well-known singer who had
recently divorced the plaintiff. Some time after their divorce she
had made certain disclosures concerning her marriage with the plain-
tiff during an interview with reporters. She had stated inter alia
1) 1958 (4) SA 243 (W) •
2) At 246.
3) See above 185f.
4) See above 194.
5) 1972 (1) SA 257 (0) •
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that on the physical side the plaintiff was not really interested
in her and appeared to have a "psychological block about wanting her,
although she was a full-blooded woman who needed to be loved in every
respe~t'" 1) Despite her efforts to give herself to the plaintiff
in full, he wanted "no-intimate closeness", and, eventually, after
she had unsuccessfully "tried everything on earth to make him physic-
ally interested" in her, she had begun to think that there was some-
thing wrong with herself. Finally she had mentioned that they had
not been lovers before the marriage, because that was the way the
plaintiff wanted it. 2) The interview was published in two newspapers
and the plaintiff sued for defamation on the basis that the reports
imputed that he was impotent or had some abnormal defect affecting his
ability to have sexual intercourse. The court held that the state-
ments were not defamatory.3) It is submitted that the court's deci-
sion was correct but that the plaintiff could have succeeded in an
action for invasion of privacy.4) Whereas defamation is primarily
concerned with a person's reputation - "that character for moral or
social worth to which he is entitled amongst his fellow-men",5) in-
vasion of privacy is concerned with a person's dignitas,6) which in-
cludes, inter alia, "that valued and serene condition in his social
or individual life which is violated when he is, either publicly or
privately, subjected by another to offensive and degrading treatment".7)
A person's sexual relationship with another is probably the most in-
timate of all human relations~ips, particularly when such r~lationship
is consecrated by marriage, and any invasion of sexual privacy must be
one of the most flagrant invasions of privacy imaginable. 8) Even in
De Vi11iers op cit 24.
McQuoid-Mason op cit (1973) 90 SALJ 31. The criminal law appears
to r~c?gnize the close relation~hip b~tween a husband and wife by
prov~d~ng that the one cannot glve eVldence against the other in
a crlmlnal case. Act 51 of 1977, s 198. See also McKerron Delict





4) ef DJ McQuoid-Mason
Neeth1ing "'n Geval
5) De Vi11iers op cit
6) See above 185f.
7)
8)
"Invasion of Potency?" (1973) 90 SALJ 23; J
van Privaatheidskending?" (1972) ~HR-HR 370.
24.
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English law which does not recognize invasion of privacy as a common
law tort,1) the courts have recognized that any disclosures concern-
ing what passed between a husband and wife during the marriage may
be construed as an actionable breach of confidence.
2
)
In the United States special legislation has been introduced
to protect the family against disclosures concerning the family life
of school children and students. The Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974,3) was enacted to "protect the integrity of the
school information gathering and retrieval process",4) in the face·
of the:
"potential and actual invasions of familial privacy inherent
in federally funded research programs where school-age children
were given psychological and/or attitude Lsi£7 tests and some-
times were subjected to behaviour modification experiments".5)
Prior to the introduction of this legislation, several court cases
were brought against school authorities as a result of such intru-
sions,6) and in Merriken v Cressman 7) the court stated that there:
"is probably no more private a relationship, except marriage,
which the Constitution safeguards than that between parent
and child".8)
It is submitted that our courts would recognize at common law an
equally close relationship between parent and child, although it has
been suggested that our law no longer recognizes the actio injuriarum
See generally Siskind op cit 259ff.
(1973) 364 F Supp 913 (ED Pa); cf Siskind op cit 259.
A~ 918. Cf Sellers v He~ry (~959) 329.SW 2d 214, where the plain-
tlffs could recover for lnvaSlon of prlvacy for the publication of
~ photograph of their young daughter showing her as she lay dead
In a wrecked car. Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit l22f.
Cf McQuoid-Mason
1) See above 72.
2) Argyll v Argyll Li96~7 1 All ER 611 620, 623ff.
op cit (1973) 90 SALJ 3lf.
3) Pub L No 93-380 § 513 (Aug 21, 1974); cf MA Siskind "Protecting
the Privacy of School children and their Families through the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974" (1975) 14
J of Family Law 255.






per consequentias. 1) The fact that disclosures concerning a child
are made in such a manner as to identify the child's parents would
seem to ground an action for invasion of privacy on the part of such
parents.
7. Past History: Our courts have consistently maintained that a




"As a general principle I take it to be for the public benefit
'that the truth as to the character or conduct of individuals
should be known. But the worst characters sometimes reform,
and some of the inducement to reformation would be removed if
stories as to past transgressions could with impunity be raked
up after a long lapse of time. Public interest as I conceive
it, would suffer rather than benefit from any unnecessary re-
viving of forgotten scandals".3)
In Graham's case the defendant had disclosed that the plaintiff was
having illicit intercourse with African women and the court found
that "it certainly was for the public interest that the conduct of
the plaintiff should be known Las h7e was a private in the Cape
Mounted Rifles, and as. such received his payout of the public
purse".4) It seems that the learned Chief Justice was referring to
moral transgressions and it is submitted that where such disclosures
are not tainted with moral turpitude or criminality they will be even
less in the public interest. Furthermore the disclosures in Graham's
case were contemporaneous with the event, and it is submitted that
had they concerned scandals of the past they would not have been jus-
tified. For instance in Patterson v Engelenburg & Wallachs Ltd5) de-
. fendants published an article stating that during the Anglo-Boer War
1 )
PQR Boberg "Defamatio~l Per Consequentias" (1962) 79 SALJ 261, 263
cf McKerron Delict op cit 55, who suggests that it applies to a
husband and wIfe relationship; cf Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit
34 7f. See below 351.
2) (1892) 9 SC 185; cf Mathews v Hartley (1880) 1 HCG 13 (doctor's
student life); Bade v Bade (1903) 17 EDC 26 (infidelity 20 years
ago); Scho~ v KrIel l~GWLD 86 (disclosure that plaintiff had
assaultea-liis father the previous year).
3) At 187.
4) Ibid.
5) 1917 TPD 350.
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plaintiff who was a post office official at the time had broken his
oath to the Zuid-Afrikanse Republiek by disclosing the contents of
telegrams to several British officers held prisoner in Pretoria, in-
cluding Winston Churchill. Wessels J said:
"Is it ... for the benefit of the large public ... to rake up
an old story of what took place in a time of war seventeen
years ago? If it were a crime for which LPlaintiff7 had been
punished, it could clearly not be resuscitated, unless in the
interests of the State the occasion demanded it ... A fortiori,
a scandal cannot be raked up unless it is done for the public
benefit; and this depends largely upon the time, the manner
and the occasion of the publication".l)
On the facts the court found that the plaintiff had not objected to
a similar article in another newspaper, and only awarded nominal
damages. It is submitted that an action for invasion of privacy may
have been met with the defence that the plaintiff had forfeited his
right to privacy by allowing the previous publication. 2) In Lyon v
Steyn3) where the defendant had wrongly accused the plaintiff of
being a National Scout (ie an Afrikaner who had fought with the Bri-
tish against the Boers during the Anglo-Boer war) a similar view was
expressed:
"It cannot be in the public interest to rake up the ashes of
the dead past and accuse a man of having done something 30
years ago. Surely there must be a time when a man can live
down his past. It would be a sorry day if any busy-body, who
discovered anything about a man's past, could come along years
afterwards and rake it up against him notwithstanding the fact
that he has lived down that past and has acquired a good and
honourable reputation".4)
1) At 361.
2) Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
(C) 249; see above17g. If, however, the plaintiff's story in the
other newspaper was copyrighted the plaintiff could have recovered
for breach of copyright. Cf Copeling op cit 30ff. But consent in
one publication does not mean consent to another. See below 331.
3) ·1931 TPD 247; cf Unie Volk~pers v Hofmeyr 1939 CPD 41 (stating that
a person had acted as intelligence officer for the British during
the Anglo-Boer War); .Weichardt v Argus Printing & Publishing Co
Ltd 1941 CPD 133 (saylng a person fought for the Germans in 1914).
4) At 254.
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Furthermore the Criminal Procedure Act 1) provides that even
the most heinous crimes(apart from those where the death sentence
may be imposed) become prescribed after a lapse of 20 years,2)
therefore a fortiori there can be no interest for the public in re-
vealing that a person ~as indulged in such activities more than 20
years ago. Where, however, a person has persisted in past misde-
meanours the court has held that disclosures concerning them may be
justified. Therefore in Yusaf v Bailey3) where the plaintiff per-
sisted in his claim that he was a member of the Abyssinian Royal
Household and a popular magazine exposed his life history, mentioning,
inter alia, that he had been imprisoned for theft, fraud and attempt-
ing to defeat the ends of justice, the court held that such disclos-
ures were in the public interest:
"It is not the case of a man who has ceased to make false
representations. He persists and has persisted in this Court
in so doing. It is my view in the public interest that the
history of such a man be made known so long as he continues to
make his false claims".4)
Yusaf's action was for defamation, but it is submitted that the same
principle would have applied had he sued for invasion of privacy.
Furthermore, where the plaintiff himself was responsible for raking
up the ashes of his past, he may have no remedy if the disclosures
are published by others. In Coetzee v CNA,5) the applicant unsuccess-
fully applied for an interdict to prevent a magazine publishing a
story about a murder of which he had been convicted 17 years previous-
ly. Plaintiff had sold a serial of the story to a magazine which had
extensively advertised it. Thereafter although the magazine was
taken over by another company, the previous owners printed the story.
The new proprietors of the magazine did the same and the plaintiff
applied for an interdict. In dismissing his application the court
observed:
1) Act 51 of 1977.
2) Section 18 "unless some other period is expressly provided by law".
Contra Act 56 of 1955, s 388, where prosecution of any offence
other than murder was barred after the lapse of 20 years. Cf
Lyon v Steyn supra 253.
3) 1964 (4) SA 117 (W).
4) At 127.
5) 1953 (1) SA 449 (W).
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"The protection which the applicant could have derived from
the passage of time may well, in my view, not be available
to him when he has made old news new again".1) •
It is conceded that all the above cases concerned defamation
actions, but it is submitted that as in the United States such dis-
closures would also constitute an invasion of privacy. Thus in
Melvin v Reid 2) where the plaintiff was a reformed prostitute who
had been the accused in a sensational murder trial and had lived as
a respectable citizen in a neighbourhood where her past was unknown,
she was able to recover for invasion of privacy when a film of her
life was made some seven years after the event. 3 ) The American
courts, however, have not been consistent, particularly in deciding
when such disclosures are in the public interest. 4 ) The principle
that a person's past history is private appears to have been accepted
by our courts in Mhlongo v Bailey,S) although no reference was made
to the fact that the ashes of the plaintiff's past had been dragged
up. Photographs of the plaintiff, a retired schoolmaster, taken
while he was a student in the company of a woman who subsequently be-
came a popular singer, were purloined after he had refused to allow
them to be used and published in a magazine. The court found that
the defendants had "trampled roughshod" over his feelings and awarded
damages for invasion of privacy.6) Where, however, the plaintiff
is a public figure involved in public life, eg a Member of Parliament




1958 (1) SA 370 (W).
At 372.
See below 316.
1) At 453. Except perhaps in the "appropriation cases". where con-
sent will have to be proved, (see below 331) or where there is a
breach of copyright. Copeling op cit.
2) (1931) 112 Cal App 285, 297 Pac 91; cf Yang op cit 182.











8. Embarassing facts: Where such disclosures are not defamatory,
and would not lower a person's reputation in the eyes of others but
are embarassing, they may be actionable as an invasion of privacy.
Whether or not the disclosures should be recognized as actionable,
however, is a question of policy.1) Generally our courts seem to
be reluctant to restrict freedom of speech in society,2) and are un-
likely to restrict publication of items that are genuinely in the
public interest. 3) The utility of an action for invasion of privacy
has only during the past 20 years gained momentum in our law4) and
therefore most examples of such disclosures are to be found in defa-
mation cases. Thus it has been held to be defamatory to say that:
a person had committed criminal intercourse resulting "in a state of
pregnancy"; 5) or somebody was the father of a woman's illegitimate
child;6) or a person's daughter was "in the family way" by someone;7)
or a person "keeps a house of ill-fame" and associates with prosti-
tutes;8) or a woman who claimed to be a spinster was married and
lived with her son;9) or a man was seen "slinking" through a widow's
bedroom window at night;10) or a person had tried to seduce his
1) See above 170. It should be noted, however, that in privacy
cases it is not necessary for the plaintiff to feel ashamed or
embarassed. Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd
1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 248; S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) 298; WA
Joubert "Die Persoonlikheiasreg: 'n Be1angwekkende Ontwikke1ing
in die Jongste Regspraak in Duitsland" (1960) 23 THR-HR 23, 39;
McQuoid-Mason op cit (1973) 90 SALJ 28.
2) Cf S v Turrell 1973 (1) SA 248 (C) 256; S v Bud1ender 1973 (1)
SA 264 CC) 267f.
3) Cf Prinsloo v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1959 (2) SA 693 (W)
696; SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman 1962 (2) SA 613 (AD).
See below 319.
4) Cf McKerron Delict op cit 54. See above 131.
5) Sparks v Hart (1833) 3 Menz 3; cf Sands v Varkevisser (1885) 2
Buch AC 130.
Reyneke v Reyneke (1889) 6 Cape LJ 111.
Bloem v Zietsman (1897) 14 SC 361.
Fyne v Lee (1900) 17 SC 251. But cf 210 above n 2.
Knoesen v Theron (1904) 21 SC 177. See below 292.







brother's wife;l) or a member of a hospital committee who could
afford hospital fees obtained free services for his servant;2) or
a White person was Black. 3) On the other hand it has been held
not defamatory to state that: a Coloured person had tried to
"slip into White cinemas" and collected "slum rent,,;4) or a person
was an enemy subject eg a GermanS) or Austrian 6) or subscribes
to unpopular political beliefs;7) or an attorney was ordered to sit
down in court;8) or a person did not fight during World War 11;9)
or a White person had sold his land zoned for Whites to Blacks.
10
)
It could be argued that if the latter non-defamatory disclosures were
not in the public interest some could qualify as invasions of privacy.
Why should a person be publicly embarassed by disclosures concerning
his nationality or political beliefs or his war record?11) But it
must be remembered that the courts will not provide a remedy merely
because a person is annoyed by the disclosure. 12 ) In order to be
actionable the defendant's conduct must usually offend the prevailing
boni mores of the community.13) Where such conduct is offensive
1) Hayton v Hayton (1936) 53 SALJ 502f. Even though the facts were
true they were not in the public interest.
2) Hultzer & Das v Van Gorkom 1909 TS 232, 240.
3) Pitout v Rosenstein 1930 OPD 112,117; but cf Maskowitz v Pienaar
1957 (4) SA 195 (AD) 197; Taljaard v Rosendorff & Venter 1970 (4)
SA 48 (0) 54; DJ McQuoid-Mason "Calling White Black" (1972) 1
NULR 14.
4) Golding v Torch Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1949 (4) SA 150 (C)
168f.
5) Richter v Mack 1917 AD 201, 206; cf Fichardt Ltd v The Friend
Newspapers-rtd 1915 AD 1, 9f.
6) Burger v Leach 1917 CPD 398.
7) Haacke v Deutsche Presse (Pty) Ltd 1934 TPD 191, was decided prior
to the S~ppr~ssion of Communism Act, 44 of 1950, which made being
a Communlst l11ega1 (s3). See above 91. See also Fichardt Ltd
v The Friend Newspapers Ltd supra 6f, 9f, 12f; SA Associated News-
pa~ers Ltd v Schoeman 1962 (2) SA 613. (AD) 617. Cf Saperstein v
Unle Vo1kspers Bpk 1946 WLD 205 (ca11lng a person a notorious "red-
bai ter".) Cf Botha v Marais 1974 (1) SA 44 (AD) 49f, where it was
held not defamatory to say that a politician had been brainwashed
with communism.
Flanagan v Walton & Co 1934 EDL 138, 141.
Good v Smith 1964 (4) SA 374 (N).
Ewart v Thirion 1955 (3) SA 115 (SWA) , 117.
Unless he is a "public figure". See below 319.
Th~ c?urts may for instance apply the de minimus non curat lex
prlnclple. McKerron Delict op cit 55£.
13) See above 172f.
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the courts have often recognized as defamatory disclosures which
are clearly invasions of privacy. Thus in Smith v Elmore,l) where
the plaintiff's name was entered in red (indicating that he had not
subscribed) on a list of names of workers who had subscribed to a
fellow-employee's tombstone, he was able to recover for defamation.
Difficulties arise where a person is called a police informer
or spy. It has·been consistently held in our law that to call a
person a police spy is not per se defamatory. For instance, in
Greenfield v MaCaulay2) the court said the following about police in-
formers:
"We do not regard them with any great esteem for the work that
they undertake, but that is no reason for saying that their
conduct is necessarily dishonourable and disreputable, and
that they are people of no character at all".3)
Even though such disclosures are not defamatory do they amount to an
invasion of privacy? Could it be argued that the fact that their
identity in court cases may be kept secret4) indicates that it is not
in the public interest to make such disclosures? Should the fact
that:
"any right thinking person would Lno!7 think any the less of
5)a student reporting ... criminal activities"
(CA).cf Byrne v Dean LI93Z7 2 All ER 204
Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, s 202; cf Act 56 of 1955,
s 233. An informer is a person who gives "information of a kind
prejudicial to others whose emnity he may thereby provoke ...
that information must be of a kind which is (or may be) the course
of a criminal prosecution, and lastly, it must be given to the
officers of justice. " B: v Van Schalkwyk 1938 AD 543, 548; cf Ed
AB Harcourt Swift's Law of Criminal Procedure 2 ed (1969) 419.
The rule should only be enforced "where it appears from the cir-
cumstances that a disclosure of the State's sources of information
may ~e inj~rious t~ the administration of justice and consequently
publlC pOllCy requlres them to be kept secret". Ex parte Minister
of Justice, in re B: v Pillay 1945 AD 653; Swift & Harcourt op Clt
4l9f.
5) Prinsloo v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1959 (2) SA 693 (W) 695.
1) 1938 TPD 18.




be sufficient to show that objectively such disclosures are not em-
barassing? It seems trite that a statement that a person who lives
in a liberal community opposed to the Government of the day, is an
agent for the Bureau for State Security or the Security Police would
cause such a person considerable embarassment.The court in Prins-
loo v South African Associated Newspapers Ltd1) rejected an applica-
tion of an interdict preventing the publication of a report that
there was a "blonde spy" allegedly operating for the police on the
campus of the university of theWitwatersrand. The matter was only
decided on the basis of defamation, as the defendants had not been
given notice of the alternative ground of an action for injuria. It
is submitted that from a policy point of view to prevent society de-
generating into a police-state of faceless informers, the courts
should continue to recognize that such disclosures are not actionable. 2)
This is particularly so where the police force is concerned with in-
vestigating political crimes, and the Executive has invested in it
powers which circumvent the Judiciary and over-ride the principles of
1 · . 3)natura JustIce.
9. Confidential information: In Dun & Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA
Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) Pty Ltd4) it was held that
the English law concept of "breach of confidence"S) did not form part
1) Supra. See above 128.
2) But PQR Boberg 1959 Annual survea 122 suggests that the appellation"spy" is "opprobrious" and shoul be regarded as defamatory.
3) Cf AS Mathews Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971) 134.
4) 1968 (1) SA 209 (C)
5) See above 75. But the Copyright Act, 63 of 1965, s 44(3) states:
"No~hing in ~his Act shall affect the operation of any rule of
equIty relatIng to breaches of trust or confidence". The intro-
duction of this English law terminology could be due to the fact
that Act.63 of 1~6S was based on the English Copyright Act of 1956.
Cf.Copellng op Clt 4cf WA Joubert Gtondslae vandie'Petsoonlik~
heldsreg (1953) 147 n 98.
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of South African law unless the action could be brought within the
" """ L A "I" 1) Cgeneral principles of the actlo lnJurlarum or ex gUl la. ope-
ling 2) points out, however, that Dun's case did not refer to Goodman
v Von Moltke,3) and suggests that "breach of confidence" should be
recognised in our law particularly in relation to copyright.
4
) Good-
man's case was concerned with the theft of certain confidential docu-
ments from the Jewish Board of Deputies which were in the process of
being published by the defendants. The plaintiff's application for
an interdict was granted on the basis that:
"Li7t is actionable to communicate information in breach of
an agreement not to do 50, and such agreement may be express
or may be implied from the fact that the person upon whom it
is alleged to be binding is or was in the employ of the plain-
tiff or in other confidential relationship with him. Further-
more, any person who, knowing of the obligation not to communi-
cate the information, obtains such information from the person
upon whom the obligation rests, may also be restrained by in-
junction from communicating it to any other person".5)
Van der Merwe and Olivier6) seem to regard Goodman's case as decided
on the basis of contract. Neethling contends that the court recog-
nized the principle that an interdict may be sought for any communica-
tion of confidential material which has been stolen - irrespective of
whether or not it is to be published. 7) Furthermore Neethling sup-
ports Joubert's criticism8) of the view that an interdict will only be
supra 157.
Copeling op cit 177.
Per Centlivres J in Goodman v Von Moltke
Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 393.
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 390.
Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg op cit 141.
1) Dun & Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau·
(Cape) Pty Ltd supra 221f; cf Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Qude
Meester Group Ltd 1972 (3) SA 152 (C) 160£. C£ SA Strauss, M---J-
Strydom & JC Van der WaIt Die Suid-Afrikaanse Persreg (1976) 336£.
WA Joubert Grondslae van die Persoonlikheidsreg (1953) 148 n 99.
2) Copeling op cit.







granted where the defendant knew "of the obligation not to communi-
cate the information". For the granting of an interdict fault by
the defendant is irrelevant. 1)
(a) Artificial Persons: A factor which appears to have been over-
looked by commentators on Goodman's case is that if the action for
"breach of confidence" 'is confined to the actio injuriarum it is most
unlikely that an action would lie where the plaintiff is an artificial
person, unless the disclosures affected the natural person members. 2)
It is true that a trading company may sue for defamation,3) but it is
submitted that it cannot be defamed by words which "would affect the
purely personal repute of an individual",4) for instance, that the
company was unchaste or suffered from some other essentially human
defect. 5)
"But it has prestige and standing in the business in which it
is engaged, and language which casts an aspersion upon its
honesty, creqit, efficiency or other business character may be
actionable".6)
Similarly, there is no reason in principle why a non-trading company
should not be able to sue for defamation,7) because even benevolent
or charitable organisations,
"may still be dependent upon the q.onations or support of the
public, and so may still be defamed by attacks which tend to
decrease contributions".8)-
1) See above 195.
2) For instance, a company director has been allowed to emerge from
behind the corporate veil to sue in his personal capacity: Bane
v Colvin 1959 (1) SA 863 (C) 866; cf Wilson v Die Afrikaanse-Pers
Publikasies (Edms) Bpk 1971 (3) SA 455 (T) 456. But this does not
apply if the members wishing to sue constitute a large class eg
shareholders in a company; Goodall v Hoogendoorn Ltd 1926 AD 11,
16.
3) McKerron Delict op cit 181; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 348.
4) Prosser Torts op cit 745. Cf Gumede v Bandhla Vukani Bakhiti Ltd
1950 (4) SA 560 (N) 561.
5) Cf Universiteit van Pretoria'v Tommie Meyer Films 1977 (4) SA 376
(T) 384: "Defloratie, aanranding, owerspel - om net 'n paar te noem -
is skuldoorsake wat uitsluitlik met die menslike persoon geassossier
kan word."
6) Prosser Torts op cit 745.
7) Cf McKerron Delict op cit 181; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 348.
Cf Die Spoorbond v SAR & H 1946 AD 999, 1011; Universiteit van
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films supra 386.
8) Prosser Torts op cit 745. But it is unnecessary for the plaintiff
to prove patrimonial loss.
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The same applies to a university. Thus in Universiteit van Pretoria v
Tommie Meyer Films 1) Mostert J observed:
"Myns insiens beskik 'n universiteit as regspersoon oor 'n reg
op werfkrag (goodwill). Dit behels die krag wat studente en
donateurs tot ondersteuning van 'n universiteit stem en is 'n
bate met 'n ekonomiese waarde en geregtig op erkenning as
regsobjek met regsbeskerming net soos in die geval van die
universiteit se stoflike regsgoed."2)
It is submitted that the hurt to the university's reputation
would affect its student enrolment and an action would lie for defama-
tion,3) even though it is not necessary for patrimonial loss to be
proved. 4) On the other hand if a university is insulted in a manner
which does not reflect on its reputation it is submitted that there
would not be an action for injuria. 5) Similarly as privacy is
essentially a natural human desire 6), which in our law is regarded
as an aspect of dignitas, it has been held that a university as a
universitas has no right of privacy8).
Even in the United States where the right to privacy is treated
as a separate right its protection has not been extended to artificial
persons:
"Since the right of privacy is primarily designed to protect
the feelings and sensibilities of human beings, rather than to
safeguard property, business or other pecuniary interests, the
courts have denied this right to corporations and institutions,
and even to partnerships as such."9)






McKerran Delict op cit 182.
Cf McKerron Delict op cit 115; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 386.
Cf Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films supra 384.
See above 1, Cf Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films
supra 384.
7) See above 185. Cf H Patrick Glen "Right to Privacy in Quebec"
(1974) 52 Canadian Bar R 297, 299; F De Graaff "The Protection of
_Privacy in Dutch Law" (1976), 5 Human Rights 177, 184f.
8) Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films supra 384.
9) J Schiffres "Invasion of Privacy - Use of Plaintiff's Name or Like-
ness for Non-Advertising Purposes" (1970) 30 ALR 3d 203 212 §3.
Cf Rosenwasser v Ogoglia (1916) 172 App Div 107, 158 NYS'56 (part-
nership); Jaccard v RH Macy & Co (1941) 176 Misc 88,26 NYS 2d 829
(corporation); Assoc for Preservation of Freedom of Choice Inc v
Nation Co (19?2) 35 M1SC 2d 42, 228 NYS 2d 628 (corporatl0n); Assoc
for Preservatlon of Freedom of Choice Inc v Emergency Civil Liber-
ties Committee (1962) 37 Misc 2d 599, 236 NYS 2d 216 (corporation).
Cf Universitelt van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films supra 384.
279.
It is submitted, therefore, that organisations such as the Jewish
Board of Deputies, the Sons of England or the Broederbond could not
claim that their privacy has been invaded, unless it affects the
privacy of identifiable individual members. 1 ) In Universiteit van
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films 2) it was ~tated:
"Die universitas beskik, m.i. nie oor persoonlikheidsregte nie
en hieruit volg dit dat die actio injuriarum nie vir 'n univ~r­
sitas beskikbaar is nie; net soos hy nie oor 'n corpus besklk wat
deur die reg beskerm moet word nie, beskik hy ook nie oor 'n
dignitas (in die menslike sin) nie. Hy.bes~ik oor ~n fama, nie
in die sin van 'n objek van 'n persoonllkheldsreg nle, maar as
factor wat mede-bepalend is vir die werfkrag (of 'goodwill') van
'n un i versit a s;' 3)
Therefore it can be argued that the reputatio~ of an artificial
person is like "an asset or species of property,,4), unlike privacy
which concerns an aspect of human dignity5).
Anomalies have arisen in the United States where the courts in
the "appropriation" cases sometimes refer to the proprietary interests
of the plaintiff in his name, image or likeness. b ) This approach
makes it difficult to see why in America the proprietary interests
of a natural person should be protected, bGt not those of an artificial
person. There seems to be no reason in principle why on analogy with
the law of defamation, where the proprietary interests of a corporation
are threatened 7) an action for invasion of privacy should not lie.
Neethling explains the anomaly by suggesting that the appropriation
cases infringe the right to identity rather than privacy8) - even
though the seminal American privacy cases concerned appropriation. 9)
See above 278.Cf Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 165.





4) Cf Die Spoorbond v SAR & H 1946 AD 999, 1010f; RW Parsons "The
Bases of the South African Law of Defamation" (1951) THR-HR 192
cf Maisel v Van Naeren 1960 (4) SA 836 (C) 848; McKerron Dalict
op cit 170; Note "Defamation, Privacy and the First Amendment"
1976 Duke LJ 1016, 1035f.
5) See above 186 n 5.
6) Cf Edison v Edison Polyform Manufacturing Co (1907) 73 NJ Eq 136,
67 Atl 392 (Ch); cf L Brittan "The Right to Privacy in England
and the United States" (1963) 37 Tulane LR 233, 25lf. See below 304f
7) See above 277.
8) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 295.
300.
9) See above 53f.
For "appropriation", see below
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In our law, however, appropriation seems to be regarded as an
invasion of privacy which impairs the victim's dignitus l ), and an
artificial person would have to find some other remedy. It is sub-
mitted therefore that all interferences with proprietary rights should
be regarded as actionable under the Lex Aquilia. 2) It is true that in
such cases the plaintiff will have to prove patrimonial loss, but
provided he can prove that he has "a well grounded apprehension of
irreparable injury" he will be entitled to an interdict, without
proving actual 10ss.3)
(b) Professional Persons: In Roman-Dutch law certain professional
relationships gave rise to an obligation to confidentiality, for in-
stance, doctor and patient,4) legal representative and client,S) and
priest and penitent. 6) These principles seem to apply in our law. 7)
On the other hand where such persons are required to testify in a
court of law communications made to them are not privileged,8) unless
there is a lawyer-client relationship,9) or "the disclosure was made
in confidence for the purpose of litigation, for then the lawyer-
client principles would apply".10)
l)Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C)
249. See below 304.
2)On the basis of unlawful competition in trade. Cf Dun & Bradstreet
(Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) Pt~ Ltd
(1968) (1) SA 209 CC) 218; Victor Products (SA) (Ptf) Lt v
Lateulere Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd 1975 (1) SA 961 (W 965. See
also McKerron Delict op cit 214£; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit
330; HJO Van Heerden Grondslae van die Mededingingsreg (1958) 258.
Cf Universiteit van Pretorla v Tommle Meyer Fllms supra 385.
3)See above 194f. 4) De Villiers op cit 108.
5) 6)Voet 22.5.6. . Voet 22.5.6.
7)De Villiers op cit 108, 202. Protection of professional confidences
is provided for in the Penal Codes of France (Article 369, see above
103; Federal Republic of Germany (Article 300, see above 90);
Sweden (International Commission of Jurists "The Legal Protection
of Privacy: A Comparative Study of Ten Countries (1972) 24 Int Soc
Sci J 568f, see above 113; Switzerland (1972) 24 Int Soc SCl J
571£, see above 113; and the Netherlands (F De Graaf "The Protec-
tion of Privacy in Dutch Law" (1976) 5 Human Rights 177, 189f, see
above 113.
8)Cf Act 51 of 1977, s 192; cf Act 56 of 1955, s 223, cf Smit v
Van Niekerk 1976 (4) SA 293 (AD) 299f.
9)Cf CH Ho~fman.The South African Law of Evidence 2ed (1970) 185f;
CWH Schrnldt Dle Bewysreg (1972) 412f. Cf Criminal Procedure Act,
51 of 1977, s 201, c£ Act 56 of 1955, s 232, cf Smi t v Van Niekerk
supra 299f. --
10)D Zeffert "Confidentiality and the Courts" (1974) 91 SALJ 432, 433.
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In our law a medical practitioner can be ordered to give evi-
dence concerning consultations with his patient,1) and may be com-
pelled by statute to make certain disclosures. 2) The same applies
to psychiatrists,3) even though "secrecy is a sine qua non of
Ltheir7 practice".4) Several countries have introduced a statutory
medical privilege,S) a~d some American States have also extended a
privilege to psychologists, marriage ccunsellors and certified or
clinical social workers. 6 ) A court cannot, however, order a legal
representative to disclose what passed between himself and his
client - the privilege is absolute and the practitioner may only be
released from his duty by the client himself. 7) It has been held
that a clergyman does not have an absolute privilege,8) and it seems
1) Cf Parkes v Parkes 1916 CPD 702.
2) For instance, in terms of the Public Health Act, 36 of 1916, medi-
cal practitioners are required to report "notifiable" (s 20) or
venereal diseases (s 55(2)). See above 257f. In other cases the dis-
closure may be privileged Cf P Stein & J Shand Legal Values in
Western Society (1974) 199: "Thus, a doctor may reveal to the
parents of a yOung unmarried patient that she is taking contracep-
tive pills". Cf AB v CD (1905) 7 Fed 72; Simonsen v Simonsen
(1926) 104 Neb 24~ l7r-NW 831, where "a physIcIan who revealed
to the patient's spouse that the patient was suffering from a
venereal disease was not held liable". R Slovenko Pyschiatry and
the Law (1973) 444.
3) Botha v Botha 1972 (2) SA 559 (N) 560. See generally Zeffert op
cit 435ff. The pressures on psychiatrists to make disclosures
concerning their patients in the United States have been.increased
"by the growing complexity of health care and the utilization of
computers". R Slovenko "On Confidentiality" (1975) 12 Contemporary
Psychoanalysis 109. Thus psychiatrists may be legally required
to report the names of drug-dependent patients (Slovenko PsychiatEl
op cit 436f), but they are frequently requested to give informa-
tion by the police, colleges, credit rating organisations, the
civil service, employers, insurance companies, behavioural science
researchers, and parents or other members of the family (Slovenko
Psychiatry op cit 442f). "Some psychiatrists, when a release has
been given by the patient, provide information if it is 'for the
good of the patient'." (Ibid)
4) Zeffert op cit 435.
5) Zeffert op cit 438f: "Newfoundland and Quebec have created such
a privilege by statute; so have Tasmania, Victoria ... New Zea-
land ... Israel ... Lang7 many United States jurisdictions ...
Of the fifty States and the District of Columbia, only twelve lack
privilege for physicians".
6) Zeffert op cit 439.
7) Hoffman op cit l85f; Schmidt op cit 413.
8) Smit v Van Niekerk supra 303. Cf FG Richings "Privilege of Reli-
gious Advisers" (1974) 91 SALJ 167; JD Van der Vyver "Die
Swygreg van Kerkeleraars u (1977) 40 THR-HR 217.
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that the same would apply to journalists, bankers or accountants.
1
)
In South Africa bankers have a limited privilege in that they do
not have to produce their books unless ordered to do so by the
Court. 2) It is submitted that in our law there is no magic in the
fact that a confidential relationship exists between the parties and
that it will only be one of several factors taken into account by
the court. 3) The relationship may, however, make the plaintiff's
task easier in convincing the court that he has suffered an invasion
of his privacy (ie that the defendant's act was wrongful),4) and may
be an aggravating factor when assessing damages. 5) In the United
States breach of a confidential relationship has formed the basis
of successful injunctions against a psychoanalyst who wrote a book
setting out the case history of an identifiable patient,6) and
against the author (an ex-CIA employee) and publisher compelling them
to make deletions in a book about the CIA.·7) In England the courts
have recognized that disclosures concerning what passed between a
husband and wife during a marriage may be actionable,8) but have re-
fused to enJoln the publication of the memoirs of a deceased Cabinet
Minister on the basis that it was not damaging to the public interest. 9)
1) Zeffert op cit 433, 443.
2) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s 236(4); Civil Proceedings
Evidence Act 25 of 1965, s 31. See below re banker and client.




Doe v Roe (1973) 33 NY 2d 902, 307 NE 2d 823, 352 NY 2d 626; cf
A Hill "Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment" (1976)
76 Columbia LR 1205, 1291; Cf Slovenko Psychiatry op cit 438:
"Psychiatrists ... are obliged to disguise their clinical data
even though it is detrimental to the scientific value of the '
material, in order to avoid the recognition of the patient".
7) Alfred A Knopf Inc v Colby (1975) 509 F 2d 1362 (4th Cir)· cf
Hill op cit 1291. '
8) -
Argyll v Argyll L196~7 1 All ER 611 (HL) 620; cf McQuoid-Mason
op cit (1973 90 SALJ 23, 3lf.
9)
Attorney-General v Jonathan Cope Ltd /19757 3 WLR 606 (QB); cf





(c) Public Servants: Public servants who deal with personal inform-
ation are generally prohibited from making disclosures concerning
such information outside the course of their official duties - unless
they obtain the consent of their head of department. 1) Similar pro-
V1Slons also apply to persons employed in terms of the South African
Reserve Bank Act,2) th~ Population Registration Act,3) the Railways
and Harbours Act,4) the Inspection of Financial Institutions Act,5)
the Income Tax Act,6) the Post Office Services Act 7) and the Statistics
Act. 8) As Neethling observes,9) there is little doubt that most of
these provisions are aimed at protecting the privacy of the individual.
(10) Data Banks: One of the greatest threats to the privacy of indi-
viduals in highly technological societies is the use of the computer
for the collection and processing of data concerning private indivi-
duals. 10) This is largely due to their speed,
"their capacity to store, combine, retrieve and transfer data,
their flexibility, and the low unit cost of the work which they
c an· do". 11 )
1) Public Service Act 54 of 1957, s 17 (m). See generally Neethling
Privaatheid op cit 395 n 6.
2) Act 29 of 1944, ss 20, 21(e).
3) Act 30 of 1950, s 17 (1). See above 233.
4) Act 22 of 1960, s 19(2).
5) Act 68 of 1962, s 8, 9(f).
6) Act 58 of 1962, s 4(1).
7) Act 66 of 1974, s 23(m).
8) Act 66 of 1976, s 8. See above 23lf. Section 15 provides that no
entry made by a competent person under the Act in any form, ques-
tionnaire, return, notice, book register or other document shall be
admissable as evidence in civil or criminal proceedings except if
the latter arise in terms of the Act. '
9) Neeth1ing Privaatheid op cit 396. See generally Hoffman op cit
210f; Schmidt op cit 426f.
10) See above 10.
11) HMSO Computers and Privacy (1975 Cmnd 6353) 4, para 6.
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It has been pointed out that the implications of computers for privacy
are that they: (a) facilitate the maintenance and retention of ex-
tensive records; (b) make data easily and quickly accessible from
many distant points; (c) make it possible for data to be transferred
quickly from different systems; (d) make it possible to combine data
in ways otherwise not practicable; and (e) allow data to be stored,
possessed and transmitted in unintelligible forms, so that few people
know what is in the records and what is happening to them.') These
factors combine to expose the subject of the information profile to
the danger that the information: (a) is inaccurate, incomplete or ir-
relevant; (b) may be given to persons who should not or need not have
it; and (c) may be used for some purposes other than that for which
it was co11ated. 2) Steps have been taken to control data banks in
the United States,3) Canada,4) and the Federal Republic of Germany5)
(and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom),6) and are being con-
sidered in several other countries. 7) While it is true that these
dangers are also present when traditional methods of data collection
are used8) (for instance, manual or mechanized filing systems), the
non-automated personal data systems have a much more restricted
ability to store,9) combine, retrieve and transfer data.· The use of
1) Ibid.
2) Computers and Privacy op cit 4,
Data Banks and the Individual:
Israel LR 542.
para 8. Cf C Farki "Computers -
Is the Problem Privacy?" (1970) 5
3) See above 64.
4) See above 122:
5) See above 93.
6) See above 81.
7) See above 117.
8) Cf HMSO Co~puter~: ~afeguards for Privacy (1975) Cmnd 6354) 5, para
13, when dlscusslng lnaccuracy: "InfQrmation held in computers is
~o more prone to this kind of error Linaccuracyl than information
ln manual records ... Moreover accurate information is far less
li~elY"to be trans~erred incorrectly by a computer than by a human
belng. Cf P Steln & J Shand Legal Values in Western Society
(1974) 202.
9) "Ten reels each containing 1,500 metres of tape 2.5 cm wide could
store a twenty page dossier on every man, woman and child in the
world". Ed AH Robertson Privacy and Human Rights (1973) 158.
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computers in South Africa in both the public and private sectioc will
obviously increase, but in the field of private personal information
systems appears to be limited. 1) Nonetheless the threat to privacy
from traditional data bank storage systems continues and is apparent
in the public and priv~te sectors. 2)
(a) Public Records: The statutory provlslons concerning in-
vasions of privacy by State agencies in South Africa have already been
considered. 3) Apart from the limited protection given in certain of
the statutes,4) unlike in the United States there is no general con-
trolling act regarding the accumulation and use of information gather-
ed by governmental agencies in the Republic. 5) The Population Regis-
tration Act6) poses a particular threat to a person's privacy by the
State, as it allows the Secretary for the Interior to furnish inform-
ation to any government department, local authority or statutory body
for any of their purposes, and to any other person (who makes written
application and pays the prescribed fee) provided the Secretary is
satisfied that it is in the interest of the person registered to fur-
nish the particulars. 7) The person registered is not required to
consent to the disclosure nor is he informed as to who has received
the information. With the growing use of computers in State depart-
ments it is submitted that there is a need for legislation similar to
the American Privacy Act of 1974 8) which will control the dissemination
1) There is apparently only one credit bureau in South Africa which
uses a computer and micro-fiche for retrievals. Information sup-
plied by Mr. P. Bartos, Managing Director of Dun & Bradstreet (Pty)
Ltd on 17th March 1977.
2) See above 10.
3) See above 23lff.
4)
Cf J Neethling Die Reg van Privaatheid (1976) 395f.
Cf Population Registration Act, 30 of 1950, s 17(1), see above
232£; Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962, s 4(1), see above 234; Statis-
tics Act, 66 of 1976 s 8, see above 23lf.
5) See above. C£ B Fail "Computer Leaks can Aid Fraud", Natal Mercurr.
25 November 1976.
6) 30 of 1950.
7) Section 17(2). See above 233.
8) Public Law 93-579, s 3418 (December 31, 1974); 5 United Stated
Code §552a; Report of the Committee on Government Operations (115
Senate) Protectin Individual Privac in Federal Gatherin Use and
Disclosure of Information Report No 93-1183 1974. See above 68f.
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'and accessibility of information stored by government data banks.
In particular tht individual should be entitled to a copy of his
data file, and given the right not only to correct any inaccuracies
th~rein, but also to veto the transmission of his personal informa-
tion to other persons or bodies. As in the United States exceptions
could be made for the pu~poses of state security and law enforcement,l)
but even if provisions similar to those in the American Privacy Act
were promulgated in South Africa in many respects this would be ren-
dered nugatory by the mass of presently existing security legisla-
. 2)tlon.
(b) Private Records: There is little information on the growth
or use of such records in South Africa. 3) Most privately compiled
data banks are concerned with credit records, and these like in
Canada,4) are usually compiled by credit bureaux from public records,
such as judgments in the law courts. S) Such information cannot be
regarded as private and may be freely circulated for a reasonable
period of time. Additional personal information is obtained from
firms selling on credit6) and sometimes the newspapers. 7) It is
interesting to note that in South Africa although most credit bureaux
would probably allow the subject of any inquiry to inspect his file,
there is usually an agreement between the user and the agency that the
former will not disclose the identity of the latter to the subject. 8)
1) See above 70 n 1.
2) Cf AS Mathews Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971) 134.
3) There are approximately 30 credit bur~aux operating in South Africa,
holding 8 million files. See above 28S n L The information contained
in this section was obtained by the writer during a visit to a
credit bureau in Durban.
4) Cf P Burns "The Law and Privacy: The Canadian Experience" (1976)
54 Canadian Bar R 1, 40f. See above 122.
5) Apparently credit bureaux in South Africa usually confine 'themselves
to matters directly concerned with a person's credit-worthiness,
and recond judgment debts and bankruptcies but not divorces and
criminal records.
6) Information is also obtained from shops who have "slow payers" as
well as "final notices" and credit reference centres. See abov~ 28S.nl
Credit inguiries from d~ta user~ are recorded on the subject's
card and lt would be posslble to bUlld up a profile of his credit-
spending habits by observing the pattern of inquiries.
7) Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit l3f. The bureau visited by the
writer only used newspaper reports to record the deaths of subjects.
8) This contrasts sharply with legislation in some of the Canadian
Provinces which makes any such agreement void. Cf Manitoba Per-
sonal Investigations Act, SM, 1971, c 23, s 6; Burns op cit 44.
See above 123.
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This means that not only is the subject unaware that he may inspect
his file but he may also experience difficulty in locating the agency
concerned. 1) Access to credit records is often restricted to mem-
bers,2) but a tracing service is sometimes available to non-members,
primarilyattorneys.3) Information for the latter is usually tele-
phonically gleaned from neighbours and employers, and is confined to
the residential or business address of the subject. Details concern-
ing a person's drinking habits, political views, marital life, sexual
activities, health, criminal transgressions and the like are not
usually recorded by credit bureaux, but are left to the pl'ivate in-
vestigator. 4) Even though the majority of bureaux probably use
manual non-automated retrieval systems the service is quick,S) and the
number of files considerable. 6) There is no system of licencing for
credit bureaux, although most agencies require their employees to ob-
serve a strict code of secrecy concerning the contents of files.
Furthermore there is the danger that the information held may be in-
accurate because of the difficulty of positively identifying subjects
from court records, credit inquiries and newspaper reports. 7) In
short members of the public have no control over the nature of the in-
formation gathered about them, the accuracy of such information nor
its accessibility, and may not even know that a particular agency has
a dossier on them. At common law the subject of a file would have to
1) In Durban there is only one credit bureau, but it would be more
difficult to locate the correct agency in say Johannesburg or Cape
Town.
2) Some firms require their customers to enter into a contract not to
use the information for purposes other than credit reference. See
above 286 n 3.
3) The tracing service is often run as an adjunct to the credit refer-
ral business and does not extent to field work which appears to be
the domain of private detectives.
4) The manager of the bureau visited by the writer was horrified to
hear of the detailed investigations carried out in the United States
and Canada. Cf EF Ryan "Privacy, Orthodoxy and Democracy" (1973)
51 Canadian Bar R 84, 88f; Farki op cit 544; J Swanton "Protection
of Privacy" (1974) 48 Aust LJ 91, 100f.
5) The retrieval rates at the bureau visited by the writer were approx-
imately 3 minutes for Whites,S minutes for Indians and l~ minutes
for Blacks. The names of Indians which were filed alphabetically
(like those of Whites) took longer to locate because of the use of
several alternative names, while those of Blacks were found more
quickly because they were filed numerically according to identity
numbers.
6) Cf The advertisement by the Natal Credit Bureau which claims that it
has files on over 800,000 customers, with access to a fur~her 3
million. (1976) 11 The Credit Manager, No 9, 9.
7) Cf Neetblini Privaatheid op cit 13. Such sources seldom include
tile. sUbJect s.date of blrth or identity number and therefore con-
fuslon can arlse where persons have th~ same names ~nCl nrr" ...." .. +-.: ---
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. h. ... 1)
bring an action for invasion of prlvacy under t e actlo lnJurlarum
or lex'Aquilia,2) and in several instances the disclosures may be re-
garded as privileged. 3)
Conclusion: It has been said that in the United States more than
half of the adult population is on file with credit rating agencies.
4
)
The proportion for South Africa is probably lower,S) but the increas-
ing use of credit buying and the growth of the cr~dit card system6)
are likely to make serious inroads into the individual's right to pri-
vacy in the future. The continuing curtailment of civil liberties
by the State 7) makes it unlikely that steps will be taken to safeguard
privacy in the public sector, but there is no reason why steps should
not be taken to control private data bank systems. 8) The present non-
automative methods of data collection already pose a threat to privacy
1) See above 147. An action might also lie for defamatio;l. Pickard v
SA Trade Protection Society (1905) 22 SC 89.
2) In which case the subject would have to prove patrimonial loss.
See below 362f.It has been pointed out that in the United States one
drawback of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (see above) is that the
plaintiff must prove actual damages and that "denial of credit does
not give rise, ordinarily, to any appreciable damages". DP Roth-
schild& DW Carroll Consumer Protection: Text and Materials (1973)
274; cf Note "The Fair Trade Reporting Act" (1971) 23 U Maine LR
253, 263f.
3) For instance communications between a credit bureau and a prospec-
tive seller or lender. See below 324.
4) Jones op cit 149. Cf R Slovenko Psychiatry and Law (1973) 443:
"Present technology will permit, within a very small space, a con-
solidation and storage of data equivalent to a 300-page book on
every person in the country". .
5) In 1976 Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd claimed to have over 6 million
files (ie for approximately 25% of South Africa's population).
(1976) 11 The Credit Manager No 1, 9, 10.
6) Cf C Smith "Credit Cards and the Law" (1975) 39 THR-HR 107, 109.
7) Cf Mathews Law, Order and Liberty op cit 134.
8)
Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 406. Similar legislation could be
introduced to control the activities of private investigators as
is the case in Rhodesia: Private Investigators and Security Guards
(Control) Act, 23 of 1977. See above 2l6f.
289
and it is submitted that the proposed Credit Agreements Bill,1) like
its English counterpart,2) should include provisions to ensure
that a data subject is: (i) notified that an agency is holding his
personal file; (ii) informed by any user of a credity agency as to
the latter's name and address; (iii) given the right to inspect,
correct and update his file; (iv) notified by the agency each time
his data is released and to whom; and (v) given the right to inquire
of any credit agency if they hold a file on him. Control of credit
bureaux would be facilitated if they were subject to a system of
licensing and civil and criminal penalties were imposed for breaches
of the relative statutory provisions. 3) It is conceded that the
above safeguards would not be adequate in the long term, but it is
submitted that at this stage they would not impose undue hardship on
credit agencies required to implement them. 4)
1) B 85 - '77 (1977).
2) Consumer Credit Act of 1974; cf AG Guest & MG Lloyd The Consumer
Credit Act 1974 (1975) l58f.
3) The Manitoba Personal Investigations Act, SM, 1971, c 23 (Burns
op cit 42ff), would serve as a useful model for these recommenda-
tions.
4) Swanton op cit 101f, has alluded to the problems involved enacting
premature omnibus legislation to control data banks. "These in-
clude such questions as (1) whether the legislation should apply
to all data banks or only those which are computerized; (2) when
does a collection of information become a 'data bank'; (3) whether
data banks should be registered or licensed; (4) whether the power
to impose restrictions on the type of data which can be collected,
the uses to which it can be put, and the method of storage should
be conferred on a Registrar or other administrative officer; (5)
whether the subject of a dossier is to have a right of access to
his file or to a computer print-out, and if so who is to pay and
when does the right accrue; (6) whether certain types of record
such as police or security files should be exempted from an obliga-
tion of disclosure; (7) whether different considerations apply to
the public and private sectors, and whether the services of an om-
budsman or similar functionary could be employed; (8) how much
regard should be paid to the claim of the information holder to the
privacy of his files; (9) how to ensure correction of errors and
inaccuracies in the files; (10) whether civil or criminal penal-
ties should be imposed, or norms of conduct established and whtther
civil liability should be absolute; (11) whether in some cases it
would be damaging to an individual to be informed of the contents
of his file; (12) what technical controls to protect privacy should
be imposed on the operators of computerized data banks and by whom;
and (13) whether there are to be privileges against defamation if
the files are opened". The answers to many of these questions are
to be found in the legislation promulgated in the United States
(see above 64), the United Kingdom (see above 81), the Federal Re-
public of Germany (see above 93) and Canada (see abovel2~.
C.
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PLACING A PERSON IN A FALSE LIGHT
1
)
In the United States where a person is exposed to publicity
which, even though it is not defamatory, places him in a false light
in the public eye, suc~ exposure may be actionable as an invasion of
privacy.2) Prosser suggests that the action was probably first
recognized in 1816 when Lord Byron successfully enjoined the circula-
tion of a badly written poem attributed to him,3) and gives several
other examples gleaned from the cases. For instance:
"publicly attributing to the plaintiff S0me 0plnlon or utter-
ance such as spurious books or articles, or the unauthorized
use of his name on a petition, or as a candidate for office,
to advertise for witnesses to an accident, or the entry of an
actor, without his consent, in a popularity contest of an em-
barassing kind".4)
In many instances, however, such cases have been decided on the
basis of defamation. A good example is Zbysko v New York American
Inc. 5) where a photograph of the plaintiff, a celebrated wrestler,
had been used, without his consent, to illustrate an educational art-
icle referring to the close structural resemblance between man and
gorilla. There were two photographs: one of a gorilla captioned
"A Hideous-looking Gorilla", and the other of the plaintiff in a wrest-
ling pose captioned "Stanislaus Zbysko, the Wrestler, not Fundamentally
Different from the Gorilla in Physique". The plaintiff's claim for
defamation succeeded when the court accepted his evidence
that he:
"enjoyed an international reputation for dignity, fine traits
of human character, kindliness, intelligence and culture ...
Land tha!7 many worthy persons Lha~7 treated and received him on
the basis of equality both physically and intellectually".6)
1) J Neethling Die Reg of Privaatheid (1976) 295, regards the "false
light" cases as relating not to privacy, but to "identity".
2) WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 812. Cf Ed AH Robertson Privacr
and Human Rights (1973) 103f. See above 58.
3) Lord Byron v Johnston (1816) 2 Mer 29, 35 Eng Rep 851; cf Prosser
Torts op cit 812.
4) Prosser Torts op cit 812.
5) (1930) 239 NY Supp 411; cf RE Megarry Miscellany-at-Law (1969) 200.
6) Ibid.
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It is submitted that even if the photograph had not been captioned
in a defamatory manner, the plaintiff would have recovered for in-
vasion of privacy, both in the United States,1) and in South Africa.
2
)
The courts in England have also decided these cases on the basis of
defamation. 3) In Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd,4) plaintiff was a
member of the Russian Imperial family who had fled to England from
Russia with her brother Prince Youssoupoff during the Revolution.
Prior to their flight plaintiff and her husband (to whom she was be-
trothed a'~ the time) had clashed wi th Rasputin the "Mad Monk". De-
fendants made a film called "Rasputin the Mad Monk" which included
characters identical to the plaintiff and her husband. The film im-
plied that Rasputin had seduced or raped the woman alleged to be the
plaintiff, and the person protraying her husband was shown as one of
Rasputin's murderers. The court awarded £25,000 damages for defama-
tion. Greer LJ said inter alia:
"If anyone printed and published the following words, 'The
lady who was engaged to Prince Youssoupoff had had sexual re-
lations with the mad monk Rasputin' nobody could suggest that
that was not a libel which ought to meet with serious conse-
quences".5)
There is a world of difference, however, between saying that a
person has "had sexual relations" with a "mad monk", and that a person
was "raped" by him, as in the latter case there is no moral blame-
worthiness attributable to the victim. 6) Therefore it is submitted
that Slesser LJ looked at the matter more realistically when he said:
1) ef Barber v Time Inc (1942) 348 Mo 119, 159 SW 2d 291; L Brittan
"The Rights of Privacy in England and the United States" (1963)
37 Tulane LR 235, 248.
2) In the United States such publication would constitute "appropria-
tion". See below 246.
3) See above 76.
4) (1934) 50 TLR 581 (CA). The plaintiff's brother brought an un-
successful action for privacy in the United States. Youssoupoff v
Columbia Broadcasting System (1963) 19 App Div 2d 865 (3); cf
Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 140.
5) At 585.
6) It is true, however, that the implication of moral blameworthiness
is not necessarily a criterion for defamation. In our law a state-
ment may be defamatory even if it excites sympathy for the plaintiff
. eg to say that he is insane; cf Rutland v Jordan 1953 (3) SA 806 '
(C) •
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"One may, I think, take judicial notice of the fact that a
lady of whom it is said that she has been ravished, albeit
against her will, has suffered in social reputation and in
opportunity of receiving respectful consideration from the
world. It is to shut one's eyes to realities to make these
nice distinctions".1) .
Early cases in our law also appear to have been decided on the
basis of defamation. In Knoesen v Theron2) the plaintiff who passed
herself off as a spinster was said to be married and the mother of
a child. The court held that such a statement, if false, would be
defamatory:
"If the defendant knew that she Lplaintiff7 passed as an un-
married woman it is clear that the defendant imputed either
unchastity or imputed that the plaintiff was sailing under
false colours in that, being a married woman she passed her-
self off as an unmarried woman. The statement in regard to
I
an unmarried woman that she has a child in itself implies un-
chastity and the mere fact that it is coupled with the state-
ment that she had been married does not excuse the person who
utters these words".3)
The last portion of De Vil1iers CJ's judgment is however difficult to
understand. One wonders how it could be defamatory to say of a
woman who profe~ses to be unmarried that she has been married and is
in fact the mother of a child. Surely such a statement would not
lower her in the eyes of right-thinking members of society, unless
there is an innuendo that she is a liar. It is submitted that the
Letter action in such a case would be for invasion of privacy. The
defendant in Mangaroo v Too1see~) another defamation case, said of
the plaintiff who was a Brahmin:
1) At 587.
2) (1904) 21 SC 177,181. Cf Dippenaar v Hauman (1878) 8 Buch 135
where the defendant dominee went further and falsely accused the'
plaintiff of giving birth to an illegitimate child, concealment
of its birth, and infanticide. Such allegations were clearly
defamatory.
3) At 181.
4) (1927) 48 NLR 100.
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"You are not a Brahmin Lthe highest cast~7, you are a Thakur
Lsecond in ran~7'."1)
The plaintiff succeeded because there was an innuendo of bastardy,2)
but it is submitted that if there was no such innuendo, and the court
was satisfied that the -circumstances justified it, an action for in-
vasion of privacy could have been brought. An action for defamation
also succeeded where a credit bureau falsely published to 3,000 con-
tributors to a trade protection magazine that a person had had a
provisional judgment taken against him. 3) On the other hand in
Smith v Lawrence 4) the defendant had said in the presence of the
plaintiff (a friend accompanying him) and one of the employees of de-
fendant's firm:
"I have taken judgment against you, and you can do what you
like".
The court, however, held that:
"L!7hough the words complained of are untrue and also capable
of a defamatory meaning the respondent did not discharge the
burden which rested upon him of establishing that they con-
veyed a defamatory meaning to anyone who heard them or any
injurious consequences to him from the effect of their publica-
tion".5)
It seems irrelevant, however, to determine whether the word~ had such
harmful consequences, as the plaintiff does not have to prove actual
damages. In defamation the court is concerned with the plaintiff's
reputation in the eyes of others, not the subjective effect of the
statement on his dignity.6) The court found that the words could
have had a defamatory meaning, but that the listeners did not regard
them as defamatory.7)
Pickard v SA Trade Protection Society (1905) 22 se 89.
(1929) 50 NLR 132.
Per Mathews J at 141. (My italics).
ef Movramatis v Douglas 1971 (2) SA 520 eR) 521.
"In other words he did not establish that the appellant's utter-
ance defamed him in his good name, credit and business reputation".









The learned judge was clearly influenced by the degree of publication
as he had previously said:
"In the circumstances proved the probabilities of any such in-
jurious consequences are very different from those which exist
when an erroneous statement of like nature has been made in a
trade journal circulating amongst those whose interest it is
to ascertain the names of persons against whom judgments for
debts have been recorded".1)
Mathews J, however, could hardly have meant to suggest that our law
follows the American approach that such publication must be made to
the public at large. 2) For instance, in Dauberman v Blumenfel,3)
it was held on exception that it may be defamatory for a person to
write to another's superior informing him that the latter had not
paid his debts. 4) It is submitted that had the plaintiff in Smith's
case sued on the basis of privacy the court would have come to another
conclusion because in privacy cases it is the effect on the plain-
tiff's dignitas which is important,S) and not the effect on the plain-
tiff's reputation in the eyes of others.
In Van Zyl v African Theatres (Pty) Ltd6) the plaintiff was a
professional singer who claimed damages arising from a false adver-
tisement in a newspaper that he would be singing at a particular func-
tion. No contract had been negotiated between plaintiff and defen-
dant although there had been some preliminary negotiations. Defen-
dants subsequently screened an advertisement which falsely stated that
the Plaintiff could not appear "because he was indisposed".7) Inex-
plicably the plaintiff confined his action to the newspaper advertise-
ment alleging that
"defendant 'maliciously' inserted the advertisement with the
intention of injuring the plaintiff, and with the intention of
using the plaintiff's name for their benefit".8)
1) At 141.
2) See above 196f. In the United States it has been held that "the
single publication rule applies to privacy as well as defamation".
Prosser Torts op cit 814.
3) 1934 NPD 314.
4) At 320.
S) See above 181£.
6) 1931 CPD 61.
7- ) At 64.
8) Ibid.
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'The court held that there was no evidence of animus injuriandi on
the part of the defendant,') and that in any event the plaintiff
had not proved "actual 10ss".2) It is submitted that the latter
dictum is untenable as the plaintiff was suing under the actio
injuriarum not the lex Aquilia. 3) Watermeyer J, however, seems to
have regarded himself bound by Fichardt Ltd v The Friend Newspapers
Ltd,4) where the appeal court had stated that a plaintiff must prove
(a) animus injuriandi and (b) damages, before he could recover.
5
)
The court in Fichardt's case appears to have regarded the action for
injurious falsehood as lying under the actio injuriarum,6) but be-
cause the plaintiff is suing for patrimonial loss and not sentimental
damages, the better view is that it falls under the lex Aquilia.
7
)
It is submitted that had the plaintiff in Van Zyl's case sued for
invasion of privacy he may have been more successful. 8) Ifi Van
Zyl's case the court stated that the plaintiff may have succeeded
had he sued for the false excuse concerning his non-appearance,
"because it was that which might have led some people to think




At 7,11. Van Zy1 v African Theatres (Pty) Ltd supra 64f.
Fichardt Ltd v The Friend Newspapers Ltd supra 7,11; cf Wessels
v Bosman 1918 TPD 431, 435; Care1se v Van der Schyff 1928 CPD 91,
94.
7) ef Brede11 v Pienaar 1924 GPD 203, 213; Gear & Son (Pt) Ltd v
Gove 1964 (1) SA 434 (AD) 441; Dun & Bra street Pt Lt' v SA
Merchants Combined Credit Bureau 1968 1 SA 209 C 18. Cf~G
McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) 214 n 37. Universiteit van
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Pilms 1977 (4)' SA 376 (T)~5.
8) ttis conceded ,that the plaintiff failed in Van Z~l'S case because
animus i~jur~andi wa~ not proved. uaere: coul be argued that as
the publlcatlon was ln a newspaper a mlttedly of limited circula-
tion) the matter should have been treated as publication by the
press? See above l57f.









Presumably he would have recovered sentimental damages, and it seems
that there is no reason in principle why he should not have been
awarded similar damages for being falsely represented as appearing
at a concert for which he had not contracted. The false excuse may
have been defamatory, but it is submitted that the false publicity
was an invasion of privacy in the sense of not only placing him in a
false light but also as an appropriation of his name for advertising.')
A classic illustration of a South African case where the plain-
tiff was put in a false light is Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers
Ltd. 2) Here the plaintiffs, one of whom was marred and two engaged,
had consented to the publication of their photograph in a nursing
journal. The photograph however, was used to illustrate an appeal
for the construction of a recreation centre for nurses at the hospital
where they worked. The photograph was captioned and couched in lan-
guage which implied that the three plaintiffs desired to meet un-
attached young men. The court held that the publication was not de-
famatory, but allowed the married woman to recover for contumelia on
the ground that:
"LIlhe publication of the alleged desire to meet persons of
the opposite sex (and this was stressed in the headlines)
because she was lonely when off duty, was an insult or con-
tumelia ... Langl would not only cause her embarrassment, but
the happiness of her married life would be thrown into doubt".3)
The two engaged nurses failed in their action because they had not
alleged that they were engaged to be married. As has been pointed
out above, all three plaintiffs should have recovered on the basis
that their private lives had been falsely exposed to the glare of pub-
licity which per se amounted to an invasion of their privacy.4) Al-
though many of the "false light" cases could be decided on the grounds
1) See below 300.
2) 1957 (3) SA 461 (W). Cf Martin v Johnson Pub Co (1956) Sup Ct 157
NYS 2d 409, which went further by describing plaintiffs as "'man
hungry' women"; Prosser Torts op cit 813 n 19.
3) At 468.
4) See above 129£.
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of defamation, Kidson's case is a good example of a case where the
disclosures were not defamatory.1) It is unfortunate that the judge
in Kidson's case emphasized the contumelia aspect, which implied that
he regarded it simply as an injuria rather than an invasion of pri-
vacy.2) An earlier "false light" case where the court also awarded
damages for injuria was Katzenellenbogen v Katzenellenbogen &Joseph,3)
where the plaintiff was coerced into signing a false statement that
she had been found in adultery and was unfit to have the custody of
her baby girl. The court held:
"I cannot doubt that this is an insult which would cause a
deep and abiding wound to her dignity and self-respect, and
lead her to feel that she has been classed as an abandoned
and dissolute person".4)
This case is perhaps distinguishable from the usual privacy situation
in that here it is the plaintiff who makes the false statement (al-
beit under duress) whereas in the privacy cases, defendant makes the
statement. Nonetheless, it could be argued that as the statement
is made under duress it is the defendant's will and not that of the
plaintiff which is being exercised. 5) Once again the fact that the
false statement was not published to the world at large is irrelevant -
here the document was signed in front of plaintiff's counsel and her
husband's attorney and counsel.
Prosser emphasizes that the "false light" cases are similar to
defamation and that there is a danger that they will swallow up the
latter,6) Bloustein on the other hand,7) submits that Prosser places
too much emphasis on the protection of reputation:
1) The same is true of Van 2yl v African Theatres (Pty) Ltd supra.
See above 294.
2) See above 130; Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 399.
3) 1947 (1) SA 622 (W).
4) Per Blackwell J at 629f.
5) Cf Spies NO v Smith 1957 (1) SA 539 (AD) 547.
6) Prosser Torts op cit 813. See above 62f.
7) EJ B10ustein "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser" (1964) 39 NY ULR 962.
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"I agree with Dean Prosser, that all of these cases involve
reputation, but I am persuaded, as he is not, that they also
involve an assault on individual- personality and dignity
which is characteristic of all other privacy cases. The slur
on reputation is an aspect of the violation of individual in-
tegrity".1)
In defamation cases in our law, where a person's fama is assailed,
the effect on his dignitas is irrelevant,2) although the fact that
the plaintiff suffered humiliation may be taken into account when
assessing damages. 3) The plaintiff is given a solatium for the loss
of his reputation, even though the effect on his dignitas may be mini-
mal. 4) Conversely in the 'false light' cases he is compensated for
the hurt to his feelings brought about by the unauthorized and false
publication of some aspect of his private life.
It is submitted, therefore, that provided the false disclos-
ures are published intentionally5) and cause the plaintiff to suffer
impairment of his dignitas6) and are offensive to the prevailing mores
of society7) - such disclosures will ground an action for invasion of
privacy. But the courts will not protect the hypersensitive indivi-
dual and will apply the de minimus non curat lex doctrine to minor
1) Bloustein op cit (1964) 39 NYULR 991. Cf TL Yang "Privacy:
A Comparative Study of English and American Law" (1966) 15 ICLQ
175, 185.
2) Cf Mathews v Van Rooyen 1972 (1) PH J 17 (NC); but cf Movramatis
v Douglas 1971 (2) SA 520 (R) 521.
3) See above 194.
4) Cf CF Amerasinghe Aspects of the Actio Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch
Law (1966) 190 "A statement which affects reputation will necessari-
ry;- on the other hand, be an impairment of dignitas". Note "Defa-
mation Privacy and the First Amendment" 1976 Duke LJ 1016 1036:
"The plaintiff may think differently of himself as a result of the
defamatory utterance. He may suffer harm to dignity, pride and
self-esteem".
5) See above 147.
6) See above 181.
7) See above 170.
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errors and inaccuracies concerning the plaintiff. 1) In any event
it is likely that our courts would be reluctant to hold a non-
defamatory news item oojectionable, and as in the United. States, it
would only be in serious cases of invasion of privacy that the courts
will grant relief. 2) It could be argued that this is what influenced
the court in refusing ~elief to the two engaged plaintiffs in Kidson
v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd. 3) The court indicated that had they
alleged that they were engaged it might have entertained their claim.
It is submitted, however, that in the circumstances even though such
an allegation was not made, the invasion per se was sufficiently re-
prehensible to ground an action. 4) A factor that would militate·
against invasion of privacy usurping defamation as a delict, is the
likelihood that the damages awarded in a defamation action will be
much larger. The main value of the recognition of an action for in-
vasion of privacy in "false light" cases would be the right to inter-
dict the publication of such false statements,S) and the recovery of
damages in situations similar to those experienced by the plaintiffs
in Kidson's case (ie where the publication is not defamatory).
In Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films 6) the court
mentioned Neethling's reference to the "torts" of "false light" and
"appropriation" as examples of infringements of identity rights. 7)
Although Mostert J observed that these "torts" could be used as guide-
lines for determining wrongfulness,8) he did not consider whether they
wouid be regarded as invasions of privacy in our law. In any event
the court found that on the facts the university had not been placed
in a false light. 9) It is submitted however, that even if the
university had been placed in a false light - short of defamation - or
had suffered an "invasion" of its "privacy", as an artificial person it
would have not.been able to recover. 10 ) On the other hand if the
university was placed in a false light and had suffered damages, or was
likely to suffer damages, it could sue for injurious falsehood under
the lex Aquilia. 11 )
1) Prosser Torts op cit 813; Arnerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit
182f. Ct Sievers v Bonthuys 1911 EDL 525, 531; Neethling
Privaatheid op cit 59, 259, 298.
2) Cf Yang op cit 185; SD Warren & LD Brandeis "The Right to Privacy"
(1890) 4 Harvard LR 193, 216 .
.~} 1957 (3) SA 461 (W). 4) See above 130 5) See above 194f.
6) 1977 (4) SA 376 (T). 7) At 386. 8) At 386f.
9) At 387. .. 10) See above 278£. 11) S b 1 361ee e ow .
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APPROPRIATION: USE OF A PERSON'S IMAGE, NAME OR LIKENESS
1
)
This form of invasion occurs when the defendant for his own
benefit or advantage appropriates the plaintiff's image, name or
likeness without the latter's consent. 2) The early privacy cases
in the United States c~ncerned "appropriation",3) while in England
they have been accommodated primarily under defamation. 4) In our
law such cases have also overlapped with defamation and passing-off,
for instance, in Reyneke v Reyneke 5) it was held to be defamatory to
give out that a plaintiff was the father of a woman's child, while
in Combrinck v De Kock6) damages were awarded where the defendant
passed him~elf off as the plaintiff's agent and thereby deprived the
plaintiff of business. There is a similarity between the "false
light" and "appropriation" cases in that in both instances, the plain-
tiff is exposed to publicity by having his image, name or likeness
used by another. It is the misuse of such image, name or likeness
which constitutes an affront to his dignitas and entitles him to an
action for invasion of privacy.7) A person's image, name or likeness
can be misused in a number of ways, for instance, in: (i) advertise-
ments; (ii) films; (iii) printed matter and photographs, and (iv)
radio and television.
1. Advertisements: The policy considerations behind this type of
invasion appear to be that the plaintiff is being deprived of prop-
rietary rights by such unauthorized use of his name or likeness for
commercial exploitation. 8) There are, however, other considerations
1) J Neeth1ing Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976) 295, does not regard the
"appropriation" cases as applying to privacy, but rather to an in-
vasion of the right to "identity".
2) WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 804; TL Yang "Privacy: A Com-
parative Study of English and American Law" (1966) 15 ICLQ 175, 186.
3) See above 53f.
4) See above 76.
5) (1889) 6 Cape LJ Ill; cf yanderbilt v Mitchell (1907) 72 NJ Eq 910
67 A 97. Befor~·theiname_of an illegitimate child's father can be '
entered in the Register of Births his consent in writing must
be obtained. Section 10, Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration
Act, 81 of 1963.
6) (1887) 5 SC 405. Cf In the United States where the defendant passed
as plaintiff to obtain credit or secret information. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co v Vandergriff (1936) 52 Ga App 662, 184 SE 452- Prosser
Torts op cit 805. '
7) EJ Bloustein "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser" (1964) 39 NYULR 962, 993.
8) Prosser Torts op cit 807.
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'which should be taken into account and the position has been sum-
marized as follows:
"The interest which a person has in the prevention of the pub-
lication of his picture without his consent may be of three
sorts: (1) the ~esire to preserve his mental peace and com-
fort from disturbances by distasteful publicity; (2) the
possible profit he may make from his photograph, if it has
commercial value; and (3) the interest in his reputation, the
loss of which by the false implication that he has sold the
privilege of using his picture for advertising purposes - if
such implication does in fact arise from the use of it - may
cause him mental distress or may prevent his entering into
desirable social or business relations with other persons".1)
Although Prosser concedes that "the element of protection of the
plaintiff's personal feelings is obviously not to be ignored",2) he
stresses the fact that the appropriation cases:
"recognize or create an exclusive right in the individual
plaintiff to a species of trade name, his own, and a kind of
trade mark in his likeness ... it is a right of value upon
which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses".3)
In many instances, however, (except perhaps where the plaintiff is
a well-known figure) the aggression on the plaintiff's dignitas will
outweigh any prospective pecuniary loss. It is interesting to note
that in Tolley v £!r4) the English court appears to have been in-
fluenced by the ,third interest mentioned above - presumably because
there was no common law tort of invasion of privacy.5) Notwithstand-
ing that the plaintiff was a well-known amateur golfer, there was no
reference to any loss of prospective profits which he might have suf-
fered had he decided to abandon his amateur status and desired to
engage in commercial advertising. He recovered simply on the basis
1) "Moving Pictures and the Right to Privacy" (1919) 36 SALJ 180, 181.
(Reprint from Yale LJ).
2) Prosser Torts op cit 807.
3) Ibid; ef Neethling Privaatheid op cit 295, who sees it as concern-
ing "identity" not privacy.
4) L193!7 All ER 131 (HL).
5) See above 72f.
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"that there was a defamatory innuendo that he had prostituted his
amateur status.') If he had wished to recover for loss of prospec-
tive profits he would have had to prove special damages which would
have been difficult to establish. 2) Similarly in our law on the
facts in Tolley's case the plaintiff would have recovered general
damages for invasion of privacy arising from the impairment of his
dignitas,3) but any loss of potential profits would have had to be
proved as special damages. 4) This would have been impossible on the
facts. Another English case which stressed the courts' concern for
the reputation (and dignity) of the plaintiff rather than his loss of
potential profits was Plumb v Jeyes Sanitary Compound Co.
5
) A photo-
graph of a policeman wiping his brow on point duty, which had been
taken several years previously, was used to advertise the defendant's
product without the former's consent. The picture had been captioned
as follows:
"Phew! I am going to get my feet into a Jeyes fluid foot-
bath".6)
The court held that the innuendo concerning the condition of the
policeman's feet was sufficient to constitute defamation. The em-
phasis in the United States on the loss prospective commercial gains
has caused one writer to suggest that the "appropriation" advertising
cases are more concerned with the plaintiff's "right to publicity"
than his right to privacy.7) Thus in the American case of Munden v
Harris 8) a photograph of a five year old child had been pUblishe~
with a caption stating:
1) Tolley v Fry supra 136, 139.
2) Cf PH Winfield & JA Jolowicz Winfie1d and Jolowicz on Torts 9 ed
(1971) 250.
3) Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
(C) •
4) Cf International Tobacco Co (SA) Ltd v United Tobacco Co (South)
Ltd. 1955 (2) SA 1 (W) 25ff.
5) (1937) The Times 15 April, 4; cf RE Megarry Miscellany-at-Law
(1969) 200.
6) Ibid.
7) MB Nimmer "The Right to Publicity" (1954) 19 Law & Contemp Problems
203; Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 66; Prosser Torts op cit 807.
8) (1911) Mo App 652, 134 SW 1076; cf L Brittan "The Right to Privacy ~
in England and the United States" (1963) 37 Tulane LR 233, 251.
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"Papa is going to buy Mama an Elgin watch for a present and
someone (1 mustn't tell who) is going to buy my big sister a
diamond ring. So don't you think you ought to buy me some-
thing?,,1)
It was held that although the plaintiff's right to privacy had been
invaded, it was in terms of an interference with the plaintiff's ex-
clusive property right of material profit to be derived from the
photograph. 2) The same principle applied in Kunz v Allen,3) where
a movie of plaintiff taken while she was shopping, was used as part
of an advertisement for the defendant's shop. On other other hand
in Olan Mills Inc v Dodd4) the court appeared to take cognisance of
the plaintiff's sentimental feelings rather than her loss of prospec-
tive commercial gains. The plaintiff had employed the defendant to
photograph her for an agreed price. Three years after she had re-
ceived and paid for the photographs, without her knowledge or consent,
the defendant mailed 150,000 post cards reflecting her photograph
throughout the state as part of an advertising campaign. In addition
enlargements were made and carried from door to door to solicit orders.
The plaintiff's name was not used, but her friends recognized her.
In assessing damages the court took into account "her humiliation, her
embarrassment, mental anguish Lang7 loss of weight from worry and lack
of sleep".5)
In the South African case of Van Zyl v African Theatres (Pty)
Ltd6) the defendants falsely advertised that the plaintiff would be
singing at one of their functions. 7) The court interpreted the plain-
tiff's claim to mean that defendants "intended to fill their own pock-





Brittan op cit 251.
(1918) 102 Kan 883, 172 Pac 532; cf (1919) 36 SALJ 181; cf
Foster-Milburn Co v Chinn (1909) 134 Ky 424, (1909) 134 Ky 424,
120 SW 364; Edison v Edison Poly Form Mfg Co (1907) 73 NJ Eq 136,
67 Atl 392; Brittan op cit 251.
4) (1961) 353 Ark SW 2d 22; Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 202f.
5) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 202f.
6) 1931 CPD 61.
7) See above 294.
8)
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injuriandi had not been proved1) and that the plaintiff had not
proved actual damages. 2) It is submitted that the court referred
to the defendant's "pockets" because the claim was for injurious
falsehood which requires the plaintiff to prove patrimonial 10ss.3)
If the plaintiff ~ad proceeded on the basis of invasion of privacy
and had established anlmus injuriandi he would have succeeded.
4
) A
classic case involving the unauthorized use of a plaintiff's photo-
graph for advertising purposes was O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Pub-
lishing Co Ltd. 5) The plaintiff, a SABC radio broadcaster, had con-
sented to her photograph being used to illustrate a news story, but
it was subsequently used in an advertisement. The issue of pros-
pective commercial exploitation was not raised, and indeed such a
claim could not have succeeded as the plaintiff's employers (the SABC)
did not allow its employees to advertise. 6) The court experienced
no difficulty in holding that:
"The unauthorized 'publication of a person's photograph and
name for advertising purposes is in my view capable of con-
stituting an aggression upon that person's dignitas".7)
This dictum contrasts sharply with that of the court in Edison v
Edison Polyform Manufacturing CoB) where the name and photograph of
the famous inventor were used to advertise a product which he had
patented and sold to defendants:
See above 141.




3) RG McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) 2l3f. See below 361.
Cf McKerron Delict op cit 214 n 37: "the wrong is said to be an
injuria and the remedy the actio injuriarum, /blut it is clear
that this is incorrect and that the remedy is-an action under the
lex Aquilia based on dolus".
4) See above 295 n 8.





"It is difficult to understand why the peculiar case of one's
features is not also one's property, and why its pecuniary
value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner rather than
to the person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it".1)
The latter case can perhaps be distinguished on the basis that the
plaintiff was a well-known inventor and that there was a link between
him and the product sold. It is not necessary, however, for the
plaintiff's name to appear on the advertisement. 2) The New York
courts have gone further when interpreting the state statute3) by
giving a broad meaning to what constitutes advertising purposes.
4
)
Where some surgeons carried out a delicate operation on the plaintiff's
nose and photographs were taken at the time and later used to illus-
trate an article by the physicians entitled "The Saddle Nose" the
court rejected the defendant's plea that the photographs were not pub-
lished for advertising purposes:
"An article even in a scientific publication may be nothing
more than someone's advertisement in disguise ... That the
article ... with its accompanying photographs of plaintiff
was published ... to advertise the defendant physicians and
their handiwork LI~7 a fair inference ... from the ... com-
plaint".5)
On the other hand if it was only the plaintiff's nose which appeared
in the photographs without anything to identify the plaintiff himself
there could be no action for invasion of privacy.6) The courts have
also adopted a similar wide interpretation of publications made for
trade purposes. In Semler v Ultem Publications 7) where a photograph
of a professional model in a negligee appeared in a sex magazine it
was held that the picture was for the purpose of trade as it sold the
magazine as well as the stories published therein. The same principle
1) Cf Brittan op cit 25lf.
2) Olan Mills Inc v Dodd supra.
3) NY Sess Laws 1903 Ch 132, ss 1-2. See above 53f.
4) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 206f.
5) Griffin v Medical Society (1939) 11 NYS 2d 109; cf Hofstadter
& Horowitz op cit 207f.
6) Cf Prosser Torts op cit 806. See above 258.
7) (1938) 170 Misc 551, 9 NYS 2d 319 (NY City Court Queen Co); cf
Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 207f.
306.
was applied where the name and likeness of the plaintiff a famous
bicycle rider was published in a booklet sold at bicycle races.
1
)
Although he was a public figure it was held that the publication was
for the purposes of trade and advertising and not merely "news".2)
Likewise to publish in a periodical devoted to the art of photography
the nude photograph of a professional model without her consent was
held to be "for the purposes of trade".3) It is submitted, however,
that such publication will only be for the purposes of trade where
the person whose image or likeness is used is a public figure or some-
one whose activities will excite public interest. 4) For instance,
it seems that plaintiff in Mhlongo v BaileyS) would have experienced
difficulty in showing that his photograph was used for business pur-
poses, whereas the plaintiff in Coetzee v CNA6) would have succeeded
as his story had received advance publicity in the magazines concerned.
In the South African action for invasion of privacy the monetary value
of the plaintiff's likeness is generally irrelevant, as the courts are
concerned with compensating the plaintiff for the aggression on his
d.· 7)IgnItas.
1) Miller v Madison Square Garden (1941) 176 Misc 714, 28 NYS 2d 811
(Sup Ct). Plaintiff had, however, given oral consent, although
the statute stated written consent must be given, and so nominal
damages of six cents were awarded. Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit
208f. For public figures see below 315.
2) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 208.
3) Myers v US Camera Pub Co (1957) 9 Misc 2d 765, 167 NYS 2d 771.
Plaintiff admitted that she had posed in the nude in the past but
only if "her face was cropped or she was partially covered so as
to be unrecognizable". Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 209.
4) Thus the unauthorized publication of photographs of a naked Miss
World taken while she was relaxing in private may well have been
actionable as an appropriation case. Cf J Neethling in Rapport
4 April 1976, 21. Similarly the use, without her consent, of a'
photograph of a topless Miss South Africa on a record album would
also be actionable. Cf Rapport, Y October 1977. See below
In Henders9n v Radio Cor oration Pt Ltd (1960) SR (NSW) 576,
an AustralIan c0':lrt oun that t e plaln~lff had "a commercially
saleable reputatIon"; cf H Storey "InfrIngement of Privacy and its
Remedies" (1973) 47 Aust LJ 498, 505.
5) 1958 (1) SA 370 (W). See above 127.
6) 1953 (1) SA 449 (W). See above 270f.
7) See above 185.
8)
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2. Films: The making of a film about a person's life has given rise
to such famous cases as Me1vin v Reid,1) and Stryker v Republic Pic-
tures 2) in the United States, and Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd
3
) in
England. Such use of a person's image or likeness is clearly for
business purposes, although it seems that a distinction will be made
between newsreels and feature films. Thus in Redmond v Columbia
Pictur~s Corp4) plaintiff, a golfer, had allowed his trick shot exhi-
bition to be filmed as a newsreel by Fox Movietone. Defendant pur-
chased the film from Fox and used it without plaintiff's consent in a
short feature distributed throughout the United States entitled
"Golfing Rhythm". Plaintiff was able to recover for invasion of
privacy.5) On the other hand where a person appears incidentally in
a newsreel eg in a crowd scene,6) or as a bystander in a police raid,7)
such invasions are unlikely to be actionable. 8) Where, however, the
news film specifically singles out the plaintiff for portrayal or com-
ment, and he is not a public figure, such a film may be actionable as
an invasion of privacy.9) Even if a person is a public figure, the
unauthorized use of his image or likeness will give rise to an action.
In Sharkey v National Broadcasting Co,10) the former world heavyweight
boxing champion of the world sued the NBe for screening a motion pic-
ture about him in a programme entitled "Greatest Fights of the Century"
without his consent. One of the claims in his successful action was
that the use of his name and pictures for the purposes of trade and
advertising had made his name and likeness less valuable to him in his
professional activities. 11 ) Where, however, the film is based on a
1) (1931) 112 Ca1 App 285, 297 Pac 91. See above 174.
2) (1951) 108 Ca1 App 2d 191, 238 P 2d 670. See above 174.
3) (1934) 50 TLR 581 (CA). See above 291.
4) (1938) 277 NY 707,14 NE 2d 636.
5) Cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 233.
6) Cook v 20th Century Fox Film Corp (1936) Supp Ct 59 NYLF 2200 71.
cr-Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 232.
7) Jacova v Southern Radio & Telev Co (1955) 83 So 2d 34; cf Hof-
stadter & Horowitz op cit 232.
Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 231; Prosser Torts op cit 807; cf
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 200. Cf Universiteit van Pretoria v
Tommie Meyer FIlms 1977 (4) SA 376 (T) 387 where the plaintiffs





Blumenthal v Picture Classics (1933) 261 NY 504.
(1950) 93 Fed Supp 986 (DCNY).
Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 238.
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fiction and the plaintiff is not identifiable no action will lie.l~
But if a person can be identified he will have an action even though
the producer purported to disclaim liability eg by stating that the
characters and events are fictitious and that any references to per-
sons living or dead ar~ purely coincidental. 2) It is submitted that
the same principles will apply in our law. 3)
3. Printed Matter and Photographs: One of the most common forms
of commercial exploitation occurs where a person is exposed to pub-
licity in a book, magazine or newspaper, whether his image or private
life is used to satisfy the interests of history, science, education
or the prurient tastes of the masses. If could perhaps have been
argued that in Mhlongo v Bailey4) the article was of the type which
would boost the sales of the magazine at the expense of the plain-
tiff's hurt feelings 5) but this is not clear from the record. Simi-
larly in Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd6) the flavour of the
article about the nurses was also designed to stimulate interest in
the newspaper and increase its circulation. Hofstadterand Horowitz 7)
give a number of examples under the New York statute where the courts
have held that the publication falls outside the "purposes of trade":
"the use of a prominent pugilist's picture in connection with
his biography appearing in a newspaper;8) the single use of
the photograph of an actress in connection with a magazine
article onburlesque;9) the use of the name in a novel once
1) Cf Lever v Warner Bros Pictures (1944) 57 Red Supp 40 (DCNY);
Bernsteln v NBC (1955) 129 Fed Supp 817 (plaintiff acquitted of
murder, portrayed fictiona11y as having been convicted - but not
identifiable); Miller v NBC (1957) Del 157 Fed Supp 240 (re-
enactment of bank robbery[)y plaintiff, using fictitious name)·
cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 235. '
2) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 235f.
3) Cf above 265.
4) 1958 (1) SA 370 (W).
5) At 373.
6) 1957 (3) SA 461 (W).
7) Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 2l0f.
8) Jeffries v NY Evening Journal Pub Co (1910) 67 Misc 570.
9) Colyer v Fox Pub Co (1914) 122 App Div 297.
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in 398 pages;1) the picture of an alleged strike-breaker on
the frona~piece of a book, and the use of the name four times
in the 314 pages of the same book, detailing a history of pro-
fessional strikebreaking;2) the use of an uncommon surname in
a comic cartoon,3) with no sufficient parallel of the character
to show intent to portray; the false use of a reputable author's
name as author of an absurd adventure story (although it con-
stituted libel) ;4) the publication of a minor's picture in a
magazine article portraying her in a night club smoking and
drinking intoxicating beverage~".5)
It is submitted, however, that apart from the incidental reference
to the plaintiff in Damron's case, and the use of the plaintiff's sur-
name in Nebb's case the other uses could well have been interpreted
as being for "the purposes of trade".6) In any event in our law it
is not necessary to decide whether or not such use was for "purposes
of trade" as it is the hurt to the plaintiff's sentimental feelings
h
o h ° ° 7)w lC lS lmportant.
4. Radio and Television: The same principles apply to the use of "a
person's image or likeness or reference to him on radio or television
programmes. It has been suggested however that references to indi-
viduals on sponsored programmes should not be regarded as for "adver-
tising purposes":
"The unique economic necessities of radio and television
require that, in large part, programs (sic) appear under the
sponsorship of commercial advertisers. To hold that the mere
fact of sponsorship makes the unauthorized use of an individual's
Cf Time Inc v Hill (1967) 385 US 374.See above 179.
1) Damron v Doubleday, Doran & Co (1929) 226 App Div 796.
2) Kline v McBride & Co (1939) 170 Misc 974.
3) N~bb v Bell Syndicate (1941) 41 Fed Supp 429 (DCNY); cf the Eng-
IISh ~ase of Blennerhasset v Novelty Sales Services Ltd (1933)
The Tlmes May 19, 4; cf Megarry op cit 201.
4) D'Altomonte v NY Herald Co (1913) 154 App Div 453.
5) Callas v Whisper Inc (1951) 278 App Div 974.
6) See above 59.
7)
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name or picture on radio or television a use 'for advertising
purposes' would materially weaken the informative and educa-
tion potentials of the still developing media".1)
In our law the criteria is whether or not such unauthorized use con-
stitutes an aggression on the plaintiff's dignitas. Should the
latter also wish to recover for pecuniary loss, he would have to
prove actual loss resulting from the invasion. 2) An interesting
case outside the field of advertising but concerning commercial gain,
and regarded by one eminent writer as relating to privacy,3) is the
Australian case of Victoria Park Racing Co Ltd v Taylor. 4) Defen-
dants had on their own property erected a high platform overlooking
plaintiff's race-course. The erection was ignored until the defen-
dants hired the platform out to a broadcasting company, whose announ-
cer was so skilled that many people preferred to remain at home and
listen to the broadcast, rather than pay admission to the course.
Plaintiff proceeded against both the announcer and the broadcasting
company but the Privy Council refused leave to appeal because it found
there was no precedent for plaintiff's action, as it fell outside nui-
sance, abuse of property rights or copyright. 5) Paton suggests that
it could probably have been accommodated as an invasion of privacy.6)
It is submitted that in South Africa the case could have been decided
on the basis of unfair competition7) under the lex Aqui1ia. In any
event the plaintiffs constItuted an artificial person which is unable
to sue for invasion of privacy.8) In order to succeed_in an action
1) Gautier v Pro-Football Inc (1951) 30 NY 354.
2) See be1o~ 362£.
3) G Paton "Broadcasting and Privacy" (1938) 16 Canadian Bar R 425;
cf (1938) SS SALJ 449, 460.
4) (1937) 58 CLR 479; cf Paton op cit (1938) SS SALJ 449f.
5) Cf Paton op cit (1938) SS SALJ 449.
6) Paton op cit (1938) SS SALJ 460.
7) Cf Dun & Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau
(~a¥e)(PtYJ Ltd 1968 (1) SA 209 CC) 218: "Lrlhe basis of a plain-
t1f 's act10n for wrongful interference by a competitor with his
rights as a.tr~der is ~learly stated to.be Aquilian. The signifi-
cance of th1S 1S that 1t means that, wh1le such an action must
satisfy a~l the requirements of Aquilian liability, the broad and
ample bas1s of the Lex Aquilia is available in this field for the
recognition of rights of action even where there is no direct pre-
cedent in our law".
8) Cf Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films 1977 (4) SA 376
(T) 384. See above 277f.
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for unlawful competition the plaintiff would have to prove patrimonial
loss or a reasonable apprehension of such 10ss.1) It has been argued,
however, that all claims for patrimonial loss should be brought under
the Aquilian action even though the wrong is also an injuria eg
defamation. 2)
Conclusion: In short it appears that in our law there is little
need to distinguish the appropriation cases from any other invasion
of privacy, as the South African courts are in general concerned
with the aggression on the plaintiff's dignitas, rather than the
effect on his patrimony.3) Where, however, patrimonial loss does
arise, whether it results from an intru5ion, public disclosure or a
"false light" situation the plaintiff may bring a "rolled-up" action
for the hurt to his sentimental feelings and the pecuniary loss





For the requirements of an interdict, see above 194f.
Gelb v Hawkins 1959 (2) PH J 20 (W), contra McKerron Delict op
cit 11 n 37. See below 365. Cf Universiteit van Pretoria v
Tommie Meyer Films supra 385. .
But cf. the ~erican appr0':lch in Prosser Torts op cit 815; "If
there 1S eV1dence of spec1al damages, such as resulting illness
or unjust enrichment of the defendant, or harm to the plaintiff:s
own commercial interests, it can be recovered."
See above 304. But contra Neethling Privaatheid op cit 295 who
regards the appropriat1on cases as referr1ng to the "right of
identity".
Mathews v Young 1922 AD 492, SOS. See below 365.





Academic writers have suggested that the defences of privilege,
fair comment and consent which are applicable in cases of defamation
should be available as defences to actions for invasion of privacy,l)
as well as the special defences of necessity and private defence.
2
)
The South African courts have stated that the success of an action
for invasion of privacy will depend:
"upon the circumstances of each particular case, the nature
of the Lpublicatio~7, the personality of the plaintiff, his
station in life, his previous habits with reference to pub-
licity and the like".3)
The Rhodesian Court appears to have approved this flexible approach
in S v 14) where Beadle ACJ refused to label the specific defence
ope~ to-the appellant. 5) Nonetheless it is useful to determine which
defences are available to a defendant faced with an action for invas-
ion of privacy. It is submitted that most of the traditional defen-
ces to actions under the actio injuriarum will be applicable to in-
vasions of privacy causing sentimental 10ss.6) These defences can be
divided into those which negative wrongfulness and those which rebut
1) CF Amerasinghe The Actio Injuriarum in Roman-Dutch Law (1966) 197;
TL Yang "Privacy: A Comparative Study of English and American
Law" (1966) 15 ICtQ 175, 187; B Neill "The Protection of Privacy"
(1962) 25 Modern R 393, 394. Contra DE Brown "The Invasion of
Defamation by Privacy" (1971) 23 Stanford LR 547, 560.
2) J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976) 332, 335.
3) O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C)
248; Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 37Q (W) 37lf; cf Restatement
of Torts, (1939) §867, Comment D: "L~7iability only exists if the
defendant's conduct was such that he should have realized that it
would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensitivities ... L~70r
determining liability, the knowledge and motives of the defendant
the sex, station in life, previous habits of the plaintiff with '
reference to publicity, and other similar matters are considered".
See above l54ff.
4) 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD).
5) At 789.
6) S v I 784supra .
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. 1)
fault. The list in each case, however, is not exhaustive.
2)
B. DEFENCES NEGATIVING WRONGFULNESS
The defences which rebut the wrongfulness of the defendant's
conduct under the actio injuriarum and could be used to defeat a
claim for invasion of privacy include the following: (i) justifica-
tion; (ii) privilege; (iii) fair comment; (iv) consent; (v) nece-
ssity; (vi) self-defence; and (vii) statutory authority.3)
1. Justification: It should be noted that justification as a defencE
to invasion of privacy will usually, but not necessarily bethe same
as justification in defamation where the elements are truth and pub-
lic interest. 4) Whether or not the invasion is justified is a matter
of policy which must be decided by weighing up the conflicting in-
terests. 5) There is no closed list of situations which would justify
a defendant's action,6) and in the wide sense the defence applies
to cases where although the defendant has the intention to injure
and has invaded the plaintiff's privacy, the law does not recognize
such invasion as wrongful. Thus the defence of justification only
concerns the question of lawfulness. 7)
1) For the distinction between wrongfulness and fault see above ISO.
2) Cf Jordaan v Biljon 1962 (1) SA 286 (AD) 294; Muller v SA
Associated Newspapers Ltd 1972 (2) SA 589 (C) 592.
3) It is conceded that the first three are usually associated with
defamation, but it is submitted that they can be applied to invasion
of privacy. Cf Fayd'herbe v Zammit supra 719. But cf Matiwane v
Cecil, Nathan, Beatie & Co. 1972 (1) SA 222 (N) 227.
4) Cf Sutter v Brown 1926 AD 155, 172; Johnson v Rand Daily Mail 1928
AD 190, 204; Mahomed v Kassim 1973 (2) SA 1 (RAD) 9. Cf Neethling
Privaatheid op cit 351: "Die verweer waarheid en openbare belang
kom nie in hierdie verbond ter sprake nie aangesIen, soos reeds
aangevoer, privaatheid slegs deur die kennismedeling van ware pri-
vate feite geskend kan word". Neethling Privaatheid op c~95,
does not regard the false light cases as falling under privacy. It
is submitted that the defence of justification in privacy cases
generally means "truth and public interest", but that "public inter-
est" is the overriding consideration. Cf Fayd'herbe v Zammit supra
719. See below 319.
5) ~ v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD 786.
6) ~ v I supra 784 f.
7) S v I supra 784: "The sole issue in this case ... is whether in
the c~rcumstance~, the appellants were justified in peeping through
the wIndow: AgaIn p~t ano!her way, were they justified in invading
the complaInant's prIvacy In the manner in which they did? If
they ~er~ so ~ustified? the fact that as a necessary consequence
of thIS InvaSIon of prIvacy the complainant's Qignitas was injured
is an irrelevant consideration".
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In S v 11) where the complainant was suspected of committing
- -
adultery with the appellant's husband it was held that the appellant
was entitled to'invade the former's privacy when seeking evidence of
such adultery, provided such "invasion Lwa?,7 no more than was reason-
ably necessary for the purpose of obtaining that eVidence".2) Beadle
ACJ observed however that:
"there may be other circumstances, such as the reprehensible
conduct of the complainant, which the modes of thought preva-
lent in the community might consider sufficient to justify the
invasion of privacy even where the invasion was not a trivial
one".3)
A similar approach had been adopted by the court in Rhodesian Print-
ing and Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan4) where the respondents had unlaw-
fully abducted the minor children of their previous marriages and
taken them from the United States to Rhodesia. 5) It was held that
although the respondents could interdict the publication of the story
by the appellants on behalf of their children,6) in respect of their
own application the disclosures would have been justified. 7) The
overriding consideration for whether or not the invasion is justified
is often the fact that it is "in the public interest". This may
sometimes arise because a person is either a publ~c figure or dis-
closures concerning him are in'the public interest. 8)
At 595f.
At 593f.
Cf the Canadian case of Deschamps v Automobiles Renault Canada Ltee
,(1972) se Mtl, unreported: "Clearly there are instances, such as
t~e reporting of news and,discussion of public issues and public
fIgures, where the public interest may override private .rights".
Cf H Patrick Glenn "Right to Privacy in Quebec" (1974) 52 Canadian
Bar ~ 297, 298. The South African Press Council Code of Conduct
para 4 Cb), provides that the press should: liexercise exceptional
care and con~id:r~tion in Dat~ers.inv?lving the private lives and
concerns of ~ndIvIduals, b~a:Ing In mInd that the right to privacy
may be overrIdden by a legItImate public interest". (my italics)
Cf K W Stuart The Newspaperman's Guide to the Law 2 ed (1977) 267.
1) Supra.
2) At 787. See above 2l8f.
3) At 784f.
4) 1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD).





(a) Public Figures: In spite of the courts' reluctance to allow
people to publish facts concerning a person's private life, if the
person happens to be a public figure such publication may be justi-
fied.
"A public figure ,has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate in-
terest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has be-
come a 'public personage'."1)
Where a person's way of life is directed to seeking publicity and he
is regarded by the society in which he lives as a celebrity, for in-
stance, an actor, entertainer, professional sportsman, politician or
war hero, he is considered, to a certain extent, to have forfeited
his right to privacy.2) Prosser suggests that there are three rea-
sons for this approach: (i) such people have sought publicity and
consented to it so they cannot object when they receive it; (ii)
their personalities and affairs have already become public, and can
no longer be regarded as their own private business; and (iii) the
Press has a privilege to inform the public about them. 3) But the
fact that a person is a public figure does not entitle the public to
know everything about him. For instance, a film star is entitled
to be left alone while at home ,4) an actress is entitled to privacy
1) WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 823; SH Hofstadter &G Horo-
witz The Right to Privacy (1964) 48, who fail to distinguish a
"public figure" from a person who is catapulted into the news.
Prosser Torts op cit 827, suggests that "the 'public figure' must
have achieved that stature before there can be any privilege aris-
ing out of it, and that the defendant, by directing attention to
one who is obscure and unknown, cannot himself create a public
picture, or make him news". Cf Gertz v Robert Welch Inc (1974)
~18 US ~23, 345: "Public figures Zass~m~Z roles of especial prom-
lnence ln the affairs of society ... LanQ/ thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to in-
fluence the resolution of the issues involved". Cf A Hill "Defa-
mation and Privacy under the First Amendment" (1976) 76 Columbia LR
1205, l2l2f: Note 1976 Duke LJ 1016, 1018.
2) Prosser Torts op cit 824; cf Ed AH Robertson Privacy and Human
Rights (1973) 49f.
3) Prosser Torts op cit 824.
4) Cf Bernard Blier v Societe 'France Editions et Publications' (1966)
2 JCP 14875, see above lOCo
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concerning her intimate sexual relationships,') and the Press would
have no right to pry into the private bank account of a famous sports-
man or war hero. 2) Thus the unauthorized publication of a photograph
of the Prime Minister or a Cabinet Minister in his private pool, or
of a famous rugby player or racing driver relaxing in his home, would
be regarded as an invasion but not if the Prime Minister of Cabinet
Minister was carrying out a public duty or the sportsman or driver was
engaged in his sporting activities. 3) The degree of such protection,
however, varies from country to country.
In Italy the publication of the likeness of a famous person or
historical event is permitted,4) and the same applies in Germany in
respect of portraits of persons "belonging to contemporary history".S)
The Swiss have a similar approach to the Germans,6) while the French
on the other hand, allow public figures the same right to privacy as
anyone else, except that their sphere of privacy is less extensive. 7)
In the words of the Paris Court of Appeal:
"A person's right to his likeness is not subject to exception
where stars and public personages are concerned, apart from
the question of consent for the publication of a representation
of their features: while such cons~nt is presumed when the pub-
lication relates to the public life or professional activity of
1) Cf Trintignan v Societe 'La France Continue 1 (1966) Dalloz 749;
cf Robertson op cit 31. See above 100f. .
2) DJ McQuoid-Mason "Invasion of Potency?" (1973) 90 SALJ 23, 29.
3) Cf SA Strauss, MJ Strydom & JC Van der WaIt Die Surcr=A'frikaanse
Persreg (1976) 291.
4) Section 97, Italian Copyright Act; cf Robertson op cit SO.
S) Robertson op cit SO; cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 88f.
6) Cf A Logdberg "The Right in a Person's Own Likeness" (1967) 11
Scandinavian Studies in Law 213, 220.
7) Robertson op cit sot; cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 147.
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such a person, by reason of his tacit but unequivocal accep-
tance thereof by making himself an object of public interest,
the same does not apply when the reproduction relates to his
private life".1)
Furthermore, although this form of defence may sometimes avail where
a public figure's privacy has been intruded upon or disclosures have
been made concerning his private life, it will not succeed where
such a person has been placed in a false light or his personality or
likeness has been appropriated. Consequently the defence has failed
in the so-called "ad"'lertising" cases. 2) For instance, even the.
Emperor of Austria was given the right to prevent his name being used
by an insurance comp~ny,3) and Count Zeppelin successfully objected
to the registration of his name and portrait as a trademark for a
certain brand of cigars and cigarettes. 4)
It is submitted that the limiting factor for invasion of the
privacy of "public figures" is whether or not such invasions are for
the "public benefit or interest".5) Difficulties arise, however,
where a previously publicly active person withdraws from public life.
The American Restatement6) states that -"public figures" and "persons
thrust into the public limelight,,:7)
1) Brigitte Bardot v Societe de Presse Marcel Dassault (1967) Dalloz
450; Robertson op cit SI. (Robertson's translation) .
2) Prosser Torts op cit 827.
3) Von Thodorovich v Franz Josef Beneficial Assoc (1907) 154 F 911
(ED Pa); Prosser Torts op cit 827.
4) Cited by HC Gutteridge "Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy"
(1931) 47 LQR 203, 209. Cf the "Herrenreiter" case in Germany,
(1958) 26 BGHZ 349, see above 87., Contra the English case of
Clark v Freeman (1848) Ch 11 Beav 112, 83 Rev Rep 527. See
above T5.
5) See below 319.
6) Restatement of Torts (1939) §867; Comment F; cf Mr & Mrs 'X' v
Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1974 (4) SA 508 eR) 513;
Rhodesian Printing & PUblishing Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590
(RAD) 593.
7) See below 3l9f.
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"are the object of legitimate public interest during a period
of time after their conduct or misfortune has brought them to
public attention; until they have reverted to the lawful and
unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community, they
are subject to the privilege which publishers have to satis-
fy the curiosity 'of the public as to their leaders, heroes,
villains and victims".1)
It follows from the above that once a person has resigned from pub-
lic life, or once a hero or victim has retreated into the anonymity
of his community, or a wrongdoer has made reparation, or a criminal
has paid his debt to society and has been rehabilitated, the "veil
of privacy" should be restored. 2) This raises the difficult ques-
tion of determining when disclosures concerning such persons cease
to be in the public interest. Our courts adopt the attitude that
generally it is not in the public interest to "rake up the ashes of
the dead past",3) unless a person's current behaviour justifies such
disclosures,4) but difficulties arise in respect of "news items" and
matters of educational interest. Where should the courts draw the
line?
"One troublesome question ... is that of the effect of lapse
of time, during which the plaintiff has returned to obscurity.
There can be no doubt that one quite legitimate function of
the press is that of educating or reminding the public as to
past history, and that the recall of former public figures,
the revival of past events that once were news, can properly
be a matter of present public interest".5)
In the United States it seems that the courts are reluctant to bury
the past if the disclosures about the plaintiff do not concern scan-
dalous, immoral or criminal conduct by him. Where the plaintiff's
1)
My italics. See above 315 n 1. Cf Prosser Torts op ci t 825.
2)
ef DJ McQuoid-Mason "Public Interest and Privacy" (1975) 92 SALJ
252, 254.
3) Graham v Ker (1892) 9 se 185,187; Lyon v Steyn 1931 TPD 247, 254.
See above--zo 8 .
4) Yusaf v Bailey 1964 (4) SA 117 (W) 127. See aboveZ70.
5) Prosser Torts op cit 827.
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'previous conduct was meritorious or praiseworthy the courts appear
to treat the disclosures as in the public interest. This can be
the only explanation for such decisions as Sidis v FR Publishing
Corp.1) and Stryker v Republican Pictures. 2)
In short it is submitted that the test for whether a person is
a public figure should be: has he by his personality, status or con-
duct exposed himself to such a degree of publicity as to justify in-
trusion into, or a public disclosure of, certain aspects of his pri-
vate life? However, non-actionable intrusions on his privacy should
be limited to those that are in the public interest or for the public
benefit, so that unjustified prying into personal affairs, unrelated
to the person's public life, may be prevented. 3)
(b) 'Public Interest Even though a person is not a public
figure, disclosures concerning~mmay well- be in the~blic interest. 4)
These cases where a person is catapulted into the public eye, often
1) (1940) 113 F 2d 806 (2 Cir). See above 174.
2) (1951) 108 Cal App 2d 191, 238 P 2d 670. See above174.In Time Inc
v Hill (1967) 385 US 374, the court ·held that in all "matters of
public interest" in order to recover in cases of false light privacy
the plaintiff must prove "actual malice" by the defendant (at 387f).
Furthermore the distinction between "public" and "private" figures
in such cases was irrelevant (at 391). See above 62f.
3) McQuoid-Mason op cit (1973) 90 SALJ 29. It is submitted that
Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 76, go too far by stating: "When a
person becomes a celebrity or a public figure, he is a legitimate
object of public interest and of news with respect both to his pub-
lic life and his l1rivate affairs". (My italics) The latter can·
only refer to "prlvate affairs" which touch on his "public life".
See also Neethling Privaatheid op cit 34lf. Cf Gertz v Robert
Welch Inc (1974) 418 US 323, 352: "an individual should not be
deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life".
4) See generally Neethling Privaatheid op cit 34lf. "Public interest"
is also a defence in certain Canadian provinces. It is a defence
in Saskatchewan if the disclosure is reasonably believed to be of
public interest (Saskatchewan Privacy Act, SS, 1974 c 80, s 2(a));
in Manitoba the belief must relate to publication in the public
interest (Manitoba Privacy Act, SM 1970, c 74, s ~f)(l)), while
in British Columbia it will only be a defence if it is of public
interest - irrespective of the defendant's belief (British Columbia
Privacy Act, SBC 1968, c 39). See generally P Burns "The Law and
Privacy: The Canadian Experience" (1976) 54 Canadian Bar R 1, 38.
It is submitted that in our law as the defence of Justlflcation
refers to 1awfulness the reasonableness or otherwise of the defendant's
belief is irrelevant. See above 313.
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~
against his will, anf finds himself regarded as an instant cele- I
brity or a legitimate subject for a "new item".l No matter how /
pas~ively a person has lived in a society, he may suddenly find
himself the innocent victim of some natural catastrophe, public
scandal, or even a criminal attack, for instance, a woman who has
been raped or indecent~y assaulted, or a bank manager who has
robbed by armed gangsters. 2) It could be argued that to a limited
extent such people invite a degree of publicity (particularly in,
the case of a complainant in a criminal case), 3) but this is not
true in respect of the victims of natural disasters or the relatives
of both the victims and the wrongdoers. It is perhaps ironic that
our law prohibits (except with the permission of the Minister of Po-
lice) the publication of photographs of a prisoner in custody to pre-
vent "the humiliation of the prisoner, or his friends and relatives,
while he is in prison",4) although the relatives and friends themselves
may be exposed to full publicity. In any eve!~ when should a disclosure
be !.egarde~as a valid "news item"? One approach is for the courts to
insist that such items should be related to current events, and this has
led to the difficulties mentioned above. 5) The same difficulty was re-
cognized in England, and one of the provisions of Lord Mancroft's ill-
fated Right of Privacy Bil1 6) stat~d that, for an invasion of privacy
1) Prosser Torts op cit 825: "Public figures for a season". Cf
Neethling Privaatheid op cit 217.
2) Cf McQuoid-Mason op cit (1973) 90 SALJ 29f.
3) A certain measure of protection is given in the Criminal'Procedure
Act 51 of 1977. The court may direct any criminal proceedings to
be held behind closed doors where it appears to be in the interests
of State security, good order, good morals or the administration
of justice (s 153(1)), or where there is "a likelihood that harm
rn~gh~ resu1~ to any person other than the accused" (s 153(2)).
Vlctlms of lndecent assaults, the procuration of indecent acts and
extortion or other similar statutory offence (or persons sUbje~ted
to attempts to commit such offences) may request the court to be
cleared (s 153(3)). In any event where the accused or a witness
is under the age of 18 years the c?urt will be cleared (s l53(4)~
s 153(5)). Where the court has dlrected the hearing to be behind
closed doors it may prohibit the publication of certain information
relating to the proceedings (s 154. Cf Act 56 of 1955, s 64(5)
s 386(1), where the accused could give his consent to such publica-
tion). Information concerning such proceedings may however be
published in a bona fide law report (s 154 (4)).
4) S v SA Associated News1apers Ltd 1962 (3) SA 396 (T) 397; cf s44(e)(ii) of Act 8 of 959.
5) See above j 18.
6) See above 79.
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to be in the public interest, it had to be shown, inter alia, that
at the time of publication the plaintiff was "the subject of reason-
able public interest by reason of some contemporary event directly
involving Lhi~7 persona11y".1) Such a provision would ensure, for
example, that the re1a~ives of a criminal or his victim would not be
harassed by the press. In deciding whether a particular statement
is for the public benefit our courts will consider not only the sub-
ject matter of the statement, but also all the circumstances surround-
ing the publication, and in particular "the time, manner and the
occasion of the pUb1ication".2) The contemporaneity approach however,
cannot be satisfactorily applied to matters dealing with:
"information or education, or even entertainment and amusement,
by books, articles, pictures, films and broadcasts concerning
interesting places of human activity in general, as well as the
reproduction of the public scene in newsreels and travelogues".3)
In such instances the courts will have to adopt the criterio n£ the
particular society's-Prevai1ing boni mores in order to determine
whether the publication is sufficiently offensive to be actionab1e. 4)
Therefore where a defendant has appropriated the plaintiff's likeness
for the purposes of art, education,S) newsreels or travelogues, in
some cases such appropriation may be regarded as being for the public
bene it. Thus in the United States the courts have allowed a picture
of a-strike-breaker to illustrate a book on strike-breaking,6) and
that of a Hindu illusionist to illustrate an article on the· Indian
rope-trick,7) where such pictures were "appropriate and pertinent" to
the pub1ications. 8) It is submitted that our courts should adopt a
1) (1961) 229 House of Lords Debates 616; L Brittan "The Right of
Privacy in England and the United States" (1963) 37 Tu1ane LR 235,
262; cf JE Juta "Some Comments on the Privacy of Public Figures in
England and the United States" (1972) 1 NULR 21, 25.
2) Patterson v Enge1enburg 1917 TPD 350, 361.
3) Prosser Torts op cit 825. See above 318.
4) See above 172; Cf- Univers-iteit van Pr~toria v' Tommie- Meye-r Films
1977 (4) SA 576 (T) 387.
5)
~ee Neeth~ing Priyaath~id"op cit 347f, on scientific and artistic
Interests. Cf UnIversIteIt van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films supra
388.
6)
Kline v Robert M McBridy & Co (1939) 170 Misc 974 11 NYS 2d 674"
cf Prosser Torts op cit 82(. ' ,
7)
Sarat Lahiri v Daily Mirror (1937) 162 Mise 776, 295 NYS 382,
ef Prosser~Torts op eit 826.
8) Prosser Torts op cit 826.
322
more cautious approach and only recognize such publications as being
in the public interest where the subject is a public figure, or is
thrust into the public limelight, or incidentally forms part of a
group photograph or a newsreel crowd. Where, however, a person who
has lived a quiet life (albeit having previously engaged in public
affairs) is exposed to the glare of publicity without his consent,
such a person should be allowed an action for invasion of privacy.
Although the readers of the magazine may have been interested in the
past life of the African artiste in Mhlongo v Bailey,') the plaintiff's
interest in his privacy overrode the former's curiosity. Similarly
while it was in the public interest to know about the need for recrea-
tion facilities at the hospital in Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers
Ltd 2) such interest could not override the plaintiff's right to pri-
vacy.3)
The defence of justification, however, is likely to overlap
with several of the other defences which negate the wrongfulness of
the defendants' conduct. It is submitted that the defence may be
raised to defeat all forms of invasion of privacy.
2. Privilege: It is submitted that privilege as a defence to in-
vasion of privacy should be treated on analogy with privilege in defa-
mation. 4) Thus where the defendant can prove that he invaded the
plaintiff's privacy on an occasion when he was entitled to in the
exercise of a right or in discharge of a duty it will be a good de-
fence. 5)
1) 1958 (1) SA 370 (W). See above 127. An aggravating factor was
that the defendants had deliberately published the photograph
against the plaintiff's wishes (at 372). See above 168.
2) 1957 (3) SA 461 (W).
3) See above 130. Cf Brown op cit 556.
4) Cf SD Warren & LD Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harvard
L~ 193, 216; Pross~r Torts op cit.8l7; Hofstadter & Horowitz op
Clt 256; Yang op Clt 187; Ameraslnghe Actio Injuriarum 174. Cf
Lord Mancro£t's Bill in England, Neill op cit 393.
5) C£ RH Christie "Invasion of Privacy" (1971) 11 Rhod LJ 15, l6f;
G Feltoe "Private Lives and Public Sins" (1976) 16 Rhod LJ 21, 30£.
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"LIlhe basis in law of a defence of privilege is, that it is
for the common weal of society that in certain circumstances
a person should be free to speak out, even if another is there-
by defamed".1)
The defence includes both absolute privi1ege 2) and qualified privi-
1ege. 3)
(a) Absolute Privilege: If the defendant can show that the invasion
was made on an occasion subject to an absolute privilege he will not
be liable - even though he acted maliciously. Absolute privilege
attaches to the following:
(i) Statements made in the course of any debate of proceed-
ings before Par1iament,4) the provincial councils,S) or the legisla-
tive assemblies in the "Bantu home1ands",6) and South West Africa. 7)
(ii) Statements TIlade in the course of any debate or proceedings
before the Coloured Persons Representative Counci1,8) or the South
African Indian Counci1,9) other than statements concerning the Senate,
the House of Assembly, a provincial council, a court of law, a statu-
tory body of member thereof, or an officer of the public service.
1) Per Ho1mes JA in Benson v Robinson & Co Ltd 1967 (1) SA 420 (AD)
433.
2) Cf RG McKerron The Law of Delict 7ed (1971) 189; NJ Van der Merwe
& PJJ 01ivier Die Onregrnatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2ed
(1970) 3S3f.
3) Cf McKerron Delict op cit 189f; Van der Merwe & 01ivier op cit 354f.
4) Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act, 91 of 1963, ss 2, 8.
5) Powers and Privileges of Provincial Councils Act, 16 of 1948, sIA.
6) Cf Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, 21 of 1971, s 3A.
7) South West African Constitution Act, 39 of 1968, s 18(7); Develop-
ment of Self-government for Native Nations in South West Africa
Act, 54. of 1968, s SB.
8) Coloured Persons Representative Council Act, 49 of 1964, s 16(3);
cf Leon v Sanders NO 1972 (4) SA 637 (0) 641.
9) South African Indian Council Act, 31 of 1968, s 8(3).
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(iii) Statements published by order or under authority of Par-
1) 0 0 01 2 ) . f °t tliament or a Provlnclal CounCl concernlng any 0 1 S repor s,
papers, minutes, votes or proceedings.
Any invasion of privacy made within the scope of the above limita-
tions will be absolutely privileged.
(b) Qualified Privilege: As with justification3) ,this defence is
also linked to public interest or benefit. For instance, often in
the case of newspaper reports the press is merely exercising its pub-
lic duty by publishing reports in the public interest on occasions
protected by qualified privilege. Many defamation cases defended on
the basis of privilege have facts similar to invasions of privacy.
They have included the following: a prospective employer obtaining
a character reference concerning an employee from an ex-employee;4)
a trader seeking a credit rating;5) a relative advising another close
relative about the character of the latter's daughter's sUitor;6) a
parishioner informing the vestry of immoral conduct by the curate;7)
a person calling the police to interview another on a reasonable sus-
picion. 8) The main categories of qualified privilege are statements
made: (i) in discharge of a moral or legal duty; (ii) in futherance
of a legitimate interest; (iii) in the cour~e of judicial proceedings;
and (iv) in reports of parliamentary and judicial proceedings. 9)
~
(i) Duty: In order for the defence to succeed the defendant must
have a legal, moral or social duty to speak or a legitimate interest to
protect and the listener must have a corresponding interest to receive
1) Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act, 91 of 1963, s 29.
2) Powers and Privileges of Provincial Councils Act, 16 of 1948, s 9.
3) See above 313.
4) Monckten v BSA Co Ltd 1920 AD 324, 331.
5) Cf Morar v Casajee 1911 EDL 171, 180.
6) Fick v Watermeyer (1874) 4 Buch 86, 91. Cf Tromp v Macdonald 1920
AD 1, 4.
7)
Davies v Davies (1883) 3 EDC 160, 165; cf De Waal v Ziervogel 1938
AD 112, 123.
8) Kleinhans v Usmar 1929 AD 121, 127; M De Villiers The Roman and
Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries (1899) 208f.
9)
See generally McKerron Delict op cit l89ff; Van der Merwe & Olivier
op cit 355ff.
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it. 1) Thus in Lappan v Corporation of Grahamstown 2) the defendants
were required by the Grahamstown Municipal Act 3) to publish a list of
names of ratepayers whose town and water rates were in arrears, and
of the properties in respect of which they were due. Plaintiff's
name appeared on the li.st, and al though the payments were due, the
corporation had omitted to demand payment from him for a number of
years. As the statement was true and in fulfilment of a statutory
duty it was held to be privileged. 4) It could also be argued that as
most of the members of the public to whom the publication was made
were ratepayers they had a legitimate interest in the publication.
Similarly where the police in carrying out their duties invade the
privacy of a person provided they are acting on a reasonable suspicion
such an invasion will be privileged. 5) On the other hand in Mentor
v Union Govt 6) where the police had legitimately employed dogs to
assist in the investigation of a crime, and a dog had indicated the
plaintiff by placing its paws on his shoulders and barking, it was
held not to constitute an injuria on the basis that the measur~used
were reasonable and the dog had been mistaken in its identification. 7)
(ii) Interest: In the United States privilege has succeeded as a
defence to invasions of privacy-on occasions when the defendant has
been protecting or furthering his own legitimate interests. 8) The
courts have allowed: a telephone company to-monitor calls on its own
telephones;9) filming to be used by a time and motion study organisa-
tion to raise the efficiency of its employees;10) non-copy~ighted
10)
1906 EDL 41.
Act 18 of 1902, s 97.
Lappan v Corporation of Grahamstown supra 45.
See above 202£.
1927 CPD 11.
At 15. The "mistake" on the part of the dog would appear to be
irrelevant provided the measures used were reasonable.
8) Cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 256.
9)
People v A~pelbaum (1950) 301 NY 738, 95 NE 2d 410; cf Prosser
Torts op Clt 818 n 74.
Thomas v General Electric Co (1962) WD Ky 207 F Supp 792; cf
Prosser Torts op cit 818 n 74.







AD 83, 93f; cf PR MacMillan "Animus Injuriandi
92 SALJ 144, 158 who submits that "dolus
"malice Yf defeats the defence of privileQe.
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'literature to be published by defendant, using the plaintiff's name
to indicate its authorship;l) and, defendants to disclose in their
advertisements that plaintiff had designed certain dresses for them.
2
)
In ~ v l3) the appellant could have been regarded as furthering her
legitimate interest of obtaining evidence of her husband's adultery,
but the court declined'to label the defence as privilege, and seemed
to prefer the broad basis of justification.
"It was argued in the instant case that where the limitation
to the right to privacy is based on the reprehensible behaviour
of the complainant, the invasion of privacy is justified be-
cause the occasion is 'privileged'. The defence of 'privilege',
however, is one that has developed when dealing with injuries
to fama rather than with injuries to dignitas and had often
caused great confusion in that branch of the law ... and I can
see no virtue in trying to find a label for, and much less for
plastering the label 'privilege' on, those occasions where the
modes of thought of the community considers that, because of
the reprehensible conduct of the complainant, the invasion of
his privacy is justified in the particular circumstances of the
case".4)
It is submitted, however, that privileges is a suitable defence for
situations where the defendant's statement is protected because of
the occasion on which it is given. This applies particularly where
the defendant is furthering an interest. 5) For instance, where a
former employer gives a reference to a prospective employer concerning
his erstwhile servant, and includes in such reference injurious and
false statements about the latter's private life. Such statements
would only be protected if they were germane to the inquiry6) and not
made maliciously.7) Amerasinghe gives as an example of qualified
privilege:
1) Shostakovitch v Twentieth-Century Fox Film Cor~ (1949) 275 App
Div 692, 87 NYS 2d 430; cf Prosser Torts op C1t 818.
2) Brociner v Radio Wire Television Inc (1959) 15 Misc 2d 843, 183
NYS 2d 743; Prosser Torts op cit 818.
3) 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD).
4) ~ v l supra 788f.
5) Christie op cit l6f; Feltoe op cit 30f.
6) De Waal v Ziervogel 1938 AD 112, 122; cf PQgrund v Yutar 1967
(2) sA 564 (AD) 570.
7) Basner v Trigger 1946
and Privilege" (1975)
directus" rather than




"the case of a creditor who writes to the employer of the
plaintiff making statements about the plaintiff's private life
which are injurious and false, though not defamatory, in order
to collect a debt from the plaintiff. If such statements are
not made 'maliciously' a qualified privilege would operate in
the creditor's favour".')
This statement appears to go too far, and it is submitted that in our
law such an occasion would not be privileged. In Daubermann v Blumen-
feld 2) where the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff's superior
stating that the latter's debts had not been paid it was held that
the letter was defamatory.3) It is conceded, however, that the ex-
ception hinged on whether or not the contents of the letter were de-
famatory and the question of privilege was not raised. In general
disclosures about another's debts can be regarded as invasions of pri-
vacy.4)
(iii) Judicial Proceedings: Statements made in the of judi-
cial and quasi-judicial proceedings, provided they are relevant to
the matter in issue, are also privileged. This applies to disclosures
made in the pleadings or during a trial by parties to the sUit,S) wit-
nesses,6) advocates,7) attorneys,8) magistrates,9) or judges,10) pro-
vided they are germane to the issue and have some foundation in the




4) See above 255.
5) Cf Basner v Trigger supra 107; Blumenthal v Shore 1948 (3) SA 671
(AD) 684£; Penn v Fiddel 1954 (4) SA 498 (C) 500.
6) Cf Preston v Luyt 1911 EDL 298, 330.
7) Basner v Trigger supra 105f; po~rund v Yutar supra 570; cf
Moolman v Slovo 1964 (1) SA 760 W) 161f.
e) Ibid; cf Findlay v Knight 1935 AD 58, 70f; cf Gluckman v Schneider
1936 AD 151, 161.
9) Cf Preston v Luyt 1911 EDL 298, 330.
10) Ibid.
11) Pogrund v Yutar supra 570.
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that in Nelson & Meurant v ~in & Col) the court could have based
its decision on privilege in that any correspondence which is pro-
duced at a judicial inquiry is privileged provided it satisfies the
above requirements. 2)
(iv) Reports of Parliamentary3) or Judicial Proceedings: 4) Fair and
accurate reports by newspapers, television or radio of such proceed-
ings are regarded as being in the public interest and privileged
S
)
even though they contain defamatory matter and it is submitted that
the same applies to invasions of privacy. Prosser explains the
policy in the United States behind such a privilege as follows:
"The privilege rests upon the idea that any member of the
public, if he were present might see and hear for himself, so
that the reporter is merely a substitute for the public eye -
this, together with the obvious public interest in having pub-
lic affairs made known to all".6)
The same would seem to apply in our law. For instance it has been
held that such privilege does not apply to the publication of documents
1) (1874) 4 SC 46.
2) See above 327~
3) Hearson v Natal Witness Ltd 1935 NPD 603, 60S. Furthermore the
publication of any extract from, or abstract of, any report or
paper ordered by Parliament to be published is subject to qualified
privilege. Powers & Privileges or Parliament Act, 91 of 1963,
s 30.
4) Webb v Sheffield (1883) 3 EDC 254, 258; Siffman v Weakley 1909 TS
1095, 1099; Van. Leggelo v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 193"5
TPD 230, 231££; cf Murdock v Ellis 1956 (1) SA 528 eN).
5) McKerron Delict op cit 194; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 366£.
6) Prosser Torts op cit 830. Prosser Torts op cit 819 discusses the
question under the heading of j'Constitutional Privilege" which is
guaranteed by the First Amendment. In Time Inc v Hill (1967) 385
US 374, the Supreme Court extended such constitutional privilege
to privacy; cf Prosser Torts op cit 823.
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'filed in pending legal proceedings but not produced in open court. 1)
It has also been suggested that privilege does not extend to matters
heard in camera,2) but where only portion of the hearing is in camera
and the contents of the evidence heard in open court are published
it has been held that what was heard in camera cannot be ignored. 3)
Furthermore once a report of such proceedings has been published it
seems that it cannot be continually exhumed, except by writers of law
books or other learned works. 4) The privilege also attached to re-
ports of proceedings of quasi-judicial bodies 5) and statutory bodies
charged with carrying our public duties. 6) Prosser mentions that
some states in America extend the privilege to public meetings where
matters of public concern are discussed,7) but this is not the case in
our law,8) and it is submitted that in such instances the better de-
fence is justification. 9)
Although the case law referred to above concerns defamation it
is submitted that the same principles apply to reports which incor-
porate disclosures concerning ~ person's private life. In many in-
stances the defence of privilege will overlap with justification and
it has been suggested that it be used sparingly.10) In any event if
1) Kingswell v Robinson 1913 WLD 129; Transvaal Chronicle v Roberts
1915 TPD 188; but contra Kavanagh v Argu~ Printing & Publishing Co
1939 WLD 284; cf Prosser Torts op cit 83lf.
2) Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 367.
3) Murdock v Ellis 1956 (1) SA 528 (N); 1956 (2) PHJ 16 (AD).
4) Cf McKerron Delict op cit 194 n 92.
5) Cf Penn v Fiddel 1954 (4) SA 498 (C) 500 (Rent Board).
6) Smith & Co v SA Newspaaer Co (1906) 23 SC 310, 317; ef Benson v
Rohinson & Co (Pty) Lt supra 426f.
7) Prosser Torts op cit 830.
8) Carbone1 v Robinson & Co £Pty) Ltd 1965 (1) SA 134 (D) 151; ef
Smith & Co v SA Associate Newspapers Co supra 318.
9) Cf MA Millner "Unbridled Privilege" (1958) 75 SALJ 133. See above3l3
10)PH Winfield "Privacy" (1931) 47 LQR 23, 4lf.
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the plaintiff can show that the defendant was actuated by an improper
motive the privilege will be forfeited. 1) It is interesting to note
that a similar principle applies in the United States where the de-
fence of Constitutional privilege can be defeated by "the plaintiff's
proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth".2)
It has been suggested, however, that this only applies to the false
light cases. 3)
It is submitted that the defence of privilege can be raised
where the invasion of privacy takes the form of either an intrusion4)
or pub1icity.5)
3. Fair Comment: Warren and Brandeis advocated fair comment as one
of the defences to invasion of privacy in their seminal artic1e,6)
and Prosser points out that it has been subsumed under the head of
"constitutional privilege" in the United States. 7) Amerasinghe also
favours the defence in a privacy action,8) while Winfield again cau-
tions against its use for fear that it may lead to abuse of the free-
dom of the press. 9) For the defence to succeed the defendant would
have to prove: (a) the statement is one of comment not of fact;10)
(b) the comment is fair;11) and Cc) the facts commented on were true,
accurately stated and of public interest. 12 ) The defence would seem
Warren & Brandeis op cit 193ff. See above 52.
Prosser Torts op cit 822.
Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 197.
Winfield op cit (1931) 47 LQR 41£.
Crawford v Albu 1917 AD 102, 114; cf Vorster v Strydpers Bpk 1973
(3) SA 482 ~486.
Ibid; Waring v Mervis 1969 (4) SA 542 (W) 546f.
Golding v Torch Printing & PUblishin~ Co Ltd 1948 (3) SA 1067 (C)
1082£;· Carbonel v Robinson & Co (Pt_) Ltd supra l47f.
1) See above 156.
2) Prosser Torts op cit 821. Such knowledge is sometimes
"actual malice" New York Times Co v Sul1ivan (1964) 376
3) Brown op cit (1971) 23 Stanford LR 558.
4) See above 198.











to apply to the publicity and false light cases,1) and would fail
if the plaintiff can prove spite or ill-will by the defendant. 2)
4. Consent: This is a valid defence to an action for invasion of
privacy provided the invasion takes the form consented to. 3) There-
fore in the case of publication of a person's photograph with his
authority, if the form of publication does not comply with the plain-
tiff's consent, there is no defence. In O'Keeffe v Argus Print-
ing & Publishing Co Ltd4) the plaintiff had consented to her photo-
graph being used to illustrate a news item, but not as an advertise-
ment. 5) Similarly in Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd6) the
plaintiffs consented to their photographs being used to illustrate a
nursing journal, but not in a nation-wide appeal for funds in a pop-
ular Sunday newspaper. 7) In any ·event the defence is volenti not
scienti and will only avail where the plaintiff had "knowledge, appre-
ciation and consent,,8) concerning the invasion. It has been suggested
however that in some instances consent may be implied from the defen-
1) Cf Prosser Torts op cit 827.
2) In which case the comment would no longer be fair. Cf Golding v
Torch Printing & Publishing Co Ltd supra 1082f; Waring v Mervis
supra 546; Prosser regrets the use of the term "malice" by the
United States Supreme Court and suggests that the term "scienter"
is a better one. Prosser Torts op cit 821.
3) Cf Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 184f; Neeth1ing Privaatheid
op cit 34.
4) 1954 (3) SA 244 (C).
5) At 247.
6) 1957 (3) SA 461 (W).
7) At 464.
8) ef Waring & Gillow Ltd v Sherborne 1904 TS 340, 344; SANTAM v
Vorster 1973 (4) SA 764 (AD) 779f. This principle has been applied
in defamation cases .Jordaan v De1arey 1958 (1) SA 638 (T) 639; cf
RG McKerron "Defamat10n: Defence of Vo1enti Non Fit Injuria" (1958)
75 SALJ 271. It has been suggested ,", however , that the defence of
consent should not avail where the consent takes the form of a
"dare" (ie there is a condition implied in the consent or if the de-
fendant.pe:sists in the defamatory allegations he will be sued by
the p1a1nt1ff). PQR Boberg "The Defence of Consent in a Defamation
Action" (1961) 78 SALJ 54, 61.
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'dant's conduct. 1)
"As iemand afgeneem wotd deur 'n fotograaf wat volgens sy
kennis 'n persfotograaf is, en die omstandighede is so dat
die gefotografeerde geredelik beswaar kan maak teen die afneem,
kan mens nouliks -tot 'n ander gevolgtrekking kom as dat hy tot
. bl·k . t h tIt 2)so wel fotograferlng as pu 1 aSle toeges em e ·
It could be argued that the necessary knowledge, appreciation and
consent is presumed in these circumstances, but this would not be the
case if the person did not know that the person was a press photo-
grapher. 3)
It is submitted that in general our courts will require strict
compliance with the requirements of knowledge, appreciation and
1) In France, for instance, photographs of private persons taken in
public places without their consent may not be actionable unless
it places the subject in a false light or exposes them to ridicule.
Cf Villard v Roches (1965) 2 JCP 14305; G Lyon-Caen "The Right to '--
Privacy or New Scenes from Private Life" (1967) 14 Rev of contem~
Law 69, 75. Contra (1971) 4 JCP 16734; Patrick Glenn op cit 30
n-I7. See above 89. It has been suggested that the defence of
implied consent was impliedly rejected in two Quebec cases,
Patrick Glenn_op cit 302: In Deschamps v Automobiles Renault
Canada Ltee L197~7 SC Mtl, unreported, the court rejected the con-
tention that .because the petitioner had been careless ·in allowing
18 photographs to be taken without specifying their purpose he had
impliedly consented to their publication. Similarly it seems -
iIDpli£it in the judgment in Field v United Amusement Corporation
L197!/ SC 283, that the petitioner by frolicking naked in front of
the crowd at the Woodstock Festival had impliedly consented to ob-
servation by those in the vicinity, but not publication to the
world at large. Patrick Glen op cit 302. See above 107f.
2) Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 292.
3) But in the United States it has been held that consent to publica-
tion in one form may be interpreted as implied consent to publica-
tion in another form. In Johnson v Boeing Airplane Co (1953) 175
Kansas 275, 262 P 2d 808, where the plaintiff had consented to the
publication of his photograph to illustrate a news article, and it
was used by defendants to illustrate an advertisement, it was held
that the plaintiff could not recover. (Cf. RG McKerron "Law of
Delict" 1954 Annual Surv~ 126; Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 85f.
Contra the position in South African law: O'Keeffe v Argus Print-
ing & Publishin~ supra 267). On the other hand where such
consent is basea-Dn contract the terms and conditions thereof must
be observed (Prosser Torts op cit 817). Where, however, such con-
sent is given gratuitously it can be revoked at any time before
the invasion' of privacy occurs (Hofstadter & Horowi tz op ci t 73;
Prosser Torts op cit 817). Furthermore those states with statutory
provisions require the consent to be given in writing. (New York
Utah, Virginia, and .Oklahoma; cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 86).
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'consent~) before they will hold that the plaintiff consented to the
invasion. 2) Furthermore there can be no consent where the plaintiff
agrees under duress,3) or in the case of clandestine tape recordings,
. " 4)
even if one party agrees to such record1ngs. In such cases the
defence of consent cannot avail against the unconsenting party, and
the defence of statuto~y authority5) would have to be relied upon.
Consent would appear to be a good defence to all forms of invasions:
intrusions,6) publication of private facts,7) false light cases 8) and
appropriation. 9) It has been suggested in the United States that
"waiver" by public figures is not really consent as such persons have
1) In Jordaan v Delarey 1958 (1) SA 638 (T) 639, it was held that
where the plaintiff had asked the defendant to repeat a defamatory
statement in the presence of the police he had consented thereto.
It has been argued, however, that such consent was conditional.
Cf Boberg op cit (1961) 78 SALJ 61. A strict interpretation of
"informed consent" has_been applied in Quebec (Rebeiro v Shawinigan
Chemicals 1969 Ltd L197~7 SC 389, 390; cf Patrick Glenn op cit
302 ,an t e efence of consent is also provided for in the pri-
vacy legislation of British Columbia (Privacy Act, SBC, 1968, c 39
s 3; Burns op cit 32) and Manitoba (Privacy Act SM 1970 c 74, S 5;
Burns op cit 36).
2) Cf SANTAM v_ Vorster supra 779f. It may, however, be sufficient
if in addition to knowledge and appreciation that his privacy may
be invaded the plaintiff forsaw the risk of such invasion - pro-
vided the particular invasion which caused him harm fell within the
ambit of the forseen risk. SANTAM v Vorster supra 780f.
3) Cf Spies NO v Smith 1957 (1) SA 539 (AD) 545.
4) Consent by one party cannot mean consent by the other .. Neeth1ing
Privaatheid op cit 208. Cf CS Fishman "The Interception of Communi-
cations without a Court Order: Title Ill, Consent, and the Expec-
tation of Privacy" (1976) SI St John's LR 41. See above 213.
5) See below 337.
6) See above 198. Neeth1ing Privaatheid op cit 383, submits that
De Fourd v Cape Town Council (1898) 15 SC 399, 402 imp1ied1y recog-
nized consent as a defence to an invasion of privacy. See above 124.
7) See above 247. Cf Mhlongo v Bai1ey 1958 (l))SA 370 (W); see above 127.-
8) See above 290. ef Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957(3) SA
461 (W); see above 129.
9) See above 300. Cf O'Keeffe A P"" & P b1" h"v rgus rlnt1ng u 1S lng Co Ltd 1954
(3) SA 244 (C); see above. 131.
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no right of privacy in regard to their "public lives",l) but that
in regard to their private lives the usual defences would prevail.
It is submitted, however, that even in their public lives such pub-
lic figures are entitled to protection against being placed in a
false light or having their image or likeness appropriated without
their consent.
5. Necessity. Where a defendant has acted of necessity to prevent
a threat of greater harm to the person or property of himself,2) or
another,3) arising from force of nature or conduct unconnected with
the plaintiff4) he will not be liable for injury caused to the plain-
tiff, provided his action was reasonably justified. 5)6) Neethling
under the influence of German law submits that necessity may be a
good defence to an action for invasion of privacy.7) He gives the
examples of: a person entering another's home to shelter from a
storm or a riot; a doctor examining an unconscious person; and a
father advertising for personal information concerning his missing
son who is suffering from amnesia. 8) Other examples might be:
l)Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 76. Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit
207. In France, however, it seems that a public figure attend-
ing a public function in his private capacity may forbid publicity
thereof, although generally if he does not object to the publica-
tion he is presumed to have consented. Justice Report Privacy
and the Law (1970) 20, para 90; cf "Current Legal Developments"
(1966) IS ICLQ 581; see above 101.
2) Voet 9.2.28.
3) Cf Stoffberg v Elliott 1923 CPD 148, ISO.
4) Cf S v Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (AD) 10.
5) Cf Stoffberg v Elliott supra ISO; S v Goliath supra 22.
6) E Newman & DJ McQuoid-Mason SA Law of Obligations (1978). Cf
McKerron Delict op cit 74; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 80.
7) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 332f.
8) Neeth1ing Privaatheid op cit 333.
searching through letters and other personal documents of an un-
conscious man to ascertain his identity or address; entering the
room of a critically ill person to render assistance; or where a
post office official discloses the contents of a "suicide" telegram
or telephone conversation to a "suicides anonymous" or "lifeline"
organisation in order that they may send help. The defence would
seem to apply to both intrusions and publicity.
In several instances, however, cases of so-called necessity are
also covered by the defences of privilege or justification. Neeth-
ling's examples of an employer seeking additional personal informa-
tion concerning a prospective employee and in insurer obtaining simi-
lar data about a client1) could be regaYded as privileged. It could
also be argued that where an employer protects his business interests
by monitoring non-business telephone calls by his employees or uses
a concealed television camera to detect thefts 2) his conduct would be
protected by the defence of justification rather than necessity.
6 . Private Defence. Where a defendant u~e s reasonable force to repe 1
an immediate and unlawful attack on his personality or property of
himself or another, by the plaintiff or his property, such defendant
will not be liable to the plaintiff for any damage arising therefrom. 3)
Neethling concedes that such a situation may seldom arise in matters
of privacy, but suggests that it might occur where a private detective 4)
1) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 334.
2) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 334f, who submits that continuous and
intensive monitoring of telephone calls would be unlawful. The
same would apply to· the installation of television cameras in the
toilets of workers. Neethling Privaatheid op cit 334 n 6. It is
a question of what society regards as repugnant. See above 156.
Cf P Stein & J Shand Legal Values in Western societf (1974) 197:
"A supermarket may install cameras to reduce stockoss by pilfer-
ing ~ .. Simil~rly the demands of ~onsumer.researchmay fully jusfify
the lnstallatlon by petrol companles of hldden cameras to observe
t~e opera!ions of a self-service pump system unfamiliar to the pub-
llC ... Lbu!7 one may well feel revulsion at ... similar use being
made of such cameras to test secretly the reaction of the bereaved
in a funeral parlour".
3) Newman & McQuoid-Mason op cit. Cf McKerron Delict op cit 74; Van
der Merwe & Olivier op cit 69f.
4) As to private detectives see above 2l7~
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is employed by a married woman to obtain evidence of her husband's
extra-marital activities') or her fiancee's deceptions, or a person
tape records abusive or insulting language used about him by another.
2
)
In all these cases the defendant is furthering or protecting his own
interests and it is submitted that the better defence would be privi-
lege. 3) Private defence could be applicable, however, where for
instance: a woman publishes certain details concerning her previous
marriage and her ex-husband publishes his version which includes addi-
tional personal information about his ex-wife; an unmarried woman
falsely represents that a man is the father of her child and the
putative father publishes facts concerning her private life which in-
dicate that someone else Inay be the father; a person tape records
his private conversation with another and the latter also records the
conversation; or a woman discloses embarassing excerpts from private
letters written by her ex-lover and he responds by publishing simi~ar
details from letters written by her. The defendants counter-action,
however, must not exceed the bounds of what is reasonable in the cir-
cumstances. 4)
The defence of private or self-defence (noodweer) would seem to
apply to both intrusions and publicity cases. The defence appears
to overlap with compensatio or retorsion although McKerron doubts
whether the defence of compensatio exists in our law apart from rixa
or self-defence on a privileged occasion. 6) Nonetheless there is
some authority for the recognition of the defence of compensatio in
South African law7) and there seems to be no reason either on princi-
ple or authority why it should not be recognized.
1) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 335.
2) Neethling Privaatheid op cit 336.
3) See above 324.
4) Cf Rhodes University College v Field 1947 (3) SA 437 (AD) 463:
"a man whose character or reputation or conduct has been assailed
can say what is reasonably necessary to defend it and some latitude
should. be allowed in deciding what is reasonably necessary; he
cann?t, however, make unfounded charges against the plaintiff which
are lrrelevant for the purpose of his defence". Cf PQR Boberg "Law
of Delict" 1968 Annual Survey l69f.
5) Digest 24.3.39; Voet 47.10.20; McKerron Delict op cit 205.
6) McKerron Delict op cit 205.
7) ef Rabie v Fourie 1914 TPD 99, 101; Strydom v Fenner-Solomon 1953
(1) SA 519 CE) 540f.
1 0)
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7. Statutory Authority. Certain statutes may legalize invasions
of privacy which would otherwise be unlawful. This is particularly
true in South Africa where a person's racial classification1) and
political beliefs 2) may have a far-reaching effect on the degree of
interference in his private life by the State. In most Western
countries there is some provision for compulsory medical tests in
certain circumstances 3) as well as the obligation to notify certain
. 4t~ .. . 1 5) d 6 )dlseases ~ll to complete certaln statlstlca an revenue returns.
South Africa goes further, however, because of the State's policy of
separate development. Therefore in this country the State inter-
feres with a person's choice as to: his marriage 7) and sexual part-
ners;8) his schoo1 9) or university;10) his place of residence;11)
his entertainrne"nt; 12) and his political party.13) Furthermore the
1) Cf HR Hahlo & E Kahn South Africa: The Development of its Laws and
Constitution (1960) 797; 3D Van der Vyver Die Beskerming van Mens-
regte in Suid-Afrika (1975) 84ff. See above 12.
2) For instance where a person is a "listed" communist. Cf Internal
Security Act, 44 of 1950, s 17 bis. See above 177
3) See above 237 nI, 238 n 9.
4) See above 257.
5) Cf Statistics Act, 66 of 1976. See above 231.
6) Cf Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962. See above 234. Cf Stein & Shand
op cit 198. See above 230 n 6.
7) Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 55 of 1949, s 1. See above
128 n 1.
8) Immorality Act, 23 of 1957, s 16. See above 178 n 1.
9) Each race group must attend its own schools. Education for Whites
is controlled by the Provincial Councils, Republic of South Afri~a
Constitution Act, 32 of 1961, s 84(1)(c). Education for other
races is controlled by the central government. Cf Bantu Education
Act, 47 of 1953; Coloured Person's Education Act, 47 of 1963; and
Indian Education Act, 61 of 1965.
Extension of University Education Act 45 of 1959, s 17, s 31. See




Group Areas Act, 36 of 1966, s 13. See above 178 n 1. Cf also
Bantu Land Act, 27 of 1913; Bantu Trust and Land Act, 18 of 1936;
Coloured Person's Settlement Act, 7 of 1946; Rural Coloured Areas
Act, 24 of 1963.
Publications Act, 42 of 1974, s 8(1)(d). See above 241.
Prohibition of Political Interference Act, 51 of 1968, s 2. See
above 178 n 1.
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police are given wide powers of search1) and detention without tria1
2
)
and have the right to intercept postal communications 3) and telephone
conversations. 4) In addition a person who is "listed" as a Communist
is denied a remedy should the fact that he holds these unpopular
political beliefs be made pUblic.
5
)
It is submitted that in general where the statutory authority
is abused, as in the case of other defences which rebut the unlawful-
ness of the defendant's conduct, an action may lie for invasion of
privacy. But even though a defendant's action is ogjectively unlaw-
ful he may still escape liability (unless the matter refers to a pub-
lication by the press6)), by showing that he did not have animus
. . . d· 7)1nJur1an 1.
C. DEFENCES REBUTTING ANIMUS INJURIANDI.
The defences which may be
used to rebut animus injuriandi on the part of the defendant are not
d 8) d . 1 d . k 9) . 10). 11) cl hclose, an may 1nc u e m1sta e, r1xa, Jest, an any ot er
defence which shows that subjectively the defendant did not have the
. . .. l·k· . 12) . t . t· 13)14)1ntent10n to 1nJure 1 e 1nsan1ty or 1n OX1ca 10n.
See above 203.
Terrorism Act, 83
s l18A. See above 207.
s l18A(2)(b). See above 212.
44 of 1950, s 17 bis. See above 177.
Cf Jordaan v Van Biljon 1962 (1) SA 286 (AD) 294; Muller v SA




Cf Wilhelm v Beamish (1894) 11 SC 13, 15: Muller v SA Associated
Newspapers Ltd 1972 (2) SA 589 (C) 592. But if the defendant's
mental affliction is such that he appreciates the nature and effect
of his act he will still be liable. Vaughan v Ford 1953 (4) SA 486
(R) 488f. ----
Cf Geyser v Pont 1968 (4) SA 67 (W) 72f; Muller v SA Associated
~~wspapers L~upra 592.
1) Cf Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s 22.
2) Cf Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s 185;
of 1967. See above 241.
3) Post Office Act, 44 of 1958,
4) Post Office Act, 44 of 1958,
5) Internal Security Act,









Geyser v Pont supra 72f: !~Wa.~rskynlik moet 'n verski 1 etrek d
tu~sen ~e~we~e .C~) wat slegs ·op di~ subjektiewe afwesig~eid va~or
anlIDUS InJurland1 berus , en Cb} wat 0P 'n objektiewe deur die
geoorloofde verdedigingsgrond berus. Waarskynlik is Ca} b r~g
tot geva1le soos skerts, vergissing, ri~a, kranksinnigheid eper
dronkenskap, ens." (Per Trnll;T\ T'\ -- ,
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1. Mistake: This defence is closely linked with the concept of
animus injuriandi. 1) If the traditional approach is adopted,2)
there would be no defence to an action for invasion of privacy unless
in addition to showing that he had no intention to injure, the defen-
dant was also not negligent in his action. 3) The best examples of
such mistakes are to be found in defamation. In Levy v Von Mo1tke 4)
defendant had published a scurrilous anti-semetic pamphlet, signed
"Rabbi" purporting to disclose the pla.ns of the Jews in South Africa
to destroy the country's traditional way of life with assistance from
Moscow. Plaintiff was able to prove that non-Jewish people in Port
Elizabeth knew him as "Rabbi" and attributed the document to him.
It was held that lack of intention to refer to him was no defence. 5)
Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd6) on the other hand was a case of
mistaken identity. Defendants had published a photograph purporting
to be of a notorious Asian gangster "Lord Latib", taken outside the
court where he was appearing on a charge for attempting to defeat the
ends of justice. In fact the photograph was of plaintiff, a respec-
table and well-known Indian businessman, who successfully sued for
defamation. Colman J after an exhaustive review of the authorities,
concluded that a bona fide mistake may be a good defence:
"only if the mistake is not attributable to the recklessness
or neglige~ce of the defendant or those £or whose acts or
omissions he is responsible".7)
Hassen's case is criticized by Van der Merwe and Olivier8) for negat-
ing the concept of consciousness of wrongfulness as an essential
Newspapers (Pty) Ltd supra 576. But contra SAUK v
(3) SA 394 (AD) 407.
& Olivier op cit 382.
Post
Lardner-
Cf Nasionale Pers v Long 1930 AD






Cf Norton v Ginsber~ 1953 (4) SA 537 (AD) 550f; Hassen v
Newspapers (Pty) Lt 1965 (3) SA 562 (W) 576; Smith NO &
Burke NO v Wonesayi 1972 (3) SA 289 (RAD) 3l4f.
4) 1934 EDL 296.
5) Levy v Van Moltke supra 318.
87,100. The court appeared
approach. See above l48f.
6) Supra.
7) Hassen v Post
O'Maller 1977
8) Van der Merwe
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element of animus injuriandi 'as held in Maise1 v Van Naeren,l) but
they appear to have overlooked the fact that Hassen's case involved
defamation by the press. 2) Maise1's case held, inter alia, that
animus injuriandi was an essential element of defamation3) and that
a bona fide mistake of ,fact was a good defence,4) but was not con-
cerned with publications by newspapers. The views expressed in
Maise1's case were subsequently approved by the Appellate Division.
5
)
If the subjective approach to animus injuriandi in defamation
is extended by analogy to actions for invasion of privacy, there are
two possibilities:
,(i) Where the defendant is unaware that he is invading the plain-
tiff's privacy he cannot be said to have the intention to injure.
(ii) If the defendant bona fide believed that the invasion was made
with a lawful purpose he is not conscious of the wrongfulness of his
act. 6)
In either instance it would seem that mistake would be a good defence,
although it is submitted that in the former case the court may infer
dolus eventua1is if the defendant knew that he was invading somebody's
privacy but was reckless as to whether or not it was that of the par-
ticular p1aintiff. 7) The defence of mistake can be applied to the
following hypothetical examples:
1) 1960 (4) SA 836 (C).






Jordaan v Van Bi1jon 1962 (1) SA 286 (AD) 296; Craig v Voortrekker-1ers Bak 1963 (1) SA 149 (AD) 156f; Nydoo v Vengtas 1965 (1) SA 1
AD) 1 f; SAUK V 0'Ma11ey supra 403.
6) Maisel v Van Naeren supra 850f. See above 151.
7) Cf Digest 47.10.18.3. See above 156. Cf EM Burche11 & PMA Hunt
South African Criminal Law and Procedure (1970) I 141 who point out
that it is no defence if the mistake is "non-essential". An
example would be: where the defendant "merely mistakes the iden-
tity of the subject matter .. or of his victim". Burchell & Hunt
op cit 252.
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(a) A hotel guest carelessly mistaking the room to be his own
opens the door of Mr and Mrs P who are staying at the hotel. 1) The
defence of mistake is available to the guest as he had neither the
intention to injure anyone nor was he aware that his act was wrong-
fUl. 2)
(b) Mrs S suspects that her husband is committing adultery with
Miss P, and while mistaking the room to be Miss pIS she carelessly
opens the door of the respectable Mr and Mrs P who are in bed to-
gether. 3) The defence of mistake is available to Mrs S as although
she intended tu invade somebody's privacy (ie that of Miss P), she
was not conscious of the wrongfulness of her act which was to obtain
evidence of her husband's adultery.4) If, however, her intention
was not to obtain evidence of such adultery, but to assault her hus-
band's paramour, she would be conscious of the unlawfulness of her
act and the defence would fail. 5) The test for intention is sub-
jective and therefore whether or not the mistake is reasonable is
irrelevant. 6) Thus in criminal law if Mrs S is unreasonable but
bona fide in her suspicions concerning her husband's adultery, or as
1) Cf ~ v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD) 788 ..
2) Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 187, states that such conduct
amounts to a mistake of fact.
3) Amicus Curiae "Criminal Injuria and the Jealous Wife" (1971) 88
SALJ 403; ~ v I supra 788.
4) Beadle ACJ in ~ v I at 786 seems to regard an invasion to prove
adultery as lawful provided it is carried out in a reasonable
manner: "How is an adulterous spouse who denies his adultery to
be brought to book if he is not kept under observation and his
privacy invaded? In the interests of society a balance must be
struck".
5) Cf Johnstone v Stewart 1968 SASR 142. Cf §. v .!. supra 787. See above 2eZ.
6) Burchell & Hunt 256; cf JM Burchell "Is the Adulterer's Home
their Castle? A Case of Criminal Injuria" (1976) 93 SALJ 265,
270. Burchell & Hunt seem to suggest that the consciousness of
wrongfulness requirement applies to a mistake of fact, not of law
~Burchell ~ Hunt op cit l34f). This principle also seems to apply
ln defamatlon cases. SAUK v 0'Mal1ey 1977 (3) SA 394 (AD) 407:
"Dit moet bevestig wora-aat na1atigheid in ons reg geen aksie weens
laster kan fundeer."
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to the identity of the hotel room, she may escape liability because
the mistake is one of fact 1) and reasonableness is' not a require-
ment. 2) Furthermore, even where the mistake is one of law3) (for
instance, Mrs S did not know that it was unlawful to invade another's
privacy), she could still succeed in her defence by showing that al-
though she knew that usually her act would be wrongful, in the par-
ticular circumstances she bona fide mistakenly believed that she had
a right to act as she did4) (ie to invade the privacy of her husband's
paramour in order to obtain evidence of adultery). It is submitted
that similar principles apply in the law of delict. 5) In any event
in Roman and Roman-Dutch law the defendant could rebut the presump-
tion of animus injuriandi by proving that he had a bona fide belief
that he was entitled to commit the act. 6) The reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct is irrelevant except if it is so grossly unreason-
able or reckless that dolus directus 7) or dolus eventualis 8) may be
inferred. Misgivings have been expressed concerning the fact that
a person may escape liability because of a mistake of law: 9)
Cf1) Burchell & Hunt op cit 140£, 250f; cf S v I supra 788.
Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 187~
2) Burchell & Hunt op ci t 253f. But' con~'ra Has~en v Post Newspa~
(Pty) Ltd 1965 (3) 562 (W) 576. It IS submltted, Fowever, t~
Hassen's, case concerned defamation by the Press where the defences
are lImited to those rebutting wrongfulness and that it was un-
necessary for the court to consider the defences rebutting animus
injurian'di. Cf SAUK v O'Malley supra 407. See above l57f.
3) Burchell & Hunt op cit 132f, 260£.
4) Burchell & Hunt op cit 265: "the defence of claim of right is
nothing but the defence of ignorance or mistake of law in a
different guise". Cf Canadian provincial legislation which
states inter aTia that the invasion must be "without claim of
right" BritIsh Columbia Privacy Act SBC, 1968, c39, s 2(1);
Maritoha Privacy Act SM, 1970, c74, s 2(1); Sas.katchewan Privacy
Act, SS, 1974, c80, s 2. See generally M Manning The' Protection
of Priva~y Act (1974) 175ff.
Cf Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 116.
McKerron Delict op cit 56f; De Villiers op cit 195f. See above 14B
Cf Burchell & Hunt op cit 116. See above 164 n 1. Cf Van der
Merwe & Olivier op.cit 116:. "Waar.A 'n bepaalde gevolg beoog en
veroorsa~k,.maa: nle seker IS o~ dIe ver?orsaking van die gevolg
onregm~tlg IS file, maar.sleg~ dl~ moontllkheid dat die gevolg on-
regmatlg ka~ wees 'VOOTSlen, IS dIe verwyt wat horn van regswee
tog seker dIe van 'dolus d'irec'tus en nie eventualis nie".
8) Cf Burchell & Hunt op cit 116. See above 156.
9) Cf Smith NO & Lardner-Burke NO v W0nesayi 1972 (3) SA 289 (RAD) 312.
But cf S v De Bl'om 1977 (3) SA 513 (AD) 529: "die opvatting 'igno-
r~nc~ o~.the.law IS ~o excuse' regtens nie van toepassing kan wees




McKerron Delict op cit 203 n 63a.
See above 342 n 4.
1960 (4) SA 836 (C).
At 850f.
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"L~7olicy precludes acceptance of a universal proposition
that mistake excludes dolus. There seems no good reason at
all why everyone's reputation should be perpetually vulnerable
to attack with impunity by every idiot or busybody well-informed
as to calumny and ill-versed in elementary law. Moreover, in
delict where the object of proceedings is repersecutory instead
of penal and where it can seldom be called for to inflict an
injuria upon another without due pause for the proper ascertain-
ment of fact and law, there is even less reason than in criminal
law to give full rein to what must surely be the most highly re-
fined form of intention ever conceived - whatever the old au-
thorities may say. Finally it is no accident that the over-
whelming preponderance of our case law - albeit influenced by
misconception and technicality - is in substance against the
thesis that error always excuses".1)
It could be argued that similar considerations apply to invasions
of privacy as the latter are "also concerned with aspects of per-
sonality rights. It is submitted, however, that should scandal-
mongers and gossips carelessly pry into a person's private life,
they may experience difficulty in convincing a court that they
were genuinely mistaken and that they were not conscious of the
wrongfulness of their acts. Nonetheless, if they are not conscious
of the wrongfulness of their acts, they cannot be held liable. 2)
Where, however, they bona fide and mistakenly believe that although
the act is prima facie wrongful they were entitled to act under
"claim of right,,3), it is submitted that they should not be held
liable. Therefore in Maisel v Van Naeren4)it was held that a mis-
taken belief that a defendant's statement was privileged was a good
defence,S) though it has been pointed out that this is the only case
which has taken such a stand. 6) An adoption of the principle in
Maisel's case would mean that a mistaken belief that a person was a
1 )
PQR Boberg "Animus Injuriandi and Mistake" (1971) 88 SALJ 57 68.






public figure, or that the invasion was in the public interest,
or that the plaintiff had given his consent, or that invasion
was iustified or that the occasion was privileged, or that the. ,
invasion amounted to fair comment, would be a defence, irrespective
of the reasonableness· of such belief.
The defence of mistake, however, would not apply where the
disclosure was made by the press, as here the defences ~re
restricted to those which rebut wrongfulness. 1) On this basis,
therefore, the defendant in H~~sen v P6st Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 2)
could not have escaped liability, and it is submitted that the same
would have applied had the "Tobacco King" in SA Associated Newspapers
Ltd vSchoeman3) decided to sue for invasion of privacy. The
fact that the defence of mistake cannot be raised by the press in
"media" cases protects privacy at the expense of freedom of speech,
whereas in 'hon-media" cases the converse is true. These competing
interests, however, are to a certain extent balanced by the
additional requirements of proof of wrongfulness 4) and impairment
of personality.5) The defence of mistake would apply whether
the invasion of privacy takes the form of an intrusion or
publicity.6)
See above 181.
In the United States it seems that a defendant may escape
liability in false light privacy cases involving "matters of
public interest" by'proving absence of "actual malice" in the
case of disclosures concerning "public figures" (ef Time Inc
v~ (~96?).385 US 374) and lack of "fault" in respect of
pr~vate lndlVlduals (cf Gertz V Robert Welch Inc (1974) 418 US
32j). See above 62f. In ~anada the Manitoba Privacy Act,
SM, 1970 c 74, s 5(b), "makes lt a defence for the defendant to
show that he neither knew nor reasonably should have known that
hi~ act, conduct or ~ublication constituting a violation of
prlvacy wo~ld have vl0lated the.privacy of any person".
Burns op Clt 36. Thus the Manltoba Act requires the defendant
to show that his mistake was not due to negligence. On the
other hand t~e British ~0lumbia Privacy Act, SBC, 1968, c 39,
and the ?askatch:wa~ ~rlvacy Act, 1974, c 80 exclude negligence
as a basls for llabll1ty. Burns op cit 37.
1) See above 158. ef Hassen V Post Newssapers (Pty) Ltd 1965 (3)
SA 562 (W) 576f; Muller v SA AS'so'c"fat'e' Newspapers Ltd 1972
(2) SA 589 (C) 593.
2) Supra.
3) 1962 (2) SA 613 (AD).




2. Rixa: A defendant will not be liable under the actio injuriarum
where he acts without premeditation, in sudden anger or provocation
by the plaintiff and did not subsequently persist in his conduct.
1
)
This principle has been applied in defamation cases 2) and it is sub-
mitted that it can also be raised against an action for invasion of
privacy. The defence 'cou1d apply, for instance, where after provo-
cation during a quarrel somebody bursts into another's room or makes
embarassing disclosures concerning his argumentative opponent's pri-
vate life. If, however, the defendant persists in his conduct the
court may draw an inference that he had the requisite animus injurian-
di and the defence will fail.
3. Jest: In Roman and Roman-Dutch law it was a good defence to an
action under the actio injuriarum that the words or conduct complained
of were used by way of a "legitimate jest".3) This applied in Roman
law where a person persistently followed another4) in order to play a
game,S) or made disclosures about another's "physical defect 6)
without any intention of injuring but by way of fun and a joke during
friendly intercourse".7) The same applied in Roman-Dutch 1aw,8) and
1) Kirkpatrick v Bezuidenhout 1934 TPD 155, 158; cf Peck v Katz 1957
(2) SA 567 (T) 573. McKerron Delict op cit 204.
2) Fradd v Jacque1in (1882) 3 NLR 144, 149; Kirkpatrick v Bezuiden-
hout supra 158; Wood NO v Branson 1952 (3) SA 369 eT) 373; Peck v
Katz supra 573. The view in Peck v Katz supra 573 that'rixa----
applies where the words are "meanIngless abuse" cannot be correct
as in such a case the words themselves are not defamatory. But cf
Strau~s, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 28tn 84, who sugg~sts that
if the words are defamatory, rixa is not defence, but should be
taken into account when assesSIng damages. They do however concede
that "Woede of toorn kan nie in sigself animus in~uriandi uitsluit
nie, beha1we as dit van so 'n ernstige graad was at die verweerder
ontoerekeningsvatbaar was, in welke geval opset onbestaanbaar is".
Cf V~n der Me:we & Olivier op cit 383. McKerron Delict op cit 205,
subm1ts that 1f the hearers "were unaware of the provocation under
which they were uttered" the defendant would be liable. It is
submitted, however, that if the defendant's anger was such as to
make him "unconscious of any intention to defame" he should escape
liability. Wood NO v Branson supra 373.
3) De Vi11iers op cit 195.
4) See above 33.
5) Digest 47.10.15.23.
6) See above 33.
7) De Vi11iers op cit 86f.
8) Voet 47.10.8.
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it is submitted that these examples could be regarded as invasions
of privacy in modern law. 1) It would not be a legitimate jest,
however, where the defendant must have known that in the circum-
stances the words or conduct would be insulting, offensive or de-
grading. 2) Thus wher~ a person tells a joke about the private life
of one of a group of close friends who are exchanging jokes at a
party jest may be a good defence, but not if the joke is told to a
group of strangers. Similarly it may be acceptable for very close
friends or relatives to hide in a person's bedroom as a joke, but not
if the intruders are strangers.
McKerron submits that in the modern law of defamation the defence
of jest will only succeed where it is apparent that the words "were
not intended, and could not reasonably be understood, to be used in a
defamatory sense".3) Strauss, Strydom and Van der WaIt suggest that
as in the case of rixa4) jest is not a defence but a factor to be
taken into account when assessing damages,S) while Van der Merwe and
Olivier submit that if the joke could be misunderstood by reasonable
bystanders an inference of dolus eventualis 6) may be drawn. 7) It is
submitted that with the subjective approach to animus injuriandi 8) it
can be argued that a legitimate jest does exclude intention,9) and
that whether or not the jest is legitimate depends upon the circum-
stances of each case. If the joke is illegitimate the defendant may
not succeed in rebutting the presumption of animus injuriandi. The
defence has been referred to by the courts in defamation cases 10) and
there is no reason in principle why it should not apply to invasions
of privacy.
Strauss, Strydom & Van der WaIt op cit 285 n 88.
See above 156.
Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 384.
See above 152.
ef Geyser v Pont 1968 (4) SA 67 (W) 72f, where jest was referred
to as one of-rhe defences which rested upon the subjective absence
of animus injuriandi.
Masch v Leask 1916 TPD 114, 116; Peck v Katz 1957 (2) SA 567 (T)
572£.
1) See above 32ff, 44ff.
2) De Villiers op cit 195.
3) McKerron Delict op cit 204.









UTILITY AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
A. UTILITY
The reason for the development of the recognition of a
right to privacy was to combat the pressures exerted on an in-
dividual as the price he must pay for living in a technologically
advanced society.1) In common law countries new torts have
had to be created to cope with the modern threats to privacy,2)
whereas civil law systems have extended existing principles of
delictual liability.3) Both jurisdictions have introduced
statutory criminal penalties for certain invasions of privacy,4)
and in some legislation has been introduced5) (or contemplated)6)
to protect the individual against misuse of information stored
in data banks. In South Africa the utility of a common law
action for invasion of privacy has not been fully realized,7)
and it is submitted that there are several instances where the
action may be brought as an alternative to both widely accepted
and doubtful delictual remedies.
1) See above 7f.
2) Cf. United States, See above 52; British Columbia, Manitoba
and Saskatchewan in Canada, see above 121.
3) Cf. Federal Republic of Germany, see above 86f; France, see
above 97f; Canadian province of Quebec, see above 121£;
South Africa, see above 123f.
4) Cf. United States, see above 64; United Kingdom, see above 78;
Federal Republic of Germany, see above 89f; France, see above
98f; Canada, see above 124.
5) Cf. United States, see above M; Federal Republic of Germany, see
above 94; Canada, see above 124. .
6) Cf. United Kingdom, see above 81f; France, see above 107.
7) For instance, a photograph of a naked Miss World 1976 taken on.. , ,
a prlvate occaSl0n was published in a newspaper without her
consent and she was advised not to sue. Cf. Rapport 4 April
1976. A similar situation has arisenin the case of photographs
of a topless Miss South Africa taken for private purposes and
subsequently used on a record album. Rapport, 9 October 1977.
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1. As an Alternative to Defamation.
Whereas defamation is an attack on the reputation of
another, invasion of privacy affects the individuality of a
person,l) i.e~ his dignitas. 2) Therefore an action for invasion
of privacy is particularly useful where the plaintiff is unlikely
to succeed in proving that the statement or action was de-
famatory, or that there was a defamatory innuendo attached to
the words or conduct used, or that there was publication.
(a) Defamatory statements: Generally a defamatory statement is
one which is calculated to expose the plaintiff to contempt,
ridicule, hatred or diminished esteem in the eyes of others. 3)
In the past one of the factors taken into accoun~by the courts
was that the statement was likely to cause the plaintiff to be
shunned or avoided by his fellow-men,4) but this view has now
been rejected by the courts. 5) For instance in S A Associated
Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman6) Steyn CJ said:-
"Vir sover omgang met medemense beskermde regsgoed is,
is die beskerming nie van absolute aard nie, en vir
sover dit deur 'n lasteraksie verleen word, is dit
beperk." 7)
1) H Patrick Glenn "Right to Privacy in Quebec" (1974) 52
Canadian Bar R 297, 299; cf F de Graaff "The Protection of
Privacy in Dutch Law" (1976) 5 Human Rights 177, 184f:
"In the case of /aefamation7 ... the wrong is in the fact
that someone's reputation Is hurt ... In the case of
{public disclosure of private facts? ... it is not reputation
which is at stake ... but rather tne protection 0= someone's
personal though ts and fee lings". See above. In
defamation cases the plaintiff's fama is assailed and the
effect on his dignitas is irrelevant. Mathews v Van Rooyen
1972(1) PH J17 (Ne). See above 298.
2) See above 181.
3) RGM McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) 171; Pitout v
Rosenstein 1930 OPD 112, 115; JG Fleming Law of Torts 4 ed
(1971) 468.
4) Marruchi v Harris 1943 OPD 15, 21; Jonker v Davis 1953 (2) SA
726 (GW) 730; Hassen.v Post Newspa~ers (Pty) Ltd 1965 (3)
SA 562 (W) 565; Omar]ee v PostNewspapers (Pty)Ltd 1967 (2) PH
J 33.. (D). . ..
5)
SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman 1962(2) SA 613 (AD)
616f; cf,PQR Boberg "Defamation Per Consequentias" (1962)
79 SALJ 201, 262f. .JM Burchell "The Cri teria of Defamation"
(19~91 SALJ 178, 200.
6) Supra.
7) SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman supra 616£.
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Thus if non-defamatory disclosures are made concerning the
health of the plaintiff's children,') his religious beliefs,
or his political affiliations in circumstances when he is not
a public figure, and the disclosures are not in the public
interest,2) it is submitted that he could well succeed on a claim
for invasion of privacy - as such disclosures or intrusions
per se (except II they refer to his children)3) would constitute
an infringement of his dignitas. 4) Similarly in Richter v
Mack,5) although it was not defamatory for the defendants to
mention that the plaintiff was a German, it may have amounted to
an invasion of privacy.6) A person who is a member of the
Progressive Federal Party in a National Party stronghold or
vice versa, may be embarrassed by non-defamatory disclosures
concerning his membership. If he is not politically active
why should his political preferences, which are in any event
protected by the Legislature in a secret ballot,7) be exposed
to the public limelight?8) The answer procably lies in the
fact that such a disclosure would not be regarded as offending
the prevailing mores of society, but it is submitted that there is
no good reason why the political affiliations of a shy sensitive
person who shuns any form of publicity should be made known to
the public. It may no longer be defamatory to call a White
1) See above 256. Unless such diseases were notifiable in terms of
the Public Health Act, 36 of 1919, ss 19, 20. See above 257f.
2) In France such disclosures have been held actionable even though
the plaintiff is a public figure; cf Anne Philipe v
Societ€ 'France Editions et Publieations' (1966) 2 JCP 14222
(health of child of famous actor); . BrIgitte Bardot v
Societ€ ~rance Editions et Publications' (1968) JCP 2136
( philosophical or religIous convictIons); See above 101
3) See below 356.
4) See above 181f.
5)
1917 AD 201, 206; cf Burger v Leach 1917 CPD 398, 400, 402.
It seems however that the company in Trichardt v The Friend News-
papers Ltd 1916 AD could not sue for invasion of privacy,
oecause a company cannot have dignitas. See above 166.
6) The disclosure itself, however, would have to be offensive to
the prevailing mores of society ego by the defendant stating
that people should boycott the plaintiff's business because he
is an 'enemy subject' and should be interned; cf Richter v
Mack ~upra 206, 208. In any event should the plaintiff suffer
pecunIary loss as a resu~t of such a statement he may be able to
recover fo~ such loss, FIchardt Ltd V The Friend Ltd supra 7,
11, 13; RIchter v Mack supra 206, 208. The court in Fichardt's
case, however, errea-&y stating that such patrimonial loss was
recoverable under the actio inturiarum. Ibid.
7) Elec~ora1 Consolidation Act, 4 of 1946, ss 58(1), 95, 171.
8) Cf FIchardt Ltd v The Friend Ltd supra 6£, 9f, 12f.
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person Black,l) but it could be argued that such a statement
or the converse may constitute an invasion of privacy, where
the person concerned is put in a false light or exposed to un-
accustomed publicity.2) It is not defamatory to say that a
man has a "psychological block" about wanting to have iritercourse
with his ex-wife during their marriage,3) but such a statement
is clearly an invasion of privacy.4)
Cb) Defamatory innuendo: Where the onus is on the plaintiff to
prove that words prima facie innocent have a defamatory
meaning,S) and he is unlikely to succeed in such proof, he may
still be able to show that the words constituted an invasion of
his privacy. Thus although there was no defamatory innuendo
attached to saying that the plaintiffs in Kidson v SA Associated
Newspapers Ltd6) desired to meet members of the opposite sex,
they should have been able to recover for the invasion of their
privacy.7) It is submitted that the same principle could have
been applied in Good v Smith8) where the court found that to
chide a person for not joining up during World War 11 did not--give rise to an innuendo that the plaintiff was a coward or
sympathized with the Nazi cause. 9) Similarly in Botha v Shaw10 )
the term "psychological block about w~nting her" could not be
understood to mean that a woman's husband suffered from impotency~l)
If the plaintiffs in Good's case and Botha's case had sued in
the alternative for invasion of privacy they may well have
succeeded in their actions.
J Neethling "'n Geval van Privaatheidskending?" (1972) 3S
THR-HR 370, 374; DJ McQuoid-Mason "Invasion of Potency?"
(1973) 90 SALJ 23, 31.
5) ef L~slie v African Life AssuranceSoc 1927 WLD 248 252·
Wallachs Ltd V Ma~sh 1928 TPD 531, 534, 544. Unie ~olks~ers Bpk
v Rossouw 19~3 AD 519, 524; Basner V T~igger 1945 AD 22, 32.
McKerron De11ct op cit 174f.
1) Maskowitz v Pi~naar 1957(4) SA 195 (AD) 197; Taljaard v
Rosendorf & Venter 1970 (4) SA 48 (0) 54; DJ McQuoid-Mason
"Calllng Whlte Black" (1972) 1 NULR 14.
2) See above 273.
3) Botha v Shaw 1972 (1) SA 257 (0) 260.
4)
6) 1957 (3) SA 461 (W).
7) See above 130.
8) 1964 (4) SA 374 (N).
9) Good v Smith supra 377.
10) 1972 (1) SA 257 (0).
11) Botha v Shaw supra 260.
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(c) Publication: In cases where the plaintiff is unable to
successfully prove publication of a defamatory statement,l) if
the statement itself constituted an invasion of privacy the
plaintiff may succeed on the latter basis.
2
) Often such
statements are actionable as injuriae or insults.
3
) Even though
communications between spouses do not constitute publication
for defamation purposes,4) they may amount to an invasion of
privacy. For instance, if A tells his wife that B is
suffering from venereal disease - it is submitted that this would
be an invasion of B's right to privacy. Likewise it would be
an invasion of privacy where defendant has intruded into
plaintiff's private life, but has not disclosed what was
discovered to third parties. 5)
Finally where a statement is not defamatory because it would
only be so in the eyes of a particular section of society,
rather than in the eyes of right-thinking members of society as
a whole,6) it may be advisable for a plaintiff to al~ge invasion
of privacy as an alternative. It is conceded, however, that in
order for the alternative allegation to succeed the defendants'
conduct must be offensive to the prevailing mores of society,?)
which in many instances may coincide with the views of "right-
thinking" members of society.
2. As an Alternative to Injuria Per Consequentias
In Roman8) and Roman-Dutch law9) a distinction was drawn
1) See above 348.
2) Ibid ..
3) Cf Whittinfton v Bowles 1934 EDL 142, 151f; Brenner v Botha
1956 (3) S 257 (T) 261f. -------
4) Whittington v Bowles supra 145.
5) Cf ~ v Holliday 1927 CPD 395. See above 199f.
6)
C~ Fichardt Ltd v The Friend Newspapers Ltd supra 9; Conroy v
Nlcol 1951 (1) SA 653 (AD) 662; SA A~so~iated Newspapers Ltd v
Schoeman supra 617; Go-yre v SA Assoclate"a Newspap"ers Ltd
1963 (3) SA 376 (T) 38 .
7) S~e above l72f.
8)
Digest ~7.10:1.~; In~titutes 4.4.2; CF Amerasinghe Aspects of
the ACtlO InJurlarum ln Roman Dutch Law (1966) 203.
9) Grotius 3.35.6;" Voet 47.10.6; M de Villiers The Roman and
Roman Dutch Law o~juries (1899) 72. See above 47.
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between a direct injuria to a third person flowing from the
implication contained in the words used by the offender to someone
else (eg. A calls B a bastard - implying that B's parents were
not lawfully marrie~,1) and an injuria per consequentias for
which a third person can sue, not because of an implied injuria
to himself but because of a close family tie with the person
, . 2)
directly insulted (eg. A calls B's daughter a prostltute).
In many instances, however, the distinction is more apparent
than real. 3) For instance, where a person calls another's wife
a prostitute, is this a direct insult to the husband or does
the latter's hurt arise from his relationship to his wife? In
Banks v Ayres 4) a husband was allowed to recover for insult from
a person who had written letters containing improper overtures
to his late wife, while in Jacobs v Macdonald5) a husband
succeeded in a claim for insult from a person who had called his
wife a prostitute. Boberg suggests that injuria per consequentias
is no longer part of our law,6) and that the examples in the case
law are in fact based on the idea that the insult complained of
is a direct reflection on the fama or dignitas of the plaintiff,
as well as that of the relative so insulted. 7) This view is
supported by the decision in Spendiff v East London Daily
Despatch Ltd. 8) wher~ the defendants published an article headed:
"The Rand 1922 Strike Fund for Murderer's Dependants. Compulsory
Levy on Labour members". The article mentioned the setting up
of a fund by the Labour Party and there was an editor's footnote
1) Miller v Abrahams 1918 CPD 50, 51, which failed on the pleadings
as there was no allegation that it reflected on plaintiff
personally. Cf Sudu Banda v Punchirala (1951) 52 New L R
512, 515; Amerasinghe Actl0 Injuriarum op cit 200.
2) Amerasingne Actio Injuriarum op cit 203f.
3) Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 201f.
4) (1888) 9 NLR 34, 39.
5) 1909 TS 442, 443. Cf RG McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971)
55 n 23: It should be noted that the basis of the decision was
not that the words complained of were ~consequentias
defamatory.of the plaintiff, but that oy-llecessary implication
they constltuted an impairment of his dignitas.
6) PQR Boberg "Defamation Per Consequentias" (1962) 79 SALJ 261,263.
7) Cf HR Hahlo & E Kahn South Africa: The Development 6f Its Laws
and Constitution (1960) 525.
8) 1929 EDL 113.
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stating: "The men mentioned were convicted of murder and execuT.ed."
Plaintiffs who were the widow and children of one of the deceased
strikers sued for defamation. Van der Riet J assumed that:
"the action no longer rests upon the Roman Law of
lnJury 'per consequentias' but upon a direct injury
to the status 'of the plaintiff". 1)
The learned judge then went on to say:
"It is almost unthinkable that the sons of any person
caluminously referred to as a criminal should have an
action as well as their father if he only be mentioned
(whatever may be their rights if they themselves are
maliciously and falsely referred to as the sons of a
convicted criminal). Although therefore it may be
natural that a son may be wounded in his self-esteem
if his father be so referred to, I think that under our
law he has no right of action unless he himself was
directly referred to and the false statement concerning
his father was therefore an actual attack upon himself.,,2)
McKerron suggests that the principle of actio injuriarum per
consequentias should be confined to the husband and wife relation-
ship on the basis that it is "the most intimate of human relation-
ships",3) but it is submitted that an argument can also be made for
extending it to a parent and child relationship where the latter
are "subject to his power or who are the objects of his natural
affection".4) Notwithstanding Boberg's contention that the
insults to the husbands in Bank's case and Jacobs' case constituted
1) Spendiff v East London Daily Desptach Ltd supra 129f. It has
been suggested that Van der Riet J (at 132) and Pitman J
(at 137) accepted that to say a man was a "murderer"
"was also slanderous of his wife and minor sons" Amerasinghe
Actio Injuriarum op cit 200.
2) Spendiff v East Londan Daily Despatch Ltd supra 131; cf
Goodall v Hoo~endoorn Ltd 1926 AD 11, 15; Whittington v Bowles
s~pra 151 (WhlCh mislnterpreted Spendiff's case);
Plke v Wesson 1938 EDL 373, 376.
3) McKerron Delict op cit 55.
4) Voet 47.~0.6. It is. conceded, that the word "power" should
not be glven the meanlng of patria ~otestas, but rather that
of legal control over a dependant mlnor. ef Amerasinghe
Actio Injuriarum op cit 209.
Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman supra 614. The court
to amend the claim to in~uria but unfortunateiy
withdrew his action. oberg op cit '(1962) 79
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a direct insult to each of them,1) the court in Banks' case
appeared to recognize the existence of the per consequentias action:
"Now without going so far as to say that this doctrine
ought to apply to all cases of injuriae, I think there
are cases in which an insult to a wife is also an insult
to her husband though it might not be directly levelled
against him. There are certain things which, if said of
a man's wife, imply necessarily contumelia to the man -
amount to an impairment of his dignitas, the dignity and
freedom from insult which every citizen is entitled to
enjoy".2)
The matter has not yet been settled by the Appellate Division,
although in SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman3) counsel for
the plaintiff appeared to concede that the action was no longer
applicable in modern law. 4) Amerasinghe suggests that the per conse-
quentias action always concerns injury to dignitas and never to fama
or corpus. 5) For instance, although a defamatory statement is made
concerning a man's wife, e.g. that she is a prostitute, the injury
suffered by the husband is to his dignitas not his reputation. It
is submitted, however, that in some instances the plaintiff may be
able to establish an innuendo which reflects upon his reputation eg.
that he is the sort cr person who consorts with prostitutes or that
he lives off his wife's immoral earnings.
In view of the current uncertainty concerning the recognition
of an action for injuria per consequentias fuere may be situations
which in Roman-Dutch iaw would give rise to such an action, but
1) Boberg op cit (1962) 79 SALJ 263 states: "The writer goes
further, however, and submits that Banks' and Jacobs' cases are
not authority for applying the principle even to the husband-
and-wife situation, for perusal of these decisions shows that
the court regarded the statement made of the wife as a direct
reflection upon the fama of the husband as well". Contra
Arnerasinghe Actio InJUrIarum op cit 206.
2) Per Innes CJ in Banks v Ayres supra 443.





5) Arnerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 206.
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which in our law could also be regarded as invasions of privacy.
Our courts would be unlikely to recognize an action for defamation
of a deceased person,1) although Roman2) and Roman-Dutch law
3
)
allowed an action in favour of the deceased's heirs, widows and
children. 4) On the ,other hand when the plaintiff proceeds
against the defendant, not for the injury to the deceased parent,
husband or child, but rather to assuage his own hurt feelings, there
seems to be no reason in principle why such a plaintiff should not
recover. Such an action could arise where unpleasant disclosures
or reminders concerning a deceased member of the plaintiff's
family are made in such a manner that the plaintiff himself is
identified and referred to. This is not, however, identical to
the Roman-Dutch per consequentias action as here plaintiff would
be claiming for the invasion of his own privacy rather than for
the injury to his deceased relative. Therefore if in Spendiff
v East London Daily Despatch Ltd5) the newspaper had published an
article about the late Mr. Spendiff, falsely referring to him as a
convicted murderer, and mentioning his dependants by name several
years after he had been in the public eye, it is submitted that
the latter may have recovered for invasion of privacy.6) Similarly
if a newspaper were to publish a report 20 or 30 years after World
War 11 concerning the exploits of certain executed Nazi war
criminals, together with a brief account of the present whereabouts
and mode of living of their descendants, the report concerning the
ef Spendiff v East London Daily1) McKerron Delict op cit 183;
Despatch Ltd 1929 EDL 113.
2) Digest 47.10.1.4.6
3) Voet 47.10.5.
4) McKerron Delict op cit 182. Cf Netherlands Civil Code, Article
1411; NJ van der Merw€ and PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in
die Suid-Afrikaanse~ 2 ed (1970) 348 n 75.
5) Supra.
6) It could however be argued that as members of a particular
political party were contributing funds to be used to support
the dependants of an alleged murderer such a disclosure was in
the public interest. See above 319.
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atrocities perpetrated by the war criminals would not
be an invasion of privacy; even though it opens up old wounds, but
the disclosures about their descendants would be. The dis-
closures concerning the whereabouts of the descendants would in
themselves constitute· an invasion,l) and the linking of such
descendants with their notorious ancestors would be an aggravating
factor. In SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman
2
) defendants
had falsely reported that plaintiff's son had been charged under
the Immorality Act. 3) Plaintiff alleged that the report was
defamatory, but it was held not defamatory to say of a person that
his son has been charged with a crime. 4) Counsel for the plaintiff
conceded that injuria per consequentias had no application in
modern law,S) but it is submitted that the plaintiff should have
sued in the alternative for invasion of privacy in that he had
been pl~ced in _a false light in the pub1-!..c eye. J It was an
unwarranted interference with his privacy to link him with the
person alleged to be his son. Even though a person is a prominent
business man in the community and is often in the pubDc eye, he
is entitled to protection from being placed in a false light. 7)
In any event the fact that the "Tobacco King" was mentioned
personally did not amount to an injuria per consequentias but was
a direct invasion of his privacy. Furthermore on the facts in
Schoeman's case there would not have been an action per consequentias
in Roman-Dutch law as Voet stated that the action did not apply to
emancipated children. 8 ) .
Ibid.
Voet 47.10.6.
1962 (2) SA 613 (AD).
Act 23 of 1957.
SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman supra 617.
Cf McKerron Delict op cit 182 n 94.
See above 290.









In the United States similar problems arise in respect
of the so-called "relational" right of privacy, where relatives
of a deceased or living person attempt to claim for injury caused
to their feelings by the publication of disclosures concerning a
member of the family.~) Prosser points out that the general rule
is that the plaintiff's right is a personal one which does not
extend to his relations unless their own privacy is invaded along
with his. 2) Nonetheless the American decisions are conflicting.
Thus an action for a "relational" invasion of privacy arising from
a publication concerning a deceased relative has failed3) when
brought by: children for false representations that their
deceased father was dishonest and guilty of bribing public
officials;4) a husband for publication of a photograph of his wife
in a story of her sensational suicide;5) a sister for a false
report that her brother had died as a "dope-sodden derelict,,;6)
the widow of Jesse James Jr for a television film which wrongfully
portrayed the outlaw's life;7) a mother for the anguish caused by
a magazine article on the murder of her son;8) an administrator
of her estate and the deceased's 9 children for a story concerning
her rape and murder;9) a father for the publication of a photograph
of his deceased drug-addicted son;10) a widow for the use of her
1) IJ Schiffres "Invasion of Privacy by Publication Dealing with
One Other than the Plaintiff" (1968) 18 ALR 3d 873, 874f.
2) WL Prosser Law of Torts 4 ed (1971) 814f.
3) See generally Schiffres op cit (1968) 18 ALR 3d 876ff.
4) Gruschus v Curtis Publishing Co (1965) 342 F 2d 775 (CA 10 NM).
5) Metter v Los Angeles Examiner (1939) 35 Cal App 2d 304, 95 P 2d 491.
6) Kelly v Johnson Publishing Co (1958) 160 Cal App 2d 718 325
P 2d 659. '
7) James v Screen Gems Inc (1959) 174 Cal App 2d 650, 344 P 2d 799.
8)
Waters v Fleetwood (1956) 212 Ga 161, 91 SE 2d 344; cf Bradley
v Cowles Magazine Inc (1960) 26 III App 2d 331, 168 NE 2d 64.
9)
Carlson v ~ell Publishin& Co (196~) 6~ III App 2d 209, 213 NE 2d
39 .. ~ claIm. for co~merclal explOItatIon of Al Capone by the
anmInIstratrIx of hIS estate, his widow and his son also
failed. Maritote v Desilu Productions Inc (1965) 345 F 2d 418
(CA 7 I 11 ) 18 ALR 3d 86 3.
10) Rozhon v Triangle Publications Inc (1956) 230 F 2d 359 (CA 7 Ill).
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deceased husband's name and likeness on a cigar label;l) parents
for pictures of the mutilated body of their da~ghter who had been
killed in a motor collision;2) and the great-grandchildren of a
composer for a film 100 years after his death depicting him and
his sister as insane. 3) On the other hand a "relational" right
to privacy appears to have been recognized where: a photograph of
the naked body of plaintiff's deceased baby child born with its
heart outside was published without their consent;4) the
plaintiff's wife bore Siamese twins joined fromfue shoulder down who
died shortly after birth, and the defendant who had been engaged
by the parents to photograph the babies sutsequently published the
photograph without the parents' consent;5) and an undertaker took
a picture of the body of the plaintiff~s deceased husband as it
was being moved from an aircraft, and used it fer advertising
1) Atkinson v John E Doherty & Co (1899) 121 Mich 372, 80 NW 285,
46 LRA 219; cf Schuyler v Curtis (1895) 147 NY 434, 42 NE 22,
31 LRA 286; 148 NY 754, 43 NE 989 (statue of a 'woman reformer").
Both cases, however, were decided before invasion of privacy was
generally accepted as a tort in the United States. See above 53f.
In France a person's image or likeness may only re used after his
death with the consent of his family. Ed AH Robertson Privacy
and Human Rishts (1973) 49. See also WA Joubert Grondslae van
OIe Persoon11kheidsreg (1953) 58. See above 94. In the Federal
Republic of Germany an action based on personality rights to
interdict the posthumus publication of Nietzsche's private
letters failed, but succeeded on the basis of copyright.
HC Gut teridge "Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy". (1931) 47
.!:9R 203, 205. Cf A Logdberg "The Right in a Person's Own
L1Keness" (1967) 11 Scandinavian Studies in Law 213, 216 (death-
bed photograph of Bismarck). See above 84.
2) Kelley v Post Publishing Co (1951) 327 Mass 275, 98 NE 2d 286.
ct Milner v Red River Valley Publishing Co (1952) 249. SW 2d
227 (Tex Civ App). Contra Sellers v Henry (1959) 329 SW 2d
214 (Ky).
3) Schumann v Loew's Inc (1955) 144 NYS 2d 27 (Sup).
4) Bazemore v Savannah Hospital (1930) 171 Ga 257, 155 SE 194. See
above 262.
5) DOU~las v Stokes (1912) 149 Ky 506, 149 SW 849, 850; "The most
ten er affect10ns of the human heart cluster about the body of
one's dead child. .A man may recover for any injury or indignity
~o~e ~he b?dy, and 1t would be a reproach to the law if physical
~n~ur~es m1~ht be recovered for, and not those incorporeal
1nJur1es wh1ch w0uld cause much greater suffering and humiliation."
~ou~las~ case did not directl~ r~ferto invasion of privacy, but
1t .a~ een suggested that th1s 1S the only possible basis for the
dec1s1on. Brents v Morgan (1927) 221 Ky 765 299 SW 967 55
ALR 964. Cf Schiffres op cit (1968) 18 ALR'3d 882 n 13:
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purposes. 1) Hofstadter and Horowitz argue that such cases have
usually been decided on some ground "other than bare right of
privacy, like contract or trust and confidence".2) The
decision in Sellers v Henry,3) however, appears to recognize a
right to privacy in such cases. In Seller's case the defendant,
a police officer, h~d published a photograph of the plaintiff's
young daughter taken while she lay dead in a crashed motor car.
The court seemed to accept that the publication was an invasion
of privacy as it held that it was necessary to clarify the
purpose of the publication and whether it was in the public
interest. 4) . In any event several of the actions for
"relational" invasion of privacy have failed because the dis-
closures were in the public interest. 5) Similarly, "relational"
actions arising out of the invasion of privacy of a live relative
have also failed. Damages were refused where parents sued fOT
publicity concerning their son's arrest, trial and acquittal on
a charge of unlawful assembly which resulted in irreparable harm
to the father's accountancy practice,6) and where a husband sought
to recover for an invasion of his wife's privacy.7)
1) Fitzsimmons v Olinger Mortuary Assoc.(1932) 91 Colo 544, 17 P
2d 535. In Fitzsimmons' case, however, the advertisement
included the names of the plaintiff and the deceased and it
could be argued that it was a direct invasion of the former's
privacy. The action was grounded, however, on breach of
contract.
2) 5H Hofstadter & G Horowitz The Right to Privacy (1964) 179.
3) Supra. Contra Kelley v Post Publishing Co Supra. In Oklahoma,
Utah and Virginia a "relational" right of privacy is recognized
by statute. Prosser Torts op cit 815.
4) Cf Hofstadter & Horowitz op cit 122f.
5) Cf Smith v Doss (1948) 251 Ala 250, 37 So 2d 118, although
the court oBserved that there seemed to be no reason why the
right of privacy of daughters could not be impaired by "un-
warranted and offensive publicity" concerning their deceased
father. Schiffres op cit (1968) 18 ALR 3d 882; Abernathy v
Thornton (1955) 263 Ala 496, 83 50 2d 235; Bremrner v Journal-
Tribune Publishing Co (1956) 247 Iowa 817, 76 NW 2d 762;
Mahaffey v Officia~ Detective Stories Inc (1962) 210 F Supp 251
(DC La). Cr Corl1ss v EW Walker Co (1894) 64 F 280,31 LRA 283.
Waters v Fleetwood (1956) 212 Ga 161, 91 SE 2d 344. See above.
6) Coverstone v Davies (1952) 38 Cal 2d 315, 239 P 2d 876; 344 US
840, 97 L ed 653, 73 S Ct 50.
7)
Cox v ~agn¥i Publications (1955) 285 App Div 1083, 140 NY 5 2d
17; Russe v Marboro Books (1959) 18 Misc 2d 166, 183 NY5 2d 8.
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A husband was however entitled to recover where a doctor took an
unauthorized photograph of his wife while undergoing medical
treatment. 1)
It seems trite that in South African law there can be no
action for the invasion of the dead child's privacy,2) but can its
parents suffer an actionable invasion per consequentias? It is
submitted that the publication of a picture of a deceased or
deformed child is an invasion of the privacy of its parents who
may suffer greatly from the reminder of their misfortune.
3
) Albeit
that generally such an action may no longer lie in our law
for insult or defamation (except perhaps where there is a husband and
wife relationship)4) it is submitted that there is scope for an
invasion of privacy action where the disclosures concern physical
abnormality of, or acute suffering by, a member of a family (eg.
a deceased parent or child).5) The better view, however, is that
the plaintiffs in this a situation are claiming for the direct hurt
to their own feelings and that it is not really a per consequentias
action. Therefore provided the relative is mentioned in such a
way that the plaintiffs themselves are also identified they should
succeed in an action for invasion of privacy. Such an approach
would not be inconsistent with the decisions in Miller v Abrahams,6)
Gelfard v Shrock,7) and Spetidiff v East London Daily Despatch Ltd. 8)
1) Clayman v Bernstein (1940) 38 Pa D & C 543. See above 252.
2) Cf McKerron Delict op cit 183. Banks v Ayres (1888) 9 NLR 34, is
distinguishable in that the wrong was perpetrated on the
plaintiff's wife before she died.
3) See above 358 n 5.
4) See above 353.
5) It is interesting to note that Lord Mancroft's Bill was partly
aimed at protecting relatives of criminals or their victims
from harrassment by' the press, by providing that disclosures
concerning them would only be in the public interest if the
event: (<;t) was contemporary, Cb) involved the relative personally
and Cc) lt was reasonably necessary to disclose the plaintiff's
identity. L Brittan "Right of Privacy in England and the
US" (1963) 37 Tulane L R 235, 262f.
6) 1918 CPD 50, where the plaintiff's daughter was called "a dirty
black b ... " and the plaintiff had failed to allege that it re-
flected on her ego by stating that both she and her husband were
White (Miller v Abrahams supra 51).
7) 1916 CPD 350, where the plaintiff also failed on the pleadings
when he sued for assault and defamation of his wife defamation
of his child and in his personal capacity but had j~ined his
wife's and child's action as one and had ~mitted to set out the
nature of the injury suffered by himself (Gelfard v Shrock supra
352).
8) 1929 EDL 113.
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3. As an Alternative to Injurious Falsehood
A person who knowingly and intentionally publishes a false
statement concerning another which causes that other pecuniary
loss is liable to an action for damages for injurious falsehood. 1)
The requirement of proof of pecuniary 10ss,2) indicates that the
action falls under the lex Aquilia rather than the actio
injuriarum,3) and therefore the suggestion in Fichardt Ltd v
The Friend Newspapers Ltd4) that the wrong is an injuria and the
remedy the actio injuriarum is clearly incorrect. 5) The usual
examples of injurious falsehood concern the false denial
of another's title to property;6) the false disparagement of a
rival trader's goods;7) and a trader passing-off of his goods as
those of a rival. 8) In all cases the plaintiff must prove
either patrimonial loss or a well grounded apprehension of such
loss when he applies for an interdict. 9)
1) E Newman and DJ McQuoid-Mason South African Law of Obligations
(1978) cf RG McKerron The Law '~f Delict 7 ed (1971) 213f.
2) Fichard Ltd v The Friend Newspa~er5 Ltd 1916 AD 1, 7, 11;
Van Zyl v African Theatres CPty Ltd 1931 CPD 61, 64f.
3) Cf Bredell v Pienaar 1924 CPD 203, 213; Geary & Son (Pty) Ltd
v Gove 1964(1) SA 434 (AD) 441; Dun & Bradstreet CPty) Ltd v
SA~can~Combined Credit Bureau 1968 Cl) SA 209 CC) 218.
4) Supra.
5) McKerron Delict op cit 214 n 37. Universiteit van Pretoria v
Tommie Meyer Films 1977 (4) SA 376 eT) 385.
6) Cf City Deep Ltd v SA Mails Syndicate Ltd 1910 TPD 160, 163,
165.
7)
International Tobacco Co (SA) Ltd v United Tobacco Co (South)
Ltd (1) 1955 (2) SA 1 (W) 15.
8) Geary and Son (Pty) Ltd v Gove supra 44lf; Dun & Bradstreet
CPty) Ltd v SA.Merchants COIDbIned Credit Bureau supra 2l6f;
Stellenbosch Wlne Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group Ltd 1972 (3)
SA 152 CC) 161£; Cf McKerron Dellct op cit 214- NJ van der
Merwe and PJJ Olivier Die Onregm~tige Daad in dIe Suid-Afri-
kaanse Reg 2 ed (1970) 332£.
9)
C~ Setlegelo v Setlegelo 1914 AD 221, 227; McKerron Delict op
Clt l40f; Van der Merwe and 01ivier op cit 387f.
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Situations may arise, however, where the plaintiff has
been put in a false light but is unable to prove patrimonial loss
or the threat of loss for instance, where falsely: an entertainer
is advertised as gOin~ to appear at a particular concert;1) a
person is said to belong to an unpopular nationality, religion or
political party;2) or a man is accused of failing to fight for his
country during World War 11. 3) These disclosures may not be de-
famatory, but may amount to an invasion of privacy if they are
sufficiently offensive to the prevaling mores of the community,4)
and are done intentionally.S) For an invasion of privacy grounded
on an intentional act it is unnecessary to prove patrimonial 10ss.6)
B. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
1. Negligent Invasions of Privacy?
With the increasing emphasis by the courts on a more
subjective approach to animus injuriandi under the actio injuriarum,
particularly for defamation,7) it is likely that the same approach
will be followed for invasions of privacy.8) This means that if it
is accepted that generally invasion of privacy falls within the ambit
of the actio injuriarum, the victim of a negligent invasion will not
be able to succeed under an action for injuria.
g
) Nevertheless it .
seems that in principle there is no reason why such a plaintiff
should not recover under the Aquilian action if in addition to
fault he proves patrimonial 10ss.10) It is true that the courts
are reluctant to award compensation for a negligent act resulting
See above 152, except for defamation by the press, see above
See above 165f,
Cf Taljaard v Resend6rff & Ve~ter 1970 (4) SA 48 (0) 54;
Van der Merwe & 01ivier op clt 388~ See above 152.
See below 366.
l57f.
(2) SA 613 (AD)






1) Van Zyl v African Theatres (Pty) Ltd. supra.
2) Cf SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman 1962
617.









in mere pecuniary 1055,1) but it is submitted that this approach
is unjustified for the following reasons:
Ca) The general trend in Roman and Roman-Dutch law has been to




Cb) Claims for mere economic or pecuniary loss in the past appear
to have failed because the plaintiff has been unable to prove
that the defendant owed him a duty,4) or because the particular
claim was regarded as an unjustified intrusion into the field
of contract,S) rather than because mere pecuniary damages are
not recoverable. 6)
(c) It is illogical to distinguish mere "pecuniary" loss from
"patrimonial" 1055. As long as 'the fault element is satisfied
it should make no difference whether the defendant acted in-
tentionally or negligently.7)
"The control of liability for 'pure' economic loss
can be just as effectively achieved by tbe reasonable
man test properly applied as can the control of lia-
bility for economic loss associated with injury to, or
. 8)
loss or destruction of, property".
1) RG McKerron "Liability for Mere Pecuniary Loss in an Action under
the Lex Aquilia" (1973) 90 SALJ 5; cf Union Government v
Ocean Accident & Guarantee cor- Ltd 1956 (1) SA 577 (AD);
Hamman v Moolman ~ SA 3 0 AD).
2) Cf Cape of Good Hop~Bank v Fischer (1886) 4 SC 368, 376;
Mathews v Young 1922 AD 492, 504; Perlman v Zoutendyk 1934 CPD 1511
155; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 197f .. ef Van Z~l v African
Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1931 CPD 61, 6: "There 1S a good eal to be
said in favour of liability for negligent statements which cause
damage, for being able to recover damages on a wider basis
than the accepted one."
3) Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657, 662, 665, 673f;
Nochomowitz v sANrAM 1972 (1) SA 718 CT) 720f.
4) Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (AD) 481, ~93, 497.
5)
Hamman v Moolman supra 347f; Combrinck Chiro Kliniek (Edms) Bpk v
Datsun Motors (Pty) Ltd 1972 (4) sA 185 eT) 192; . Latham v Sher
1974 (4) SA 687 (W) 695f.
6) Contra McKerron op cit (1973) 90 SALJ 1.
7) Cf yan der ~erwe & Olivier op c~t 1~7f; for instance McKerron
Del1ct op C1t 113 states: "P~trimon1al damages ... are always
dam~ges aw~rde~ as co~pensat1~n for calculable pecuniary loss."
It 1S subm1tted that 1n many 1nstances such economic loss is cal-
cUlabl~. Surely it is unnecessary to revive a primitive coreore
cor¥or1 concept? Cf Hedley Byrne& Co v HelIer & Partners [19637
2 A I E R 575 (HL) 60 2f . -
8)
MA Millner Negligence in Modern Law (1967) 42_
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Provided the other essential elements for an action under the
Lex Aquilia are present it is submitted that it should make no
difference that the loss suffered is purely "economic".
Another problem arises, however, in respect of the "wrong-
fulness" aspect in the Aqui1ian action. Assuming that the
wrongdoer ought to have foreseen that the person whose privacy
is invaded would have been injured by his negligent act, and that
the latter has in fact suffered patrimonial loss (eg. emotional
shock),1) is the defendant's act "wrongful"? It is clear that
where the plaintiff only suffers sentimental damages his remedy
lies under the actio injuriarum in terms of which there can be
no liability for negligence. 2) Nonetheless the flexibility of
the concept of negligence has been pointed out by both the English
3
)
and South African courts. 4)
"The grounds of action may be as various and manifold as
human errancy, and the conception of legal responsibility
may develop in adaptation to the altering social con-
ditions and standards. The criterion of judgment must
adjust and adopt itself to the changing circumstances of
life. The categories of negligence are never closed."S)
The courts must, however, determine which categories of negligence
they will recognize:
"Whatever the scope of moral duty, not to cause foreseeable
harm to others in their persons or estates may be, in law
this duty is restricted in the interests of the indivi-
dual's freedom of action and legitimate interest. After
all law in a community is a means of effecting a
compromise between conflicting interests and it seems
to me that according to the principles of Roman-Dutch
law the Aquilian action in respect of damnum injuria datum
can be instituted by a plaintiff against a defendant only
1) See below 234.
2) Union Govt v Warneke supra 670; cf Van der Merwe & Olivier op
cit 388.
3) Donoghue v Stevenson Lf93~7 All E R Rep 1 (HL).
4) Herschel·v Mrupe supra 489f.
S) Per Lord M "11 "D h Sacm1 an 1n onog ue v tevenson supra 30.
Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 388£.
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if the latter has made an invasion of rights recognized
by the law as pertaining to the plain~iff, apart from
that the loss lies where it falls.,,1)
It is submitted that ,it is trite that a person's right to privacy
is recognized by the courts in South Africa,2) and that where
such a right is intentionally breached an action will lie.
3
) But
should the courts recognize liability for a negligent invasion of
privacy? In Gelb v Hawkins 4) Hiemstra J suggested that the
developed action for defamation is "an actio ex lege Aquilia and
an actio injuriarum rolled into one".5)
"The effect is that damages are assessed under the two
heads. Firstly for loss of reputation seen as an
economic asset. Then culpa either in the wide or
the narrow sense, is an essential element. Secondly
to assuage wounded feelings. The animus injuriandi
or intent to injure is essential and its extent will
profoundly affect the amount awarded".6)
From the above it follows that in an action based on culpa the
plaintiff can recover patrimonial loss, but not sentimental
damages:
"Waar die ei.ser nie opset kan bewys nie, maar slegs
nalatigheid, kan hy met sy eis om genoegdoening nie
slaag nie, maar is nog steeds geregtig op skade-
vergoeding".7)
It is submitted that Hiemstra J is incorrect when he states that
1) Per Van den Heever JA in Herschel v Mrupe supra 489f.
2) See above l25ff.
3) Ibid.





damages are assessed for "loss of reputation seen as an economic
asset". The damages arising from culpa are awarded for loss of
earnings, profits and the like which flow from the defamatory
statement i.e. these are special damages which have to be proved,1)
unlike damages for solatium for loss of reputation (which in the
abstract may be regarded as an "economic asset,,)2) and "wounded
feelings" which do not have to be proved. 3) In order to succeed
in an action for a defamatory statement made negligently, the
plaintiff will only be able to recover those damages which he can
prove i.e. patrimonial 10ss.4) It is submitted therefore the the
same principle may be applied to a negligent invasion of privacy
which results in patrimonial loss. In such cases the plaintiff
will not be able to recover for any wounded feelings or impairment
of dignitas. 5) Recently the concept of patrimonial loss itself
has been widened by the recognition of emotional shock as physical
In]Ury. This development may have an important bearing on
actions for negligent invasions of privacy.
2. Emotional Shock
In the past South African courts were reluctant to allow an
action for emotional shock unless the harm was caused intentionally,6)
or negligently under circumstances where the plaintiff could prove:
(a) that he had suffered physical "organic" injury,7) and (b) the
1) Cf International Tobacco Co (SA) Ltd v United Tobacco Co (South)
Ltd. 1955 (2) SA 1 (W) 19.
2) e£ Die S~oorb0nd v SAR & H 1946 AD 999, 1010£; Maisel v Van
Naeren 1 60 (4) 836 (C) 848; McKerron Delict op cit 170.--Cf
Note "Defamation, Privacy and the First Amendment" 1976 Duke L J
1016, 1035: "Reputation thus reflects one's economic relation-
ships as well as one's 'honour' . To the extent that reputation
imp~icate~ the attitudes of.third.persons, it is a very tangible
nO~10n.whlch ca~ be ascertalned wl~h some sophistication by the
Ob]ectlve technlques of modern soclal science (although) these
methods (are) infrequently employed in practice".
3) McKerron Delict op cit 115; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 386.
See above 19'4.
4)
Moaki v Reckett & Colman (Africa) Ltd 1968 (1) SA 702 (W) 704.
5) Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 388f. The American "appropriation"
cases on the other hand regard the plaintiff's image or likeness
as an asset and seek to compensate him for the loss of his
"property right of material profit". See above 304£.
6) EIs v Bruce 1922 EDL 295, 298.
7) Hauman v Malmesbury District Council 1916 CPD 216, 220.
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harm was triggered by a fear for his own safety.1) This outmoded
Cartesian distinction2) has been rejected by our courts, and
a plaintiff may now recover for nervous shock wrongfully inflicted
provided: (a) the harm was foreseeable 3) and (b) it was not a
mere inconsequential'shock of short duration. 4) In other words
there is no longer a distinction between physical and psychological
injury,S) and a plaintiff will recover if he can prove that he is
suffering from a "recognized" psychiatric illness.
6
) In English
law it is necessary for the defendant to foresee shock,7) but in
our law it seems that the "thin-skull" rule app.lies,8) provided
some shock (other than merely inconsequential shock of short
duration)was reasonably foreseeable. 9) Therefore if a negligent
intrusion into a person's private life results in a heart attack
or causes the plaintiff to undergo a personality change, such a
person should be e~titled to recover for any expenses incurred in
respect of medical or psychiatric treatment. For instance, where
the negligent and cnauthorized publication of a photograph of a
mother's grossly deformed baby causes her severe nervous shock
requiring her to undergo intensive psychiatric treatment, it is
submitted that she may recover for both medical treatment and pain
and suffering. A claim for this form of "pain and suffering" can
1) Mulder v South British Insurance 1957 (2) SA 444 (W); cf MA Mill-
ner "Liability for Emotional Shock" (1957) 74 SALJ 263.
2) "The Cartesian distinction between mind and matter for a long
time had an obdurate influence on man's thinking. The inter-
relation of mind and body was little understood and often un-
acknowledged. But this position has given way in medicine and
should I think, give way in law" per Windeyer J in Mount Isa
Mines Ltd v Pusey (1971) 45 Australian LJR 88, 96.
3) Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1973 (1)
SA 769 (AD) 777.
4) Bester v Com~ercial Union yersekerin~smaatskapoyBpk supra 779;
cf DJ MCQuold-Mason "Emotlonal shoc: Shades of Descartes?"
(1975) 92 SALJ 18.
5) Bester v Commercloa'l U 0 V k ° k knlon erse erlngsmaats appy Bp supra 779.
6) Cf DJ McQuoid-Mason "Emotional Shock: Why the Cartesian
Distinction?" (1973) 36 THR-HR 124; Louise Tager "Nervous Shock
and Mental Illness" (1973) 90 SALJ 123.
7) Fleming T6rts op cit 151.
8) Tager op cit (1973) 90 SALJ 123; DJ McQuoid-Mason op cit (1973)
36 THR-HR 137, 175.
9) PQR Boberg "Law of Delict" 1973' A 1 Snnua urvey 139.
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theoretically be distinguished from a claim for sentimental pain
and suffering arising out of the anguish caused by the invasion
itself. The former is identical to the pain and suffering
which accompanies an' injury or illness under the Lex Aquilia, while
the latter is confined to sentimental damages recoverable under
the actio injuriarum as a solatium for wounded feelings. In short
if the mental suffering is sufficient to manifest itself in a
"psychiatric illness" the plaintiff can recover, otherwise not.
In any event the suffering resulting from emotional injury is often
greater than that resulting from physical injury.1) After all
the Roman-Dutch jurists were prepared to recognize a claim for
pain and suffering for "physical injury,,2) in an age when medical
science was still in its infancy, and there is no logical reason
for rejecting such a claim in respect of suffering caused by
emotional shock in an age when psychiatry is recognized as a
skilled profession in which trained persons are able to assess to
a considerable degree the mental anguish and psychosis suffered
by vi~tims of emotional shock. 3) An invasion of privacy causing
emotional shock may also result in claims for loss of earnings and
loss of profits. In any event where the defendant's negligence
is so great that it amounts to a reckless disregard of the
consequences of his act this may be evidence of intention in the
form of dolus eventualis. 4)
1) "The distinction between mental shock and bodily injury was
never a scientific one, for mental shock is presumably in all
cases the result of, or at least accompanied by some physical
disturbance in the sufferer's system, md a mental shock may have
consequences more serious than those resulting from physical
impact" per Lord Macmillan in Bourhill v Young (1942) 2 All E R
396 (HL) 402.
2) Hoffa NO v SA Mutual Fire & General Insurance Co Ltd 1965 (2) SA
944 CC) 951£.
3) McQuoid-Mason op cit (1973) 36 THR-HR 138.
4) ~'I~ a man acts recklessly, not heeding whether he will or will not
InjUre another, he cannot be heard to say that he did not intend
to hurt" per Wessels JA in Nasionale Pers v ~)ng 1930 AD 87 100·
cf Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1965 ( SA 562 (W) 574f. '
See above 156.
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3. A Hybrid Action?
Certain writers have argued for the recognition of invasion
of privacy as an independent delict, but seem to concede that it
must fall within the-provisions of the actio injuriarum and the
lex Aquilia. 1) It is not satisfactory, however, simply to take
over the American action in toto or to argue that the concept
has been recognized in certain European countries and should be
accepted in South Africa. 2) The South African law of delict is
based on the broad principles of the actio injuriarum and the lex
Aquilia,3) plus several sui generis wrongs. 4) It is submitted
that there is no need to create a new wrong,S) because apart from
the threat to privacy by data banks,6) the Roman-Dutch law as
adapted by South African law, is flexible enough to cope with
many modern day invasions of privacy. In most cases an action
for invasion of privacy will be based primarily on the actio
injuriarum, with an occasional subsiduary claim under the lex
Aquilia. Although it is no longer necessary to bring separate
actions under the actio injuriarum and lex Aquilia,7) our courts
still apply the principle that any claim for solatium (other than
pain and suffering)8) must be brought under the actio injuriarum. 9)
1) Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 393; J Neethling "Grondslag vir
die Erkenning van 'n Selfstandige Persoonlikheidsreg op
Privaatheidin die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg" (1976) 39 THR-HR 120,
128; J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976) 380.
7.) Cf Neethling Privaatheid op cit 406.
3) McKerron Delict op cit 10; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 196.
4) McKerron Delict op cit 11; Van der Merwe & Olivier op cit 427£.
5) See above 125.
6) See above 283.
7)
Mathews v YCunr 1922 AD 492, SOS; Govt of RSA v Ngubane 1972(2) SA 601 AD 606.
8)
ef Hoffa NO v SA Mutual Fire & Gener~l Insurance supra 952;
Van der Merwe & Olivier op Clt 210£.
9)
Union Govt v Warneke 1911 AD 657, 662; Nochomowitz v SANTAM
Insurance Co (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 718 (T) 721.
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The Roman-Dutch law jurists were not faced with the harmful conse-
quences arising from publications by mass media like the press, radio
and television, and there is much to be said for the view that such
organizations should be held liable for sentimental damages without
proof of intention on ~heir part. 1) The increasing threat· to pri-
vacy by the press in an over-crowded and ever-expanding society seems
to warrant the introduction of strict liability for invasions of
privacy by them2) even though the plaintiff does not suffer patri-
monial loss. The elimination of the requirement of intention by the
wrongdoer for a successful action for invasion of privacy by the press
would obviate the difficulties caused by the recent trend of the
courts to favour the subjective test for animus injuriandi. 3) The
press should be able to raise the traditional defences which rebut
the wrongfulness of their conduct,4) but not those which negative
animus injuriandi. 5 )
4. Conclusion
The common law development of the right to privacy in South
Africa has been inhibited by statutory provisions which give the
State wide powers to interfere with the liberty of the individual for
ideological reasons. 6) It is true that the European Convention on
Human Rights recognizes that the State may interfere with the right as
"is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country".7)
Ibid.
Cf HR Hah10 & E Kahn South Africa: The Development of its Laws
and Constitution (1960) 797; JD Van der Vyver Die Beskermin~ van
Menseregte in Suid-Afrika (1975) 84ff. See above 12, 178, 37.
7) Article 8(2). See above 108.
1) See above 169.
2) SA Strauss, MJ Strydom & JC Van der WaIt Die Suid-Afrikaanse Pers-
~ (1976) 258f. See above l57f.
3) See above 152.
4) See above 159.
5)
6)
5 United States Code §SS2 a (Supp 1976). See above 68.
Cf Manitoba Personal Investigations Act, SM, 1971, c 23; British
Columbia Personal Information Reporting Act, SBC, 1973 c 139·
Ontario Consumer Reporting Act, So, 1973, c 97; Nova Scotia Con-
sumer Reporting Act, SNS, 1973, c 4; Saskatchewan Credit Reporting
Agencies Act, 5S, 1972, C 23. See above l22f.
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Nonetheless South Africa cannot be regarded as a "democratic society",
and much of its racial and security legislation goes beyond what is
acceptable in the Western democracies. 1)
On the other hand, as in the United States 2) and other countries
where the right to privacy has evolved in the common law,3) South
African law has been unable to safeguard the individual adequately
against the collection of information in data banks by the pUblic4 )
and privateS) sectors. While the common law remedies may be adequate
once the individual discovers that he has become the subject of an
offensive invasion of privacy, in most cases he is not aware that his
privacy has been invaded. 6) There is a need for legislation to con-
trol the collection and dissemination of data bank information in
both the public and private sectors. A useful precedent for the con-
trol of the former is to be found in the United States Privacy Act,7)
and for the regulation of the latter in the legislation of the Cana-
dian Provinces. 8)
1) The racial and security laws in South Africa conflict with almost
every article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to
which the country is not a signatory. Cf I Brownlie Basic Docu-
ments on Human Rights (1971) 106. See above 12, 178, 337, 37S.
2) See above Slff.
3) Cf Federal Republic of Germany, see above 84ff; France, see above
96f£; other Ruropean countries, see above 108f£.
4) See above 285.
S) 6See above 28 .






In the light of the above analysis of the wrong of invasion of
privacy in South Africa it is submitted that the following conclu-
sions may be drawn:
(1) Social scientists see the right to privacy as the right to con-
trol 'over one's "information preserve,,1) and "a status of personal
dignitY",2) while an invasion of privacy is "an immoral affront to
human dignity".3)
(2) The wrong was accommodated under the actio injuriarum in Roman
law and many of the injuriae previously regarded as referring to
reputation or chastity are analogous to the modern concept of inva-
sion of privacy.4)
(3) The broad principles of the developed Roman action were re-
ceived into Roman-Dutch law. 5)
(4) Although the Roman and Roman-Dutch law wrongs also referred to
injuries to reputation or chastity the common factor linking most of
them was interference with dignitas. 6)
1) E Goffman Relations in Public (1972) 63. See above 3.
2) OM Ruebhausen & OG Brim "Privacy and Behavioural Research" (1965)
65 Columbia LR 1184, 1189. See above 7.
3)
E Shils "Privacy: Its Constitution
Law and Conternp Problems 289, 306.
4) DJ McQuoid-Mason "Roman Law and the
NULR 277. See above 18.
5) See above 41.
6) CF Amerasinghe Aspects of the Actio
(1966) 176, 190. See above 43.
and Vicissitudes" (1956) 31
See above 186 n 5.
Right to Privacy" (1976) 1





(5) The modern action for invasion of privacy developed in the
United States,l) but it has also been recognized in several European
countries 2) and enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights.
3
)
(6) The action in South Africa has generally been recognized as
falling under the actio injuriarum as an impairment of dignitas. 4)
This approach accords with that of the social scientists, but it has
been suggested that privacy is independent of dignitas. 5)
(7) Invasion of privacy has not been clearly defined by the courts
in South Africa; but where it falls under the actio injuriarum the
plaintiff must usually prove the essential requirements of animus
injuriandi~) wrongfulness') and impairment of personality.8)
(8) Where, however, the invasion of privacy is perpetrated by the
press the plaintiff need not prove animus injuriandi,9) and the defen-
dants may only escape liability if they can raise a defence which
establishes the lawfulness of their conduct. lO )
1) See above 51ff.
2) Cf Federal Republic of Germany, see 'above 84ff; France, see above
96ff; other European countries, see above 108f£.
3) Article 8(2). See above 108.
4) Cf O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244
(C) 249; Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957 (3) SA 461
(W) 467f; Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 370 (W) 373; Rhodesian
Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (RAD) 594.
See above 185.
5) J Neethling Die Reg of Privaatheid'(1976) 380. See above 184 .
6) Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 185f, 192f; cf Neethling
Privaatheid op cit 380. See above 147.
7) Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 183.
8) Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 182.
9) SAUK v O'Ma11ey 1977 (3) SA 394 ,(AD) 407.
10) See above 169. But cf Amerasinghe Actio Injuriarum op cit 197f.
374.
(9) An action may lie for negligent invasion of privacy if the
plaintiff can prove patrimonial 10ss,1) which has been extended to
include damages resulting from emotional shock.
2
)
(10) Privacy is essentially a natural desire which is "primarily
designed to protect the feelings and sensibilities of human beings,,3)
and does not apply to ~rtificial persons,4) which should rely on some
other remedy.5)
(11) Invasions of privacy usually take the form of intrusions
6
) or
publicity7) and in both instances individual privacy is being further
threatened by the increasing use of data banks in the pUblic8) and
private 9) sectors.
(12) The activities of private investigators and security guards should
be controlled by legis1ation,10) which should also prohibit the un-
authorized importation, manufacture, sale or delivery of monitoring
equipment. 11)
For instance defamation (RG McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971)
181; NJ Van der Merwe & PJJ 01ivier D1e onrefmatige Daad in die
Suid-Afrikaanse Re 2 ed (1970) 348) or un~aw ul trade compet1t10n.
n & Bra street t) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau
a e Pt Lt 196 SA 209 CC) 218; Qude Meester Group Ltd v
Ste11en osc W1ne Trust Ltd 1972 (3) SA 152 CC) 160; Victor Pro-
ducts fSA) Pty Ltd v Lateulere Manufacturin (Pt Ltd 1975 (1) SA
961 (W 965. See genera 1y Mc erron De11ct op C1t f; Van der
Merwe & 01ivier op cit 330; HJO Van Heerden Grondslae van die .
Mededinginasreg (1958) 258. See above 280. Therefore 1n the case
of industr1al espionage (cf Sunday Times Magazine 25 September 1977)
the injured party may bring an action for unlawful competition.
Where, however, somebody's office or telephone is "bugged" the
individual concerned may sue for invasion of privacy.
1) See above 366.
2) Cf Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1973 (1)
SA 769 (AD) 777f. See above 367
3) Un'iversiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films 1977 (4) SA 376 (T)
384. See above 278f.
4) Ibid.
5)
6) See above 198. 7) See above 246.
8) See above 285. 9) See above 286.
10) Cf Rhodesia: Private Investigators and Security Guards (Control)
Act of 1977. See above 216f.
11) Cf B v D Van Niekerk "Unplugging the Bug, or the Right to be Let
Alone in Criminal Law - Some Reflections" (1971) 88 SALJ 171. See
above 217.
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(13) The~Aata bank threat could be met by legislation to regulate
the activiits's of public1) and private 2) agencies.
(14) Privacy in South Africa has been further eroded by the mass
of racia1 3) and security4) legislation which has been introduced to
enforce the government's policy of separate development.
(15) Apart from the data bank threatS) and the numerous statutory
interferences6) with individual liberty, South African common law is
flexible enough to provide protection against most of the categories
of invasion of privacy recognized in the United States 7) and else-
where. 8)
(16) The utility of the action in South African law has not yet been
fully realized, particularly as an alternative to defamation,9) the
. f .. . . 10) d··· f 1uncertaIn wrong 0 InJurIa per consequentlas, an InJurIous a se-
hood. 11 )
1) State agencies could be subject to legislative safeguards as pro-
vided for in the United States Privacy Act of 1974 (5 United States
Code §552 a (Supp 1976); See above·59d) or in the Cerman Land
Hessen Data Protection Act of 1970 (Act 1 7 October 1970;--$ee
above 94).
2) The proposed South African Credit Agreements Bill (B85-'77 (1977))
could include provisions similar to those in the English Consumer
Credit Act of 1974 (see above 81) , or the American Fair Credit
Reporting Act (see above 64 , or the Canadian legislation (see
above l22f. Such legislation should not only control the nature,
accurac* and accessibilitr of the information stored but also re-
quire t e data bank agenCIes to notify the persons concerned that,
information profiles have been opened on them.
3) Cf JD Van der Vyver Die Beskerming van Menseregte in Suid-Afrika
(1975) 84f£. See above 12, 178, 337, 375.
4) ef AS Mathews Law! Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971) 54ff.
See above 207, 24 •
5) See above 283.
6) See above 177, 337f, 370£.
7) See above 55£f.
8) Cf Federal Republic of Germany, see above 84ff; France see above
96ff. For other European countries, see above 108f£. '
9) See above 348 .
. 10) See above 351.
11) See above 361.
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